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Abstract and Keywords 
This thesis evaluates the development of surveillance-based undercover policing in Victorian 
England through an examination of the first centralized police detective force in the country, 
the Detective Department of the London Metropolitan Police (1842-1878). It argues that the 
Detective Department overcame British fears that detective police were incompatible with 
individual liberty and parliamentary democracy, making the English detective a familiar and 
reliable public servant. The Detective Department, which worked from Scotland Yard, was 
formed in 1842 in response to criticism that the Metropolitan Police was unable to 
successfully investigate homicide. This was a surprising development in a country where 
property crime had always spurred developments in criminal justice. London’s newspapers 
played a key role in the creation of this detective force by creating a murder scare and 
demanding that the Metropolitan Police devote more specialized attention to complicated 
investigations, including homicide. The new detective force remained small to protect the 
police from accusations of spying. Since murders were infrequent, the new detectives 
devoted most of their attention to property crime, especially theft. During the 1860s and the 
economically depressed 1870s, detective priorities reflected a government crackdown on 
forgery and fraud, crimes that threatened the paper economy upon which Britain’s industrial 
and mercantile power rested. Detectives also regularly worked for the Home Office to help 
supplement limited investigative machinery in the counties. Scotland Yard detectives 
routinely travelled throughout England helping local magistrates investigate felonies ranging 
from homicide to arson. Scotland Yard’s close relationship with the Home Office was unique 
in England and resulted from London’s lack of municipal authority. For this reason, 
Metropolitan Police detectives often acted as agents of the British government, especially 
when they monitored foreign nationals and refugees that arrived in England following 
European revolutions in 1830 and 1848. Detectives’ non-felony work for the Home Office, 
which also included evaluating naturalization applications and performing extraditions, offers 
a new perspective on Victorian detectives and their cases that current historiography 
neglects.  
Keywords: detectives; police; England; newspapers; surveillance; white-collar crime; 
homicide; extradition; naturalization; spies.  
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Preface 
The English public has always had a fraught relationship with detective policing. Since 
March 2014 the London Metropolitan Police (Met)1 has faced several accusations that 
undercover police officers abused their position as government agents. In March 2014 The 
Guardian and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that several officers 
infiltrated protest groups and developed romantic relationships with female members. The 
operatives worked for the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS)2 during the 1980s, though the 
women only discovered that their lovers were police officers in 2012. One officer, Bob 
Lambert (married and a father) fathered a child with a female activist, only to abandon her 
and the child two years later when he was pulled from the operation. She received a £425,000 
settlement from the Met in October 2014 and, though she was far from the only woman 
romantically entangled with an undercover policeman, is the only one to have come forward 
with a child born of the union.3 
These allegations came just as another undercover officer was accused of spying on the 
parents of Stephen Lawrence, a young black man murdered in London in April 1993. In June 
2013 former undercover officer Peter Francis (also part of the SDS) told The Guardian that 
                                                 
1
 The Metropolitan Police are also referred to colloquially as the Met and Scotland Yard, the latter being the 
name of the Met headquarters in London and the most common shorthand for describing the metropolis’s police 
services. The modern acronym is the MPS or Metropolitan Police Service.  
2
 “The SDS was a top secret squad within Special Branch, operational from 1968 to 2006. It specialised [sic] in 
the long-term undercover deployment of officers into a range of groups that had the potential to cause serious 
public disorder or other violence or injury.” Mark Ellison, QC., “The Stephen Lawrence Independent Review: 
Possible corruption and the role of undercover policing in the Stephen Lawrence Case, Summary of Findings,” 
prepared for the House of Commons, 6 March 2014, 20, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/287030/stephen_lawrence_revie
w_summary.pdf; Rob Evans, “Special Demonstration Squad: unit which vanished into undercover world,” The 
Guardian, 24 July 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jul/24/special-demonstration-squad-
undercover-unit-analysis. 
3
 Daniel Boffey, “Scotland Yard in new undercover police row,” The Guardian, 8 March 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/08/scotland-yard-undercover-police-row; June Kelley and 
Dominic Casciani, “Met pays £425,000 to mother of undercover policeman’s child,” BBC News, 24 October 
2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29743646; Dominic Casciani, “The undercover cop, his lover, and their 
son,” BBC News Magazine, 24 October 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-29743857. None of the 
officers were charged with misconduct for participating in undercover romantic relationships. Rob Evans, 
“Undercover officers will not be charged over relationships with women,” The Guardian, 21 August 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/aug/21/undercover-officers-relationships-women-not-charged.  
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his superiors ordered him to find “dirt” on the Lawrence family to discredit claims that the 
murder was racially motivated and to shield the Met from scandal. During the mid-1990s, 
Francis and several other officers supplied the Met with information about anti-racism 
groups, especially those “campaign[ing] for justice over the death of Lawrence.”4 The same 
Bob Lambert who fathered a child with an activist in the 1980s was, by the late 1990s, a 
detective inspector involved with the campaign to infiltrate advocacy groups in the Lawrence 
case. An independent review published in March 2014 condemned SDS placement of a “spy 
in the Lawrence family camp” as “wrong-headed and inappropriate.”5  
Most recently, animal rights demonstrator Geoff Sheppard accused a former SDS officer of 
inciting him to commit a crime that resulted in a four-year jail sentence. Sheppard claims he 
was targeted by SDS operatives Bob Lambert and Matt Rayner, who “‘deliberately 
encouraged him to take more serious direct action’ and to commit crimes he had been 
initially unwilling to carry out.” Sheppard is one of numerous campaigners challenging the 
legitimacy of their convictions on the basis of police perjury, of whom fifty-seven have 
recently had their sentences overturned because police and prosecutors “frequently 
conceal[ed] key evidence gathered by undercover operations.”6 
In the wake of these scandals, Home Secretary Theresa May announced a public inquiry into 
undercover policing and suggested that police corruption had become so egregious that the 
                                                 
4
 Rob Evans and Paul Lewis, “Police ‘smear’ campaign targeted Stephen Lawrence friends and family,” The 
Guardian, 24 June 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/23/stephen-lawrence-undercover-police-
smears. 
5
 Mark Ellison, QC., “The Stephen Lawrence Independent Review: Possible corruption and the role of 
undercover policing in the Stephen Lawrence Case, Summary of Findings,” prepared for the House of 
Commons, 6 March 2014, 23, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/287030/stephen_lawrence_revie
w_summary.pdf. 
6
 Rob Evans, “Activist’s conviction to be quashed after undercover officer testified at trial,” The Guardian, 23 
June 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/23/activist-conviction-quashed-undercover-police-
officer. See also, Rob Evans, “Undercover police spy accused of encouraging activist to crime,” The Guardian, 
4 December 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/dec/04/undercover-met-spy-animal-rights-
overturn-conviction-appeal; Rob Evans, “Activists to appeal against convictions over involvement of police 
spy,” The Guardian, 7 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/07/activists-appeal-
convictions-involvement-police-spy; Rob Evans, “Prosecutors improperly withheld crucial evidence from trial 
of protestors,” The Guardian, 10 June 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/undercover-with-paul-lewis-
and-rob-evans/2015/jun/10/prosecutors-improperly-withheld-crucial-evidence-from-trial-of-protesters.  
 xiv 
 
criminal code would be updated to include ‘police corruption’ as an offence separate from 
‘misconduct in public office’.7 
The current debate about the place of undercover work in England is strikingly similar to 
nineteenth-century concerns about the legality and legitimacy of detective policing. The 
“deceitful human interaction” that characterizes much undercover policing is why England 
was one of the last European states to officially sanction detectives as part of its criminal 
justice system.8 Whereas post-Napoleonic Europe was a highly policed – and politically 
policed – society, England in 1815 had no centralized police force and only a handful of 
proto-detectives operating in London. The first centralized police force was the London 
Metropolitan Police, founded in 1829, yet the Met lacked a detective branch before 1842 
because of popular hostility towards government surveillance. The 1829 Metropolitan Police 
Act, cautiously, only applied to London and the geographical extension of this model was 
haphazard and slow. Only in 1856 did the government compel English counties and boroughs 
to establish centralized and professional police forces. When the Met’s Detective Department 
was established at Scotland Yard in 1842, it was the first police detective force in all of 
England. Its foundation ushered in the early years of detective and surveillance-based 
policing that has reached its apex in the twenty-first century. The men who staffed this 
branch and their life’s work are the subjects of this thesis.9  
In the following discussion, I argue that the men of the Detective Department demonstrated 
to the English public and the government that detective policing could be an English 
institution. Far from acting, as feared, as a political police, Scotland Yard detectives actively 
                                                 
7
 “Stephen Lawrence police ‘spy’ prompts public inquiry,” BBC News, 6 March 2014 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26466867); Rob Evans and Paul Lewis, Undercover: The True Story of 
Britain’s Secret Police (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 2013).  
8
 This phrase is taken from Mark Ellison, QC., “The Stephen Lawrence Independent Review: Possible 
corruption and the role of undercover policing in the Stephen Lawrence Case, Summary of Findings,” prepared 
for the House of Commons, 6 March 2014, 20, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/287030/stephen_lawrence_revie
w_summary.pdf. 
9
 For the purpose of this thesis, detective policing is considered any investigatory policing done out of uniform, 
particularly undercover and surveillance work. In this way, detective policing is separated from beat policing, 
which is done in uniform, on a distinct path, to prevent crime. I will refer to the Detective Department as the 
Detective Department, Scotland Yard and the Yard interchangeably. 
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investigated felonies such as murder, theft, fraud and forgery, while also becoming an 
investigatory arm for an increasingly busy Home Office. Throughout this early era of 
detective policing, the Detective Department established a climate of tolerance for detective 
work and laid the foundation for the expansion of undercover policing after 1878, including 
the creation of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Special Branch and MI5.  
 
 
1 
 
1 Introduction 
The following section contextualizes our discussion of detective policing by describing 
the basic units of law enforcement, and, briefly, outlining relevant reform debates in the 
years before the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829. Following the 
historical background is a historiographical discussion of criminal justice literature 
indicating that early detective policing in the Met is a neglected subject and one worthy 
of historical attention. The subsequent sections describe my intentions in this thesis and 
outline the discussion to follow.  
1.1 The English Criminal Justice System 
From the medieval period to the early nineteenth century, English criminal justice relied 
on severe penal legislation to deter crime and a small body of officials to enforce the law. 
Governments under William and Mary, Anne, and the Hanoverians passed over two 
hundred capital statutes, most of them for property crime, to dissuade offenders from 
breaking the law.1 England relied on the threat of death, rather than a comprehensive 
policing system, to prevent crime and, when the deterrent effect of such harsh penalties 
was unsuccessful, law enforcement stepped in.   
Policing was a local affair involving parochial officials, constables and night watchman 
to prevent crime and apprehend offenders. Local constables, contrary to modern 
standards, did not patrol. The position of constable was a part-time unpaid job, which, by 
the eighteenth century, was often performed by deputies.2 Constables were responsible 
for the night watch and for raising the hue and cry but they rarely investigated offences. 
                                                 
1
 Capital offenses ranged from sheep stealing, forgery and petty theft to poaching, burglary and murder. 
For a detailed description of the development of the so-called ‘bloody code’, see J.M. Beattie, Crime and 
the Courts in England, 1660-1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), chapters 3 and 4. 
2
 Increasingly, traditional candidates for the position of constable (merchants, tradesmen and farmers) 
outsourced the responsibility to paid deputies. Deputies were of lower social status than the original 
nominee and performed the job for money instead of, as was historically the case, out of a sense of duty. 
The 1715 Riot Act and a 1735 act for fining constables who neglected to raise the hue and cry attempted to 
reinforce the importance of the constable to the administration of criminal justice. T.A. Critchley, A History 
of Police in England and Wales 900-1966 (London: Constable, 1967), 29. 
2 
 
Night watchmen did not patrol and remained stationary in watch boxes but could, like the 
constable, be called upon to respond to an incident. The onus of investigation and 
prosecution lay with the victim; if a constable or watchmen apprehended a criminal, they 
encouraged the victim to prosecute.3 Prosecution was an expensive affair, however, and 
many victims neglected to charge offenders for pecuniary reasons.4 The most senior local 
law enforcement officials were the justice of the peace and magistrates, which were 
voluntary positions held by local gentry. This pattern of local amateur office holding was 
peculiarly English and protected against “an over-strong central executive encroaching on 
the ‘liberties’ of the English landowner.”5  
As historian David Philips notes, the English criminal justice system - local and amateur 
–  “was designed for, and worked mainly in, the small units of pre-industrial England – 
rural parishes, villages, market towns.”6 It could not handle the population growth and 
increasing urbanization that characterized the eighteenth century, especially in London. 
By the 1750s, this system was under attack by reformers who argued that a severe 
criminal code and limited local law-enforcement were inadequate.7 One forceful critic of 
                                                 
3
 England had no system of public prosecution until the late nineteenth century. Until then, the state 
prosecuted serious threats to the government, such as riot, sedition and threats to the Hanoverian 
settlement. J. M. Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, 1660-1750: Urban Crime and the Limits of 
Terror (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 384. Victim and accused were first brought before 
magistrates who could adjudicate misdemeanours summarily. In felony cases, magistrates took depositions 
and then bound over the prosecutor, accused and any witnesses for trial at the next sessions of the criminal 
courts. Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 270.  
4
 After 1690, English governments began to offer rewards for successful criminal prosecutions. Valued at 
£40, they helped defray the cost of trial. John Beattie estimates that the average prosecution could cost 
between 10s and £1. Victims were required to pay for witnesses, warrants for the accused, recognizance 
fees for all witnesses bound over for trial, indictments, the officer who swore in witnesses, the bailiff and 
the crier. Ibid., 41-48.  
5
 David Philips, “‘A New Engine of Power and Authority’: The Institutionalization of Law-Enforcement in 
England 1780-1830,” in Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western Europe since 1500, 
eds. V. A. C. Gatrell, Bruce Lenman and Geoffrey Parker (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1980), 
160. 
6
 Philips, “The Institutionalization of Law-Enforcement in England,” 159. 
7
 Some commentators, such as criminal law reformer Samuel Romilly, argued that the severe criminal code 
actually encouraged crime. Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration 
from 1750, vol. I (London: Stevens & Sons, 1948), 318. For a discussion of the eighteenth-century reform 
3 
 
the existing system was Henry Fielding, chief magistrate at Bow Street magistrate’s court 
in London. His 1751 pamphlet An Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of 
Robbers argued that local policing and victim prosecution were insufficient for the needs 
of the growing metropolis.8 Finding that many victims were unable or unwilling to hunt 
down those who robbed or assaulted them, Fielding established a small group of men to 
apprehend offenders.9 The ‘Bow Street Runners’, as Fielding’s men soon became known, 
were a private initiative and his detective force was unique in England. Local justices, if 
willing, had many opportunities for independent action, though Fielding was unusually 
dedicated to detecting and prosecuting offenders. England’s intense localism, however, 
also meant that Fielding’s experiment was confined to London.10 Fielding’s Runners 
grew to include preventive patrols spread across London, especially along perimeter 
roads. The creation of this small force marks the beginning of formal detective policing 
in the country.11 Aside from the Runners in London, the rest of the country relied on 
constables and night watchmen to prevent crime and the detective capabilities of the 
criminal justice system remained limited.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
movement, see Ibid., volume I. Romilly’s argument was based on the fact that juries were often unwilling 
to proffer a guilty verdict for crimes they did not believe deserved the death penalty. For example, 
offenders charged with minor larcenies were saved from the gallows when juries undervalued the goods 
stolen to 39s, or just under the £2 minimum for a capital larceny. Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 424. 
8
 The War of Austrian Succession ended in 1748 bringing large numbers of demobilized soldiers to 
London. John Beattie’s research has shown that prosecution rates were highest following wars. This was 
true of 1713, 1733, 1748, 1763, and 1815. Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 216-219. 
9
 J. M. Beattie, “Sir John Fielding and Public Justice: The Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, 1754-1780,” Law 
and History Review Vol. 25, No.1 (2007): 62.  
10
 The Runners, did, however operate outside of London. See David J. Cox, A Certain Share of Low 
Cunning: A History of the Bow Street Runners, 1792-1839 (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2010). Cox is 
also discussed towards the end of section 1.2.  
11 The Bow Street Office was closed and its work amalgamated with the Metropolitan Police in 1839. 
Elaine A. Reynolds, Before the Bobbies: The Night Watch and Police Reform in Metropolitan London, 
1720-1830 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 152. 
4 
 
Reformers intent on police centralization had to tread a careful line because English 
landowners jealously guarded the power wrenched from the crown in the Glorious 
Revolution. Gentry dominance of local justice ensured their independence from the 
executive and they vigilantly guarded against any erosion of these rights and liberties. 
Police reform after 1750 was hampered by widespread distrust of executive power – 
closely associated with France and the spy networks run by Richelieu, Mazarin and 
Fouché (Napoleon’s minister of police).12 Executive control of policing was a 
particularly sensitive topic and kept reform at bay for decades. Public fear of a policeman 
state cannot be overemphasized. It was visceral, widespread and triumphed for decades, 
even in the face of serious threats. The Gordon Riots, for example, which raged 
throughout London in June 1780 and left 700 dead and nearly £100,000 of property 
damage (including numerous prisons and magistrates’ homes) were not enough to 
convince the public or the House of Commons that the city might require a more 
coordinated police apparatus. The government had to call in 12,000 soldiers to quiet the 
burning metropolis, a move that further exacerbated rhetoric against government 
repression. As Stanley Palmer explains, “Englishmen considered unconstitutional not 
only the police but the very institution that had saved the metropolis from destruction,” 
the army. Official solutions in the wake of the riots remained rooted in localism.13  
Seven years after the Gordon Riots, the Pitt government introduced a bill to combine 
London’s various parochial forces (including the City of London) into one unified body. 
The plan would have superimposed a centralizing apparatus upon existing parochial 
policing and introduced new, far-reaching powers of “search, seizure, and social control.” 
The government managed the bill poorly in the House of Commons and was unable to 
deflect attacks from MPs fearful of a Parisian-style police, while the furious Lord Mayor 
who would not hear of the City of London losing its traditional independence. Defeated 
                                                 
12
 See chapter 6 for a discussion of European political policing and espionage.  
13
 Stanley H. Palmer, Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780-1850 (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 88. Because riot-control was a magisterial responsibility, much of the 
criticism of London policing in the days after the Gordon Riots focused on the city’s magistrates for not 
properly enforcing the Riot Act. Reynolds, Before the Bobbies, 62. 
5 
 
in London, the police bill was instead applied to Dublin. The government majority in the 
Irish parliament helped the bill’s passage there, as did the frequency of riots and the high 
level of interpersonal violence that characterized Irish public disorder. Opposition to the 
bill, though unsuccessful, again relied on rhetoric against a government police force as a 
“‘foreign’ and ‘unconstitutional’” concept.14 
Following the failed 1785 London and Westminster Police Bill, the next attempt to 
improve London policing was more measured, reforming an existing body of local 
justice: London’s magistrates. The 1792 Middlesex Justices Act rested upon the Bow 
Street model where stipendiary magistrates managed local justice and also commanded a 
group of paid constables for preventive patrolling, especially against violent crime. Seven 
police offices were established throughout London staffed by full-time salaried 
magistrates and a complement of forty-two constables. The Act acknowledged the 
success of Bow Street’s patrols in prevention and apprehension and of its magistrates in 
encouraging prosecutions.15 The 1792 Act created an institutionalized network of police 
offices throughout the metropolis. While not radically reforming criminal justice in 
London it did draw the government more directly into supporting the preventive model. 
Significantly, it also provided salaries for magistrates and officers, a departure from 
centuries of voluntarism. 
Further reform of London’s police was not considered again until 1811, when a series of 
brutal murders along the Ratcliffe highway in Wapping threw London into panic. Two 
families were found with their throats cut and their heads crushed on December 7 and 19, 
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 The bill replaced the government’s reliance on the militia to keep order in the city. Military occupation 
was a poor long-term solution in the Irish capital because locals and the militia disliked each other and the 
army, dedicated to anti-riot duties and also to protect public buildings, had no involvement in local policing 
matters. The new Dublin Metropolitan Police, modeled unabashedly on the Paris police, replaced parochial 
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Protest, 101 and 89-102. 
15
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trend began with rewards statutes in the 1690s and support for Bow Street and its officers in the mid-
eighteenth century. Ibid., 166.  
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1811. A variety of individuals were arrested on suspicion, including several Portuguese 
sailors and Irishmen, the unfortunate victims of traditional suspicion of foreigners and the 
Irish. When a viable suspect was at last detained, he hanged himself in police custody.16  
In the wake of the Ratcliffe murders the public blamed the night watch for failing to 
prevent the tragedy. Shortly thereafter, a bill was floored to reform the watch, setting 
numbers of watchmen and frequency of patrols while also giving the new stipendiary 
magistrates overarching control.17 Parochial authorities in London objected to the 
expense while “Whig fears of an over-mighty executive” were leveled against the bill in 
the House.18 Although the bill sought to improve not innovate, and shied away from 
government control, suspicion of the proposed amendments, even in the face of brazen 
violence, remained pervasive. The social standing of the victims and the location of the 
murders help explain why these shocking killings resulted in little legislative change. 
Marr was a linen-draper and Williamson a publican and both carried on their businesses 
in Wapping, a rough area in the east along the Ratcliffe highway, one of London’s main 
access roads. John William Ward expressed the now famous opinion that introducing 
‘French-style’ police would hardly ameliorate crime in such a bad neighbourhood and 
would not be worth the cost to individual liberty. His response is worth quoting in full:  
I am inclined to suspect that it is next to impossible to prevent outrages of this sort 
happening in those parts of the town that are inhabited exclusively by the lowest 
and most profligate wretches in the nation, except by entrusting the magistrates 
with powers vastly too extensive to be prudently invested in such hands. They 
have an admirable police at Paris, but they pay for it dear enough. I had rather half 
a dozen people’s throats should be cut in Ratcliffe Highway every three or four 
                                                 
16
 Seamen were suspected because the first victims, the Marr family, had their throats cut by a ripping 
chisel traditionally used by a ship’s carpenter. Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, vol. I, 315-323. 
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 Reynolds, Before the Bobbies, 99.  
18
 Reynolds, Before the Bobbies, 100-101. 
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years than be subject to domiciliary visits, spies, and all the rest of Fouché’s 
contrivances.19  
As David Philips notes, “It was easy enough for the future Earl of Dudley, who was 
unlikely ever to be found – dead or alive – in such an insalubrious neighbourhood as the 
Ratcliffe Highway, to make this generous offer of other people’s throats for the 
cutting.”20 But Ward’s feelings do represent the depths of English distaste for anything 
smacking of French policing, anything centralized and, especially, anything government 
controlled. The 1812 Night Watch Bill, like the London and Westminster Police Bill of 
1785, fell victim to pervasive localism.21 
In 1816 a committee was established to re-investigate London’s policing following the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars and the subsequent rise in crime that followed 
demobilization.22 The Report reinforced the sacredness of local authority in the face of 
government control. While lauding the principles of preventing and detecting crime, the 
Report stated unequivocally that “the difficulty is not in the end but the means…in a free 
country…such a system would of necessity be odious and repulsive.”23 In response, 
Home Secretary Lord Sidmouth augmented the number of officers attached to London’s 
magistrate’s courts, including the creation of ninety patrolmen in the suburbs (a 
‘dismounted patrol’) to protect the outskirts of the city.24 
                                                 
19 Quoted in Philips, “The Institutionalization of Law-Enforcement in England,” 174.  
20
 Philips, “The Institutionalization of Law-Enforcement in England,” 174. 
21
 Reynolds notes that contemporaries recognized the Gordon Riots and the Ratcliffe murders as unique 
events and did not see the sustained necessity for major legislative change as a result. Reynolds, Before the 
Bobbies, 101-102.  
22
 For a discussion of the relationship between war and property crime, see Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 
213-235. 
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 Third Report from the Committee on the State of the Police in the Metropolis (1818), 32.  
24
 Beattie, First English Detectives, 232-234. 
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A more sustained effort at police reform came with Robert Peel, who became the new 
home secretary in January 1822 as part of Liverpool’s newly reshuffled cabinet. Peel had 
served as chief secretary in Ireland from 1812 until 1818 and had made significant 
changes to policing in that fraught corner of the British Isles. As in England, the army 
was called in during serious unrest, and the militia, Yeomanry and army formed the basis 
of Dublin Castle’s arsenal in case of serious disturbances. Yet in a nation where public 
unrest and violence were routine this was insufficient, especially since “the militia 
appeared unreliable, the Yeomanry was troublesome, and the army was irritable and 
overworked.”25 To help quell disorder Peel created a flying squad of riot police called the 
Peace Preservation Police that Dublin Castle might use anywhere in the country as 
necessary. These ‘Peelers’, as they became known, were deployed in ten Irish counties 
between 1814 and 1818.26  
Peel’s experience in Ireland affirmed his belief that central control of police was essential 
for public order. He had a uniformed day patrol added to Bow Street’s other preventive 
patrols but his zeal for police reform – and unification of London’s disparate elements in 
particular – was not widely felt. Detective work was discredited in the 1820s during an 
intense period of debate about police reform in the metropolis. Under Peel, two select 
committees met during the decade to establish what measures might improve the safety 
of life and property in London. The first, reporting in 1822, lauded Bow Street’s 
preventive policing; the committee deemed Bow Street’s foot patrol (1783), horse patrol 
(1805), and dismounted foot patrol (1821) the most “effectual” method of preventing 
crime in and around the metropolis.27 Conversely, suggestions “for facilitating the 
detection of crimes” were considered too dangerous. The committee felt strongly that 
                                                 
25
 Palmer, Police and Protest, 198. 
26 There were also objections to the Peelers, mostly based upon cost. Palmer, Police and Protest, 214 and 
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officers could not and should not be trusted with “those extended powers, and that wide 
latitude of discretion” necessary to detect criminals.28  Police officers required strict 
supervision, an impossibility with undercover police work. 
In 1828 Peel established another select committee on police reform in London. The 
object of this new investigation was to determine the causes of a perceived increase in 
crime in London, as well as the efficacy of the city’s policing arrangements. Peel was 
alarmed by crime statistics that, he believed, forecasted a great threat to order and 
stability in the capital. He was also concerned about how to police the outer parishes of 
London, many of which had neither a history of organized policing nor sufficient taxation 
to fund it.29 Using Bow Street officers as an example, the committee warned that 
detective policing was dangerous. They thought Runners’ complicity in compounding 
felonies was proof that detectives were less accountable than uniformed officers.30 “A 
regular system to facilitate them [compounded felonies],” the Report argued, “has 
gradually been maturing.” Moreover, the financial incentives of compounding felonies 
also gave Bow Street Officers “an interest in not detecting crimes.”31 Overall, the Report 
denounced detective policing as disgraceful, corrupt and fundamentally inappropriate for 
England’s greatest city. By the 1820s, much of London’s parochial police apparatus was 
far more professionalized than it had been in the eighteenth century. But professionalism, 
based mostly on improved organization and coordination of night watches, was still 
directed towards preventing crime through the use of beat systems.32 Preventive practices 
remained the framework for policing in late Georgian London, and the Metropolitan 
Police tried – at least publicly – to maintain this focus between 1829 and 1842.  
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Although Bow Street’s detective function was in disrepute, its patrols were, according to 
Peel, just what London needed. To convince the House of Commons that centralizing 
London’s police apparatus (and the associated expense) was worthwhile, Peel extolled 
the successes of Bow Street’s patrols, particularly the Horse and Day Patrols, in 
combatting criminal behaviour.33 What better example demonstrated “the advantage of 
having an efficient, vigilant, and well-regulated patrol, both by night and day, controlled 
by one authority, and acting under one head”?34 Here was a model of centrally controlled 
preventive policing that might appeal to a skeptical parliament. Peel’s focus on 
prevention was the culmination of a paradigm shift in British criminal justice that began 
in the 1780s. John Beattie identifies this transition, from a prosecutorial to a preventative 
criminal justice framework, beginning after the end of the American War and 
accelerating after Napoleon’s 1815 defeat at Waterloo. Postwar crime waves, 
characterized by theft – and highway robbery in particular – challenged preventive 
theorists’ belief that harsh penalties deterred crime.35  
Peel introduced his Metropolitan Police Bill to the House of Commons on April 15, 1829. 
It was the fruition of his belief that crime – and property crime in particular – was an 
escalating problem in London and that the solution was centralization and 
professionalization of police resources for the ever-growing metropolis. Two Irishmen, 
Richard Mayne, a Dublin lawyer, and Charles Rowan, an army colonel, were selected as 
commissioners of police to oversee a force of nearly 3,000 officers. The new 
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 Foot patrols began at Bow Street in 1792, the brainchild of magistrate Sir Sampson Wright, who used 
them to guard London’s perimeter roads. In 1805 and 1822 further patrols were established: a horse patrol 
to more effectively combat highway robbers and a day patrol to offer protection on the streets during the 
day. The horse patrol consisted of mounted patrolmen (many recruited from the cavalry) to protect travelers 
from highway robbers. Beattie, The First English Detectives, 143-145 and 176.  
34
 Commons Sitting of Wednesday April 15, 1829, House of Commons Hansard, Second Series, Volume 
21, col. 883.  
35
 National policing took much longer to establish and was only achieved in 1856, though there were 
earlier attempts. David Philips and Robert D. Storch, “Whigs and Coppers: The Grey ministry’s national 
police scheme, 1832,” Historical Research Vol. 67 (1994).  
11 
 
Metropolitan Police District they oversaw covered a four to seven mile radius from 
Charing Cross and contained seventeen police divisions.36 
Historians have struggled to explain how, in the face of sustained opposition to 
centralized policing, Peel was suddenly able to maneuver his Metropolitan Police bill 
through parliament in 1829 with little opposition. David Philips proposes that the public 
was startled by commitment statistics that suggested an extraordinary increase in crime. 
This worry plagued minds already preoccupied with fears of revolution after nearly 
fifteen years of political and industrial unrest.37 John Beattie argues “Contemporaries 
believed they were experiencing a serious crime problem in the 1820s” and that Peel 
himself was motivated by his concern about the negligible policing on the outskirts of the 
growing city. Peel relied heavily on evidence from the 1828 committee about minimally 
policed parishes when presenting his bill to parliament.38 Elaine Reynolds argues that 
many traditional objections to centralized policing had diminished by the 1820s, by 
which time many of London’s parishes had professional forces. Criticism instead turned 
to corrupt and inefficient local government officials, including magistrates and their 
officers.39 The truth probably involves all of these reasons to some degree. To usher his 
bill through the House, Peel had to be confident that the twin shibboleths of British life – 
localism and liberty – (or what David Ascoli less sympathetically terms “English bloody-
mindedness”) had less power than they hitherto had.40 An Establishment for whom the 
French Revolution was not quite out of mind was also skittish in the face of industrial 
unrest, Catholic emancipation, Irish troubles and criminal returns that suggested an 
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unusually high number of criminal committals. Peel himself is an important consideration 
and his experiences in Ireland and as home secretary lent authority to his concerns when 
he expressed them to parliament. London’s parochial police had also come a long way 
since the eighteenth century and, as Reynolds notes, probably did much to allay fears that 
professionalization would not compromise liberty.  
After the establishment of the Metropolitan Police, Bow Street officers continued to 
investigate crime, although many of their patrolling functions were absorbed by the Met 
between 1829 and 1836.41 This parallel system of policing (unusual given Peel’s stress on 
unification) meant that detection remained in the hands of police court officers, not 
Metropolitan Police officers, until 1839.42 Indeed Rowan and Mayne assumed that the 
ten-year overlap with Bow Street ensured that the Met remained strictly preventive.43 
This was not entirely the case, however, as many constables in the Metropolitan Police 
worked undercover to detect crimes, a function that expanded significantly after the 1839 
Metropolitan Police Act finally eliminated Bow Street’s police function.44 Shortly 
thereafter, in the wake of a public scandal about murder investigations by the Met, a 
Detective Department was established at Scotland Yard that became the central detective 
branch for the Met and England. Following another scandal in 1877/78, the Detective 
Department was reorganized into the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), which it 
remains today.  
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My thesis examines the activities of the Detective Department in its early to mid-
Victorian years, arguing that the Department established detective policing as a 
necessary, acceptable and even English institution, paving the way for the creation of the 
security services.45 I have used the 1842 and 1878 scandals to bookend this discussion 
because they helpfully divide this first era of detective policing from the subsequent 
generation of late-Victorian and Edwardian detective and anti-terror organizations.  
1.2 Historiography 
Until recently, pre-1880 detective policing has garnered limited attention within the 
historical community, remaining peripheral to a historiographical tradition focused on 
uniformed police services and the development of late Victorian and Edwardian anti-
terror and anti-spying organizations Special Branch and MI5.46 The earliest work on 
policing and justice in England revolves around the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act as a 
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benchmark for discussing the efficacy of policing institutions. For historians in this 
whiggish tradition, police history is one of institutional development and 1829 a 
watershed year. The underlying assumption is that modern and centralized police forces 
are the most effective way to enforcing the law and these historians herald the evolution 
of British policing from voluntary and parochial to salaried and centralized as a triumph 
over the ineffectiveness of local government.  
One of the earliest, and most fundamental, histories of English criminal justice is Leon 
Radzinowicz’s A History of English Criminal Law. Covering the years between 1750 and 
1914, Radzinowicz’s five-volume compendium (1948-1986) traces the evolution of 
British criminal justice through penal policy, legislative reform and policing. 
Radzinowicz’s work connects eighteenth-century reform ideas with nineteenth-century 
parliamentary policy and ends with the establishment of the ‘new police’ in the mid-
nineteenth century as well as late-Victorian and Edwardian criminology and penal 
policy.47 The underlying assumption in Radzinowicz’s history is that English policing 
before 1829 was weak and disorganized. He contends that parochial resistance to 
centralization was the result of “tradition, inertia, local jealousies, class distrust and fear 
of tyranny” and that effective law enforcement was only, finally, realized through greater 
government control.48 He sees eighteenth-century reform debates, criminal law reform in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century, and the policing reforms of 1829, 1835, and 
1856 as linear developments. Reformers such as Henry Fielding, Patrick Colquhoun, 
Jeremy Bentham, Samuel Romilly, Sir Robert Peel and Edwin Chadwick are each 
presented as participants in the slow inexorable march towards rational bureaucratic 
organization of the criminal justice system. Radzinowicz’s evaluation of police practice, 
although immaculately detailed, ends after the establishment of the new police in the 
mid-nineteenth century and does not evaluate the progression of police services after this 
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date. Though his conclusions have been subjected to significant revision, A History of 
English Criminal Law remains a foundational text in criminal justice history.49 
Radzinowicz’s contemporary Charles Reith likewise celebrates 1829 as the birth of 
modern British policing, condemning eighteenth-century local and central government 
for failing to effectively police the nation.50 He argues that rising crime levels and 
population growth in the eighteenth century incapacitated parish constables and that, 
from the Glorious Revolution to the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act, England was 
characterized by the “almost complete absence of any effective law enforcement 
machinery.”51 Reith blames this on the English government’s “foolish” reliance on the 
deterrent effect of the criminal code.52 He credits five individuals with making necessary 
reforms to the criminal law: reformers Henry Fielding, Patrick Colquhoun, and Robert 
Peel, as well as London’s first police commissioners, Charles Rowan and Richard 
Mayne, commending the first three with rationalizing the criminal law and the latter two 
with enforcing it.53 Reith’s dismissal of eighteenth-century parochial policing as 
ineffective ignores important debates and experimentation that took place in these years.  
In The Queen’s Peace, published twenty years later, David Ascoli supports Reith’s 
assessment of pre-1829 policing; as London grew in population and wealth, he argues, 
the old constabulary system and the watch and ward organized by parish vestries 
struggled. Ascoli traces the development of the Metropolitan Police from 1829 until 
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1979, arguing that the metropolis brought with it metropolitan-sized problems, straining 
established methods of safeguarding public order. The centralized and professional 
Metropolitan Police were a necessary corrective to “the corruption of the magistracy, the 
insularity of the vestries, and the growing lawlessness of the English people, most 
notably in the Metropolitan area.”54 He credits Rowan and Mayne (who served in tandem 
from 1829 until 1850, when Rowan’s death left Mayne as sole commissioner) with 
placing the Met on firm footing with the public.55 The commissioners also benefited from 
a good working relationship with the Home Office, especially in the 1840s with Peel as 
prime minister and Lord John Russell as home secretary. Both politicians supported 
police reform and, under Russell, the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act and 1839 Rural 
Constabulary Act provided opportunities for centralizing police services throughout the 
country.56 Under Peel and Russell’s directorship, the Detective Department was formed. 
Ascoli offers a judicious examination of the Metropolitan Police, with a special focus on 
commissioners and their relationships with their superiors at the Home Office.57  
In 1967, T. A. Critchley shifted the focus away from the Metropolitan Police and towards 
local policing. He takes a long view, beginning in the medieval period and ending in the 
1960s. The local constable was the single dominant figure in local law enforcement from 
the 1285 Statute of Winchester until the late eighteenth century, when the prestige of the 
position declined.58 Until 1829, constables were the only parochial officials with powers 
of arrest.59 Critchley highlights developments in provincial policing, policemen’s 
working lives and twentieth-century developments. He rejects Reith and Ascoli’s claims 
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that the eighteenth century was un-policed. By 1828, he argues, “a substantial corps of 
professional full-time officers already existed in London,” indicating that local vestries 
were far from disinterested in their policing responsibilities.60  The real significance of 
1829 was that it separated the executive and judicial functions of the magistracy, 
responsibilities Critchley criticizes eighteenth-century governments for not dividing 
earlier.61 The true pinnacle of Victorian police reform, in Critchley’s estimation, was the 
1888 Local Government Act, which established joint councils, separating executive and 
judicial power in the counties as 1829 had in London.62 In A History of Police in 
England, Critchley moves the discussion of English police away from individual police 
services and towards local government.  
Radzinowicz, Ascoli, Reith and Critchley all highlight the institutional development of 
English criminal justice and chronicle a long road towards centralization. With the 
exception of Critchley, there is little in this scholarship to identify what happened in 
practice. Looking exclusively at government policy sidelines local experience and 
initiative and obscures variety in parish responses to policing issues. Over the past several 
decades, historians have revised these interpretations. Instead of writing sweeping opuses 
covering hundreds of years, the following historians isolate more specific areas deserving 
historical attention.  
John Beattie’s study of policing and punishment in the City of London during the 
eighteenth century challenges orthodox historians’ dismissal of eighteenth-century 
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criminal justice. He stresses the active nature of parochial government in London during 
this time. Street lighting, for example, was a significant boon to nocturnal safety; 
illuminating dark laneways, courts and alleys, especially during long winter nights, was 
an important preventive measure and helped the night watch police effectively. Local 
government Acts in 1662, 1695 and 1735 required householders to put out candle 
lanterns at night while a 1736 Lighting Act put public money (from ward coffers) toward 
ensuring that City streets were properly illuminated.63 The repeated focus on lighting 
demonstrates that London’s parochial authorities were dedicated to prevention. Beattie 
also highlights executive initiatives such as rewards to encourage prosecutions and state 
prosecutions for particularly serious crimes.64 
Although Beattie acknowledges that some of the City’s wards were poorly policed at 
night, he demonstrates that the night watch was not the impotent force Reith, 
Radzinowicz and Critchley assume. In 1663 Robinsons’ Act reaffirmed householder 
responsibility to participate in the night watch and established guidelines regarding hours 
and equipment.65 An Act of Common Council in 1705 set a minimum number of 
watchmen, ordered the construction of watch houses and fixed hours of patrol.66 Finally, 
in 1737, another Act of Common Council approved a local rate to pay night watchmen.67 
These plans indicate that local and central government bodies were aware of the crime 
problem and took steps to ameliorate the quality of nocturnal policing in the City of 
London.   
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Beattie’s extensive research on Bow Street magistrates Henry and John Fielding (John 
replaced his half-brother Henry when the latter died in 1754) also demonstrates how local 
authorities in the eighteenth century were able to improve local policing. John Fielding 
believed that strengthening and streamlining the administration of the criminal law would 
deter criminals.68 He based this system upon “rapid reporting by victims, a quick 
response by men capable of discovering and apprehending perpetrators, and effective 
action by the magistrates who were responsible for initiating criminal proceedings.”69 
John was an energetic magistrate who expanded traditional pre-trial procedures, holding 
regular hearings at his Bow Street office to encourage victims to report and prosecute 
criminal offenders. Bow Street’s principal officers helped victims locate criminals, 
distributed handbills with descriptions of stolen goods and canvassed pawnbrokers and 
second-hand shops.70 John also made use of the Public Advertiser to publicize thefts and 
descriptions of stolen goods, thieves and suspects. By skillful use of advertising and of 
the Runners’ detective abilities, he aided victim-prosecutors with “his capacity to frame 
and organize a strong and effective prosecution case.”71 John Fielding’s determination to 
support prosecutors and his success in securing government funds to help Bow Street 
operate demonstrate that criticisms of eighteenth-century criminal justice rely on a 
selective reading of material or an ignorance of parochial and magisterial activity.  
Another forceful critic of the first wave of criminal justice historians is Elaine Reynolds. 
Like Beattie, Reynolds reinvigorates the study of eighteenth-century policing. Her 
examination of the Westminster night watch from 1720 to 1830 refreshes our 
understanding of local government institutions that orthodox historians dismissed as 
hopelessly archaic. Before the Bobbies offers two correctives to whiggish narratives of 
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law enforcement in the metropolis. First, the decentralized nature of the Westminster 
night watch, she challenges, did not make it de facto inefficient. Early policing historians 
tend to assume that parochial officials rejected any and all attempts to professionalize or 
centralize. Instead, Reynolds demonstrates that local authorities were extremely 
concerned about local safety and actively petitioned the central government for more 
power to combat crime: the majority of Westminster parishes had obtained local Night 
Watch Acts before the nineteenth century. These Acts were not the result of utilitarian 
reform agitation nor were they devised by the central government.72 Night Watch Acts 
are strong examples of parochial desire to professionalize law enforcement and had little 
to do with the reformist ideas of Henry Fielding, Patrick Colquhoun, or Samuel Romilly. 
The second, related, revision Reynolds offers is that a decentralized police system is not 
necessarily unprofessional. As early as 1735, the parish vestries of St James, Piccadilly 
and St George, Hanover Square successfully petitioned the government for greater 
control over the night watch. The vestry obtained the power to appoint watch constables, 
determine the hours of patrols and levy additional watch rates to fund improvements.73 
Although the 1774 Night Watch Act was a government initiative to expand on the 
preventive function of the watch in Westminster, parish vestries had significant input 
because they were responsible for funding and implementing the legislation. By the final 
years of the century, Reynolds argues that watch committees were conscious of the need 
to maintain an efficient watch. Initiatives to improve accountability, qualifications, 
supervision and patrols mean that late eighteenth-century night watches “had evolved 
into police forces in the modern sense.”74 By the 1820s, several Westminster watch 
committees had twenty-four hour patrols, although not all were able to perform these 
functions due to expense. This point is crucial for Reynolds: where orthodox historians 
argue that fear of reform kept centralization at bay until the nineteenth century, she 
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asserts that the primary objection of parochial officials to centralization was the cost.75 
Reynolds does not see the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act as a watershed. Her 
investigation of the Westminster night watch in the century before 1829 demonstrates 
that Westminster had developed a strong body of local law enforcement, including 
twenty-four hour policing, before Peel’s bill went before the House of Commons.76 The 
debate from which the bill developed concerned policing in terms of centralization versus 
decentralization. Professionalization was no longer an issue because many areas of the 
metropolis were already policed professionally.77   
Ruth Paley also aims to demonstrate that policing in London before 1829 was not an 
“imperfect, inadequate and wretched system.” She concurs with Reynolds that local 
officials were not helpless in the face of crime and stresses the importance of judging 
eighteenth-century crime and public order by eighteenth-century standards: 
“contemporaries, who had never experienced anything other than a vibrant street culture, 
almost certainly perceived order and disorder in very different terms.”78 Although there 
was no citywide coordination within London, “watch committees were nevertheless 
anxious to copy models of good practice, and they looked to each other for advice and 
information on the best ways to improve their service to ratepayers.”79 This system 
functioned adequately unless jurisdictional issues arose. Paley suggests that the Wilkite 
and Gordon Riots broke out because both sets of magistrates for the dual jurisdiction of 
Moorfield were unable to coordinate themselves.80  In ordinary circumstances, however, 
the system was sufficient to the everyday needs of law enforcement.  
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Paley’s primary concern is magisterial reform. Whereas Radzinowicz argues that the 
1792 Middlesex Justices Act – which established a salaried magistracy within London – 
was part of an extension of central control into local government, Paley contends that, 
although the Act ultimately strengthened central government authority, it was actually 
intended to increase the power of magistrates to administer justice locally.81 
Radzinowicz, Critchley and Reith argue for a palpable reform movement beginning in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, while Paley contends that there was no climate of 
reform. She argues that Henry Fielding and Patrick Colquhoun had little influence on 
government policy and that the 1829 Act was Peel’s work alone.82 Like Reynolds, Paley 
suggests that the Metropolitan Police bill was not revolutionary in terms of the efficiency 
of the force or the men employed. If anything, she concludes that policing after 1829 was 
initially much worse than it had been under local control.83 Rather, the true significance 
of 1829 was constitutional, institutionalizing total central control of London’s police and 
daytime patrols.84  
The focus of all the works considered so far is overwhelmingly on policing London. 
Although Beattie, Reynolds and Paley offer significant revision to the orthodox historical 
tradition, they, too, neglect policing outside of the metropolis. Several historians have 
remedied this and, in doing so, have branched out from institutional history to the social 
history of the police. This historical tradition emphasizes the social and political impact 
of centralized policing on England’s cities and countryside, arguing for a class-based 
policing policy that used Victorian morality to combat urban and rural disorder.   
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Robert D. Storch characterizes Victorian law enforcement as a “a bureaucracy of official 
morality.”85 By the nineteenth century, elites were far less tolerant of urban disorder than 
their eighteenth-century counterparts and Storch contends that heightened social and 
political tension in the 1840s was the crucible for “new agencies of social discipline.”86 
This expedient was most urgent in the north, where Chartist activity and industrial unrest 
strained local authorities. Storch’s assessment of policing provincial England between 
1850 and 1880 indicates that the social and moral discipline meted out by the new police 
was at odds with many traditional working-class recreations, especially “gambling, illegal 
drinking, brutal sports, and prizefighting.” Constables monitored public gatherings, 
drinking establishments, theatres, sports and prostitution through constant surveillance 
and suppressed certain public festivals. Since outright repression was unenforceable so 
the police relied instead on surveillance and selective enforcement.87 The emergence of 
new police in the industrial north often sparked violent resistance and Storch isolates 
several instances when rioters violently attacked policemen, but cheered when the army 
was called in. Locals preferred the army to the police for quelling riots because they 
believed the police were intent on physical brutality.88 Working-class preference for the 
army over local constabularies indicates pervasive distrust of police. Inclination towards 
the army may also reflect the fact that it was rarely used, whereas the police were 
involved daily in stamping out traditional working-class recreational activities. Policemen  
brought the arm of municipal and state authority directly to bear upon key 
institutions of daily life in working-class neighbourhoods, touching off a running 
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battle with local custom and popular culture which lasted at least until the end of 
the century.89 
Resentment towards the new police took various forms. In Coventry, policemen were 
criticized for having better clothes than their working-class counterparts and for putting 
on airs.90 Labourers also expressed their discontent with the police through personal 
violence; Storch argues that throughout the nineteenth century policemen were beaten for 
“interfering too closely in family or neighbourhood affairs…providing escort for 
strikebreakers…or moving people on too forcefully.”91 The new police in urban 
industrial England enforced the official morality of the Victorian government but at the 
expense of alienating themselves from other members of the working class.  
David Philips’ 1977 investigation of law enforcement in the ‘Black Country’ between 
1835 and 1860 also maintains that class relations were at the heart of policing industrial 
England. The unique social landscape of this area of southern Staffordshire was devoid of 
a middle class or landed gentry. As a result, industrial entrepreneurs filled the ranks of 
the local magistracy, meaning that the same men who employed the local population also 
oversaw law enforcement.92 Before 1835, the region had no police force but by 1860 the 
Black Country contained four forces totaling 262 men.93 Like other revisionist historians, 
Philips points to continuity before and after the establishment of new police forces in 
provincial England, stressing the continued importance of the parish constable.  Because 
new police forces were small, the parish constable remained an important member of the 
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community and continued to arrest offenders until the 1870s.94 When change did come to 
provincial forces, it was as a result of the 1856 County and Borough Police Act, which 
compelled counties to establish provincial forces. In the Black Country, this translated 
into larger forces, the result of inspections by the government to ensure efficient 
policing.95 Philips notes an increase in public order prosecutions after 1856, especially 
against public entertainments such as animal baiting.96 
Carolyn Steedman similarly argues that England’s new police forces reinforced Victorian 
social hierarchy; constables and their families had to adhere to strict codes of discipline 
while the new police themselves were part of “a local system of control and 
management” that coopted working-class constables into “disciplining much broader 
sections of working-class communities.” Victorian policemen, she asserts, were always 
“agents rather than actors.”97 Police ranks also reinforced social distinctions, with recruits 
drawn from labouring backgrounds while their superiors hailed from the lower middle 
class.98 Magistrates intended provincial police to be active enforcers of the criminal law 
and to perform other administrative duties. Police constables inspected weights and 
measures, monitored the vagrant poor, acted as poor law relieving officers, enforced 
liquor licensing legislation, and upheld government acts, such as the 1875 Unadulterated 
Foods Act and the Public Health Act.99 This variety of duties reinforced the constable’s 
position in “the management and control of populations.”100  
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Steedman’s work uncovers a high rate of dismissal and resignation among the new 
police.101 Many officers quit because of difficult working conditions. Policemen worked 
seven days a week without rest, were required to be in uniform off-duty, had to attend 
weekly church services, were forbidden to participate in traditional working-class 
recreations, such as gambling, drinking, smoking, and could not attend fairs. Pay was low 
and wives were barred from remunerative employment.102 At work, policemen enforced 
the social and moral policy of the Victorian state while their clothing, comportment, 
leisure and family life were under similar scrutiny by superiors. A policeman’s life was a 
balance between the difficult task of enforcing standards of behaviour and morality on 
other members of his community and maintaining strict adherence to the rules imposed 
upon him. Many were unable to conform.  
Writing in the 1990s, Stefan Petrow likewise sees the police – in this case the 
Metropolitan Police – and the Home Office promoting a dual policy of moral reform with 
a particular emphasis on recidivism, prostitution, drinking and gambling in the capital. 
What he terms “the coercive or punitive state” used “the law in general, and in particular 
the criminal law under central direction, to regulate, marginalize, or suppress social 
behaviour of various kinds which seemed to threaten order and morality.”103 Powerful 
interest groups, such as the National Vigilance Association, kept moral issues in the press 
and lobbied parliament to crack down on vices threatening the health, morality and 
productivity of Britain’s labourers.104 By the 1870s a substantial Home Office and 
Metropolitan Police bureaucracy jointly enforced public order in the metropolis. 
Although bureaucrats – alarmed by statistics – advocated increasingly extreme levels of 
state control, politicians and police officials realized the impracticality of strictly 
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enforcing all moral legislation, especially those acts relating to prostitution and the 
consumption of alcohol. Nonetheless, Petrow stresses “the erosion of individual liberty in 
the late-Victorian and Edwardian years.”105 
Several historians question the utility of the class control or moral reform approach to 
police history. Stanley Palmer suggests that we should look not at moralizing but at 
public order to understand police development. Moral and social control were maintained 
through various forms of “citizen self-policing,” including societies for the reformation of 
manners, local policing and voluntary peacekeeping initiatives, while the new police 
focused on disorder.106 Although rioting was a regular feature of English protest 
movements, the 1830s was a decade of particular concern. The combined threats of the 
Swing Riots (1830), Chartism and widespread condemnation of the New Poor Law 
(1834) pressured the government to pass the 1839 County Police Act to restore order to 
the provinces.107 Yet, the development of English policing was piecemeal and remained 
heavily decentralized. Even the 1856 County and Borough Police Act left constabularies 
under local control, with government intervention only to “make the new police system 
relatively uniform and efficient.”108  
Palmer is one of the few historians to look closely at Irish policing, arguing that Ireland, 
not England, was the site of real police innovation.109 The Irish police was militarized 
and centrally controlled by 1840, Dublin, not London, had the first centralized urban 
police force (founded over forty years before the Met), and pan-Irish county forces were 
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established in 1822.110 In Palmer’s estimation, the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act is only 
considered a watershed in English police history because most historians completely 
ignore Ireland, “the theatre for innovations in police in the British Isles.”111 
Victor Bailey also questions how much we should see the police as enforcers of social 
morality. Focusing on late-Victorian London, Bailey argues that historians must step 
away from institutions to see how communities policed themselves. Social order in 1890s 
East London was influenced by “a complex combination of informal family and 
community sanctions, the mixed welfare of charity and state support, the new board 
schools, slum clearance, and the negotiated justice of the police courts.”112 While the 
police certainly played a role in the prevention and detection of crime, the social fabric of 
communities remains an important, and neglected, factor in explaining the decline of 
theft and violence after 1850.113 
Clive Emsley, one of the foremost police historians (and the son of a police officer) also 
cautions against viewing the police of industrial England as an instrument of class 
oppression. After 1850, he notes that the historian is just as likely to find instances of 
working-class Englishmen and women soliciting police help to solve domestic disputes 
or locate missing children. “Many members of the working class,” he argues, “also 
sought respectability and desired orderliness and decorum.”114 Police responsibility for 
maintaining public order, however, did often put them at odds with working-class 
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industrial grievances, especially when it came to strikes in the years preceding the First 
World War. Public order was the raison d’être of the Victorian Bobby.115  
Haia Shpayer-Makov takes class analysis of the police further by presenting the police 
itself as a labour organization. She argues against revisionist historians, such as Beattie 
and Reynolds, who contend that 1829 was not a decisive break with the past. Ignoring 
law enforcement, Shpayer-Makov claims that the development of the Metropolitan Police 
after 1829 was a complete break with past labour practice, providing a modern approach 
to labour relations.116 Shpayer-Makov’s description of the average policeman, his 
reasons for joining the force, and his experiences differ little from those analyses offered 
by Steedman and Philips. But, unlike those historians, Shpayer-Makov claims that the 
new police force was not a tool of social control but part of a trend of “improvements in 
public services.”117 Social control was exercised within police ranks. Employers 
practiced a ‘bureaucratic paternalism’ that combined the aristocratic value of hierarchy 
and enforced compliance with middle-class notions of “rational management.”118 This 
structure relied on strict selection of applicants, practical and theoretical training, rewards 
for good service, and the possibility of promotion. By the late nineteenth century, social 
services, pensions, and competitive exams were also part of the organizational structure 
of the force.  Police strikes in 1872 and 1890 resulted in pay raises and pensions, 
activities that lead Shpayer-Makov to argue that policemen saw themselves as members 
of a labour force, which, by the late nineteenth century, had a “professional identity.”119 
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Many of the historians discussed above downplay the significance of detective policing in 
nineteenth-century England, if the subject is mentioned at all.120 Most assume that the 
early and mid-Victorian Metropolitan Police was a preventive force with limited 
detective capabilities. Radzinowicz argues that the Metropolitan Police sometimes used 
detection to ferret out dissident political groups but that undercover policing was 
otherwise limited and plainclothes police employed “only with the utmost caution.”121 
Critchley dismisses detective policing before 1878 as “the Cinderella of the police 
services” and, like many orthodox historians, accepts wholeheartedly that the 
Metropolitan Police was a preventive force for most of the nineteenth century.122 
Likewise, Stanley Palmer heralds a “de-emphasis on detection” beginning in 1829.123 
Others skip over early and mid-Victorian detection to focus on the late-Victorian CID. 
This later period understandably draws significant historical attention because it includes 
the development of Special Branch, the Jack-the-Ripper murders and the nascent MI5 
and MI6.124 But what of detectives earlier in the century?  
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One of the earliest to identify the significance of detective policing is Philip Thurmond 
Smith, whose Policing Victorian London concerns the short period between 1850 and 
1868 when Richard Mayne was sole commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. The 
English detective system never reached the level of professionalization that existed on the 
Continent, yet, Smith contends, “Surveillance, nevertheless, was a fact of life in the 
Metropolitan Police and played an important part in mid-Victorian security.”125 Smith 
identifies detectives’ importance watching foreigners and Fenians and helping enforce 
Sunday trading legislation. Yet, throughout, Commissioner Mayne “subordinated police 
efficiency to constitutional and political considerations.” Although critics of the 
Metropolitan Police feared that it might be used for state espionage, Smith demonstrates 
that, in reality, “The Victorian bobby may have been portrayed frequently as a figure for 
ridicule but almost never as a figure of terror.”126  
Several more recent publications bring detection before – indeed well before – 1880 into 
historical focus for the first time. J.M. Beattie’s The First English Detectives establishes 
the Bow Street Runners as England’s first organized detective force, illuminating the 
Runners’ activities in London and Bow Street’s relationship to police reform between 
1750 and 1840. In 1849 Henry Fielding established a small group of men to hunt down 
violent robbers and bring them to justice. He had been pressed into action by the property 
crime wave that followed the end of the War of Austrian Succession and his initiative and 
willingness to experiment influenced London policing for nearly a century afterwards.127 
Although the Runners began as a way to help locate offenders and stolen property and to 
assist victims with prosecutions, they soon developed a wider portfolio that included 
investigations in the provinces, security for the royal family and work for the home 
secretary rooting out seditious groups and foreigners during the tense 1790s and 1800s. 
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Bow Street’s Runners were, Beattie argues “detectives in all but name.” Their popularity 
waned after 1815, ironically, following a post-war crime wave similar to the one that 
spurred Henry Fielding into action in 1749. The cultural and political climate was 
different in 1815 than it had been in the mid-eighteenth century, however, and “What was 
required, it became clear in this post-war world, was a more effective preventive 
strategy” based around a centralized police force that focused on patrolling to prevent 
crime. Decision-makers at Whitehall espoused a vision of a “more strictly controlled and 
a more moral police force,” a vision that excluded Bow Street.128 The First English 
Detectives isolates an initial period of detective policing in England and Beattie, with this 
strong grasp of contemporary politics, ably demonstrates how the Runners adapted to 
new policing demands in the metropolis until, ultimately, the climate of police reform in 
the 1820s and 1830s heralded the disintegration of these important early experiments.  
While Beattie specializes in the Runners’ metropolitan work, David J. Cox explores their 
provincial investigations. Cox’s study of 600 cases investigated by Bow Street principal 
officers between 1792 and 1839 indicates that murder, arson, damage to property and 
larceny were the most common cases investigated by Runners outside the metropolis, 
although they also investigated robberies, burglaries and frauds.129 Hiring a Bow Street 
officer brought experience, expertise and, importantly, impartiality to an investigation in 
an era when local constables and members of the watch were volunteers with strong 
community ties. Local law enforcement often lacked the Runners’ skills and, at times, 
were unable or, especially in the case of violent offences, unwilling, to conduct 
exhaustive investigations.130 This was especially true between 1792 and 1820, when 
Runners investigated sedition and political unrest for the Home Office.131 
                                                 
128
 Beattie, First English Detectives, 224 and 259.  
129
 Cox, A Certain Share of Low Cunning, 105. 
130
 Cox, A Certain Share of Low Cunning, 207 and 105-110. 
131
 Cox, A Certain Share of Low Cunning, 88 and 121-122. 
33 
 
Together, Beattie and Cox illuminate the hitherto neglected world of Bow Street’s 
detective officers in the years before the Met’s Detective Department was formed. Haia 
Shpayer-Makov continues the discussion of detection after Bow Street in The Ascent of 
the Detective: Police Sleuths in Victorian and Edwardian England. Her analysis begins 
with an historical overview of detective policing from Bow Street until the First World 
War, while the second half of the book describes how detectives were represented in print 
media and the effect this had on public perception of detective policing. Her central aim 
is to determine how, by 1914, English detectives emerged as “a central figure in the 
gallery of English archetypes,” having been transformed over the course of the nineteenth 
century from “menacing figure to national celebrity.”132 Industrialization, urbanization 
and exponential population growth contributed significantly to this change by inflaming 
long-simmering social and political issues. Urban over-crowding combined with political 
radicalism frightened the Establishment and made the maintenance of public order 
paramount in the minds of lawmakers and law enforcers. The press, too, was essential to 
this transformation. As the “central mediator between detectives and the public,” English 
newspapers, especially the conservative press, consistently upheld the importance of 
detective policing to the maintenance of law and order and helped portray police 
detectives as necessary public servants. This was especially true in the 1880s when 
Fenian bombings brought Irish political unrest home to England.133  
The Irish threat in the 1880s, followed closely by Indian nationalism, socialism and trade 
unionism, suffragette protests, and pre-First World War German spy scares spurred the 
expansion of political policing within Britain. Bernard Porter traces this development 
between 1881 and 1914 in The Origins of the Vigilant State. Until the 1880s, Porter 
argues, Victorians were satisfied that, with the Chartist threat abated, they had little to 
fear from homegrown political agitation. The 1867 Reform Act, too, alleviated any 
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significant political tension in the mid-Victorian period.134 With “the pure unadulterated 
milk of mid-Victorian liberal self-confidence,” Britons could look across the channel at 
European unrest safe in the knowledge that they had no such revolutionary movements 
with which to contend. Detective policing before the Fenian bombing campaign was, 
Porter suggests, in a state of innocence, an innocence he finds “impressive…[and] just a 
little myopic.”135  
The Irish Republican Brotherhood enacted a bombing campaign between 1881 and 1885 
to force the British government to grant Irish Home Rule. Bombs detonated at the Salford 
Barracks (1881); The Times’ offices, Whitehall, and several Underground stations and 
Scotland Yard (1883); and the killing of Thomas Burke and Lord Frederick Cavendish in 
Phoenix Park, Dublin (1882) shattered this complacency. Attempted bombings of London 
Bridge (1884) and the House of Commons (1885) further emphasized the seriousness of 
the threat. In response, the CID formed an Irish Branch (Section B) in 1883, headed by 
Chief Superintendent Williamson (a former Detective Department man), which was 
followed shortly by the creation of Special Branch (Section D), which also had a former 
Detective Department alumnus at the helm, Detective Chief Inspector John Littlechild. 
Special Branch was a significant departure from traditional policing practice because it 
was answerable to the Home Office only, not the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. In 
this way, Special Branch was conceived as a “national political police” with a special 
focus on anarchists, Fenians, socialists and trade unionists.136  
Smith, Beattie, Cox, Shpayer-Makov and Porter all isolate significant periods of detective 
policing within the history of English criminal justice, though none focuses exclusively 
on the first detective force within the Metropolitan Police. Although Smith is one of the 
only historians to investigate the significance of Scotland Yard’s detectives in monitoring 
foreign nationals, his decision to focus on the years from 1850 to 1868 neglects the 
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crucial decades in which the Detective Department was formed, the 1840s, and the 1870s, 
when it was dissolved. In order to achieve a more holistic view of this first centralized 
detective force, I choose to consider all four decades of its existence during which 
Metropolitan Police detectives became a staple of English policing.  
By contrast, Shpayer-Makov’s The Ascent of the Detective covers a great deal of history, 
beginning in 1842, the year the Detective Department was founded, and ending on the 
eve of the First World War. This long span includes several detective groups within the 
Metropolitan Police, including the Detective Department (1842-1878), the CID (1878) 
and Special Branch (1887). The creation of the CID in 1878 marks an important moment 
in the history of crime detection in England because the Detective Department, although 
mired in scandal, had over the preceding four decades proved the utility of detective 
policing in an English context. By treating the period between 1842 and 1914 as one 
continuous period she ignores the significance of this early era in solidifying the 
reputation of detective policing and paving the way for the CID and Special Branch. Her 
focus on the print media demonstrates how important ‘good press’ was to this process, 
but one gains little sense of the content of an early Victorian detective policeman’s 
workload. Furthermore, although the book covers the period from 1842, most examples 
and statistics used are from the 1870s and later, making her work far less representative 
of the early and mid-Victorian era than it is of late-Victorian and Edwardian detective 
policing.  
1.3 Intentions 
My thesis has two primary goals. The first is to counterbalance a historiography of 
policing and surveillance weighted heavily towards policing done in uniform and late-
Victorian and Edwardian political policing. The second is to determine what mid-
Victorian detectives were actually doing and how they were doing it. Without an explicit 
understanding of how detective policing functioned in these early years, historians cannot 
adequately explain the sudden appearance of detectives in 1842, the consistent growth of 
the force and its responsibilities, or the rapid expansion of state security services in the 
1880s, the end of the period covered by my thesis.  
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Records of detective investigations are scanty in official files and only a few late-
Victorian detectives left memoirs. The paucity of obvious resources is a likely reason 
why the Detective Department has received little serious historical attention.137 I have 
relied heavily on the records of the Metropolitan Police and Home Office for operational 
details and to identify individual detectives, since no rosters for the force survive. I have 
also used the Old Bailey Proceedings Online to locate detectives in trial records and 
establish a benchmark for their felony investigations. Newspapers from London and the 
provinces have also proved indispensible. The Times’ trial reports in particular are some 
of the most detailed available for this period. 
My research contributes to the understanding of an understudied aspect of policing 
nineteenth-century England, a topic that has focused almost exclusively on the 
development of official uniformed police throughout England and the social and class 
repercussions of this extension of government power. The mid-nineteenth century was a 
revolutionary era in Europe and refugees flooded into England.138 It was also a period 
where the Home Office expanded its activity – largely into social welfare and policing of 
all kinds – and the Detective Department was a convenient and flexible institution used 
by the Home Office to offset its own increasingly burdensome responsibilities.139  
Foucault characterized the growth of European state power in the nineteenth century as 
“state control of the methods of discipline.” His seminal Discipline and Punish (1975) 
argued that eighteenth-century population growth and industrialization put pressure on 
governments to assert control over individual members. Although Foucault focuses on 
how modern prison and penal culture effected this desire, he makes special note of the 
development of the police in the nineteenth century, arguing that they helped the state’s 
                                                 
137
 Murder case files, however, have been mined extensively for use by trade authors. See, for example: 
Cobb, Critical Years at the Yard and The First Detectives; Lock, Dreadful Deeds and Awful Murders and 
Scotland Yard Casebook; Payne, The Chieftain; Summerscale, The Suspicious of Mr. Whicher. 
138
 See chapter 6, section 4.2.  
139
 Jill Pellew, The Home Office, 1848-1914: From Clerks to Bureaucrats (London: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1982), 3.  
37 
 
will to power through “permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance.”140 We need to 
be careful, however, about over-emphasizing state power and, in particular, the ability of 
the police to maintain constant and effective surveillance. Foucault’s prime example is 
France, where government and police differed dramatically from England. The French 
state was highly centralized and grew in size and influence over the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, reaching its apex during the Napoleonic period.141  
While Foucault identifies several broad themes about the growth of state power in the 
nineteenth century, he was a sociologist and primarily concerned with France. His 
assertions about a police state, in particular, fit uncomfortably into the realities of English 
political, institutional and social history. While it is certainly true that the English 
government had pretentions to more effective police surveillance and control, the English 
police, and the Metropolitan Police in particular, were hardly omnipotent. Victor Bailey 
challenges Foucault’s state-monopolization thesis through an examination of policing and 
society in London’s East End during the final decade of Victoria’s reign. Community 
control, he alleges, was asserted by, not on, the community and the Metropolitan Police 
presence in the East End was characterized by “hesitancy” and “intermittency.” “It is 
clear,” Bailey argues, “that working-class Londoners by the 1890s were willing to bring, 
and capable of bringing, some level of discipline to bear on their streets, whether to deter 
illegal activity or to manage numerous instances of anti-social behaviour, all without the 
recorded intervention of the police.”142 
My exposition of the activities of Scotland Yard’s detectives between 1842 and 1878 will 
not only reveal a new era of policing in England, but also a new era of governance. Under 
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the auspices of the Home Office, the work of the Detective Department reflects the most 
significant concerns of the government during a period of rapid population increase, 
cultural and administrative change, and social and political upheaval abroad. Scotland 
Yard’s detectives were employed in a variety of ways: to help manage crime in London 
and the provinces, to investigate and monitor foreign nationals, to oversee the extradition 
of criminals to and from England, to investigate cases of undetected crime, to enforce 
public order during major events, and to investigate the growing problem of white-collar 
crimes. The scope of their work indicates key shortcomings in the ability of a purely 
preventive police to properly survey the population and the steps taken by the English 
government to correct this. The expansion of government information gathering and 
surveillance is also something of a contradiction in an era known for laissez-faire 
principles in government.143 This was less the case in policing, however, because after 
1829 in London, and after 1856 in the rest of the country, the principle of central 
coordination and government involvement in police matters was accepted. The London 
Metropolitan Police, in particular, flouts the laissez-faire model because, for lack of any 
central governing authority, the police commissioners worked directly for the Home 
Office and the Met’s detectives often worked for the home secretary. 
The perceived need to monitor the population and the political ability to do so is a strong 
indication about changes in public opinion and government practice in the mid-nineteenth 
century. Public opinion is a notoriously difficult concept to apply to historical practice. 
Nineteenth-century state growth in England coincided with an enlarged electoral 
franchise that was opinionated and voiced its opinions through a vibrant newspaper press. 
The press is central to debates about public opinion because, as Habermas alerts us, 
parliamentary governments and their citizens negotiate power via the press. The literary 
bourgeois public in England used the relative freedom of the press to express, at times, 
“coercive force” while the lawmakers likewise saw newspapers as a forum to “legitimate 
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themselves” and their politics.144 For criminal justice historians, newspapers are key 
sources for crime reporting but also to gauge public feeling about government practice. 
Maintenance of public order is a significant government responsibility and the English 
press was vocal when it perceived shortcomings in government policy. To offer clarity, I 
restrain my use of the term ‘public opinion’ and try instead to portray ‘newspaper’ or 
‘press’ opinion, though there is obviously a good deal of the former within the latter.  
1.4 Outline  
The men of Scotland Yard’s Detective Department were the first police detectives in 
England. Their exertions on behalf of private victims and the English government helped 
overcome public skepticism about the use of detectives by the state and transformed 
police detectives into indispensible public servants and – in some cases – celebrities.145 
Understanding how police detectives worked and the climate in which they operated 
between 1842 and 1878 is crucial for understanding developments in policing, 
prosecution, and public order in nineteenth-century England. 
Although property crime was the principal focus of Victorian policing, murder had an 
effect on the public psyche out of proportion to its actual incidence.146 Chapter 2 explores 
the cultural climate of the late 1830s and early 1840s that led to a sea change in public 
opinion about who should investigate murder. Before the foundation of the Metropolitan 
Police in 1829, London’s coroners investigated suspicious death. Local press, however, 
advocated for greater police involvement in murder cases and newspapers paid close 
attention to the quality of police investigations. Several failed inquiries in the six years 
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following Victoria’s ascension to the throne resulted in significant negative press for the 
police and calls for a professional detective force. The Met and the Home Office 
acquiesced to this pressure and the new Detective Department was formed in August 
1842. This was an extraordinary volte face after nearly fifty years of anti-executive 
feeling and fears that a centrally controlled police would be used, as on the Continent, to 
spy on citizens and police their politics. Following the establishment of the new detective 
branch, property crime remained the greatest policing priority, although the new 
detectives were usually involved in murder investigations, especially if a case gathered 
press attention.  
Chapter 3 offers, for the first time, a concrete picture of who staffed the Detective 
Department and the details of their operational lives. The police commissioners recruited 
detectives from the uniform ranks, with a few additional men brought in from the public, 
based on alacrity and education. In an era where formal education was still unsystematic 
for working-class Britons, literacy and foreign language skills were in high demand in a 
police force that required constant written reports and interactions with people of varied 
backgrounds. Detectives learned on the job and, without advanced forensic techniques 
such as fingerprinting, relied on accumulated experience and information gathering to 
solve cases.  They were well compensated for their work and, after a promotion to the 
rank of inspector and above, could maintain a comfortably lower middle to middle-class 
lifestyle. Many detectives had challenging and rewarding working lives, receiving 
coveted promotions and retiring with pensions. 
Chapter 4 investigates detectives’ caseloads, based on their appearances in felony trials at 
London’s Central Criminal Court, the Old Bailey. A decade-by-decade breakdown 
indicates that detectives’ role as felony investigators evolved over time. Although the 
Detective Department was established in response to concerns about murder 
investigations, there were not enough murders to sustain their attention and London’s 
new detectives reverted quickly to investigating property crime during the 1840s. During 
the 1850s they branched out to provincial investigations on behalf of the Home Office 
and also trained divisional officers in detective and surveillance methods, resulting in a 
diminished detective presence at the Old Bailey during this decade. By the 1860s, 
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divisional men with detective training acted more independently of the central detective 
force, allowing Scotland Yard’s detectives to refocus on London crime. During the 1860s 
and 1870s government concerns about white-collar crime escalated and central detectives 
spent a great deal of time investigating forgery and fraud. Investigations into white-collar 
crime were time consuming and required the attention of a specialized and flexible force 
like the detective squad at Scotland Yard. 
The fifth chapter examines the spread of detective policing in the Met more broadly, 
arguing that that the Metropolitan Police was, from its inception, far more oriented 
towards detective policing than historians have acknowledged. Local superintendents 
regularly used plainclothes officers for official and unofficial duties. The commissioners 
approved the use of undercover officers to detect pickpockets and other thieves during 
significant state occasions, fairs, regattas and races. Also approved were detective-led 
night patrols to deter and detect burglars during long, dark winter nights. Less official 
was the use of planted men to monitor subversive groups and a significant scandal 
erupted when one undercover officer was found to have participated in Chartist political 
meetings and encouraged illegal activity. By mid-century, however, Police Commissioner 
Mayne was won over by the success of detective activity in London and authorized the 
use of undercover men in the divisions. These divisional officers became official 
divisional detectives in 1869, sanctioning a practice that had unofficially existed from the 
very earliest days of the Metropolitan Police.    
The final chapter examines Scotland Yard’s investigations for the Home Office, 
including the surveillance of foreign nationals and political dissidents. This was a new 
priority for the government in the wake of European revolutions in 1830 and 1848. 
Government concern focused on possible homegrown dissent but more immediately on 
waves of refugees, some highly politicized, who appeared on England’s shores in the 
1830s, 1840s and 1850s. Scotland Yard’s detectives monitored foreign nationals in 
England and on the Channel Islands to ensure safety and public order, often at the request 
of frantic European ambassadors. Detectives also helped a Home Office increasingly 
overburdened with legislative responsibilities by evaluating applications for 
naturalization. Officers’ information-gathering and language skills made them natural 
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choices to investigate applicants and their references so the Home Office could determine 
whether or not to grant citizenship. The government allowed detectives a great deal of 
discretion when it came to surveillance of foreigners and naturalization applications and, 
by relying heavily on detectives’ evaluations, gave Scotland Yard detectives a 
discretionary part in determining who was allowed to remain on British soil. Extradition 
was another complicated and laborious process with which central detectives helped the 
Home Office by executing extradition warrants, tracking offenders in England, on the 
Continent and in America, gathering witnesses, and extraditing offenders to and from 
Britain. The Detective Department quickly became an important force that the home 
secretary could use to alleviate intensifying pressure on his own office.  
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2 Investigating Murder 
This chapter examines the role played by murder in the creation of the Detective 
Department. Before 1829, property crime had been the traditional focus of both criminal 
justice legislation and local policing activity. After 1829, however, homicide, for the first 
time, became a police priority. The first half of the chapter considers who investigated 
murder, a crime not traditionally investigated by constables or even Bow Street.1 As 
evidenced – and fed by – the press, murder would assume a new, and not entirely 
explicable, prominence in the public imagination and began to dominate crime reporting 
in the early Victorian period.2  
The ostensibly preventive new police were expected to play a role in the investigation of 
this crime. This expectation especially appears to have been shared by the police 
themselves, resulting in conflict and something of a ‘turf war’ or jurisdictional battle 
between the new agents of law and order and the ancient office of the coroner that would 
span decades. Although murder comprised a minuscule fraction of metropolitan crime, 
press attention lent it an impact out of proportion to its incidence and placed significant 
pressure on the police to solve homicides quickly and diligently. Six murders perpetrated 
in the years around 1840, which received extensive reportage in London and the 
provincial papers, seemed to indicate a pattern of police incompetence. The final portion 
of this chapter investigates what went wrong in these investigations and how they led 
senior police and Home Office officials, spurred by negative publicity, to form a 
dedicated detective force, the first in Metropolitan Police history.  
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2.1 From Candlesticks to Cadavers?  
Threats to property drove the majority of developments in the criminal law from the late 
seventeenth century. Most of these changes involved the capitalization of property 
offences. In lieu of centralized police forces, the government relied on a severe penal 
code to deter criminals and the rewards system to encourage private citizens to apprehend 
and prosecute offenders. Beginning in 1692, several property crimes were capitalized and 
parliamentary rewards of up to £40 were offered for the detection and apprehension of 
offenders.3 Over the course of the following century a further two hundred offences 
(mostly against specific types of property) were capitalized. Cumulatively referred to as 
‘The Bloody Code’, this body of statutes was the culmination of a legislative mania to 
defend England’s new industrial and mercantile prosperity.4  
In the eighteenth century, Radzinowicz explains, “[t]he value of human life was … 
relatively small.” In a nation of shopkeepers it was the contents of the shop, not the life of 
the proprietor, that were of primary concern.5 The proliferation of capital statutes 
reflected a “[g]eneral sense of insecurity” in a country without “an effective police 
force.”6 In the capital, Henry Fielding, magistrate at Bow Street magistrate’s court, made 
property crime a priority. Fielding’s principal concern was the rising tide of robbery in 
London, caused by demobilization of the army following the War of Austrian Succession. 
Beginning in 1748, he gathered men (some with backgrounds as parish constables) to 
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help detect violent criminals and bring them to justice.7 Bow Street also pioneered a 
system of gathering and disseminating information about stolen goods using handbills 
and advertisements. Under Henry and John Fielding Bow Street struggled against 
property crime in the metropolis using detection and the skillful publication of 
information about stolen goods.8  
Property remained paramount in the minds of legislators, although criminal law reform in 
the first quarter of the nineteenth century de-capitalized many of the offences capitalized 
during the previous century. Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel styled his Metropolitan 
Police Improvement Bill to parliament in 1829 as a response to rising property crime 
rates in the metropolis. His statistics indicated that “housebreaking; cattle, horse, and 
sheep stealing; forgery and coining; robbery, larceny, embezzlement and fraud; and 
receiving stolen goods,” were on the rise and required a new organization to fight them.9 
The home secretary also worried about crime committed on the outskirts of the 
metropolis where parochial policing was less sophisticated.10 The new police were 
established to protect Londoners’ property but, once the new Bobbies began walking 
their beats, Londoners made it clear that they expected their new police to make homicide 
a priority.  
2.2 Murder: The Immediate Threat 
Murder fascinated Victorians. Their Georgian forebears’ appetite for the salacious details 
of crime, criminals and executions was prodigious and it is not surprising that the 
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Victorians retained a good deal of this heritage.11 From single-sheet broadsides printed to 
commemorate noteworthy crimes to the crime reports in lengthy Sunday papers, “the 
Victorian popular imagination was bloodier, much more explicit, and more angry and 
turbulent than historians have thus far been prepared to acknowledge.”12 In Georgian 
England newspapers, broadsheets, pamphlets and ballads publicized the details of 
notorious crimes, trials and executions. Executions were a particular source of public 
fanfare, especially the criminal’s procession from Newgate prison to Tyburn (near 
modern-day Marble Arch) for public hanging.13 Many celebrated eighteenth-century 
criminals were not murderers but thieves like thief and gaol-breaker Jack Sheppard 
(hanged 1724), thief-taker Jonathan Wild (hanged 1725) or highwayman and horse thief 
Dick Turpin (hanged 1739).14 Sheppard managed to escape from St. Giles’s Round-
House, New Prison Clerkenwell and Newgate (twice) before he was apprehended by a 
member of Wild’s thief-taking gang and hanged for burglary. Wild was himself hanged 
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for compounding a felony (arranging for the return of some stolen lace without 
prosecuting the thief), while Turpin was executed for horse-theft.15 
By the 1770s, Georgians’ desire for crime news and scandal began to take up column 
space in newspapers that had traditionally devoted most of their pages to advertising and 
politics. The foundation of the Morning Post in 1772 as a scandal sheet symbolized this 
change, for the paper was “as much entertainment as it was information” in an era where 
“scandal was a valuable commodity.” One of the early cases to attract sustained press 
attention was a forgery involving twins Robert and Daniel Perreau and Daniel’s mistress, 
Margaret Rudd. The three stood trial at the Old Bailey in 1775 for forging and uttering 
cheques worth many thousands of pounds. Both Perreaus were convicted and executed 
while Rudd, who was very obviously guilty, escaped conviction. The case involved 
scandal, betrayal and intrigue, all guaranteed to sell papers. Editors happily printed 
accounts from all three perpetrators alongside a healthy dose of rumour and innuendo. 
Newspapers had too few reporters (those employed were exclusively dedicated to 
parliamentary reporting) to fact check and, without an investigative police to furnish the 
press with information, eighteenth-century crime reports were rife with error. Inaccurate 
reporting seems not to have affected sales. Significantly, Donna Andrew and Randall 
McGowen argue, the Perreau-Rudd case and the press furor surrounding it “helped 
produce a new genre, the sensational criminal trial.”16 The growth of newspaper crime 
reportage complimented, and eventually displaced, the publication of the Old Bailey 
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Sessions Papers, which, since the 1674 had published the details of trials prosecuted at 
London’s Central Criminal Court.17 By the nineteenth century crime reporting was an 
established part of the national press, feeding the popularity of crime-related news.  
Although scandal remained a popular subject for newspapers, from the 1830s homicide 
was a focal point for this morbid national imagination and fuelled the popularity of penny 
bloods, pamphlets and plays based upon the latest slaying.18 Publishers, sensitive to how 
sensationalism sold subscriptions, were keen to meet public demand. This sales strategy 
is aptly demonstrated by the popularity of crime reporting in the press, which spared none 
of the lurid details and was often accompanied by illustrations. Newspapers such as the 
radical The Times and the working-class Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper devoted significant 
column space to homicides and “celebrity murderers,” often providing portraits of 
criminals as they stood in the dock.19 Lloyd’s and its competitor for Sunday working-
class readership, Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, provided readers with a steady “diet of 
crime, scandal and sensationalism.”20 The Illustrated London News, established in 1842, 
was especially popular with a circulation of roughly 200,000 copies per week by 1856 
and was followed by the ‘low class’ Illustrated Police News in 1864. Although the 
circulation of the Illustrated London News was less than The Times’s of 230,000 in 1851, 
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it was a good showing for the upstart against the most popular and established paper in 
the country.21 
The mid-Victorian press expanded significantly from the 1850s after pressure groups, 
most notably the Association for the Promotion of the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge 
(APRTK) and the Newspaper and Periodical Press Association for the Repeal of the 
Paper Duty (NPPARPD), successfully lobbied the government to abolish indirect 
taxation on newspapers. Tripartite paper, stamp and advertisement duties had kept 
newspaper production and purchase expensive until mid century. These ‘taxes on 
knowledge’ also limited the number of titles; advertisement taxes, for example, meant 
that papers that attracted the most advertising were most likely to survive, a pattern that 
helps explain The Times’s consistent domination of London dailies, while popular 
Sunday papers such as Reynolds’s and Lloyd’s chose to publish only on Sundays to take 
advantage of the more lenient taxes on weekly publications.22 Taxes on advertisements 
were repealed in 1853, the stamp duty on newspapers in 1855 and duty on paper in 
1861.23 Repeal drove down prices of existing papers as they struggled to compete with 
cheap upstarts that took advantage of a more level entrepreneurial playing field. 
Eighteenth-century consumers had circumvented prohibitive newspaper costs by clubbing 
together with friends to buy and share a paper or by reading or having papers read aloud 
at coffee houses and libraries. With newspaper prices falling in the 1850s there was no 
longer any need to read papers collectively – individuals could now afford their own 
copies.24 “Newspaper readers,” Hannah Barker observes, “became both more numerous 
and more socially diverse,” reflecting the new accessibility of print news across the social 
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spectrum, including the upper and ascending middle classes as well as a large section of 
the tradesmen and artisans.25 
This varied reading public could choose from numerous newspapers all of which 
dedicated column space to noteworthy news from the criminal justice system, including: 
coroner’s inquests, police investigations, magisterial examinations, trials and executions. 
With the press (and its dedicated readership) watching closely, the police had little 
leeway for failure. This responsibility, coupled with the high-profile nature of many of 
the murders they investigated in the capital, put immense pressure on officers to conduct 
investigations in a timely and professional manner. Yet, before 1829, murder was not a 
police issue, nor, as we have seen, had homicide been included on the list of rising crimes 
Peel presented to parliament in 1829. The press, however, began to expect the new police 
to investigate murder and this expectation of police involvement challenged the 
traditional role of the coroner and the inquest in investigating suspicious death.  
2.3 Coroners in a New Age of Policing 
The coroner had been the royal official responsible for investigating death since the 
twelfth century. In the medieval period, his remit was to protect royal sources of revenue 
connected with crime and death (such as forfeiture of goods and chattels to the crown). 
Over time, however, holding inquests on bodies became the office’s primary function.26 
In the nineteenth century, the coroner had a variety of legal powers, some not dissimilar 
to those of local magistrates, including: 
To attend and view the body and examine and take the depositions of witnesses, 
to record the verdicts, draw up the inquisitions, and grant warrants to bury; and in 
cases of culpable homicide to commit to prison or issue warrants against the 
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offenders, and to bind over by recognizance the witnesses to attend and prosecute 
and give evidence.27   
Although the time-honored system of coroners’ inquiries remained in place after the 
establishment of centralized police forces, coroners came under strain after 1829. One 
source of tension was the constant pecuniary squabbling between coroners and 
magistrates. Coroners were paid per inquest and local magistrates approved their fees. At 
each sitting of the local quarter sessions, magistrates would evaluate coroners’ bills and 
decide whether or not each case had warranted an inquest. Magistrates would disallow 
expenses when they believed an inquest had been unnecessary (they were especially 
reluctant to pay the extra two-guinea fee to physicians for conducting post-mortems). 
This frustrated coroners, who were sensitive about their discretionary powers. England’s 
coroners felt they alone could determine which cases required investigation and did not 
like having magistrates retroactively deny inquest costs.28  
In February 1858, the coroner for Kent wrote to the home secretary condemning Kentish 
magistrates who had disallowed eighteen of his inquest expenses. “I consider,” he 
thundered, “the interference of the magistrates in the discharge of my duties as Coroner 
unwarrantable, and calculated to impede the detection of crime, and the cause of justice, 
and to render perfectly nugatory the usefulness of the Coroners Court.”29 Middlesex 
Coroner William Baker aimed similar vitriol at his local justices, characterizing their 
decision making as “arbitrary, oppressive and illegal.” He also accused them of ignorance 
and corruption. Many, he said, are  
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in general not acquainted with the Law, but are Esquires, Merchants and 
Tradesmen and often ex Officio Guardians of the Gaols and Poor Houses and 
Shareholders in the Mines, Ducts, Canals, Railways, and other large undertakings, 
in which, cases frequently arise for the Coroner to enquire into, in which they 
have an interest in preventing Inquests, and they are, for the most part, entirely 
ignorant of the Statute and Common Law under which the Coroner Acts.30 
A coroner’s position was delicate because, though he might have expenses disallowed, if 
found to have neglected his duty to investigate a case, he was liable to prosecution at 
Queen’s Bench. This quandary left at least one justice feeling “utterly paralyzed and 
disabled from acting.”31 Financial conflicts between coroners and magistrates were 
alleviated only when coroners became salaried in 1860.32 
Coroners could only initiate inquests based on information from third parties. As James 
Sharpe and J.R. Dickenson observe, this gave the public a place in the discretionary 
justice of the inquest: “The whole coroner system depended completely upon the 
willingness of the public to report suspicious deaths – the persons who did so were 
clearly the most crucial ‘decision makers’ of all.”33 Once alerted to a death, the coroner 
would send one of his clerks or a parochial officer to do a preliminary inquiry. If, based 
on the report, the coroner felt that the case merited investigation, he would summon a 
jury of between 12 and 23 men and begin a formal inquest.34  
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The inquest began with the viewing of the body. Bodies found at home might be left in 
situ but they were usually removed to the nearest deadhouse, shed or tavern, where they 
would be viewed by the coroner and the jury.35 The coroner, jury and witnesses then 
began the hearing, typically in a nearby pub, vestry house or hospital boardroom, where 
they heard depositions from witnesses and, sometimes, testimony from a medical 
professional.36 The jury’s verdict was recorded on a legal form called an Inquisition, 
which could also name any suspect(s). Verdicts fell into three categories: accidental 
death, natural death and homicide, the latter being subdivided into “justifiable, excusable, 
or felonious” homicide.37 If an inquest jury found verdict of felonious homicide (also 
called willful murder) against a specific person, that person could be committed upon the 
coroner’s warrant to stand trial at the next sitting of the local criminal courts.38 Assize 
juries did not, of course, have to heed the findings of a coroner’s inquisition because an 
inquest was a court of record with “an investigative rather than an adversarial function.” 
An inquest verdict was “not legally conclusive” and therefore not equal to a verdict in a 
court of law. Rather, the inquest was the registration of a death and the supposed reason 
for it.39 
Coroners felt that, by ancient rights, they were the primary investigators of violent or 
suspicious death. Beginning in London in 1829, however, the new police challenged this 
preeminence. The creation of centralized and professional police forces broke coroners’ 
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six-hundred year monopoly over homicide. An entirely new body of law enforcement 
became an additional interest group in murder investigations and legislation offered no 
clarity on how the two groups were to coexist. If the police identified a possible murder 
suspect, they could keep them in custody while they gathered information about the 
individual and the crime and identified any useful witness. Once this was done, their 
instructions were to take suspects directly to a magistrate. The magistrate would then hear 
the evidence and chose from two options: dismiss the charges or commit the suspect to 
gaol until the next sessions. Coroners, as we have seen, could also identify suspects and 
have them committed for trial. Thus, both coroners and magistrates had separate – and at 
time conflicting – powers of investigation and committal.  
During the early years of the Metropolitan Police, the force and London’s coroners did 
not have an efficient arrangement for investigating suspicious deaths in tandem.40 
Procedure developed in an ad hoc manner. As decisions were made, they were recorded 
in the daily police orders and read out to men going on duty. In January 1834 the daily 
police orders reminded the police (or perhaps stated clearly for the first time) that: 
In all cases of violent or sudden death, or casualties, where a Coroner’s inquest 
should be held upon the body, the Police, whenever the case comes under their 
cognizance, are, in addition to giving information to the parochial authorities, to 
give information to the Coroner also, and the Superintendents are to state upon the 
Morning Report that they have done so.41 
This instruction seems to leave the determination of whether or not an inquest “should be 
held” with the police, even though it was the coroner’s decision whether or not to hold an 
inquisition. The next police order regarding coroners came in 1841, when constables 
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were ordered to attend all coroner’s inquests “to preserve order and give assistance to the 
Coroner.”42 Assistance meant finding witnesses and, if necessary, giving testimony.  
By the late 1850s, coroners felt that both the bobby and the bench were interfering with 
inquests. Beginning in 1858, the Home Office received numerous petitions from coroners 
across the country begging for legislation to precisely delineate their position relative to 
police and magistrates. In March 1860, a Select Committee on the Office of the Coroner 
was convened to investigate how coroners functioned in England and Wales. The Select 
Committee investigation raised concerns about the working relationship between 
coroners and police as well as the place of the coronership within the English criminal 
justice system.  
A central problem identified by coroners was jurisdiction over the accused in cases of 
manslaughter and homicide. Although police were required to inform coroners when a 
dead body was found, police investigations were often well underway before a coroners’ 
jury was summoned. Middlesex coroner John Humphrey described it as a sort of race: “It 
depends,” he said, “upon who gets possession of the prisoner first.”43 Although the 
coroner had sole jurisdiction over the body in an inquest, he had no right to witnesses or 
suspects.44 Before 1829, if a coroner’s jury identified a suspect, the coroner had the 
power to have that person examined before the jury and, if a verdict was found against 
them, committed for trial.45 By contrast, the 1829 Metropolitan Police instruction book 
told new recruits to bring murder suspects before magistrates.46 A criminal hearing 
before a magistrate could be finished and a prisoner committed to the next assize before 
the coroner’s court even passed a verdict. Once suspects were committed for trial 
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coroners had difficulty accessing the accused for questioning before the inquest. Police 
procedure circumvented the coroner and, at times, suspects never appeared at inquests.  
Coroners could appeal to the home secretary to help present the prisoner or the police 
commissioners might oblige by allowing the prisoner to be taken before the coroner on 
the way to the magistrate’s office. Technically, though, Undersecretary of State Horatio 
Waddington advised that the coroner had to apply to the court of Queen’s Bench for a 
habeas corpus to have a prisoner in police custody produced before an inquest.47 
Notwithstanding the rules, Humphrey declared that it was only “right that a prisoner 
should be before the jury that is trying him.”48  
Not all coroners sat idly by as the new police infringed on their rights and 
responsibilities; they could and did fight back against their perceived marginalization and 
the profession’s most vociferous defender was Middlesex Coroner Thomas Wakley. 
Wakley was a physician, founder and editor of The Lancet (a premier medical journal) 
and the first medically qualified coroner in England.49 He was also the Liberal MP for 
Finsbury between 1835 and 1852, a position he held concurrently with the coronership 
from 1839. Wakley was not a mild man. He had strong opinions about the importance of 
medicine to the inquest and waged a lifelong war against magisterial interference with his 
work.50 He had, at best, a confrontational nature and possessed an “unfortunate tendency 
to act abrasively.”51 During the investigation into the murder of John Templeman in 
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1840, Wakley and the sitting magistrate at Hatton Garden, Mr. Combe, had a very public 
altercation over the three accused: Richard Gould, Mary Anne Jarvis and John Jarvis. The 
suspects were charged and taken into custody at Hatton Garden police court on 
Wednesday March 18, 1840. That same evening Wakley’s inquest began its hearings at 
the Barnsbury Castle pub. After the jury viewed the body and several witnesses were 
interviewed, Wakley asked police Inspector Miller whether there were any other suspects 
who should be interviewed. Miller replied in the affirmative and Wakley adjourned the 
inquest until the following Monday with a mind to interview the suspects in police 
custody. Miller transmitted Wakey’s request to interview the suspects to Combe, who 
replied   
he would not grant such a request. He had nothing to do with the coroner, nor the 
coroner with him. The prisoners were before him, and he would investigate the 
matter and remand the prisoners from time to time until he eventually committed 
them, and if he made his mind up to commit them for trial, on Saturday next or on 
Monday next he would send them to Newgate … He could not see what the 
coroner had to do with the magistrates.52 
This was, at any rate, what the papers reported Combe to have said, and Wakley read the 
papers closely. The following day, the coroner grilled Miller about what happed at Hatton 
Garden and a rather uncomfortable Miller admitted that, though the papers exaggerated 
somewhat, the report was correct. Wakley was furious. It was the third time that Combe 
had refused to allow a murder suspect to appear before him, even though in one instance 
the inquest was held not forty yards from the prison where the suspect was in custody. In 
retaliation, Wakley threatened to adjourn the inquest to the prison for “if they could not 
get the persons in custody there, there was no reason in the world why the jury should not 
go to them.” He did not follow through on this threat however as he did not want to put 
poor Mr. Kilsby, governor of the New Prison (and by all accounts horrified to be in the 
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middle of Wakley’s war on the magistracy) in a tough spot. In the end, the home 
secretary intervened and the prisoners were brought before the inquest.53 
What most frustrated Wakley was that the magistrates paid so little heed to his 
prerogative and his tirade encapsulates the siege mentality of nineteenth-century 
coroners. To Wakley, the magistrate was a latecomer in the criminal justice system and 
could in no way usurp the hallowed place of the inquest in the pantheon of British 
liberties. The inquest was, he declared, “one of the greatest bulwarks of the liberty of the 
subject,” and he had every intention of defending it to the last.54 Fifteen years later, 
Wakley was still waging his war against the magistracy. In this case, the suspect in a 
failed murder-suicide (the murder was successful but the suicide not) was convalescing in 
Middlesex Hospital. The prisoner, Luigi Buranelli, was officially in police custody while 
in hospital and, once sufficiently recovered, the police had every intention of taking him 
from hospital to court to be examined by a magistrate “in the regular way on the charge 
of murder.” Wakley had different ideas. He stole Buranelli from the hospital – and police 
custody – and brought him before his inquest on the murder victim. The jury found a 
verdict against Buranelli, and Wakley “made out a warrant to his own officer for the 
commitment of Luigi Buranelli to Newgate for Trial.”55 Police Commissioner Mayne was 
irate that Wakley flouted police jurisdiction and prevented police officers from properly 
investigating the crime. The January sessions at the Old Bailey had just begun, and it was 
possible that Buranelli could go to trial without any policemen being called to give 
evidence. Mayne asked the home secretary to have the case made a state prosecution so 
the treasury solicitor could delay the prosecution.56 This was done and Buranelli was 
found guilty four months later at the April sessions of the Central Criminal Court.57 This 
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case was unusually acrimonious but does indicate the lengths to which a frustrated 
coroner would go to perform his duty.  
For the police, any delay in charging a suspect could lead to bad press and public 
criticism. A coroner who stole the suspect and impeded a murder investigation was thus 
more than just a jurisdictional headache and could affect public confidence in the police. 
Several poorly orchestrated murder investigations in the late 1830s and early 1840s left 
the police vulnerable to press attacks. As The Town put it in 1840, “The fearful laxity, 
ignorance, and incompetency of the new police, gives premium to murder and other 
dreadful crimes. No man is now safe in his bed; the hearth of his house may, with 
impunity be violated by a set a consummate scoundrels.”58 Some still felt that the new 
police was “in its nature unconstitutional … [and] dangerous to the liberty of the 
people.”59 As such, the police were keenly aware of the need for timely and professional 
murder investigations. Scotland Yard detectives would subsequently read the papers daily 
to identify bad press.60 
Coroners’ evidence before the 1860 Select Committee showed that they rarely received 
notices of death from the police. The Middlesex coroner stated that he received 
information of a death from the police in only 1 per cent of cases, while the coroner for 
the City of London and Southwark received reports from the ward beadle.61 All three 
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coroners examined before the committee argued that they should be able to initiate 
proceedings based on information from any person, not just from local or central 
government employees, to allow them discretion to take on cases they thought required 
investigation. The Middlesex coroner felt that there were many cases of death not 
reported to the police; if private individuals were blocked from giving information, the 
coroner might never know about a significant number of deaths.62  
In Hampshire, the coroner for Winchester reserved particular contempt for the local 
constabulary, accusing them of interfering with his work by withholding pertinent 
information about deaths.  He felt that the police had begun to do his job for him: “There 
is a supervision kept up over the coroners by the police” he complained, “which is 
degrading, and most painful to contend with.”63 In Hampshire, the police filled out a form 
including particulars of a death before sending it to the coroner, copies of which were 
forwarded to the chief constable and the finance committee of the quarter sessions. 
Magistrates would use this information to determine whether to pay inquest expenses. 
Undersecretary of State Waddington agreed that the police should not interfere in 
coroners’ work. He felt that the coroner was a “much higher officer” and the police 
“ought not to decide upon the facts constituting a case in which an inquest should be 
held.”64  
There were at least a few moments of camaraderie in the coroner-police relationship. 
When a coroner’s court from Dorset determined that a man found floating in the 
Sherbourne River in July 1852 had been strangled, the coroner requested help from the 
Metropolitan Police to investigate the case. Feeling that the local constables needed help 
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with the murder inquiry he promised to pay all the expenses of the detective officer 
loaned out to him by Scotland Yard.65 By the early 1860s, coroners and the police seem 
to have reached common ground. Policemen replaced parochial officers executing 
coroners’ warrants, indicating a more consistent level of cooperation between the two 
groups. Police orders reflect this new détente, reminding officers in 1870 that persons 
apprehended under a coroner’s warrant were to be charged at the police station and then 
taken directly to prison, without presentment before a magistrate.66 Coroners and police 
remained involved in the apprehension of a suspect and the coroner’s ancient right to 
imprison a suspect awaiting trial was upheld. 
2.4 Murder and the Birth of Detective Policing 
The Metropolitan Police was established amid a period of decreasing violent crime, yet 
homicide spurred the specialization of detection within the Met. The coroner remained an 
important part of homicide investigations, yet – as we will see – the London press 
expected the new police to bear the responsibility of apprehending murderers and 
bringing them to trial. By the late 1830s, murder reports shifted noticeably away from 
their earlier focus on the inquest and towards the police investigation. A series of horrific 
murders in the late 1830s and early 1840s drove London’s newspapers to demand a 
proper detective body within the metropolitan police. The victims – Eliza Davis (d. 
1837), Eliza Grimwood (1838), Robert Westwood (1839), John Templemann (1840), 
Lord William Russell (1840) and Jane Jones (1842) – were all murdered within six years, 
but it was not until the last two that the press considered the murders together and 
reported a pattern of ineffective detective policing. It is worth briefly exploring all six 
cases to understand how and why murder became the barometer of police effectiveness in 
the early years of Victoria’s reign. 
One might expect that class had something to do with the attention these murders 
received, yet the social status of the victims was varied. Davis was a barmaid, Grimwood 
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a prostitute, Westwood a successful watchmaker, Russell a nobleman and Jones a 
laundress. Public outrage about these cases focused on the investigation, not the victim. If 
these cases had received less press attention and ignited less public indignation, it is 
unlikely that the police would have felt pressured into making detection a specialty. But 
they did garner extensive press coverage and the police were criticized for 
mismanagement, incompetence and corruption, especially in Russell’s and Jones’s 
cases.67 The press determined that the police, trained in the prevention of crime but not 
its subsequent detection, was unable to fulfill an investigatory role. Although senior 
officers – inspectors and superintendents – coordinated murder investigations, there was 
no formal training for this work and the infrequency of murder meant that expertise in 
homicide investigations was limited. The only other official involved, the coroner, was, 
as we have seen, limited to determining the cause of death and naming possible suspects. 
The first victim, Eliza Davis, was a young Welsh barmaid working at the King’s Arms 
public house in Hampstead. Her assailant came into the bar early on Tuesday May 9, 
1837 and slit her throat sometime between 6:00 and 6:15 am. When the police arrived, 
the murder weapon was on the bar, along with the murderer’s unfinished breakfast of ale, 
bread and cheese. Davis’s attacker had also, courteously, left money for the bill. The 
police suspected a man who had been seen at the bar on several recent mornings, 
although his identity was unknown. Although several people were arrested, all were 
eventually released and the trail went cold.68 The inquest, likewise, found a verdict of 
homicide against person or persons unknown.  
The police continued to investigate in 1841, 1842 and again in 1848 based on new leads, 
although these came to nothing. Expense reports from the month following Davis’s 
murder indicate that Inspector Aggs and Constable Pigler spent 22 days in May 1837, 
from early in the morning until “11 or 12 at night, though sometimes until 2 am,” trying 
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to solve the case. In January 1841 Inspector Aggs traveled to Jersey to see two possible 
witnesses whose evidence turned out to be fabricated. Again, in 1848, a witness came 
forward claiming that he suspected the killer had been the brother of the housekeeper to 
his previous employer. Inspector Tedman was sent to ascertain the veracity of this 
statement and came across a man named Alfred Gee. Gee saw someone with bloody 
hands running away from the pub just after 6 am the morning of the murder and was 
certain he could identify the man if he saw him again. Gee’s 1848 statement was 
significant because he had told the same thing to the magistrate at Marylebone, Mr. 
Rawlinson, shortly after the murder in 1837. Tedman’s report indicates that Rawlinson 
“treated the matter rather lightly and nothing further was done and he ‘Gee’ was not 
examined on the Inquest.” This, if true, was a serious oversight by the magistrate. It was 
of little use eleven years later, but might have been integral to the case in the days after 
the murder. Although no one was ever charged with Davis’s murder, the police devoted 
time and manpower to the case, including exhaustive attempts to follow up new leads in 
later years.69 The press, too, followed the case. At the time, there was no criticism of the 
police for not finding Davis’s killer. It was lamentable but no one pointed any fingers at 
the police for their failure to apprehend the murderer.  
The investigation into Eliza Grimwood’s murder on May 26, 1838 was also unsuccessful, 
although Inspector Frederick Field spent almost every day between May 26 and July 14, 
following every lead he could.70 Field retraced the deceased’s steps on the eve of her 
death. She had been at the Strand Theatre on the evening of May 26 with a man, though 
he was never identified. One witness testified at the inquest that Grimwood’s suitor might 
have been foreign, so Field spent a day with the witness visiting haunts and hotels in 
Piccadilly, Regent Circus and Leicester Square popular with foreigners in London. Based 
on her description he also stopped at “different Docks, Wharfs, and other places, to 
ascertain whether any persons…left London by any of the Steam Boats answering to the 
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description the Cab Man and others gave of the man that accompanied the deceased 
Home, also made enquiries at the passport office.”71 Subsequently, an anonymous tipster 
‘Cavendish’ wrote to the coroner claiming that he and Grimwood’s suitor went to her 
lodgings together the night of her death but were thrown out by her partner, a bricklayer 
named William Hubbard. The police tried strenuously to find Cavendish but were 
unsuccessful. With no other suspects, Field arrested Hubbard and he was examined at 
Lambeth police court. The magistrate generously held Hubbard over for a week to allow 
the police to locate ‘Cavendish’, but discharged him on June 20 after no further evidence 
appeared.72 Charging suspects on the basis of anonymous letters, the magistrate argued, 
went “against all principles of English Justice.” With no other evidence, Field’s notes 
indicate that he stopped investigating on July 14, having spent the final few days 
following up more anonymous letters, to no avail.  
The Grimwood murder was a model of cooperation between coroners, police and 
prosecutors.73 The inquest and the police investigation took place concurrently, with the 
lead investigator, Field, attending each day of the inquest. Field took detailed notes of the 
testimony, which he also submitted to the commissioners, and used the inquest as a 
source of information for his own investigation. The police reciprocated and helped the 
coroner gather information. Field went with an inquest witnesses to search for 
information throughout London, “it being the Coroners [sic] wish” that they do so. On 
another day, Field “Attended the Inquest the whole of the day[.] Afterwards went to 
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several persons resident in the neighbourhood of the Strand to collect Information by 
order of the Coroner.”74 In this case, the inquest was a source of valuable information for 
Inspector Field and testimony given by witnesses provided leads for him to follow. He 
was also, in turn, a source of information for the coroner. The detective’s relationship 
with the Grimwood’s solicitor, Mr. Pelham, was also symbiotic. Pelham accompanied 
Field while the latter searched for ‘Cavendish’, the only tangible evidence the 
prosecution had against Hubbard. Field even visited Pelham at his home to discuss what 
to do about anonymous letters Pelham had received about the case.75  
Like the Davis case, the investigation into Grimwood’s death was also protracted. New 
evidence brought the case back into the press in late summer 1845. On August 20 of that 
year, a drunken private in the 67 Regiment of Foot stumbled into a police station in 
Dublin and claimed he, George Hill, had killed Eliza Grimwood. In his official report, 
Inspector Maher of the Dublin Metropolitan Police noted that Hill “appeared to be tipsy 
at the time” but nevertheless kept him at the station and had the private write a 
confession. The Metropolitan Police were notified and Field travelled to Dublin to collect 
the suspect.76 When Hill faced the magistrate in Southwark two weeks later he recanted 
his statement as a drunken utterance. He had been trying for some time, he told the 
magistrate, to get transported in order to escape “tyrannical treatment” in the army; 
between September 1843 and July 1845 he had deserted three times, gone AWOL seven 
times and was once arrested for a felony. The man described by Field and his regimental 
colonel as “a desingning [sic] cunning Artful fellow” and “a man of extreme bad 
character” had outdone himself this time in search of dismissal. Hill’s murder confession 
was the last in a series of acts designed to free him from the army’s grip: “I would,” he 
admitted, “have said anything to have gained my liberty.”77 Hill’s confession, revealing 
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more about the treatment of men in the armed forces than the murder, did not result in a 
prosecution. It also brought the police no closer to solving Grimwood’s murder. 
Field’s day-to-day report of his investigation of Grimwood’s case is rather defensive. 
Written after his failure to apprehend the killer, he is at pains to emphasize his diligence. 
On June 24, a frustrated Field recorded  
attend[ing] to several letters sent to me respecting the murder, endeavouring all in 
my power to find some … Evidence to bring it Home to the right persons, 
continually watching every movement of Hubbard to see he does not leave 
London and Keeping myself in constant communication with persons who could 
in any way throw some light upon the murder.78 
The police never found a viable suspect.  
These two cases involved young women in dangerous occupations. Davis, although by all 
accounts “a steady young woman, perfectly sober, and of strong and sound mind,” was a 
barmaid, meaning that early in the morning she was often alone at the bar with any 
number of men.79 Grimwood was a prostitute, the most dangerous occupation for any 
woman, then as now. Walking the streets at night and bringing men home at all hours 
made her extremely vulnerable. The third victim, Robert Westwood, was different. He 
was a respectable watchmaker (the personal watchmaker to the Duke of Sussex no less) 
and was killed during a burglary and attempted arson at his premises in Soho. On the 
evening of June 3, 1839 Mrs. Westwood said goodnight to her husband and went upstairs 
to bed. She retired shortly after ten o’clock, after the servant locked and bolted the street 
door. At 11:30 pm she heard a scuffle, went downstairs and found her husband groaning 
on the ground and the shop ablaze. When police arrived they found a bloody knife on the 
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sideboard and Westwood dead with two knife wounds to the neck. The door to the street 
was unlocked.  
The police had several theories about the case. The first was that someone had hidden 
inside the shop while Westwood was out earlier that evening. The maid testified that she 
had locked all the doors around 10 pm, but when she came downstairs around 11:30 pm 
the street door was unlocked from the inside. Westwood had been burgled before. For 
“better security,” he now slept in a back bedroom on the main floor, with his wife and 
servants upstairs.80 The burglars seem not to have known this and Westwood probably 
surprised them – or they him – when they came out of their hiding spot late on the night 
of the burglary. The second theory was that the thieves were familiar with the watch 
trade. The burglars stole roughly £2000 worth of watches, something they could not have 
accomplished if they did a snatch and grab of the more accessible watches on display. 
Instead, they had taken very valuable pieces from “private drawers.”81  
Watches were valuable, easily stolen and even more easily concealed, making them a 
natural target for thieves. All watches made at this time came engraved with the makers’ 
name and a serial number, so pawning a stolen watch in London – especially once the 
police advertised the manufacturer’s name, serial number and a description of the watch 
in local papers and to pawnbrokers – was a sure way to be caught. Unfortunately, 
Westwood’s murderers were savvy enough to avoid the London market; the police 
canvassed pawnbrokers and sent notice to all police stations with the serial numbers and 
descriptions of the stolen watches, yet none were found. Charles Lewis Le Roche, a 
fellow watchmaker, told the inquest that the principal market for stolen watches was 
Holland and that the thieves more than likely hawked Westwood’s merchandise on the 
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Continent.82 As a result, officers with descriptions of the suspects were sent to “the 
docks, wharves and railroad stations to see if anyone with that description had gone from 
any of them.”83 In July, the police received reports that a man had stolen a ship from 
Ramsgate and sailed to Boulogne. An officer was sent to investigate but concluded that 
the man had not been involved.84 
The final theory was revenge. Accomplices of William Reading, convicted and executed 
for a previous burglary at Westwood’s, were suspected of killing the watchmaker in 
reprisal. The police watched four men with known gang connections, including 
Reading’s brother and close friends, but this was also a dead end. Two final clues 
surfaced August 1839 and July 1840. In August, someone used one of the £20 notes 
stolen from Westwood in a teashop in the City. The Charter advertised a £50 reward to 
anyone with information. No one came forward. The following summer a creeper on the 
Thames came across watch parts for about thirty or forty watches and reported them to 
the police at Covent Garden. None of them were Westwood’s and the trail finally went 
cold.85 
Although it was the third unsuccessful murder investigation in two years, press coverage 
of the Westwood investigation was remarkably positive. The inquest jury was impressed 
by police diligence, even calling on Inspector Beresford personally to apologize that 
reporters had left the inquest before the jury praised police conduct. The jury also sent a 
letter of approbation to the commissioners 
to express their best thanks to Superintendent Baker to Inspectors Beresford and 
James and generally to the officers who were engaged in the above inquiry for the 
zeal promptitude and efficiency displayed and for the very great attentions and 
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assistances afforded on this most distressing occasion and for their efforts (though 
unsuccessful) to discover the diabolical perpetrators.86 
The press, too, lauded the police. After nearly a week unsuccessfully investigating the 
case, The Times praised Inspector Beresford and Sergeant Otway who were “unremitting 
in their exertions to obtain some clue to the murders and the recovery of the property” 
even though “their efforts had failed of success.”87 Until now, the police had been unable 
to trace the killers in three brutal killings. Although the Davis, Grimwood and Westwood 
cases were clear investigatory failures, the police exhausted all immediate avenues of 
inquiry including clues discovered years later. The press seems to have respected these 
exertions and not been unduly critical. Following John Templeman’s murder, however, 
goodwill towards the police began to wane.  
Templeman was an older gentleman and landlord living in a cottage in Pocock’s fields 
Islington. He was braggart and boasted a little too freely to his neighbours about the £50 
notes he kept at home. On Monday March 16, 1840 he collected rent from his tenants, 
amounting to roughly £6. Later that evening, somewhere between midnight and 3 am 
someone entered his cottage, tied him to a chair, blindfolded him and beat him to death.88 
Every drawer in the house was forced open and the small box containing his precious £50 
notes emptied.89 The main suspect was Richard Gould, an army deserter and general lay 
about who lived close by. The inquest cast suspicion on Gould because, in the days 
preceding the murder, he complained about being broke, yet was flush when police 
searched his lodgings after the murder. Gould had also recently – and damningly – asked 
                                                 
86
 MEPO 3/42, 7 June 1839. 
87
 The Times, 10 June 1839. Not everyone was happy, however. Hannah Pritty, the Westwoods’ former 
maid, went to Marlborough street police court in late August 1839 to complain that the police were 
“making incessant inquiries of her.” She feared that constant police harassment would cause her to lose her 
job and “she was in danger of starvation.” The magistrate said there was nothing he could do to help her 
and, The Champion and Weekly Herald reported, “the poor woman left the office shedding tears.” The 
Champion and Weekly Herald, 25 August 1839.  
88
 It was a brutal beating. The police found three of Templeman’s teeth on the floor near the body. 
89
 The Times, 19 March 1840.  
70 
 
a friend to borrow lock-picking tools, saying he would “serve” an old man who lived 
nearby. He also failed to account for a new pair of shoes, money found on his person, and 
coins hidden in his privy. Coins found on him matched the value of coinage stolen from 
Templeman’s premises.90 Although there was plenty of evidence against him, Gould was 
acquitted of the murder at the Old Bailey two weeks later, the result of testimony from 
defense witnesses who muddied the water.  
The police and local magistrates were unhappy with the verdict and met shortly after the 
trial to determine whether Gould might still be charged with theft. By that time, however, 
Gould was already in Gravesend about to sail to Australia. The commissioners sent 
Sergeant Otway to retrieve him. Otway tricked Gould into coming back to London by 
telling the thief that, if he could pin the murder on an accomplice, he would be entitled to 
the government’s £200 reward for useful information about the crime. Gould knew he 
could not be tried for murder twice and accompanied Otway back to London for his £200, 
or so he thought. After giving a full confession to the magistrate at Bow Street, Gould 
was informed that, as an accessory to both the robbery and the murder, he was not only 
barred from taking reward money but would also be charged with burglary. At this, 
Gould cried foul play. Otway, he said, had promised him immunity. Otway denied this, 
claiming he only told Gould that he was immune from another homicide prosecution, but 
had said nothing about the burglary. Either way, Gould recanted his confession, saying he 
had only given it to get the reward money. The magistrate chose to believe Sergeant 
Otway, though The Times’ reporter felt that Gould’s confession was unfounded. Gould 
was charged, tried and convicted of burglary in June 1840. The judge sentenced him to 
transportation for life but decided “to add to it still heavier punishment, which was, that 
he be sent to a penal colony there to pass the remainder of his existence in hopeless 
slavery, poverty, and misery of the worst description.”91 It was a small victory for the 
police. 
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In the month between Gould’s acquittal for murder and conviction for burglary, Lord 
William Russell – younger brother of the Duke of Bedford and uncle to Colonial 
Secretary Lord John Russell – was murdered in bed, by his valet, at his home at No. 14 
Norfolk Street, Park Lane.92 The Russell Murder, as it came to be called, shocked 
London society. François Courvoisier had killed Russell by slitting his throat while he 
slept.93 Knowing Courvoisier to be guilty but lacking evidence to prove it, the police 
appear to have planted a pair of bloodied gloves to implicate him.94 The police 
commissioners adamantly denied this when questioned about it by the home secretary 
and, although Courvoisier ultimately confessed and was hanged for his crime, allegations 
of police corruption and evidence tampering lingered.95 
Sarah Mancer, Russell’s housemaid, woke early the morning of the murder to find that 
the main floor of the townhouse ransacked. She called Courvoisier, the valet, and told 
him the house was burgled. Courvoisier first went downstairs to check the valuables, then 
went upstairs to wake his master. Both he and Mancer discovered Russell, whose throat 
had been slashed so deeply as to nearly decapitate him.96 The police interviewed the five 
servants Russell employed: valet, cook, housemaid, coachman and groom. All swore that 
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they had heard nothing in the night and that all the doors had been locked. The police 
report from the following day indicates that the house was in disarray but only rings from 
his Lordship’s room, several pins, a gold watch and seals, and fourteen pieces of silver 
cutlery were missing.97 The police searched the servants’ rooms but found none of the 
stolen property. When they searched the kitchen they found that the door had been forced 
open, but tool marks indicated the door had been broken from the inside.98 The inquest 
sat the same day under Mr. Higgs, the deputy coroner for Westminster, and found a 
verdict of willful murder against person or persons unknown.99  
The police originally suspected Russell’s former valet, who had left service five weeks 
before the killing (Courvoisier was a recent replacement), but the old valet’s new 
employer, the Earl of Mansfield, vouched for him. Officers also investigated another 
former valet, a man named Bernard, who was heard referring to Lord William Russell as 
“that damned old rascal,” but that line of inquiry also came to nothing.100 Having failed 
to find suspects outside the house, the Metropolitan Police again turned the investigation 
to the current servants. The house had been turned over without anyone hearing anything 
(and silver plate being thrown around would have made quite a din) and the back door 
was broken open from the inside. All this, one police report surmised, was “no doubt for 
deception.”101 Inspector Beresford testified at Bow Street that there was “a studied and 
false appearance of housebreaking violence” about the scene.102 This was only evidence 
of a theft, however, and not conclusive proof of Courvoisier’s involvement in the murder. 
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What the police needed was something covered in blood, and this they found in 
Courvoisier’s portmanteau one week after the murder was committed. It was sufficient 
evidence to send him to trial at the Old Bailey, which took place over three days in mid 
June.  
The discovery of the bloody gloves so late in the investigation, and at a point when the 
police were desperate for evidence connecting Courvoisier to the crime, was highly 
suspicious. The examining magistrate at Bow Street and Courvoisier’s solicitor, Mr. 
Flower, thought so too. They grilled Inspector Tedman about why the prisoner’s 
portmanteau was not locked after its initial examination on May 6. Anyone could have 
slipped incriminating evidence into the box during the week between the initial search 
and the discovery of the gloves. In fact, another constable had looked through the 
portmanteau on May 13 and found two handkerchiefs with blood on them, but no gloves. 
Officers examined the box on May 6, 9, 13 and 14 and only found bloody garments on 
the last two searches. Before the Grand Jury at the Old Bailey considered the indictment, 
the judge cautioned them about the gloves. Courvoisier was taken into custody on May 
10, but the gloves were only found on the 14, so “It was but a justice to the prisoner in the 
investigation of the murder to keep in view the date on which the gloves were found.”103 
Questions about the fortuitous appearance of the gloves were posed again at trial. 
Inspector Pearce faced repeated questions by Courvoisier’s counsel about his initial 
search of the accused’s belongings. Pearce argued that, although he had taken out the 
contents of Courvoisier’s trunk, he had not unfolded any of the shirts. Inspector Tedman 
had unfolded the shifts in the initial search, but only discovered the bloody gloves later, 
during a reexamination, when he shook them out.104  
The press – following the case closely – accused the coroner, the government and the 
police of mismanagement. The first to come under fire in the papers was the coroner. On 
May 11 The Morning Chronicle reprinted an article from The Examiner censuring the 
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coroner for a poorly run inquest. Why had the coroner not questioned the discrepancies in 
Mancer and Courvoisier’s testimony about whether there was a cloth over the deceased’s 
face when they found him? No one had asked Courvoisier whether the door was locked 
after him when he stepped out for a beer on the evening before the murder. Could not 
someone have sneaked in and hid in the house? The witnesses were also never asked 
whether a knife was missing from the house or whether there was any evidence of the 
perpetrator trying to clean the blood from their hands or person. Even the surgeon 
bungled his investigation. In addition to the slash to the throat, part of Russell’s thumb 
had been cut off in the process. The surgeons missed that injury when they examined the 
body. All in all, the paper concluded, “if its [the inquest’s] object had been to avoid the 
discovery of the assassin, its proceedings would have been most skillfully conducted for 
the purpose.” The only person to emerge unscathed was Inspector Beresford, whom the 
paper credited with “acuteness of observation” for his discovery that the break-in was 
really a break-out.105  
London’s newspapers became increasingly critical of the police during the Russell 
murder. The murder of the colonial secretary’s uncle attracted significant press attention, 
which only exacerbated the evidence-tampering scandal.106 Criticism swung quickly 
from the inquest to the police investigation, indicating that expectations about whom – 
coroner or police – was responsible for a homicide investigation were in flux. Following 
the discovery of the gloves there were no more accolades for the police. A letter to the 
editor printed in The Morning Post on May 19 railed against the “improbability of 
detecting the perpetrator from the nature of the constitution of the police.” Five murders, 
the writer thundered, had been “committed in London with impunity and without 
detection” over the last several years. If the police were so inefficient, why not, he 
                                                 
105
 The Morning Chronicle, 11 May 1840. 
106
 In August 1844 the police commissioners declared that an experienced officer was “responsible for 
every proper step being taken” in murder cases and prohibited any officer from entering a homicide crime 
scene without express orders from the superintendent and without “reporting to him every circumstance 
that comes to their knowledge.” MEPO 7/9, 28 August 1844.  
75 
 
suggested, replace them with the Coldstream guards, who would cost half as much?107 
The papers also emphasized differences in how the police handled Templeman’s and 
Russell’s cases. Had not the government offered a significant reward (£200) for 
information about Russell’s killer and did Richard Mayne not personally attend the crime 
scene?108 Poor Mr. Templeman received no such treatment. The Times accused the 
Whigs of “scandalous apathy” towards the hoi polloi. Why had the government not 
initially offered a reward for information relating to Templeman’s death? They ultimately 
did (although as we have seen, this was likely just a ruse to get Gould to confess his 
involvement in the burglary) but only after they had rolled out the cavalry for the Russell 
investigation. There is truth to these criticisms. Commissioner Mayne arrived at Russell’s 
home shortly after the crime was discovered and took an active part in the investigation – 
but there is no evidence that he ever set foot in Templeman’s Islington home. Whatever 
their reservations about the perfunctory inquest or police corruption, the committing 
magistrate, grand jury and trial jury all agreed that the evidence against Courvoisier was 
sufficient; he was found guilty of murder and executed in June 1840.109  
Two out of the four sensational murder cases examined thus far involved low status 
women. Yet only a quarter of a century earlier the Earl of Dudley famously – and 
confidently – stated that the occasional murder of social non-entities was a fair price to 
pay to be free of centralized policing. Clearly opinions had changed by the 1830s and 
neither murder, regardless of the victim’s social standing, nor inefficient policing were 
acceptable in the metropolis. The press made this abundantly clear during the 
investigation of the final murder in the Metropolitan Police District before the creation of 
a detective police. The victim was Jane Jones, a laundress, found dismembered in a 
Putney stable on April 3, 1842.  
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On May 9, 1842, before a packed audience at the Old Bailey, London’s Central Criminal 
Court, Daniel Good, a coachman from southwest London, was tried for the murder of 
Jane Jones.110 The witnesses for the prosecution described a story by then well known in 
the newspaper press as the ‘Roehampton Murder’. The police were lucky to have brought 
Good to trial so swiftly, given that the discovery of the crime and the apprehension of the 
suspect were due to the diligence of civilians, not policemen. The case altered the 
paradigm of policing Europe’s largest city; after a bungled investigation and public 
outcry, an official Detective Department was created within the Metropolitan Police to 
investigate serious or complex crimes.  
The Good case was not the only story of violent death in the press that spring: between 
April and June one murderer was executed in Salop, seventeen men died in a coal-pit 
explosion outside Manchester, a policeman in London was murdered, a husband 
murdered his wife, John Francis attempted to assassinate Queen Victoria, and another 
colliery explosion killed seven.111 As one of several incidents of death in the press, why 
did the Daniel Good case capture such attention? The case highlighted tension between 
public expectations of police efficiency and the reality that the Metropolitan Police were 
not sufficiently equipped to investigate complicated murders.  
The first indication that Good intended to murder his wife came at least three weeks 
before the murder when he promised his mistress, Susannah Butcher, that she could have 
his wife’s old clothes.112 He then told Jones he found her a job as a housekeeper at a 
gentleman’s lodge and she gave her landlady notice that she would not be returning after 
April 4. These details were suspicious only in retrospect and no one, Jones included, 
suspected anything was wrong. On Sunday April 3, the night before Jones began her new 
job as a housekeeper, she arranged for a neighbour to take care of her son, Daniel Good 
Jr., because her husband did not want their son to tag along. Jones left home mid-
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afternoon on April 4 to meet Good near Hammersmith Bridge, where they were seen 
walking together by a witness. The two walked towards Barnes, were the publican at the 
Coach and Horses saw them together around 4 pm. At 4:30 pm the two proceeded to Mrs. 
Hester’s, a friend of Good’s in Roehampton, where they had tea. Hester accidentally let 
slip that Good had a mistress and the couple argued. They were still quarrelling when 
they arrived at the King’s Head pub in Roehampton around 7 pm. From their initial 
meeting at Hammersmith Bridge, the two worked their way to Roehampton, where Good 
worked as a coachman for Mr. Quelaz Shiell. Shiell was an East India Merchant who 
lived on Putney Park lane in Roehampton and Good lived on the property above the 
stables. Shiell’s cook testified that Good arrived back home on Sunday night between 
7:30 and 9:30 pm, and that she saw him again for breakfast the following morning. 
Jones’s landlady was certain that Jones never returned home that night or any other. 
Sometime on that Sunday night between the King’s Head public house and Shiell’s 
property, Good murdered Jones.  
The next morning (Monday), Good went back to Jones’s house to pick up her clothes and 
told the landlady that he needed to extend the rent another two weeks so that he could sell 
her mangle. Good then pawned some of Jones’s clothes around the corner. That afternoon 
Good told Daniel Jr. that Jones had gone into service and that the boy would not see his 
mother again for some time. He then took the child to Putney with him for the night. On 
Tuesday morning Shiell’s under-gardener John Houghton smelled something burning in 
the stables. Good told him that he was only toasting some cheese to help cure a hangover 
and Houghton left it at that.113 The cook reported that Good came to breakfast filthy on 
Tuesday morning and she sent him away to clean himself up, but no one suspected 
anything unusual. On Wednesday April 6, Good took his son to Woolwich to visit 
Susannah Butcher. He told his son to call Susannah ‘mother’, gave her Jones’s clothes 
and promised to bring her Jones’s mangle. Around 8:30 pm Good and his son stopped at 
Mr. Collingbourne’s pawnshop in Wandworth where he purchased a pair of knee 
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breeches on credit and, while leaving the store, stole a pair of trousers. When 
Collingbourne confronted Good about the shoplifting, Good denied the charge and drove 
off back to Putney. Collingbourne reported the theft to police constable William 
Gardiner, who, assisted by two local men, proceeded to Shiell’s to investigate the 
allegation. 
Although some witnesses at his trial recalled behaviour that now seemed suspicious, no 
one at the time suspected Good of any crime. He provided Jones’s landlady, Susannah 
Butcher and his son with plausible explanations for Jones’s whereabouts. Although 
witnesses observed that Jones was upset on Sunday, it is unclear whether or not she 
believed she was going into service or whether she did so willingly. What is certain is 
that no one suspected that Jones was dead until her body was discovered. Had Good not 
committed larceny that evening, it is uncertain if Jones’s body would ever have been 
discovered. She would simply have been counted among the anonymous missing of the 
city’s transient population. 
Constable Gardiner arrived at Shiell’s shortly after 9 pm on Wednesday to question Good 
about the stolen trousers and was directed to the stables. Gardener entered in the 
company of two young men from the locality and the gardener. Thus confronted, Good 
again denied shoplifting but tried to pay Gardiner for the trousers. Gardiner left one of the 
local lads to watch Good while he searched the stables. During his search, he noticed a 
pig under some hay. At that moment, Daniel Good ran out of the stables and locked the 
constable, two young men, and the gardener inside.114 Unable to break down the door, the 
group returned to examine the stall and discovered that what Gardiner noticed was not a 
pig, but a female torso. This shock prompted a renewed, and successful, effort to break 
down the stable door. After escaping, Gardiner sent a runner to locate the nearest 
policemen. Shortly after, constables Hayter and Tye appeared; Hayter searched the 
immediate neighbourhood for Good, while Tye took one of Mr. Shiell’s ponies and rode 
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to the nearest police station. Around 11 pm Tye returned with Superintendent Bicknell 
and Inspector Busain.115 At this point, Sergeant Palmer discovered charred bone 
fragments in an adjacent harness room, clear evidence that Good had been in the process 
of burning the remains of his victim.  After this, Superintendent Bicknell ordered a Route 
to be sent to all other police stations with Good’s description.116 Good locked the officers 
in at around 9:30 pm, the Route was sent out at 11:15 pm and took until 4:00 am to reach 
every police station within 60 miles.  
The police made a concerted effort to search for Good. They contacted local cab drivers 
to determine his movements after his escape. They also contacted his mother and his 
legal wife for clues. Local superintendents were instructed to watch all travellers by 
coach, railway or boat and Good’s description was sent to all seaports. Surveillance was 
also kept up on Good’s mother and Susannah Butcher, lest he should try to contact them 
again.117 The police also contacted the constabulary in East Sussex, where Jones lived 
before moving to London with Good.118 Many superintendents ordered their men into 
plain clothes to begin the manhunt. Superintendent Bicknell ordered Sergeant Golding 
into plainclothes and the sergeant determined that Good had returned to Jones’s house 
early that morning but had left again in a cab. He managed to trace Good as far as the 
Spotted Dog pub in the Strand.119 In Southwark, Constable George Tew was put into 
plain clothes to trace Good, while another two constables were seconded to the Eastern 
Counties railway and to the Steam Wharfs “to prevent his [Good’s] escape from those 
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places.”120 Constable Tidmarsh remained at the railway terminus until Good was 
apprehended ten days later. Another sergeant was put in plain clothes to make enquiries 
around Covent Garden.121 
Police inquiries at local pubs, Good’s habitual haunts and the homes of family and 
friends ultimately came to nothing. The police arrested Good’s mother Mary for 
receiving, harbouring and maintain him, although she was later found not guilty at the 
Old Bailey.122 Good was ultimately apprehended ten days later in Tonbridge, Kent, where 
he was posing as a bricklayer. By sheer coincidence, Thomas Rose, a former police 
constable from Wandsworth, was living in Tonbridge and working at the same facility. 
Recognizing Good from his days on the beat and having heard about the murder in the 
news, he reported Good’s whereabouts to the local police. Good was apprehended and 
brought back to London.123   
2.5 The Backlash 
Jones’s murder was the sixth gruesome murder in five years and confidence in the police 
was at a startling low. Even though Good was convicted and executed, what infuriated 
the press was that the discovery of the crime and the apprehension of the murderer 
happened by chance. Jones’s body was only found while the police investigated an 
unrelated crime and Good’s arrest in Kent was mere happenstance. While Good was still 
at large, a Times article identified the case as the last in a long line of mishandled murder 
investigations: 
The conduct of the metropolitan police in the present case, as in those of the 
unfortunate Eliza Grimwood, Lord William Russell, and others, is marked with a 
looseness and want of decision which proves that unless a decided change is made 
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in the present system, it is idle to expect that it can be an efficient detective police, 
and that the most desperate offender may escape with impunity.124 
Although the commissioners tried to defend the professionalism of their police, the press 
was irate. Not only had Good locked a constable in a barn for over an hour, he had 
returned to Jones’s house and spent the night there unmolested. He left at 5 am on 
Monday morning, four and a half hours before the first policemen arrived to search the 
premises.125 The Morning Advertiser felt that arresting Good’s mother was a stunt to 
make it seem like the investigation was making progress. Taking an old woman into 
custody failed to impress:  
The secret of the matter appeared to be, that the police, feeling annoyed at the 
slovenly manner in which the case has been managed, as well as their own almost 
culpable negligence in permitting the murderer to escape, were determined to 
apprehend some person as a sort of flash in the pan, and have fixed upon ‘Old 
Molly’.126 
Strikingly, the Metropolitan Police’s poor record of murder investigations seems to have 
partially rehabilitated the reputation of the Bow Street Runners. Although the Runners 
did not specialize in murder investigations in London, The Times nonetheless praised 
their detective ability and castigated the Met for “the want of that tact and ability as a 
detective police displayed on all occasions by the old Bow-street officers.”127 
The cases of Eliza Davis, Eliza Grimwood, Richard Westwood and John Templeman 
would not have been linked to those of Lord William Russell or Jane Jones had the police 
not made critical mistakes investigating the latter two. Press reports and police evidence 
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demonstrate that protocol was followed in each of the first three cases. Accusations of 
corruption and incompetence in the investigations of Russell’s and Jones’s murders, 
however, caused the press to glance backwards to find similar cases. An 1840 pamphlet 
entitled Remarks on the Recent Murders in London lamented, “There have been six most 
atrocious murders committed within the last four years, and only one of them has yet 
been traced.”128  
It is also significant that the press, keeping earlier cases fresh in readers’ minds, picked 
up developments in the older cases. The Davis, Grimwood and Westwood murders made 
headlines three years in a row, garnering extensive press coverage. Davis’s case ran from 
May until July 1837, Grimwood’s June and July 1838, and Westwood’s from June to 
August 1839. In 1840, Templeman’s case received coverage from March until June, with 
Russell’s case overlapping in May and June. The following month, Westwood’s case was 
again in the press. By the time Jones was murdered in April 1842, the previous five 
murders had received fourteen months’ press coverage, not including coverage after the 
main investigation. The Russell murder occurred in the midst of the investigation into 
Templeman’s murder, right between Gould’s acquittal for murder and his trial for 
robbery. Gould’s arraignment at Bow Street in April 1840 occurred the same day as 
Courvoisier was examined – in fact, Gould was brought to the dock shortly after 
Courvoisier vacated it.129 Courvoisier’s conviction for murder occurred on June 20, while 
Gould was convicted of burglary three days later.  
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Public disapproval in the wake of the Jones débâcle rattled the police commissioners. 
They sent Home Secretary Sir James Grey a long memorandum defending the police 
investigation. They were especially piqued by claims that Bow Street’s men were 
superior investigators. Bow Street’s methods were notorious, they argued, and “the 
results do not show that they were successful where the Police had failed, or that the 
public gained additional security from the skill or means of information they were 
supposed to posses.” In London, they explained, the police had to deal with exponential 
amounts of moveable wealth, much of it easily stolen, and to investigate crimes without 
trampling individual rights. “Regard for personal liberty” might compromise efficiency, 
but it was the English way. The commissioners did, however, concede that it might be 
advantageous to establish a detective force within the Met. Eight men would be 
sufficient, but the commissioners wanted them to be a separate body to prevent 
interfering with regular police duties.130 On August 23, 1842 they submitted the names of 
the eight men (two inspectors and six sergeants) chosen for detective duty, to began work 
immediately.131  
Haia Shpayer-Makov has argued that 1842 represents a shift in the culture of law 
enforcement rather than a change in policing techniques.132 I do not disagree with this 
assessment, but would suggest that the shift in culture was more superficial than Shpayer-
Makov allows and that the influence came from outside rather than developing within. It 
also had much to do with the timing of the murders discussed above. When the 
commissioners wrote to Sir James Grey suggesting the creation of a detective force, they 
chose men who had typically undertaken investigative functions before. Many had been 
involved in the very investigations that led to the creation of the Detective Department. 
They were the same men wearing different hats.133 The only real difference was that 
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these men were officially detached from their divisions and worked full time at police 
headquarters in Scotland Yard. So, in a sense, the creation of the detective force in 1842 
was more about a perceived shift in the institutional culture of the police than a real one, 
although there certainly was some change. Yet perception was important and the 
commissioners’ admission that detective policing was a necessary component to 
London’s police apparatus went a long way to appease the public. It was a reorganization 
born of public criticism and, at least initially, given the minuscule number of men 
detached for detective duty, a nominal one.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Property crime drove change in the English criminal justice system from the Bloody 
Code and Bow Street to the establishment of the Metropolitan Police. It is surprising, 
then, that murder, a crime that occurred relatively infrequently, had such a significant 
impact on the development of London’s police.134 The coroner had always investigated 
murder and it was never made explicit that the new police should take on this 
responsibility. Indeed, no one, including Home Secretary Peel, Police Commissioners 
Mayne and Rowan or anyone involved in the drafting of the Metropolitan Police Act 
seems to have thought about how the police were to interact with London’s coroners. 
Unsurprisingly, this led to frequent jurisdictional conflicts and a good deal of animosity 
between the two groups that lasted until mid century.  
The new police had little formal investigatory training and high turnover among recruits 
meant that it was difficult to retain men long enough for them to gain experience.135 In 
this climate, the police were unlucky to have had six high-profile murder investigations in 
as many years and a newspaper establishment hungry for crime news. London’s papers 
supported the police during their investigations into Davis’s, Grimwood’s and 
Westwood’s murders and recognized the difficulty of tracing suspects. The mood shifted 
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noticeably after Russell’s murder. The slapdash inquest and allegations that the police 
planted evidence overwhelmed newspaper editors’ earlier tendency to give the police the 
benefit of the doubt, causing them to approach murder investigations more critically. The 
accusatory tone of reporting that accompanied the Jones investigation reflected this 
change. Crime reporting was a substantial part of metropolitan daily and weekly papers 
and the press happily publicized murders and police investigations for their readership. 
The heightened attention on an already strained Metropolitan Police exacerbated the 
situation and, by linking all six cases, the London press created a scandal that might not 
otherwise have arisen. Faced with public disgrace, Mayne, Rowan and Home Secretary 
Grey had little option but to satisfy the public with a token detective force to specialize in 
complicated investigations.  
As the following chapters will show, the Detective Department, which began life as a 
response to public criticisms of the Metropolitan Police, quietly took on a life of its own. 
Its officers were respected and many became household names. They were championed 
by the likes of Charles Dickens and Wilkie Collins, who based characters in Bleak House 
(1853) and The Moonstone (1868) on Scotland Yard men.136 The popularity of these 
detectives helped rehabilitate the Metropolitan Police after a brief but intense period of 
public criticism. As an investigatory group, the Met’s first detectives became 
indispensible to the police commissioners and the Home Office as a flexible group of 
experts who could be deployed within London and throughout England. These men and 
their working lives are the subject of the following chapter.   
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3 A Detective Police for London: Personnel and Practice 
Police Commissioners Richard Mayne and Charles Rowan drew their detectives from the 
uniform ranks, although there were some notable exceptions hired from outside the force. 
On the whole, the men who staffed the new Detective Department were better educated 
than the average metropolitan policeman and had the opportunity, through better pay and 
frequent monetary rewards for good conduct, to attain a better standard of living than 
their contemporaries. Most had lengthy careers in the Metropolitan Police and many 
became household names, rising through the ranks to coveted leadership positions in the 
detective and uniformed branches of the service. Detectives used rudimentary forensics 
during their investigations because advanced techniques, such as fingerprinting, were not 
invented until later in the century. Instead, detectives relied heavily on information 
gathering to solve cases. Thefts, for example, were routinely solved by locating stolen 
property at pawnbrokers and tracing suspects backwards from there. Visual recognition 
was also vital and detectives had much success tracking down suspects already known to 
them through previous offences.   
This chapter presents, for the first time, a comprehensive analysis of the working lives of 
Metropolitan Police detectives in the early and mid-Victorian period. Little has been 
written about the career trajectories of the Met’s first detectives and references to 
detectives from this early period are scattered throughout official documents.1 Using a 
combination of government records, court transcripts, newspapers and secondary 
literature, I have compiled a list of sixty-nine men who served in the Detective 
Department between 1842 and 1878.  
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3.1 The First Detectives 
In August 1842 the men specially selected for the Detective Department began work at 
Scotland Yard, the Metropolitan Police’s head office located at No. 4 Whitehall Place. 
Only the commissioners, clerical staff and central detectives worked there while all other 
policemen worked out of stations located in their respective divisions. 4 Whitehall Place 
earned the epithet Scotland Yard because the building backed onto Great Scotland Yard, 
which itself was named for the former Palace of Whitehall, once used by Scottish royalty 
visiting England before it burned to the ground in the seventeenth century.2 In the 
Victorian period, Great Scotland Yard was “a small – a very small – tract of land, 
bounded on one side by the river Thames, on the other by the gardens of Northumberland 
House: abutting at one end on the bottom of Northumberland Street, at the other on the 
back of Whitehall Place.”3 In the early nineteenth century the small yard catered to the 
coal heavers who worked at the wharves but increasingly up-market traffic provided by 
the Metropolitan Police head office and the expansion of parliament after 1832 gentrified 
Great Scotland Yard. Dickens described the transition in Sketches by Boz, lamenting the 
replacement of the tavern by vine vaults and the pie maker with a jeweler.4 
The new detective recruits – Inspectors Pearce and Haynes and Sergeants Gerrett, 
Thornton, Whicher, Goff, Shaw and Braddick – were a remarkably small group for a city 
teeming, as London was in the nineteenth century, with wealth and people. The city’s 
population was less than one million in 1800, but grew by 330,000 in the 1840s, “a 
staggering 17 per cent of London’s total population.”5 While population exploded, so did 
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national income, which “more than trebled” between 1850 and 1914.6 The minuscule size 
of the Detective Department (no more than thirty were ever employed at one time until 
1878) reflected continued ambivalence among senior police and government officials 
about the use of detectives. Although undercover police work was hardly unknown in 
England, public stigma against such ‘continental’ methods ensured that the new 
department remained small.7    
Rowan and Mayne selected their new detectives from among serving Metropolitan Police 
officers. The first detectives had experience investigating crimes or were thought to be 
able to learn this skill quickly. Gerrett, Goff, Thornton and Shaw had been involved in 
investigating the murders leading up to the creation of the detective force.8 A degree of 
continuity with London’s earlier detective force is also evident: Nicholas Pearce began 
his career in London law enforcement in 1825 as a Bow Street Officer. He subsequently 
joined the Metropolitan Police, earning coveted promotions to sergeant and then 
inspector during the 1830s. As a police inspector in Whitehall division, Pearce was a 
senior officer in the Westwood, Courvoisier and Good murder investigations. His 
experience working for Bow Street and more than twelve years as a Metropolitan Police 
officer made him an excellent choice to oversee the new detective force.9 John Haynes, a 
police inspector from Camberwell, joined Pearce at the helm of the new department. Like 
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his colleague, Haynes had been with the Metropolitan Police since the early 1830s and 
had ample experience as a senior officer.10 Both men had been inspectors in their 
divisions for at least two years before being chosen to oversee the Detective Department. 
The commissioners drew their new sergeants from Whitehall, Holborn, Lambeth, 
Greenwich and Covent Garden. The range of divisional experience ensured that the new 
detectives possessed expert knowledge of central London and the South Bank. Of the six 
initial detective sergeants, only half seem to have enjoyed long-term careers in the 
Detective Department. Gerrett lasted four months and Goff just over a year while 
Braddick managed to stay on for two years. Gerrett resigned in December 1842 and was 
replaced by Sergeant George Vickers from Whitehall. Goff was demoted and sent back to 
uniform duty; Braddick also went back into uniform.11  
Stephen Thornton, Jonathan Whicher and Frederick Shaw, on the other hand, made the 
Detective Department their life’s work. All three joined the police in the 1830s and 
worked together in Holborn division before Rowan and Mayne handpicked them for 
detective duty. Holborn was a notoriously dangerous part of town and those who called it 
home were more than likely to merit a visit from the men in blue. Mayne himself 
admitted that it was police policy that the wealthy neighbourhoods of “Belgrave-square 
and Grosvenor-square are really watched in Whitechapel, Saint Giles’s, the Mint, and the 
bad neighbourhoods.”12  
Thornton’s illustrious career in the Metropolitan Police ended only with his death in 
1861, after nearly two decades as a detective. He began treading the pavement in Holborn 
and was subsequently promoted to sergeant. He was part of the teams investigating 
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Robert Westwood’s murder in 1839 and Daniel Good’s escape from the police in April 
1842. He was assigned to tail Mary Good and her associates and was also involved in 
searching her house. Thornton worked under Nicholas Pearce on the case and Thornton’s 
discreet surveillance of Mary Good and her accomplice may have caught the eye of 
senior officers. By the 1850s, Thornton was a detective inspector. He coordinated and 
oversaw detective work among uniformed policemen, notably the periodic use of 
plainclothes patrols at fairs, races and other public events.13 Thornton, with his “ruddy 
face and high sun-burnt forehead,” was a trusted government emissary; he and his 
colleague Sergeant Jonathan Whicher were sent to investigate Chartist agitation in West 
Yorkshire in June 1848.14  
Thornton ascended the ranks with Whicher, another bright young man. Whicher was 
labourer from Camberwell who also worked as a beat constable in Holborn division, from 
where he and Thornton were plucked for detective duty in late summer 1842.15 Both men 
were senior detective officers by the 1850s. Like Thornton, Whicher coordinated 
plainclothes police patrols in London and undertook investigations outside the 
metropolis. Most famously, he was involved in the investigation of Samuel Kent’s 1860 
murder, also known as the Road Hill House Murder.16 The police commissioner and 
home secretary had great confidence in his abilities and he was chosen to consult with the 
Russian government on behalf of the English government in 1862. He and another officer 
traveled to Russia to help the Russian government reorganize the police force in Warsaw 
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along English lines.17 Back home, Whicher scrutinized candidates for naturalization and 
denization for the Home Office; his fact-finding skills were helpful in verifying the 
background and character of applicants and their references.18 He was also mentor to one 
of the most successful of the Met’s detectives, Adolphus Williamson, who later became 
the first Chief Superintendent of the CID.19 Whicher’s career is an excellent example of 
the upward mobility that the Detective Department offered its members. As a young 
police constable in the 1830s, he would have earned around 25s per week. Once 
promoted to the Detective Department in 1842 his salary increased to over 30s. By way 
of comparison, nearly thirty later a First Class Sergeant in uniform received only 28s per 
week, and that only after a recent pay hike.20 On retirement in 1864, he was given a 
pension of £133.6.8 per annum.21 It was the highest pension awarded in the Detective 
Department during the 1860s. Other offices’ retirement allowances ranged between £46 
and £70. It was a successful career in public service for the son of a market gardener.  
Frederick Shaw, “a little wiry Sergeant of meek demeanour and strong sense,” joined the 
police in 1830 and served alongside Thornton and Whicher in Holborn.22 In 1840 he was 
transferred to Greenwich, from where he would be recruited as a detective sergeant in 
1842. He was with Pearce during the Westwood investigation and was also part of the 
investigating team on the Courvoisier case in 1840. He testified at some length at 
Courvoisier’s trial about his involvement in the investigation – Shaw had been the one to 
discover Lord William Russell’s locket hidden under the hearth in the butler’s pantry. 
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Defense counsel, as noted above, had been concerned that the police planted evidence. 
Clearly, Shaw’s reputation within the force was untainted by this association, as he was 
promoted to sergeant just two weeks before Courvoisier stood trial at the Old Bailey.23 
Pearce, Haynes, Thornton, Whicher and Shaw comprised the first wave of career 
detectives at Scotland Yard. They each had long and successful careers and trained 
subsequent generations of detectives, many of whom would go on to be senior public 
officials. 
A glance at police reports in London newspapers indicates that the new detectives were 
very active during their first few months on duty. Thornton had chased a jewel thief to 
Dublin and brought him back to face justice at Bow Street magistrates’ court.24 Two 
weeks later Thornton reappeared, this time at Marylebone, along with Inspector Haynes. 
The case was, The Times wrote tactfully, “of a most extraordinary and delicate nature.” 
The accused, Alice Lowe, had been living clandestinely with Viscount Frankfort de 
Montmorencey as his mistress. Although the terms of their ‘agreement’ precluded their 
appearance in public together, Frankfort was clearly happy to provide her with bespoke 
clothing and jewellery. Lowe stayed with him for several months before absconding with 
valuable jewellery and other items. By Lowe’s third presentment at Marylebone, 
boisterous spectators clamoured to get in forcing Frankfort to flee through back entrance 
to escape the “crowd of from 200 to 300 persons.”25 The stolen property was located 
through pawnbrokers’ tickets found at Lowe’s apartment. Thornton’s testimony before 
the magistrates emphasized the lawfulness of his arrest, indicating that he identified 
himself as a policeman (this would not have been obvious since detectives did not wear 
uniforms) and told her the reason for her arrest.26 Although Lowe was acquitted at the 
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Old Bailey, Haynes and Thornton exerted much energy tracking the stolen property and 
ferreting out Lowe’s hiding place “by making inquiry.”27  
The Times was also impressed with the young Sergeant Whicher, applauding him for 
“conduct[ing] the case with great skill” when he apprehended a watch thief. This was 
especially noteworthy because the theft occurred in August 1841, over a year before 
Whicher became involved in the investigation.28 Inspector Haynes appeared at Bow 
Street in early December to give evidence against cheque-forger William Brady. Haynes 
searched Brady’s lodgings and found a “bank book, [and] a book of blotting paper, on 
which was an impression of the cheque in question.” After comparing the handwriting in 
the bankbook with the prisoner’s, Haynes sent Sergeant Shaw to arrest Brady, who was 
convicted of fraud and sentenced to fourteen years’ transportation.29  
A man who was shortly to join the Detective Department, Sergeant Edward Langley, also 
appeared in the paper that fall, bringing fraud charges against William Dell at Queen’s 
Square police court in October. Dell’s fraud of choice was to order expensive goods on 
behalf of wealthy Londoners for whom he claimed to work. He would then snatch the 
goods from the errand boys sent to make the deliveries. Dell was committed for trial and 
the magistrate complimented Langley “for the attention and ability he had shown in the 
course of the prosecution, and directed that the greatest allowance should be made to him 
for expenses.”30 
The commissioners had, on the whole, chosen their new detectives well. In this short time 
they demonstrated talent at tracking stolen property, locating incriminating evidence and 
arresting suspects. Praise for their conduct in court indicates that they also knew how to 
present evidence in court and were courteous and professional before the bench. Their 
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investigatory skill and public deportment demonstrated, even at this early date, that 
undercover detective work was neither a threat to civil liberties nor an infringement on 
personal rights.  
3.2 Career Trajectories 
Personnel records for the sixty-nine detectives who served in Scotland Yard’s Detective 
Department between 1842 and 1878 are scattered and sparse.31 This explains why this 
detective force has received so little comprehensive scholarly attention.32 Complete 
career data is available for only thirty-three men, although partial information exists for 
all but five.33 The statistics in the following section cover the period from September 
1842 until April 1878, bracketing the years between the foundation of the Detective 
Department and its reorganization into the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in 
April 1878.   
3.2.1 Recruiting Detectives 
As of August 1842, the home secretary and police commissioners committed to the 
necessity of a detective division. Small in size as that division was, its officers quietly 
proved their worth. How would the Detective Department develop over time and how 
would future detectives be recruited? Promotional prospects in the Metropolitan Police – 
and the associated possibilities for social mobility – were “limited but possible” in the 
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nineteenth century.34 Shpayer-Makov has calculated the promotional possibilities of 
(uniformed) Metropolitan policemen between 1869 and 1914, concluding that constables 
expected to wait at least five years before being promoted sergeants.35 Although the 
Metropolitan Police force as a whole grew considerably from around 3,300 in 1830 to 
nearly 9,000 in 1868, the glut of constables in the force meant that only so many could 
progress.36 In the 1860s the Met had one Chief Superintendent, 26 superintendents, 253 
inspectors, 951 sergeants and 7729 constables, making roughly eight constables for every 
sergeant.37  Subdividing ranks into first, second and even third classes gave the illusion of 
upward mobility within a single rank without actually accelerating promotional 
possibilities between ranks. Set periods had to elapse before promotion was considered 
and most recruits were unlikely to ascend past sergeant.38 All hiring from the position of 
superintendent down to constable was internal and only the most senior officers were 
appointed from outside. Detectives were drawn from the same pool of men recruited into 
the Metropolitan Police more generally. Officially, this meant fit and literate men from 
labouring backgrounds who were at least five foot nine in height and under thirty-five 
years of age. Clive Emsley’s research indicates that most recruits were from labouring or 
trade backgrounds or were agricultural workers.39  
Men suitable for detective work received recommendations from their superintendents, 
but the final decision lay with the commissioners.40 When policemen were promoted 
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from uniform duty to detective, they were expected to have adequate knowledge of the 
criminal law, their divisions, and of any techniques that would be useful to them. Since 
all (save a very few) members of the Detective Department were hired from within the 
uniform branch, the same initial hiring and training techniques applied to detectives as 
uniformed policemen.  
Training in the Metropolitan Police was typically done on the job, and this was no 
different for detectives. New police recruits were expected to pass drill instruction and 
memorize the instruction manual in their preparatory class. They were also taken to 
police courts to see how cases were conducted and, importantly, to learn how to give 
evidence.41 Assistant Commissioner Colonel D.W. Labalmondiere felt that drawing 
detectives and senior officers from the ranks was a fruitful policy: 
I think that a previous acquaintance with Police duties, with the limits of the 
power intrusted [sic] to a Constable, and the assurance that a man has habits of 
industry and sobriety, and a due control of his temper, are strong points in favour 
of the selection being made, as a rule, from men serving in the Police.42  
Walter Andrews, who joined the Detective Department in 1875, felt similarly. “[M]y 
experience as a constable,” he told an 1878 Departmental Commission, was “of great 
assistance to me as a detective officer, because it taught me the routine of police duty, 
and the kind of evidence which is required to be given in a police court, and how to go 
about my business.”43 Police service in uniform was the preferred training ground for 
detectives.  
Once promoted to the Department, new detective recruits were subject to a short 
probationary period, ranging from three to six months, although this was flexible and 
                                                 
41 
Minutes of Evidence for the Committee to inquire into the System of Police (1868), 168 and 14.  
42
 Minutes of Evidence for the Committee to inquire into the System of Police (1868), 168.  
43
 Report of the Departmental Commission (1878), 48. 
97 
 
depended upon the alacrity and adroitness of the recruit.44 There was no instruction 
manual for detective work. Both senior detective officers and their superiors felt that 
developing detectives was an organic process, better accomplished through job 
shadowing. A new detective recruit would typically attach himself to a veteran officer to 
get a feel for the job. Once the probationary period elapsed, senior detective staff would 
determine whether the recruit had distinguished himself. If so, he would be made a full 
detective; if not, he would be sent back down to the divisions. By the 1860s the 
probationary period was extended for some men. Nathaniel Druscovich was made a 
temporary detective police sergeant in October 1863 but only made permanent in May 
1866. Similarly, John Meiklejohn was temporarily transferred to the Detective 
Department from Finsbury in 1867 but had to wait until the spring of 1869 to receive his 
permanent detective stripes. 
It is rather unclear what specific detective skills were required for new detective recruits, 
although some are more obvious than others. Williamson described the ideal detective 
candidate as one with “good education, a man of observation, a man of tact, and a man of 
perseverance.”45 He also thought “intelligence” and “natural aptitude” were important 
qualities.46 What Williamson, who had attended Hammersmith Grammar School, 
considered a ‘good education’ was probably a good deal more rigorous than most of his 
contemporaries could hope to achieve. At an urban grammar school, Williamson would 
have received a classical education focusing on Latin, Greek, French and German as well 
as arithmetic, English grammar and geography.47 He was the son of the Hammersmith 
police superintendent and his father could easily afford to send his son to school with the 
sons of other middle-class Londoners. After graduation Williamson became a clerk for 
the Royal Ordnance and the Metropolitan Police before formally joining up as an officer. 
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Many policemen would have received a rudimentary education at Sunday school or in a 
small dame or fee-paying private school. Most working-class children in the 1850s 
remained in school for only two years before beginning their working lives. The 
education of those who stayed longer was hampered by the poor quality of instructors and 
school facilities and only a very few might achieve sufficient literacy to work as clerical 
assistants.48 
Basic literacy was a necessity for detective work. Detectives wrote endless reports to 
keep the commissioners abreast of investigations. This was especially important when 
inquiries took them outside London. Most detectives seem to have been comfortable 
writing reports, many of which ran for pages, on a regular basis. Literacy became more 
pressing after the government introduced Civil Service exams in the 1850s.49 In the face 
of these requirements, candidates for detective could sometimes be exempted from the 
exams “on the ground of special qualifications for detective duties.” The home secretary 
usually only granted these exemptions for divisional detectives and illiteracy among 
central detectives was rare.50 One exception to this rule was inspector Daniel Davey. 
When Davey received his promotion to inspector in 1875, Commissioner Henderson 
requested that he be excused from the educational examination and Home Secretary Sir 
Richard Assheton Cross agreed “on the ground of his special qualifications for Police 
duties.” It is not clear what those were, but given Davey’s later work in extradition cases 
it was more than likely his foreign language skills had attracted attention.51 
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Foreign languages were a boon to a prospective hire. Detective police work would often 
take policemen to the Continent, especially to extradite prisoners to and from other 
countries.52 The Detective Department boasted men who could speak German, Greek, 
Italian and Russian, although French was the most common second language among 
them. These language skills were also in high demand for the translation of documents. In 
November 1876 Home Secretary Cross congratulated the Detective Department for 
translating important information needed by the Treasury solicitor to prosecute a case at 
the Old Bailey. Always with an eye on the bottom line, Under-Secretary Henry Selwin-
Ibbetson wrote to Mayne that 
in this, as in other cases, great assistance has been rendered by the Detective 
Department at Scotland Yard under Mr. Superintendent Williamson, especially in 
reference to the accurate translations from the German, which were necessary in 
the case, and which were furnished by that Department, thus saving expense to 
the Crown.53 
Inspector Charles Von Tornow, who became a detective in the early 1870s, worked in a 
similar capacity, translating evidence from German to English in preparation for a trial in 
1879.54 Having several – preferably high-profile – arrests under your belt also brought 
possible recruits to the attention of senior officers. Andrew Lansdowne was promoted to 
detective after catching a highway robber and a housebreaker.55 
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3.2.1.1 Outliers  
The commissioners hired seven men straight into the Detective Department from outside 
the police service (see Figure 1).56 This was highly irregular. The Metropolitan Police 
hired internally for all but the highest supervisory positions. Labalmondiere argued that 
hiring men who had no police experience was, on the whole, unwise.  Yet, “I do not 
affirm,” he told a committee in 1868 
that it is altogether inexpedient to admit persons to this Department who have not 
previously served in the police, because there may be men peculiarly qualified for 
this service outside the Force.57  
Detectives were expected to be intelligent, trustworthy, independent individuals with 
above average education and, if possible, fluent in at least one foreign language. Because 
Metropolitan Police recruitment norms favoured brawn over brains, fresh blood from 
outside the police services was periodically necessary to bolster detective numbers.58 
Labourers, tradesmen and lads from the counties were unlikely to suit. As Detective 
Superintendent Williamson put it in 1878, “I do not think that an agricultural man is quite 
the class of man that we want for the superior order of detectives.” To find the class of 
men he was looking for, men who were “of some education … some intelligence, and … 
                                                 
56
 Shpayer-Makov counts six men, those who are mentioned in Williamson’s testimony before the 1878 
Committee. I count John Hitchens Sanders, making seven, among these men because he had only been in 
the police a brief time in 1850 before quitting and reapplied directly to the Detective Department in 1851. 
There may also have been an eighth man, another Sanders, mentioned by Williamson in his 1878 
testimony. I have not included him in any of these calculations, nor as one of the sixty-nine men of the 
Detective Department, because I can find no additional corroboration for his existence. I do not believe he 
could be John Hitchens Sanders, famous for his surveillance of foreign refugees in the 1850s, because 
Sanders was a successful detective who died of apoplexy 1858, while Williamson describes the man he 
means as a drunk who committed suicide. There is one detective Sanders mentioned in a police report in 
Home Office Records in 1877 as receiving a promotion in Inspector. It is also possible Williamson made a 
mistake in his testimony. Report of the Departmental Commission (1878), 4-5. 
57 
Minutes of Evidence for the Committee to Inquire into the System of Police at the Home Office (1868), 
168. 
58
 Haia Shpayer-Makov, “Becoming a Police Detective in Victorian and Edwardian England,” Policing 
and Society Vol. 14, No. 3 (2004): 256. See also Shpayer-Makov, The Ascent of the Detective, 82-83.  
101 
 
of some shrewdness and perseverance, and honesty,” it was sometimes necessary to look 
beyond police stables.59 
The first man drawn from outside the ranks was John Hitchens Sanders.60 He was fluent 
in French, married to a Frenchwoman and had lived in France. He was hired as a 
detective constable for a probationary period in 1851 and was made a detective sergeant 
later that year. Between 1851 and his death in 1858, Sanders monitored the activities of 
foreign refugees, especially French ones, in England and the Channel Islands. Following 
Louis Napoleon’s December 1851 coup many French refugees fled to Jersey, where they 
remained particularly active.61 Sanders spent much time travelling between London and 
Jersey so that he could keep the government informed about any dangerous activities. He 
became an indispensible source of information to General Love, the Governor of Jersey, 
who lamented that Sanders routinely had to return to London. Love pleaded with the 
Home Office in September 1855 to let Sanders stay a while longer, for “to recall him at 
this moment would be to deprive me of some very important information relative to the 
conduct of the French Refugees, which through his aid I am alone enabled to obtain.”62 
Sanders rose quickly. When the Detective Department added another inspectorship in 
1856, he beat five other candidates for the promotion.63 His career would probably have 
continued to soar had he not died suddenly in August 1859.64 After Sanders’s death, the 
commissioners hired a Frenchman named Lavite, who did not last long due to ill health. 
                                                 
59 Report of the Departmental Commission (1878), 4. 
60
 Sanders had joined the police briefly in 1850, but left. When he re-applied to the police he was brought 
on directly as a detective. Bernard Porter, The Refugee question in mid-Victorian Politics (London and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 151.  
61
 Caroline Emily Shaw, “The British, Persecuted Foreigners and the Emergence of the Refugee Category 
in Nineteenth-Century Britain,” Immigrants & Minorities Vol. 30, No. 2-3 (2012): 254.  
62
 HO 45/6188, 28 and 29 September 1855.  
63
 HO 65/20, 8 January 1856.  
64
 His death was particularly ill timed because he was in the process of gathering French witnesses to 
testify at Barnard’s trial in London for the latter’s part in the Orsini Plot. See chapter 6.  
102 
 
Little is know about him, except that he seems to have joined the force around 1857 or 
1858 and retired in 1861 after a protracted illness.65 
James Jacob Thomson, the third man hired from without the force, quickly distinguished 
himself in the Metropolitan Police.66 Even Labalmondiere, a devotee of internal 
recruitment, had to admit that Thompson was “[a] very prominent and excellent 
Officer.”67 Thomson had briefly been a Met policeman in 1856, but left to serve as an 
officer in Devonshire and Hampshire. When he returned to the Metropolitan Police in 
1862, he immediately entered the Detective Department as a sergeant.  
Thomson’s language skills were extraordinary, especially considering that many 
Metropolitan Police constables were functionally illiterate at this time.68 He spoke 
French, Italian and, unusually, Greek.69 His talents were especially useful when Mayne 
met with Russian officials about reorganizing the Warsaw police force. Russian 
correspondence came through in French and, given the sensitive nature of the 
discussions, translation was entrusted to the recently re-instated Thomson.70 Thomson 
was an active officer and his progress through the ranks was swift. Many of the cases he 
investigated were high profile, which no doubt contributed to his success. In July 1863 
Earl Spencer rewarded Thomson and his colleague, Detective Sergeant Beard, for helping 
to uncover and prosecute two extortionists who had threatened to accuse Spencer of a 
crime if he did not pay. One of the perpetrators was sentenced to twenty years’ penal 
servitude, although his accomplice was acquitted. Thomson received £15 from the 
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grateful earl and a further £2.2s. from the prosecution solicitors for helping develop the 
case.71  
Thomson was promoted to detective inspector in record time. Fourteen months after his 
return to the force, he became one of the senior officers of the Detective Department and 
continued to earn his keep. He lead a team of sixteen men to investigate a major burglary 
in Manchester. The theft took place on May 26, 1866, when Charles Batt, Charles 
Leeson, and William and Thomas Douglas stole £10,000 worth of stamps from a safe in 
the Manchester Stamp Office. The government was involved in the investigation from the 
beginning and immediately sent Thomson to Manchester. After three months, he found 
two of the suspects in a betting ring in Doncaster and arrested them.  
The prosecution put Thomson on the stand to explain the technicalities of safe breaking 
to the jury. He showed them the tools he found in the Douglas’s apartment and 
demonstrated how drills and wedges were used to force open the safe door. Another 
witness, a London toolmaker named Cohen, reinforced Thomson’s testimony. When 
defense counsel argued that the tools Thomson presented to the court “might be used for 
an honest purpose,” Cohen backed Thomson: “taken together,” he asserted, “they could 
not be.”72 For coordinating the investigation in Manchester, London and Doncaster, 
Thomson received an immense £70 reward, the lion’s share of £200 awarded by the Hon. 
R.E. Howard, Distributer of Stamps in Manchester, to the seventeen London policemen 
involved in the case.73 1867 was a good year for Inspector Thomson, who was enjoying 
significant professional and pecuniary success as a London detective.  
His ascent continued over the next few years. Thomson, as well as the rest of the 
Detective Department, received commendation for his work detecting Fenian 
                                                 
71
 This was a significant sum, given that detective inspectors’ annual salaries were around £200, over three 
times the average adult man’s wage in the 1860s. Shpayer-Makov, The Ascent of the Detective, 111. MEPO 
7/24, 17 July 1863. Trial is at OBP: t18630713-858, “James Mills, George Peacock Smith.” 
72
 Manchester Times, 15 December 1866.  
73
 MEPO 7/29, 25 March 1867.  
104 
 
conspiracies in 1867/68. Thomson accepted a £10 gratuity for “gallant and courageous 
conduct in the apprehension of the notorious Fenian Richard Burke, charged with 
Treason Felony.”74 He also found time to exonerate a man convicted as a sheep stealer, 
earning a silver-plated tobacco case from friends of the vindicated man.75 In May 1869, 
just seven years after entering the Detective Department as a sergeant, Thomson was 
promoted to Detective Chief Inspector and his salary increased to £250 a year.76 
Thomson’s meteoric rise culminated in his promotion to superintendent in July 1869. He 
was given the stewardship of Holborn division, a post previously held by another former 
detective, Nicholas Pearce. Holborn had recently been amalgamated with the now 
defunct Covent Garden division, so Thomson’s new mandate was to police some of the 
most notorious turf in London.77 He never abandoned his detective instincts and still 
worked cases outside London when the Home Office or Commissioner required.78 He 
remained Holborn’s superintendent until his retirement in 1887.79 Sanders and Thomson 
were unqualified successes, so far as outside hires went. 
Edwin Coathupe, a Met detective from 1863 to 1866, was the next man brought in from 
without the force. Unlike Sanders and Thomson, who had police experience, Coathupe 
had none. He was a surgeon from Bristol with a keen interest in detective work and 
applied directly to police commissioner Mayne for a job. Coathupe had no recorded 
foreign language abilities – the usual reason for hiring outside men – but was highly 
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educated and had, according to Mayne, “detective tastes.”80 The commissioner must have 
seen something in him, since, by his own admission, Coathupe stoutly “refused to join as 
a uniform man.”81 In his memoirs, Andrew Lansdowne remembered that Coathupe was 
particularly adept at catching pickpockets: “He seemed to have an instinct for that kind of 
thing.”82 Even before joining the police, Coathupe helped arrest several pickpockets in 
Regent Street; he and a police sergeant from St. James’s brought three young men to 
Marlborough Street police court in February 1863 for picking ladies’ pockets of £8. 
Coathupe, who was presumably out for a walk, was “watching the boys.”83 Upon joining 
the Met, he was trained by Williamson and Whicher. A better pedigree could not be had. 
Whicher was already a seasoned detective and Williamson would go on to be, arguably, 
the most famous and certainly the most successful Scotland Yard Detective. Finding that 
he could not make ends meet as a detective, however, Coathupe left in 1866 to continue 
his medical practice.84 He later reentered police service in Manchester and Bristol.85  
George Greenham was hired in 1869 as part of the augmentation of the Detective 
Department following an 1868 Departmental Investigation.86 He was exceptionally well 
educated, having earned a degree in engineering from Vienna’s Polytechnic Institute. 
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Born in Italy, he was also fluent in Italian and French.87 These language skills helped him 
work extradition cases where a unilingual officer would have struggled. Speaking before 
the 1878 Departmental Commission, he remembered that, as an outside hire, he had a 
difficult time proving his worth to fellow Yard men. “When I first joined I found it very 
hard work,” he explained. “I was really one of the first that were brought from the 
outside, and I found a tremendous amount of jealousy, and everybody was looking at me 
with distain, and was sneering at me.”88 Greenham proved his worth to colleagues and 
superiors and graduated to detective inspector in early January 1877 (replacing Inspector 
Reimers, who was demoted to detective sergeant on Boxing Day 1876). After the 
creation of the CID, Greenham rose to the rank of Chief Inspector.89  
The final two outside hires were Adolphe Marchand, a commercial clerk, and James 
Henry Lambert, also an engineer. Both were more than likely hired to help with the work 
piling up as a result of the 1870 Extradition Act.90 It is not clear why engineers were 
drawn to detective work or how their training made them suitable candidates. Most 
probably their advanced and specialized education made them thoughtful, initiative-
taking problem solvers who could work independently. There was no handholding in the 
Detective Department.  
3.2.2 Years of Uniformed Service 
Since nearly all detectives came up through the ranks, knowing how much time they 
spent in uniform indicates how experienced detectives were as policemen when they 
began their new jobs (Figure 1). This information exists for thirty-two men, just less than 
half of the detectives employed in this period. The majority of new hires already had 
ample experience, having spent between nine and fourteen years in uniform. The 
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Detective Department only began hiring at the rank of sergeant, so new detectives were 
drawn from a body of men whose skill and leadership in the divisions had already 
advanced their rank. Promotion to sergeant in the Metropolitan Police was difficult. 
Constables were only eligible for promotion to sergeant after five years, and this was 
only possible if myriad other variables fell into place, including: a vacancy in the upper 
ranks, favourable references from senior officers, passing the Civil Service exam, a clear 
bill of health from the police surgeon and, finally, the commissioners’ sanction.91  
Men who spent fewer than nine years in uniform before they were plucked for detective 
service were the exception. Williamson had been in the police only two years before his 
promotion to detective in 1852. Nepotism must have played some part – Williamson’s 
father was the superintendent of Hammersmith division. But Dolly, as he was 
affectionately known, was also an energetic and talented young man. He was educated at 
Hammersmith Grammar School and worked as a clerk for both the Royal Ordnance and 
the Metropolitan Police before formally joining up as an officer. Williamson’s mentor, 
Jonathan Whicher was also hired early in his career – he joined up five years before he 
was chosen to be one of the Metropolitan Police’s first detectives.92 Walter Andrews 
spent six years in uniform before joining the detective ranks. Like Whicher, his 
promotions to sergeant and detective were concurrent. He was an emergency hire because 
the commissioner needed to replace Sergeant Moon, who was demoted in June 1875.93 
Andrews was a plainclothes officer in Paddington for a year, giving him the undercover 
experience valued at headquarters.94 His fellow detective George Littlechild had also 
been a policeman in Paddington, but for ten years. Like Andrews, Littlechild’s 
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superintendent specially selected him for plainclothes duty and he spent his time 
undercover detecting illegal betting houses and breaches of the liquor laws.95 
Figure 1: Years of police service pre-detective 
 
Others spent far longer in uniform. Detective Sergeants Henry Lockyer, Samuel Gibbs, 
George Urben, William Henry Campbell and John Croome were only taken up to 
Scotland Yard after fifteen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty-two and twenty-three years 
respectively. Urben and Croom had been divisional detectives, which accounts not only 
for their promotion, since they were already skilled in undercover and surveillance work, 
but also explains why they remained in the divisions for so long. Divisional detectives 
were formally established in 1869 with the expansion of the detective function of the 
Metropolitan Police more generally.96 As a result of their longtime divisional service, 
Urben and Croom spent less time in the Detective Department than men who joined 
earlier. Croom was pensioned after four years, Campbell after six, and Lockyer seven. 
Gibbs and Urben remained detectives after 1878, though they retired from the CID 
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shortly after. By then Gibbs, still a detective sergeant, had worked at Scotland Yard for 
ten years and Urben, now a detective inspector, for seven.  
Detective Inspectors Mulvany and Clarke also spent significant time in uniform before 
their promotions. Mulvany joined the police in July 1848 and trod the beat as a constable 
in Hampstead from then until August 1854, when he was promoted to sergeant. His 
progress from constable to sergeant took six years, while his promotion from sergeant to 
detective sergeant took ten. After that, progress was quicker. Mulvany was among those 
who had investigated the Manchester Stamp Office robbery under Inspector Thomson 
and was rewarded for his diligence.97 After five years as a sergeant in the Detective 
Department he was promoted to detective inspector in 1869, along with several others in 
that year’s expansion.98 Mulvany might have moved up further in the ranks had he not 
become worn out and retired in 1873.99 Clarke had an unusually long police career. He 
joined up at twenty-one in 1840 and spent the next twenty-two years as a constable, then 
sergeant, also in Hampstead. His career at Scotland Yard was sterling until his forced 
retirement in 1878 for his part in the Turf Fraud scandal.100 
3.2.3 Years of Detective Service  
Of the sixty-nine detectives identified, we know how many years fifty-eight spent as 
detectives (Figure 2).101 Most men spent between one month and eleven years in the 
Detective Department, with the bulk of those serving between three and eight years. 
These figures only include the number of years detectives served between 1842 and 1878, 
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so the careers of those who continued serving in the newly formed CID are abbreviated 
by these calculations.102  
Eleven men served for two years or less. Of these, five men can be taken out of the 
equation because they were either promoted or still serving in 1878. The first, Detective 
Inspector John Lund, was promoted out of the department in 1851 to be Superintendent 
of Camberwell division, where he remained until his retirement in 1858.103 Inspector 
Nicholas Pearce was likewise promoted in 1844 to the superintendence of Holborn. Three 
others, detective sergeants Marshall, Robson and Smart, were still serving as detectives 
when the Detective Department became the CID. All had only recently been promoted, 
so their detective careers were just beginning by 1878.104 Three other men who spent less 
than two years on duty were Sergeants Goff, Gerrett and Braddick. As we saw above, 
Goff was demoted within a month, Gerret resigned after four months and Braddick was 
also demoted. Sergeants Foley and Manners resigned from the police; Manners, worn 
out, received a gratuity of £63.14.0.105 Sergeant Warne was fired and received nothing 
“for general bad conduct in the Detective Branch, and irregularity in the Section House,” 
though what irregularity he was guilty of is unspecified. Unmarried officers lived in 
section houses attached to local stations where, in the paternalist structure of the 
Metropolitan Police, senior officers could ensure that the young men in their employ 
avoided the temptations of metropolitan life, including excessive drinking and loose 
women.106 
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Figure 2: Years of known detective service 
 
Twenty-nine men (the majority) served as detectives between three and eight years. This 
may seem like a short period, but many had spent years as uniformed policemen and, 
after a handful of years as detectives, were ready for retirement. Seven of the twenty-nine 
qualified for pensions. These men had all spent considerable time in the police. Detective 
Sergeant Campbell led the way with twenty-eight years of service (six as a detective), 
while Sergeants Croome and Lockyer also worked well over twenty years. Sergeants 
Monckton and Sunnerwy, as well as Detective Inspector Shackell, had all worked 
between fourteen and sixteen years. Inspector Thomas had spent seven years as a 
detective with an unknown number as uniformed officer beforehand. Others, including 
Sergeant Beard and Inspectors Sanders and Pay, died while in service. Of the remaining 
eighteen, one transferred, another was demoted, three were promoted, four resigned from 
the police, and eight continued on as part of the the CID.107  
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Twelve men served between nine and fourteen years in the Detective Department. These 
were the men who had done their service in uniform, been promoted to detective and 
then, in most cases, continued to rise within the Detective Department. Only three, 
Sergeants Samuel Gibbs, Andrew Lansdowne and George Greenham, failed to rise above 
a sergeant’s rank before 1878 but became detective inspectors in the new CID.108 John 
William Reimers spent ten years in uniform and another nine as a detective. He had 
reached the rank of detective inspector in October 1876, only to be demoted the 
following month for passing information to a private investigator.109 The remaining nine 
detectives were inspectors or detective chief inspectors (a rank introduced in 1867) by 
1878. Inspectors Frederick Shaw and Richard Tanner served before the introduction of 
the Chief Inspector rank, so as inspectors they had risen as high as possible in the 
Detective Department by the time of their departures. Detective Chief Inspector John 
Shore was still serving upon the creation of the CID. Poor Inspector Davey, only a year 
into his promotion, died suddenly of typhoid while on duty in Naples. He was 
presumably executing an extradition warrant, his specialty, when he became ill.110 After 
sixteen years of uniformed service and five as a detective, Mulvany was worn out and 
pensioned. Nathaniel Druscovich and John Meiklejohn were both on their way to high 
office when they were convicted of perverting the course of justice as part of the Turf 
Fraud scandal in 1878. Druscovich moved quickly through the detective ranks, with only 
three years between his formal instatement as a detective sergeant and his promotion to 
inspector. The following year, 1870, he became a chief inspector. Meiklejohn was made 
detective sergeant in 1869 and took Davey’s position as inspector in March 1876. He was 
dismissed alongside Druscovich and Palmer in November 1877. The last of the twelve, 
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Inspector Edward Sayer, spent at least ten years in detective service. He joined in October 
1867 as a sergeant, became an inspector in 1873 when Mulvany retired, and was serving 
at least until late 1877 when he took sick leave.111 
Six men spent more than fifteen years as detectives, the small number reflecting the 
length of time it took to work one’s way up the ranks and the physical demands of the 
job. The only man in this group who failed to rise above sergeant was Henry Smith, who 
was a detective as of at least 1845 and resigned his position in 1863.112 Chief Inspector 
Palmer spent an incredible thirty years in the police – equal parts in uniform and as a 
detective – when he was dismissed in 1877 for perverting the course of justice. His co-
conspirator George Clarke was a thirty-eight year veteran of the force, with twenty-two in 
uniform and sixteen as a detective before his forced retirement in 1877. As chief 
inspectors, Palmer and Clarke answered only to the superintendent of detectives, 
Adolphus Williamson.113 Stephen Thornton and Jonathan Whicher, two veteran 
detectives at Scotland Yard, were two of the first six sergeants selected to join the 
Detective Department. They worked together for nineteen years until Thornton’s 
death.114 Whicher retired shortly after, edging out his colleague with twenty-two years 
detective service. The only man to spend longer time as a detective was Williamson. He 
became the first chief inspector of the Detective Department in 1867 and, in 1869 became 
its new superintendent. In the new CID, Williamson was again – in spite of the Turf 
Fraud scandal – promoted, this time to Chief Superintendent.115 When he retired in 1888 
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he had spent thirty-six years as a policeman, twenty-six of those in the Detective 
Department.  
On the whole, detectives were veteran policemen with ample experience in the police 
divisions before they doffed their uniforms for detective duty. They had been through the 
drill instruction mandatory for all new police candidates and walked beats in some of 
London’s most notorious neighbourhoods. Most young constables destined for detective 
duty were promoted to sergeant while still in uniform and excelled at the skills that went 
with the job - organization, watchfulness and discipline – before being selected to join the 
cadre at Scotland Yard.   
3.2.4 Reasons for Leaving  
We know why sixty-one of sixty-nine detectives left, which offers a clear picture of the 
institutional culture of this elite group of men.  Detectives had various reasons for leaving 
the Detective Department, which fall into nine categories (Figure 3). 
The least common reasons for leaving detective service were transfer, demotion, 
dismissal and promotion. Sergeants Peck and Morgan asked to be sent back into uniform. 
Peck, part of the 1869 hiring round, seems to have had some trouble in his new position. 
In April 1872 he was cautioned and fined and cautioned again in February of the 
following year. Shortly thereafter, he asked to return to divisional work as regular 
sergeant and was transferred to St James’s division.116 Peck’s classmate, Richard Moon, 
did not last much longer.  Moon was suspended and then demoted in June 1875 for being 
light fingered with stolen property held at the station house. His official reprimand was 
“for not satisfactorily accounting for property which came into his possession in a case of 
felony, and also improperly withholding other property in the same case, and neglecting 
to report that he had received a gratuity.”117 This was a serious offense. The government 
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did not want money changing hands between policeman and policed. Police regulations 
dictated that all rewards had to be reported to and approved by the commissioners.118 
Figure 3: Reasons for leaving the Detective Department 
 
Four men were dismissed from police service outright. The first was Sergeant Warne, 
who only managed fifteen months as a detective before being shown the door for 
misbehaviour.119 The other three were fired in disgrace at the conclusion of their autumn 
1877 trial for perverting the course of justice. All three – much to the dishonour of the 
Metropolitan Police as a whole – were high-ranking detectives: Palmer and Druscovich 
were chief inspectors and Meiklejohn an inspector.  
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Some detectives left the police voluntarily. Sergeant Gerrett resigned after four months of 
detective work. Sergeant Henry Smith, who joined the force in the mid 1840s, left in 
August 1863.120 Four of the seven outside hires, Lavite, Lambert, Marchand and 
Coathupe, also resigned. George Manners gave his notice in November 1868 after 
twenty-one months because he was worn out. He received a gratuity of £63 14s, but no 
pension. John Foley quit just after Christmas 1870.121 The last resignation was that of 
sergeant Frederick Jarvis, who left in May 1876 after three years as a detective.122  
Four detectives had the honour of promotion to superintendents of police divisions. There 
were a fixed number of superintending positions in the Met and competition for these 
prestigious posts was fierce.123 Metropolitan Police superintendents oversaw hundreds of 
policemen in densely populated areas and were responsible for the administrative, 
executive and investigative functions of the office. The density of some London’s police 
divisions “actually exceeded some English counties in population.”124 Advancement to 
superintendent reflected the expertise of Scotland Yard’s detectives but also the limited 
promotional possibilities in such a small group. As Thomson noted, “[i]t was simply a 
question of promotion. I had attained the highest rank which I could attain in the 
detective department; the commissioner thought I was fit to take command of a division; 
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he offered it to me, and I accepted it.”125 Pearce became head of Covent Garden in 1842, 
Haynes followed as superintendent of Holborn in 1849, Lund was appointed 
superintendent of Camberwell in 1851 and Thomson accepted oversight of the new 
combined Holborn/Covent Garden division in 1869. Superintendents received the highest 
rates of pay, next to the commissioners of police, and were of significant stature in the 
police force and the community. It is no accident that three of four detectives-cum-
superintendents were placed in charge of Holborn/Covent Garden. This was one of the 
roughest areas of London, containing the St. Giles slums and heavily Irish.126 The 
commissioners wanted their most seasoned officers in charge of this troublesome turf.  
Promotion within the Detective Department seems to have come rather more quickly than 
in uniform. In the Department, promotion from second-class sergeant to first class took 
between two and five years for most men. Advancement between sergeant and inspector 
took between two and five and the promotion to chief inspector up to five years. Thus, 
members of the Detective Department could expect relatively quick ascension through 
the ranks. This occurred for several reasons. The first was that the expertise gained on the 
job made detective inspectors contenders for senior positions back in the divisions. As in 
the rest of the police, however, there were always more men than positions at the top of 
the detective hierarchy. Promotion came more slowly for those men who joined in the 
1860s and 1870s, by which time gradations were introduced so that men had to pass 
through two ranks for sergeant (second and then first class) before being eligible for 
promotion to inspector. That said, after the 1869 expansion, there were more senior ranks 
to fill. 
Seven men died while in office: Inspector Sanders (1859), Inspector Thornton (1861), 
Sergeant Robinson (1864), Sergeant Beard (1867), Sergeant Langley (1871), Inspector 
Pay (1875) and Inspector Davey (1876). Sanders died of “apoplexy” in the middle of 
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investigating the Orsini plot.127 The cause of death is unknown for Thornton, Robinson, 
Beard and Langley but the rest died from disease. There was an inquest on Inspector Pay 
because of his “sudden death,” though the findings are not recorded.128 Davey, as we 
have seen, died of typhoid while on assignment in Naples.  
The largest single category includes those who were still serving in 1878 and continued 
on to careers in the CID. This reflects growth in the Detective Department beginning in 
1869 and continuing through the 1870s. The Home Office approved an addition of 
sixteen detectives by 1869 and a further three by 1878.129 Men hired during this boom 
were just embarking on their careers at Scotland Yard when the Detective Department 
came to its end.  
3.2.5 Pensioners 
The second most frequent reason detectives left service was retirement. In order to 
receive a pension, officers had to serve at least fifteen years and be worn out by the job. 
Pensions or gratuities were given entirely at the discretion of the Home Office, upon 
recommendation of the commissioners.130 Twelve men received pensions between 1842 
and 1878.131 Some, such as Sergeants Croome and Sunnerway, had only been detectives 
for a few years but had a long history of police service; Sunnerway had been a policeman 
for sixteen and Croome twenty-seven when they retired. This pattern of long service is 
the case for all but two pensioners, Inspectors William Thomas and Frederick Field, for 
whom there is no data to support statistical analysis on this point. On average, the twelve 
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pensioners spent nine years as detectives following nearly fourteen years of uniformed 
service. This was a considerably long period of time in Metropolitan Police, where 
turnover was high. Only thirteen per cent of policemen in the entire Metropolitan Police 
received pensions between 1829 and 1860,132 while between 1842 and 1878 seventeen 
per cent of detectives were pensioned.  
Figure 4: Value of detectives' pensions, 1830-1890 
 
The value of pensions differs dramatically (Figure 4). Variance in pension values reflects 
when the pension was received (they increased over time), seniority and length of 
service. The largest pensions, predictably, went to the most senior officers and those who 
served many years in the Metropolitan Police. Seven men received pensions of between 
£140 and £200, including Superintendent Haynes, Inspector Lund, Inspector Mulvany, 
Superintendent Pearce, Inspector Lansdowne and Chief Inspector Clarke. Each served 
more than twenty-three years in the force, some much longer; Pearce retired in 1855 
having served Bow Street and the Met for thirty years, while Chief Inspector Clarke was 
                                                 
132
 Calculated from statistics given in Shpayer-Makov, The Making of a Policeman, 161.  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
30-49 50-69 70-89 90-109 110-129 130-149 150-169 170-189 190+
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
M
e
n
To
ta
l =
 2
4
Value of Pension (£)
120 
 
forced into retirement in 1877 after thirty-eight years in service. Luckily for Clarke, his 
acquittal at the Old Bailey – even though he was not entirely guiltless – allowed him to 
collect a sizeable pension of £184.133 Charles Burgess Goff’s 1853 pension of £36 is 
unusually low, reflecting the early date of his pension and the fact that he returned to 
uniformed service before retiring. 
The majority of pensioners retired in the 1870s and 1880s, reflecting the retirement of the 
second and third waves of detective officers. All had served more than the requisite 
fifteen years required for pension qualification (Figure 5); most served between twenty 
and thirty years, with the vast majority serving between twenty-five and thirty. This was a 
comparatively long period in a physically taxing profession.  A police officer’s physical 
deterioration, what Shpayer-Makov terms ‘natural wastage’, was the leading cause of 
leavers by the 1870s.134 It was the only reason detectives were discharged with pensions, 
a status variably labeled ‘ill health’, ‘bodily infirmity’ or ‘age and long service’ on their 
retirement paperwork.  
Inspector Shackell retired in 1848 “Ulcerated and diseased” after a leg injury. He was 
five years shy of the twenty-year rule, but Richard Maybe convinced the Home Office to 
include his years at Bow Street so that he might retire with a £70 pension and a £216 
gratuity.135 When John Haynes retired as superintendent of Southwark in 1856 he was 
forty-eight years old, suffering from a leg injury and chronic rheumatism. Haynes’s 
colleague Frederick Shaw, who had replaced him as detective inspector over a decade 
hence, retired the same year.136 Inspector Henry Lockyer received his pension in 1860 for 
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“impaired vision and loss of memory.”137 Some detectives’ bodies gave out earlier than 
others. Inspectors Tanner and Monckton were both only thirty-eight when they retired, 
while thirteen others were in their forties and eight more in their fifties upon leaving. 
George Clarke, the only man for whom “age and long service” is listed as a reason for 
leaving, was the oldest retiree at fifty-eight.138  
Figure 5: Total years of service for detective pensioners 
 
Looking more specifically at pension records indicates how detectives lived, including 
their birthplaces, residences and some details of their family life (Figure 6). The great 
majority came from southern England, primarily Essex, Kent and Surrey in the Home 
Counties, and London. Lund was from Knightsbridge, Lockyer from Marylebone, 
Mulvany from Chelsea and Peck from Whitechapel. Whicher and Goff hailed from the 
South Bank. Whicher was born in a none-too-glamorous part of Camberwell, while Goff 
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joined the police from Greenwich.139 Detectives born further from the metropolis include 
Pearce, who was Cornish and Andrews, who came from Boulge in Suffolk. Only four of 
the twenty-three men were born outside England. William Henry Campbell was an 
Irishman from Swanlinbar in County Cavan and John Croome came from St. Lawrence 
on Jersey in the Channel Islands. Thomson and Reimers were from farther afield. 
Thomson, born in 1837 to an English merchant father and an Italian mother in Turkey, 
spent his early years in Smyrna and Paris until the family moved to England in 1844.140 
John William Reimers was born in 1830 to parents Carl and Sophia in Holstein, 
Germany.  
Figure 6: Detectives' birthplaces by county 
 
Pension records also reveal where officers lived (Figure 7). As might be expected, many 
chose to live close to headquarters at Scotland Yard. The office at No. 4 Whitehall Place 
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was in Westminster and six men made their homes there. Eight lived across the river in 
Lambeth, which was less expensive than Westminster and a quieter place to rest off duty. 
Detectives who became superintendents usually moved into their new precincts. While 
head of Covent Garden, Pearce moved to Great Russell Street in Holborn. Thomson, who 
held the same position in later years, chose to settle his family in King’s Cross. Lund, as 
superintendent of Camberwell, lived on Carter Street in Lambeth while Southwark 
superintendent John Haynes lived with his wife Mary just off Horsemonger Lane in 
Newington.  
Figure 7: Detectives' residences at time of retirement 
 
All members, serving and former, of the Detective Department who retired with police 
pensions were married. Policemen’s wives were prohibited from working, which severely 
limited their financial contribution to the household income.141 Detectives’ superior pay 
did much to alleviate financial strain of a one-income household during a time when 
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workingmen’s wives commonly supplemented the family income.142 There is no 
indication of whether or not these detectives had children, but that is, in most cases, 
probably a safe assumption. Metropolitan Police constables were restricted to a two-child 
household, though how strictly this rule was enforced is unclear.143 
On their pension applications, most detectives indicated that they intended to remain in 
London. Only two decided to move. John Haynes and his wife moved back into London 
from Newington. Nicholas Pearce, however, put the city behind him, taking his wife 
Eliza back to Cornwall. After more than thirty years of metropolitan dirt and din, he was 
ready for some peace and quiet.  
3.2.6 Remuneration 
As well as the perk of shedding cumbersome police uniforms, Scotland Yard detectives 
received competitive pay. In 1842 Inspectors Haynes and Pearce made £200 per annum 
(£84 more than regular inspectors) while their detective sergeants pocketed £73 (£10 
higher than a normal sergeant’s salary). By comparison, an average clerk working in 
London might expect to be paid around £100 per annum.144 These salaries would 
continue to rise (as did pay for the uniformed branch) over the next few decades. By the 
late 1870s, detective second-class sergeants earned £123, first-class sergeants £163, 
inspectors £225, chief inspectors £276, and the superintendent of detectives at £550. For 
many, these comparatively high salaries allowed them to ascend socially. At a time when 
police constables were considered solidly working class, detective sergeants’ salaries 
placed them squarely in the lower-middle class while their superiors, including 
inspectors, chief inspectors and superintendents, could expect to live more comfortably 
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among middle-class society.145 Divisional plainclothes men received no such perks, since 
their position was temporary and unofficial until 1869. Those on more regular undercover 
duty did, however, receive a £5 bonus each year to help cover the cost of regular 
clothes.146  
In addition to salaries, many detectives received rewards during their careers. These were 
meant as honours and bonuses to men who demonstrated skill and excellence and ranged 
from £1 to much larger sums. Although police regulations prohibited officers from 
collecting reward money offered by the government (for the capture of a murderer, for 
example), the home secretary could make exceptions.147 To reward the policemen who 
helped capturer murderer James Mullins in 1861, Thornton received £20 while Sergeants 
Tanner and Thomas received £15 and £10 each.148  
Different rules governed rewards from private sources. Detectives could not accept 
gratuities unless the commissioners allowed it. Before any senior detective officer made a 
reward recommendation to the commissioner, they were instructed “to satisfy themselves 
that no solicitation, direct or indirect has been made to the party by whom the Gratuity is 
to be given, and shall there be reason to suppose that such solicitation has been used, all 
the circumstances are to he reported to the commissioner.”149 Sergeant Robinson 
received a commendation and award from the Recorder at the Central Criminal Court 
“for his zeal and activity in apprehending Moss Benjamin, receiver of stolen goods” in 
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March 1862.150 Detectives were also well placed to earn gratuities since they were often 
involved in protection details for heads of state. The Ottoman Sultan was so impressed 
with his police escorts during his visit to London in May 1867 that he gave the 
government over £210 to reward them with. The superintendent of Whitehall received the 
largest reward, but Williamson, Tanner, and Thomson were each given £5, while Clarke, 
Langley, Thomas, Manners and Shore all received £3.151 Detectives who made an 
indelible mark on the police received gifts or emoluments to recognize their contribution 
to the police service. Pearce received a silver teapot from the Queen in August 1851 for 
“her appreciation of the constant zeal, intelligence, and discretion showed by him when 
in attendance upon her on her visits to the Exhibition.”152 When Whicher retired he was 
given “a massive gold signet ring of the value of £30, manufactured expressly for him, 
and engraved with the monogram ‘J.W’.” It was a gift from his fellow officers, and an 
indication of the their high esteem for him.153  
3.2.7 Life after the Detective Department 
Many men, as we have seen, went on to careers in the CID after April 1878 and ended 
their days in high-ranking positions. Williamson became the chief constable of the CID, 
while Greenham, Shaw and Shore all became chief inspectors. Littlechild was a chief 
inspector within the CID before being selected by James Monro, one of the assistant 
commissioners, to work in the newly formed Special Branch in 1887.154 Others stayed 
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within the uniformed branches, becoming divisional inspectors. Moon became an 
inspector in Hampstead and Morgan in Paddington. Others left the police but persisted 
within the criminal justice system. Shackell, for example, became an officer of the 
Giltspur Street Compter.155  
Detectives who reached retirement had several choices available to them. The most 
obvious was to use their considerable experience as private detectives.156 This route 
offered a decent salary (in addition to their police pension) and allowed them to work for 
themselves. Charles Frederick Field was one of the first to parlay his detective prowess 
into this sideline. He retired in November 1852 and began a private inquiry office at No. 
20 Devereux Court Temple “to make inquiries and detect frauds.”157 The work was 
lucrative. Field himself claimed he could charge a guinea per day, plus accommodation 
expenses, and told a court that he regularly received large bonuses at the conclusion of a 
case: “Up to the last trial I only received £60 or £70 from the plaintiff.”158 He was hardly 
doing badly; £70 was more than half of his annual government pension.159 
Field was a well-known public figure, especially following the release of Charles 
Dickens’s Bleak House, published in serial in 1852 and 1853. Inspector Bucket, the 
cunning, all-knowing and plain-speaking detective was modeled on Field, whom Dickens 
knew from a series of interviews for Household Words in 1850. He was, Dickens 
described, “a middle-aged man of portly presence, with a large, moist, knowing eye, and 
a husky voice, and a habit of emphasising [sic] his conversation by the aid of a corpulent 
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fore-finger.”160 Dickens’s support for the detectives did much to improve the public face 
of undercover policing, but Field’s activities in as a private contractor drew attention 
towards the seedier side of the profession.161  
The Home Office could not stop former policemen setting themselves up as investigators 
for hire, though there was concern that Field, in particular, took liberties. His name was 
invoked several times in the early 1860s as an example of how unseemly this line of work 
could be. Field’s testimony in a criminal conversation case, Evans v. Robinson, at the 
South Lancashire Assizes in April 1855, drew the ire of the presiding justice. The 
plaintiff Loyd O. Evans hired Field to follow his wife and her lover, Robinson, in order to 
prove her adultery. Field had Mrs. Evans under surveillance in Cheltenham and London, 
where he infiltrated the boarding house where the lovers were living. Field took rooms in 
the same house and planted a cook as his personal spy. Hoping to catch the lovers in 
flagrante, Field asked the cook to drill a hole in the first floor drawing room door. The 
landlady later testified to peeking through the opening and seeing Robinson and Evans 
“having connexion.”162 Although the plaintiff won the case, Field’s tactics shocked 
Justice Cresswell, who condemned him as a “hired spy.”163 An editorial in Lloyd’s 
Weekly Newspaper agreed and wondered why nothing was being doing about the plague 
of spies: “If the honour of an English matron lies in the power of professed spies and paid 
informers,” the editorial asked, “what family is safe from scandal?”164 
Field’s reputation was again debated during a libel trial between two newspapers at the 
Exchequer in December 1861. Lloyd’s Weekly News branded Stubbs’ Gazette’s public 
outing of dishonest tradespeople an affront to “freedom, of justice, and of hospitality 
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men’s reputations.” During the trial, Lloyd’s counsel Serjeant Ballantine compared 
Stubbs to Field, and accused him of running a spy system. “You don’t keep a secret 
police-office?” he asked Stubbs: “You are not connected with Mr. Field?” When Stubbs 
answered in the negative, Ballantine replied, “Why, what is the difference,” to an amused 
courtroom.165 Allusions to detectives and spying concerned Mayne and the Home Office 
and Field’s behaviour caused anxiety. Public misconduct by a former detective was bad 
for everyone, especially since undercover work was becoming a significant factor in 
policing London. In May 1861 Field and another private detective, though not of police 
pedigree, tried to get information from the Rotterdam police through false pretenses. 
They signed their request for information the “Superintendent of the Foreign 
Department,” a fictional branch of the Metropolitan Police. The ruse was uncovered 
when Dutch authorities liaised with the British about the request. Mayne condemned 
Field’s actions and suggested to George Grey that they withdraw his pension. Grey 
agreed and suspended Field’s pension, although it was restored after Field took legal 
action. The attorney and solicitor general acknowledged that the home secretary did not 
possess the power to remove pensions unless the recipient was convicted of a felony. 
Field promised to behave in the future, although “no promise was made to discontinuing 
his practices as spy.”166  
Jonathan Whicher also became a private investigator after leaving the Metropolitan 
Police. Unlike Field, he kept a low profile, avoiding the contentious world of divorces. 
His involvement in one of – or perhaps the most – famous of the private cases brought his 
name back into the news. Whicher helped to unearth the fraud of the Tichborne Claimant. 
The Claimant appeared in 1866 claiming to be Sir Roger Tichborne, long presumed dead, 
and heir to the family fortune. The Tichborne family solicitors, Dobinson and Geare, 
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hired Whicher to locate witnesses to discredit the Claimant, who was after the 
considerable estate of the Tichborne family, of which Sir Roger’s infant nephew was the 
current baronet. After a prolonged trial at the Court of Common Pleas in 1871 and 1872, 
the Claimant lost his case after he was identified as Arthur Orton, a butcher from 
Wapping. Whicher played a significant role as Dobinson and Geare constructed a case 
against the imposter. The solicitors hired agent John Mackenzie to gather evidence 
against Orton in Australia while Whicher was assigned to the investigation in England. 
The former detective located and questioned witnesses, showed them photographs of 
Orton and brought them to see the Claimant to determine if they recognized him.167 
Following Orton’s loss of the civil suit, the government successfully prosecuted him for 
perjury. Orton’s defense counsel Mr. Kenealy tried to vilify Whicher by using his former 
status as a detective against him. Detectives were, the barrister charged, “‘most 
dangerous agents’ in getting up a case when they become ‘hired discoverers of guilt’.”168 
Kenealy also attempted to discredit witness testimony by suggesting that Whicher 
pointed out Orton to prosecution witnesses instead of allowing them to identify him on 
their own.169 
Several of the younger generation of Detective Department men also chose to work in a 
private capacity. Meiklejohn went a similar route after his 1877 disgrace, as did John 
Littlechild. John Shore became one of the American Pinkerton Agency’s European 
contacts, a post which he passed on to another Scotland Yard man, Frederick G. 
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Abberline, in 1898.170 Sergeant Campbell, hired to the Detective Department in 1867 but 
retired in 1873, went to work for the Royal Mint as an investigator in coining cases.171  
Others parlayed their detective experience into more conventional pursuits. Edwin 
Coathupe, the surgeon-cum-detective who served in the Detective Department between 
1863 and 1868 left the Metropolitan Police to return to medicine. This did not captivate 
him for long and he again left medicine to spend eight years as the deputy chief constable 
of Manchester. He was personally responsible for their detective force of forty-five 
men.172 Coathupe was particularly active in Manchester, often appearing in court to 
pressure magistrates to remand prisoners in custody so that the city’s detectives could 
“get up the case properly.”173 Coathupe had both the intelligence and the refinement 
required for such a post, being as he was from “an old Bristol Family” and could be 
found dining with the Mayor of Manchester.174 Coathupe’s career prospects may have 
been limited in Manchester, or perhaps he wanted to return home, because in early 1876 
he applied for the position of superintendent of police in Bristol. Out of one hundred and 
twenty-three applicants, the Bristol Watch Committee shortlisted Coathupe and three 
others. The other three were military men, two of whom were also superintendents of the 
Devon and Carmarthenshire constabularies.175 Although his competitors had the military 
experience that county constabularies liked in their leadership, Coathupe’s proficiency 
with urban policing put him ahead in the race. His “great police experience … and the 
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testimonials touching his handling of a large force of 809 men” also helped win over the 
Watch Committee, who elected him in a near unanimous vote.176  
Two former detectives became publicans. One of the duties of the Metropolitan Police 
was to enforce liquor legislation, especially ensuring that closing times were strictly 
observed. With extensive knowledge of regulations governing publicans, retired 
detectives were in an excellent position to open a small business with their pensions as 
seed money. Although Tanner intended to stay in Westminster after retirement, he 
eventually moved to Winchester and ran an inn.177 After retiring in 1856 Frederick Shaw 
ran the Golden Anchor Public House in Saffron Hill. Retirement was not altogether quiet, 
since his bar became the scene of the Saffron Hill Murder on Boxing Day 1864. A fracas 
between some Italians and Englishmen in the bagatelle room of the Golden Anchor ended 
in the death of Michael Harrington. The accused, Seraphini Polioni, was sentenced to 
death for homicide at the Old Bailey at the end of January 1865, but was reprieved 
shortly thereafter when the real murderer, Polionio’s cousin Gregorio Mogni, walked into 
King’s Cross Police Station and confessed.178  
3.3 Investigative Methods 
3.3.1 Information Gathering 
As we have seen, training for detective work relied on apprenticeship. The earliest 
instruction books were not exhaustive police manuals but outlined the general duties of 
all ranks. Any new regulations were publicized in the daily police orders on an ad hoc 
basis; if an issue arose, the commissioners would broadcast it in the daily orders and 
supply a new set of instructions to remedy the situation. This made for a confusing 
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proliferation of rules, which, from time to time, were republished in updated and 
increasingly comprehensive instruction books. Following the initial 1829 instructions, 
new editions appeared in 1836, 1862, 1873 and in 1881 the new commissioner, Howard 
Vincent, wrote an entirely overhauled Police Code.179  
None of the pre-1881 editions outlined methods for investigation, focusing instead on 
general rules and regulations. Addendums to each new edition contained lists of 
important police orders but only the 1873 edition focused exclusively on practice and, for 
the first time, categorized police orders instead of listing them chronologically. Thus, the 
1873 edition was the first instruction manual issued to officers that explicitly outlined 
operational practice in relation to specific offences or areas of concern. Even so, details 
for how to conduct investigations were limited. The entry for murder, for example, stated 
only that “the Superior Officer of Police available on the spot is to take immediate steps, 
and make all possible inquiries to apprehend the perpetrator, and obtain all the particulars 
for the information of the Coroner and Magistrate,” while there were no entries regarding 
theft, forgery or fraud.180 Methods of detection are rarely discussed. The entry for 
burglary is the only one to offer instructions for investigators, but these were hardly 
exhaustive. With such limited prescriptive resources, detectives had to rely on the 
institutional knowledge within the detective department and to learn investigative 
methods from experienced senior officers.181  
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Information – its collection and dissemination – was key to detecting crime. The 
Fieldings and their successors at Bow Street knew this well; their great innovation was to 
use newspapers, in their case the Public Advertiser, to publicize descriptions of criminals 
and stolen goods.182 They even printed their own handbills to increase local exposure. 
Bow Street focused on local “pawnbrokers, silversmiths, and ‘Cloaths Shops’” and made 
sure that proprietors were informed about stolen property.183 The Metropolitan Police 
adopted the system pioneered at Bow Street for gathering and broadcasting information 
about stolen property. Andrew Lansdowne described a department within Scotland Yard 
dedicated to “the circulation, to pawnbrokers and secondhand-goods dealers, of lists of 
stolen property which possess distinctive marks of identity.”184  
Many cases of theft were solved after detectives traced stolen property to pawnbrokers 
who, in turn, were able to help identify the person who sold the goods.185 For example, 
Inspector Haynes located goods taken by Alice Lowe at a pawnshop in the Strand. Lowe 
was a frequent customer and the broker, Arthur Jones, was able to link her directly to the 
stolen items.186 Pawnbrokers were also key witnesses in the prosecution of several 
burglars in 1857, including the theft of £500 worth of jewellery from Benjamin Lee in the 
early hours of October 26. Nine pawnbrokers testified that various items of Lee’s 
jewellery were pledged at their shops the day after the burglary. They were also able to 
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identify the pledgers and positively connect the defendants with the stolen goods.187 
Sergeant Williamson relied on pawnshops to track down a ring stolen from a jeweler in 
October 1860. When he finally located a shop with a pledged diamond matching one 
from the stolen ring, he located the pledger and arrested her and her son.188 
Contacting pawnbrokers was a routine part of many police investigations, not just for 
thefts. After the Russell burglary and murder, the police immediately circulated 
descriptions of stolen items to pawnbrokers. During Jane Jones’s murder investigation the 
police found that Daniel Good had pawned some of Jones’s property, which linked him 
to the crime. Following the assassination of Edward Drummond by Daniel M’Naghten in 
January 1843 the police located the pawnbroker in Whitechapel who sold M’Naghten the 
pistols used in the murder.189  
Recognizing criminals was also part of the information-gathering process. Much of this 
relied on the “retentive ability of individual detectives.”190 They needed to remember the 
names, faces and favourite haunts of criminals they encountered. This was also an 
important part of a constable’s duty and police instructions required beat constables to 
“be able to recognize all inhabitants and their houses” so as to identify suspicious 
characters.191 Lower-ranking officers were involved in investigations for this reason – 
they usually had more recent patrol experience and could better recognize neighbourhood 
thieves.192 
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As an investigative tool, visual recognition of criminals was key. To improve officers’ 
familiarity with known offenders, a system of prison visits was institutionalized within 
the Metropolitan Police, beginning in the 1830s and continuing throughout the nineteenth 
century.193 Prison visits by detectives coincided with significant changes to English penal 
policy. From 1718 until 1853, the government relied on transportation to America and, 
after 1787, Australia to remove serious criminals from English shores. After the cessation 
of Australian transportation in 1853, Penal Servitude Acts (1853 and 1857) replaced 
transportation with long stretches of domestic incarceration as the primary punishment 
for serious crimes.194 Convicts now spent nine months in solitary confinement before 
being sent to public works prisons in Portland, Chatham and Portsmouth where they 
bolstered national defense by constructing breakwaters. Sir Joshua Jebb, Surveyor-
General of Convict Prisons, was especially proud of the public works system, which he 
felt would encourage “productive employment” while also benefiting the state.195 This 
dual system was intended to punish and reform convicts through a period of moral 
reflection followed by hard work. Sentences of penal servitude were shorter than 
sentences of transportation, however, and most convicts were released on licenses, called 
tickets-of-leave, before they had served their full term.196 Around 1,300 convicts were 
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released on a probationary ticket-of-leave annually in England and Wales, making 
roughly one quarter of the number of incarcerated persons.197  
The prison visiting system became more pressing after the ticket-of-leave system was 
introduced, as the police anticipated large numbers of former convicts returning to the 
streets.198 Between 9 am and 5 pm on Wednesdays and Saturdays, Scotland Yard 
detectives led groups of divisional officers (after 1869, divisional detectives) to 
familiarize themselves with prisoners nearing release at: Tothill Fields Prison, Millbank 
Prison, Southwark Prison, Brixton Prison, Wandsworth House of Correction, 
Horsemonger Lane Prison, Middlesex House of Correction, Middlesex House of 
Detention and Holloway House of Correction. At the end of the day, the Scotland Yard 
detective coordinating the visits submitted a “Descriptive Form” to the Commissioner’s 
Office that described each convict and named the police officers attending that day. It 
was hoped that this prison visiting system would keep former convicts under constant 
supervision.199 Facial recognition of released convicts by police officers was key in a 
system that relied on personal surveillance of released offenders.  
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The prison visiting system not only reflects concerns about the behaviour of convicts on 
probation but also, it seems to me, belies an assumption on the part of Home Office 
officials and the police commissioner that released convicts would reoffend. Early 
Victorian experiments in reformative incarceration, most obvious in the construction of 
Millbank Penitentiary and Pentonville Prison, stressed “seclusion, labour and religious 
instruction” in an attempt to create morally regenerated ‘penitents’. Sir George Grey, 
home secretary for most of the period between 1846 and 1865, and senior prison 
administrator Sir Joshua Jebb, surveyor-general of prisons, dominated prison policy 
during the 1840s and 1850s. Their shared evangelicism gave them hope for the 
reformatory model of incarceration.200 This impulse was soon considered a failure and 
Millbank dropped penitentiary from its name in 1844.201 Evangelical influences on 
prison management waned by the 1850s when incarceration became less about moral 
reflection and more about discipline, something Jebb reluctantly accepted as the realities 
of prison administration supplanted his earlier humanitarian instincts. Historians agree 
that a noticeable change in tone is apparent in the 1850s. David Smith argues that the 
realities of prison management and the difficulty of disciplining large numbers of 
criminals caused early evangelism to give way to military discipline; the separate system, 
in particular, became less an opportunity for moral reflection and more punitive.202 Philip 
Harling agrees that the reformation movement was at an end by mid century. “By the 
early 1860s,” he argues, “the conviction had become widespread that serious criminals 
were simply not redeemable.”203  
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Photographs were another method of information gathering that attracted the attention of 
prison administrators and police by the 1860s and 1870s. The earliest use of criminal 
photographs was to record members of transient populations – vagrants and railway 
thieves in particular – and to ensure that recidivists were properly identified; in 1852, the 
governor of Bristol Gaol took photographs of prisoners he considered “mobile people not 
known to local police forces.”204 Photography, daguerreotype portraits in particular, 
became popular in England during the 1840s. The first photographic exhibition was held 
in 1852 and photographic machinery was part of the 1851 and 1862 Exhibitions. It 
remained an expensive process until the development of glass negatives in the 1850s and 
dry plates in the 1870s, which lowered the cost significantly.205  
The high cost of photographic prints in the early years of the technology explains why the 
Metropolitan Police, overseen as it was by the notoriously parsimonious Home Office, 
only photographed criminals after the 1871 Prevention of Crimes Act required criminals 
to be photographed and a picture of each offender added to a Habitual Criminals Register 
at Scotland Yard.206 The Act put increased pressure on the police to monitor offenders, 
but “the size of the subject population and the means of keeping them under surveillance” 
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made the task practically impossible.207 The volume of entries in the Habitual Criminals 
Register quickly rendered it “useless” and “unwieldy.”208 Detectives found the Habitual 
Criminals Register difficult to manage. Andrew Lansdowne remembered that the 
photograph database at the Convict Office was unhelpful and preferred searching for 
suspects based on descriptions: “I have never arrested a man from having recognized his 
portrait in the collection of photographs at the Convict Office,” he asserted. He had, 
however, “arrested scores by means of descriptions which have been supplied.”209 
Sergeant Littlechild agreed, believing that registers of criminals were less helpful than 
practical experience. “[M]y own impression,” he mused to the 1878 Departmental 
Commission, “is that a good officer would, in the course of time, gain his own 
knowledge; he would gain very little more from what I could write down in a book.”210 
As late as 1893 “personal recognition” was still the dominant method for identifying 
criminals and worked extremely well when dealing with local offenders.211 
Photographs of individual offenders in relation to specific crimes were also taken. After 
two Fenian prisoners escaped from police custody in Manchester in September 1867, the 
Home Office spent £50 printing 2000 photographs of one of the escapees, Colonel 
Thomas J. Kelly.212 Likewise, when Queen Victoria’s would-be assassin Edward Oxford 
was released from Broadmoor Lunatic Asylum in 1867, Home Secretary Gathorne 
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Hardy213 asked Mayne to send some officers to see Oxford in Broadmoor to “make 
themselves acquainted with his appearance.” Oxford’s release was conditional on his 
immediate emigration and Hardy wanted the former convict recognized immediately 
should he ever set foot back on English soil. The police also took Oxford’s photograph, 
copies of which were distributed throughout the police district.214  
3.3.2 Forensics 
Forensic medicine dominated the field of forensic science in the nineteenth century. 
Medical witnesses began testifying in court by the mid-eighteenth century, but forensic 
medicine only became an established field in the 1830s.215 Medical experts testified 
about wounds, disease, poisoning, mental illness, infanticide and abortion to inquest 
juries and in courts of law.216 They also began publishing authoritative texts on poison, 
toxicology, anatomy and mental illness in the 1820s and 1830s, establishing a quasi-
official field of medical forensics. Forensic medicine gained an official foothold in 1831, 
when the Society of Apothecaries required all their licensees to take classes on medical 
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jurisprudence.217 Ironically, it was the inquest, and coroners’ parsimony in particular, that 
hampered the development of forensic medicine in England.218 Although the 1836 
Medical Witnesses Act required that medical witnesses give testimony at inquests, 
coroners – still under the thumb of local magistrates – were reluctant to pay doctors the 
one guinea fee for an autopsy. Only after 1887, when coroners gained the right to hold 
inquests without magisterial interference, did autopsies become more prevalent.219 
Locating a doctor with proper anatomical training was also a problem, meaning that, even 
when an autopsy was performed, the examination of the body was often only external.220  
Nineteenth-century detectives did not have the benefit of advanced forensics, such as 
fingerprinting, to identify suspects. Although Sir William Herschel pioneered the use of 
finger and palm prints in British India, the science took much longer to gain a foothold in 
English policing practice.221 Refinements to the fingerprinting system in the early 1890s 
established it as a reliable way to identify individuals, though it took the development of 
a workable classification system to convince the Home Office to adopt it in the Met.222 It 
also took administrative change. Edward Henry, the man who invented the fingerprint 
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classification system, became assistant commissioner overseeing the CID in early 
summer 1901 and by July, fingerprinting was enshrined at New Scotland Yard with a 
professional staff of five fully trained technicians.223 Blood identification was also 
unavailable to early detectives. It was scientifically possible to identify a bloodstain after 
1850 but “not until 1895 could human blood be distinguished from animal blood.”224 
While more advanced techniques, such as fingerprinting, were not available to officers in 
the Detective Department, they used sketches, tool marks, footprints, handwriting and 
visual identification to connect suspects and crimes. Crime scene sketches were an 
important method of capturing the scene before the routine use of photography. In 1841 
Colonel Rowan declared that all burglary reports should include a sketch of the location 
of the crime as well as where on the local beat the building was located. Not only would 
this help refresh the memories of responding officers if they testified at trial, but drawn 
images could also help situate valuables and points of entrance and egress.225 During an 
1876 fraud trial, detective Walter Andrews used a sketch to explain his evidence to the 
court. The four defendants were accused of misrepresenting the weight of goods sold to 
the prosecutor, so that he overpaid them by £50. To detect the fraud, Andrews and 
Detective Sergeants Thomas Roots and John Manton concealed themselves in a building 
to observing the suspects at work. The detectives hid in the workshop for several days, 
watching the number of loads weighed and copying down the weights as they were called 
out. Andrews’s sketch established the set-up of the warehouse, the detectives’ hiding spot 
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and the scales, showing that the officers had a clear view of the scales during their 
operation.226 
Burglaries were a bountiful source of forensic information. Tool marks from the initial 
break-in were often key evidence. In the Courvoisier case, the back door was forced, as 
were some of the drawers and a cupboard in the back kitchen. The police matched the 
marks on the drawers and cupboard to a chisel found among Courvoisier’s belongings. 
They also matched a poker to the marks on the door. One of the senior investigators on 
the case, Inspector Tedman of St. James’s division, testified that the door had been forced 
from the inside, indicating that the perpetrator was already in the house on the night of 
the murder and burglary. The door and post were both brought to court for an expert 
witness – a carpenter – to comment on.227 During Francis Bull’s trial for burglary in 
November 1843, the Superintendent of the East Sussex constabulary testified about drill 
marks. He found a drill on the defendant and matched the markings to those on two boxes 
with the locks drilled open.228  
Footprints were another source of forensic evidence. Police policy required that all crime 
scene footprints be protected until molds could be taken. Occasionally, well-intentioned 
constables compromised investigations by putting possible shoe matches on the original 
footprint and irreparably damaged the evidence. Orders from Colonel Rowan explicitly 
required that any possible matches be imprinted separately and compared with the 
original footmark to avoid this problem.229 In another burglary case in June 1869, police 
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 Andrews and Roots testified at length and in great detail about the defendants’ activities. All four were 
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do not specify exactly how to prepare and cast the molds. This was evidently taught on the job. 
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matched suspect John Holloway’s boot to a footprint found at the scene.230 Sometimes, 
the lack of footprints helped crack a case. In the 1860 murder of Samuel Kent, for 
example, the murderer, his elder half-sister Constance, opened a drawing room window 
to make it seem as if an outsider had broken in. Yet the only footprints outside the 
window were those of the odd-job boy, who had been working in the garden the previous 
evening. Once the police ruled him out as a suspect, it was clear that no one had broken 
in to kill the young boy. The window itself had not been forced, lending further support 
to the theory that the murderer was already inside the house when the Kent family bedded 
down for the night.231  
Investigations included exhaustive searches for evidence in the area around the crime 
scene. The Grimwood murder is an excellent example. Inspector Field “Had the Cesspool 
Emptied and the water pipes taken down the Chimnies [sic] searched and every part of 
the house minutely searched” to locate any evidence that might have been hidden.232 
While investigating the Russell murder, police dismantled large parts of the butler’s 
pantry and searched the dust holes, cisterns and water closet, the contents of which were 
“passed through a sieve.”233 A similar search was done to find additional evidence in the 
death of Jane Jones, although a search of “the cesspool, the water-tanks, and the manure 
heaps in the stable-yard” turned up nothing.234 Police officers located the murdered infant 
Samuel Kent in the family’s privy while conducting a search of the property.235  
Handwriting identification was also an important forensic tool, especially in forgery and 
fraud cases. In the eighteenth century, witnesses testifying about handwriting were 
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usually friends of the person whose signature was forged. Later in the century, clerks 
began to supplant the testimony of friends and acquaintances because of their familiarity 
with clients’ signatures and business practices.236 By the mid-nineteenth century, clerks, 
policemen, handwriting experts and the prosecutor all routinely testified in fraud and 
forgery trials.237 In 1848 Inspector Shackell testified that the accused in a fraud trial had 
written a series of letters to extort money from Cynric Lloyd.238  
While it was not uncommon for detectives to testify about handwriting, handwriting 
experts also appeared in court. By the late 1860s, Charles Chabot emerged as a leading 
expert, testifying in a number of Scotland Yard cases of larceny and highway robbery. In 
September 1868, Chabot and another expert, Frederick George Netherclift, were expert 
witnesses at Joseph Smith’s trial for larceny. Smith intercepted winning betting stubs in 
the mail to redeem for himself. Chabot and Netherclift testified that Smith’s handwriting 
matched the letters accompanying the winning tickets. Both experts emphasized their 
considerable experience. Netherclift told the court that he “h[ad] been an expert in 
handwriting for twenty-five years” while Chabot “h[ad] practiced in that way for many 
years.”239 At Eugene Brunneau’s 1874 trial for defrauding a French clockmaker, Chabot 
gave evidence linking Brunneau’s handwriting with letters written to the clockmaker.240 
Chabot was an engraver by trade, giving him great attention to detail. His expertise was 
in great demand. “I have very often been examine in Courts before,” he told the bench in 
1872.241 Although Chabot admitted during an 1877 cross-examination that juries did not 
always take his expertise to heart, solicitors repeatedly sought him out. Lithographers 
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were also called in as witnesses. At Joseph Smith’s trial the prosecution called three 
handwriting experts, Chabot and two lithograpers, to the stand. The lithographers were 
“fac-similist[s] of handwriting” and, like Chabot and Netherclift, paid great attention to 
the finer details of penmanship.242  
Once a suspect was in custody, it was important that witnesses provide a positive 
identification. This was done through a police line up. There were no specific 
instructions, however, for how to execute one. The police orders only mention line-ups in 
1871, with a reminder that the Middlesex session’s rule for prisoner identification 
required that the accused “be placed in the company of others of the same sex, 
preparatory to being seen by the witness expected to identify.” There is no mention of 
how many others need to be used, although, obviously, officers in uniform were 
prohibited. Officers out of uniform could be placed with the prisoner if no one else could 
be found. The commissioner requested that “[p]ersons of the same general appearance 
and dress as the prisoner should as far as possible be selected.”243  
Defense counsel routinely attacked line-ups as a method for identifying suspects. At 
Robert Massie’s burglary trial in 1871, the policeman who saw the suspect coming 
towards London from Edgeware at 3:50 am was asked to identify Massie as the man he 
saw. Constable Painter picked Massie “from ten or twelve others” at the Court House. 
Counsel strongly suggested that Painter was told who to identify, but the policeman 
denied the accusation categorically: “I was not directed to go and pick him out – I saw a 
description in our informations and I said he was the man I had seen.”244 During John 
Holloway and Thomas Lewis’s 1869 trial, Lewis accused Meiklejohn of pointing him out 
to the victim in the police lineup. The victim was another officer, beaten savagely by the 
two accused after catching them in the middle of a burglary. The local inspector Thomas 
Brady and Sergeant Meiklejohn were adamant that Lewis was not set up to be identified. 
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Brady testified that he told Lewis, “‘You select your own spot when you will stand’ – he 
placed himself where he thought fit.” Meiklejohn agreed that “you [Lewis] were told to 
place yourself, and you stood at the end of the men who were placed in a row.”245 
3.4 Conclusion 
Between 1829 and 1860, roughly 100,000 men joined the Metropolitan Police. Nearly 
half resigned and a third were dismissed.246 High turnover made acquiring and retaining 
good officers a challenge. Low pay, long hours, strict control, the monotony of beat work 
and constant exposure to inclement weather were a few of the more obvious detractions 
from the job. Drinking and associated vices were also serious problems and the cause of 
many dismissals.247 By contrast, the Detective Department managed to retain most of its 
staff and many of those who remained obtained prized promotions. The men who quit, 
transferred or were fired (thirty-one per cent of recruits) are the exception to the rule. 
Over sixty-eight per cent of detectives serving between 1842 and 1878 made careers in 
the police, leaving only when promoted, pensioned or because they died.248 
Job satisfaction tended to rest on the particular skill of each officer. Recruits knew that 
invitations to join the Detective Department reflected their individual talents and 
favoured them in the Metropolitan Police meritocracy. Once drawn from their divisions, 
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apprentice-detectives worked closely with senior officers.  Some had experience as Bow 
Street officers, while others had shown a knack for surveillance or investigatory work. 
Each could rely on his skills to propel him into a group of policemen praised for action 
and initiative instead of confined to the passive patrolling duties of beat officers. The 
Detective Department operated within a framework of trust and respect, as opposed to the 
paternalistic and controlling world of uniformed policing. The freedom accorded to 
detectives must have seemed a great change from the strict discipline and monotony of 
life in uniform. It is no surprise, then, that so many of those offered admission to this elite 
cadre chose to remain.   
Most detectives spent between nine and fourteen years working their way up through the 
ranks (most had at least achieved a sergeant’s rank before promotion) and then went on to 
spend between three and eight years as detectives. Those whose detective careers 
extended beyond nine years were almost certain to rise to an inspector’s rank or above. 
Their elite status was similarly reflected in their incomes. While most constables earned 
salaries within working-class parameters, detectives’ wages placed them higher up the 
social scale. Those who rose to the rank of inspector and above achieved comfortable 
lower-middle and middle-class status. These salaries were at times supplemented by 
generous rewards from the public and the Metropolitan Police for meritorious conduct. 
The following chapters will discuss the content of detectives’ careers, beginning first 
with an examination of detective priorities.  
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4 Detective Priorities  
Thus far, this thesis has examined the origins of Scotland Yard’s detective force and the 
careers of the detectives who worked there. Our focus shifts now to examine the specifics 
of felony investigation and prosecution in London. Just as the Bow Street Runners had 
done, detectives, and police officers more generally, appeared in court to bolster 
prosecution cases against offenders. They located witnesses, gathered evidence for 
solicitors and testified in court. This chapter evaluates detective priorities by examining 
their caseload at the Old Bailey, London’s Central Criminal Court, between 1842 and 
1878. 
4.1 Sources 
The following discussion is based on digitized trial transcripts in the Old Bailey 
Proceedings (OBP) Online. The number of surviving case files in the Metropolitan Police 
archive is limited, making court transcripts and newspaper crime reports the best way to 
locate case details.1 To this end, I have compiled a database of cases prosecuted at the 
Old Bailey in which detectives testified. As the Central Criminal Court for London, 
felonies committed within London and Middlesex were tried at the Old Bailey, making it 
a useful way to determine which serious crimes Scotland Yard’s detectives investigated 
and prosecuted in the country’s main courthouse.2 My database offers, for the first time, 
the most complete possible picture of detectives’ activities in a single jurisdiction in the 
early and mid-Victorian period.3  
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 Many of the case files within the Metropolitan Police records at The National Archives have been lost, 
destroyed or discarded. The only case records that survive in significant numbers are murders, located in 
MEPO 3.  
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 Detectives also appeared at London’s quarter sessions, the Middlesex Sessions, where misdemeanours 
and lesser felonies were tried. David Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century (London: 
The Hambledon Press, 1998), 58.  
3
 Using digitized Old Bailey records for statistical purposes has drawbacks as the database’s categories can 
lead to statistical distortions. This is especially true when one considers that some categories – stealing 
from a master or theft from a specified place, for example – no longer had a meaningful statutory basis 
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The main categories of crime employed by the database are: breaking the peace, damage 
to property, deception, killing, miscellaneous, royal offences, sexual offences, theft and 
violent theft.4 
Cases prosecuted at the Old Bailey were the culmination of hard work by prosecutors, 
policemen, solicitors and barristers. Although private prosecution remained the norm 
until the creation of a public prosecutor, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), in 
1879, by mid century “prosecutions were now increasingly overseen by either the police, 
clerks to magistrates or borough solicitors, and were financed out of public funds.”5 The 
government became involved in prosecutions that affected state matters and employees or 
in cases where victims were unable or unwilling.6 In the years before 1879 the treasury 
solicitor conducted state prosecutions, aided by the Home Office’s solicitor after 1841.7  
Before going to trial, suspects were first charged before magistrates, who took 
depositions from witnesses, heard statements by the accused and (after 1836) defense 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
after early-nineteenth-century criminal law reforms. I use these categories, however, for continuity because 
they are the ones used by the OBP Online and other scholars use this resource extensively. 
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 Only robbery and highway robbery were considered violent thefts. Highway robbery, though of great 
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June 1841 and 21 September 1841; HO 65/15, 26 December 1845 and 25 March 1846. Later state 
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liquor legislation. HO 65/29, 19 and 28 October 1872; HO 65/13, 28 January, 20 February and 27 May 
1875.  
7
 The Home Office appointed solicitor William Vizard in February 1841. HO 65/13, 3 February 1841.  
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counsel.8 If the evidence against the accused was strong, he or she would be committed 
for trial, at which point the prosecution solicitor would gather evidence and witnesses to 
establish a strong case, which a barrister would ultimately argue at the Old Bailey.9 
Before the Sessions began, a Grand Jury of between twelve and twenty-three men had to 
find a ‘true’ bill against the accused, meaning that the Grand Jury heard the evidence 
against the accused and determined whether the case would go ahead for trial. 
Indictments would go on to trial only if the jurors found “prima facie evidence of 
guilt.”10 The Grand Jury hearing was a final attempt to weed out weak cases. 
4.2 Detectives at the Old Bailey 
Between 1842 and 1878 Scotland Yard’s detectives appeared in the Old Bailey witness 
box in three hundred and eighteen trials, or roughly eight cases per year (Table 1).11 
Numbers this low are not surprising because the detective force was small and stretched 
thin, geographically and operationally. Only a small number of men were employed full- 
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 The Prisoners’ Counsel Act allowed counsel to represent defendants in summary hearings before 
magistrates and during trial. It also entitled the defense to disclosure of prosecution documents. For a 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), chapter 7.  
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December 1878. The keyword search for “detective” also brought up many City of London detectives and 
Metropolitan Police divisional detectives, whose cases I also recorded in my database. For the period 1842-
1878, City of London detectives appeared in 718 cases and, between 1869 and 1878, Metropolitan Police 
divisional detectives appeared in 412. Although I am confident that I have located the majority of Scotland 
Yard cases in the Old Bailey records, the numbers for the City and the Met’s divisional men are probably 
on the low side. I did not have rosters for their names to do a more exhaustive search, so this search only 
includes cases where the detectives themselves or other witnesses referred to them as detectives.  
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Table 1: Detective cases at the Old Bailey, 1842-1878 
  
Offence Total 
% of Total Cases 
(318) 
Breaking the Peace (3.4%) Assault 1 0.30% 
  Riot 1 0.30% 
  Threatening behaviour 3 0.90% 
  Wounding 5 1.60% 
  Arson 1 0.30% 
Deception (32.7%) Forgery 59 18.60% 
  Fraud 38 11.90% 
  Other 3 0.90% 
  Perjury 4 1.30% 
Killing (5.3%) Manslaughter 2 0.60% 
  Murder 15 4.70% 
Miscellaneous (2.4%) Conspiracy 3 0.90% 
  Kidnapping 1 0.30% 
  Perverting the course of justice 2 0.60% 
  Returning from Transportation 2 0.60% 
Royal Offences (6.3%) Coining Offences 13 4.10% 
  Seducing from Allegiance 1 0.30% 
  Seditious Words 1 0.30% 
  Treason 5 1.60% 
Sexual Offences (1.6%) Bigamy 5 1.60% 
Theft (47.1%) Animal theft 3 0.90% 
  Burglary 13 4.10% 
  Embezzlement 1 0.30% 
  Extortion 4 1.30% 
  Housebreaking 8 2.50% 
  Mail theft 3 0.90% 
  Other 1 0.30% 
  Pickpocketing 7 2.20% 
  Receiving 11 3.50% 
  Simple Larceny 39 12.30% 
  Stealing from a Master 24 7.50% 
  Theft from a specified place 36 11.30% 
Violent Theft (0.9%) Highway Robbery 1 0.30% 
  Robbery 2 0.60% 
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time in London and the burden of non-felony investigations they undertook was 
significant.12 When detectives appeared at the Old Bailey, it was usually on cases they 
had spent considerable time and energy investigating. Occasionally, detectives became 
involved in cases by sheer luck, such as when they caught someone red-handed; the 
majority of the time, however, the police commissioners assigned officers directly to 
cases that held some importance for the police services or the government. 
4.3 Patterns of policing 
Theft was the most prosecuted crime in the eighteenth century and remained so in the 
nineteenth.13 The murder scare in the early 1840s may have pressured the police 
commissioners and Home Office into creating a new detective force, but theft remained 
the dominant focus of policing – including detective policing – at mid century (Table 
2).14 In the 1840s, 70 per cent of detective cases at the Old Bailey were larcenies, which 
continued to be their main priority until the 1860s. After 1860 there was a change in the 
focus of detective policing in London towards forgery.15 Counterfeiting financial 
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Detective Department focus on murder. Although murders captured public (and historical) attention, it was 
not the most significant part of the Detective Department’s work. One of the aims of this thesis is to move 
away from sensational (i.e.: murder) investigations and towards a more meaningful evaluation of Scotland 
Yard’s detective caseload.  
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 Randall McGowan has written extensively on forgery prosecutions, with a focus on the eighteenth 
century and the Bank of England, and is the acknowledged expert in the field. See Randall McGowen, 
“Making the ‘bloody code’? Forgery legislation in eighteenth-century England,” in Law, Crime and 
English Society, 1660-1830, ed. Norma Landau (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Randall 
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instruments – wills, power of attorney, banknotes or stock certificates – was a significant 
threat to the industrial success and financial stability of the country. Investigations were 
tricky and prosecutions complicated, meaning that prosecutors, solicitors and the 
government wanted the most experienced police officers involved. Theft still made up the 
majority, 43 per cent, of the detective caseload in the 1860s but forgery was a close 
second at 32 per cent. This landscape changed in the 1870s when detectives began a 
major anti-fraud offensive. Between 1870 and 1878 their fraud caseload occupied 27 per 
cent of their time, for the first time equaling the amount of time spent on larceny. Forgery 
was the third most investigated crime in the 1870s, amounting to 19 per cent of the 
Detective Department’s workload.16  
The noticeable drop-off in detective appearances at the Old Bailey in the 1850s and 
1860s reflects changed priorities in the Detective Department’s second decade. They 
began to spend more time overseeing divisional plainclothes men, working for the Home 
Office and investigating cases outside London.17 Detectives appeared before the Old 
Bailey bench only forty-six times in the 1850s and fifty-five times in the 1860s 
(compared with 103 appearances between 1842 and 1849). By the 1870s, however, 
detectives spent more time at the Old Bailey than ever before. After an injection of 
manpower in 1869 there were now more men to pick up the slack in London while senior 
officers continued to work for the Home Office and in the counties. The following 
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sections discuss the major categories of felony investigated by Scotland Yard detectives 
between 1842 and 1878: theft, forgery and fraud. 
Table 2: Detective cases at the Old Bailey by decade 
 
 
 1840s 1850s 1860s 1870s Total 
 % Of Total 
Cases (318) 
Theft  Simple Larceny 21 6 6 6 39 12.3 % 
  Theft from a Specified Place 19 3 6 8 36 11.3 % 
  Stealing from a Master 13 4 2 5 24 7.5 % 
  Burglary 3 3 5 2 13 5 % 
Deception  Forgery 10 10 17 22 59 18.6 % 
  Fraud 4 1 2 31 38 12 % 
Total   70 27 38 74 209 66.7 % 
 
4.4 Theft 
“No branch of the law is more intricate, and few are more technical,” wrote Justice James 
Fitzjames Stephen in 1883, than the law relating to the fraudulent misappropriation of 
property.18 Theft was a broad category encompassing anything from pickpocketing to 
mail theft, livestock theft to burglary.19 There was a proliferation of larceny statutes in 
the eighteenth century, making many crimes larcenies and then capitalizing those 
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 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. III (London: Macmillan and 
Co., 1883), 122.  
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 Scotland Yard detectives were involved in a variety of theft cases at the Old Bailey between 1842 and 
1878, including: animal theft, burglary, embezzlement, extortion, housebreaking, mail theft, pickpocketing, 
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larcenies.20 These new felonies, many of which were highly specific, formed part of an 
“elaborate and intricate system which has been built upon common law doctrines” by 
removing benefit of clergy or making it theft “to steal certain things which at common 
law were not the subject-matter of larceny.”21 During the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century, many of these capital larcenies were decapitalized and amalgamated into a more 
rational table of crimes.22 Larceny law remained complicated, however, leaving several 
categories into which felonious thefts might fall. Simple larceny – the largest general 
category of theft – was a catchall for anything not specifically covered by the myriad 
other classifications of thefts in the Larceny Acts. The other major groupings included: 
burglary, housebreaking, robbery, theft from specified places, stealing from a master or 
employer and receiving stolen property.23 
Two major legislative efforts streamlined nineteenth-century larceny law: the 1827 and 
1861 Larceny Acts. The 1827 Act was the culmination of Robert Peel’s “consolidation 
and digestion” of roughly fifty statutes concerning capital and non-capital property 
offences. Significantly, the abolition of grand larceny removed many offenders from the 
grip of the gallows.24 The 1861 Larceny Act, while attempting to further clarify a still 
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complicated set of principles remained “cumbrous.”25 “The arrangement of the act was so 
strange,” lamented Stephen, “that a person who, with no previous knowledge of the 
subject, attempting to find out from it what was the English law relating to the 
punishment of theft … would be simply bewildered.”26  
Notwithstanding legislative complexity, prosecutions for larceny were the largest slice of 
the prosecutorial pie at the Old Bailey. Contemporaries were frantic that crime rates had 
increased exponentially, though those rates were, in fact, decreasing when set against 
population explosion in the nineteenth century.27 Victorian commentators can be forgiven 
for their alarm, however; a quick glance at the statistics bears out their worst fears: 
whereas “in 1805 … only 3,267 men and 1,338 women in England and Wales were tried 
for indictable offences,” by the early 1840s nearly three thousand criminals were tried for 
theft annually at the Old Bailey alone.28 Theft prosecutions began their decline in the late 
1840s. This is reflected in Old Bailey prosecution statistics. In 1842 thefts comprised 86 
per cent of cases heard at the Old Bailey but dropped to 75 per cent by 1850, 50 per cent 
by 1860 and less than 40 per cent by 1870.29 The most obvious explanation for these 
numbers is that the decapitalization of larcenies after 1827 encouraged victims to 
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prosecute. Knowing that the defendant, if convicted, would receive a punishment more 
proportionate with the crime must have affected prosecution rates. No one wanted to see 
someone hanged for stealing bleached linen.30 Another explanation is the increase in 
summary jurisdiction, which prevented minor thefts from clogging the court calendar. 
Magistrates had for decades been adjudicating what Peter King terms “common 
complaints” while sending more serious felonies to trial. These practices were codified, 
however, in several statutes between 1847 and 1855, which expanded the scope of 
summary jurisdiction to include simple larceny by juveniles and adults for theft under 5 
shillings.31  
Regardless of the overall statistical decline, theft remained the most common crime 
facing the Metropolitan Police. Nearly half of detective appearances at the Old Bailey 
between 1842 and 1878 were for theft, making larceny the lion’s share – thirty-nine per 
cent – of their workload before the Old Bailey bench. They poured energy into tracking 
thieves, indicating that the government placed a premium on theft as a barometer of 
police efficiency.  
The following section discusses the categories of theft most often investigated by 
detectives: simple larceny, theft from a specified place, stealing from a master and 
burglary. The caseload indicates the variety of criminals, crimes, victims and the ubiquity 
of theft in Victorian London.  
4.4.1 Simple Larceny 
Theft “perpetrated without any other aggravating circumstance, such as assault or 
breaking and entering, theft from the person or a specified place” was classified as a 
                                                 
30
 Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 167. Theft of “cloth in the process of manufacture” was capitalized in 
1670. Ibid., 172-173.  
31
 Peter King, Crime and the Law in England, 1750-1840: Remaking Justice from the Margins 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 29-30; Bruce P. Smith, “The Emergence of Public 
Prosecution in London, 1790-1850,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities Vol. 29 (2006): 56. For the 
summary courts of the City of London in the eighteenth century, see Drew Gray, Crime, Prosecution and 
Social Relations: The Summary Courts of the City of London in the late Eighteenth Century (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
160 
 
simple larceny.32 The most common items stolen were the necessities of life and goods 
easily accessed, concealed or pawned: “food, clothing and money, and other valuables.”33 
Following criminal law reform in 1827, the distinction between grand (capital) and petty 
(misdemeanour) larceny was abolished and replaced by simple larceny. Simple larceny 
was punishable by seven years’ transportation or two years’ imprisonment.34 After 1849, 
transportation was abolished as a punishment for larceny and replaced by three years’ 
penal servitude or up to two years in prison with or without hard labour or solitary 
confinement.35  
The simple larcenies investigated by detectives always involved goods taken for profit, 
not survival, including: paper, copper, cloth, feathers, jewellery, watches, cash, household 
goods (often silver plate, serving ware and cutlery), tea, portraits and clothes ranging in 
value from two shillings to thousands of pounds. Many larceny prosecutions involved 
wealthy or high-profile victims and valuable goods, but this was not true in every case. 
The plaintiffs themselves were a diverse group, including a solicitor, gentry, members of 
the military, a ribbon manufacturer, a photographer, jewelers, a ship steward, an Anglican 
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minister and the Queen. The variety of stolen items and victims indicates that anything 
owned by anyone was fair game for thieves in the ‘great wen’.  
In most cases of theft, detectives were assigned to investigate after victims reported the 
crime, but there were also times when they caught criminals red-handed. The very first 
simple larceny prosecution involving a detective at the Old Bailey was the result of a 
plainclothes patrol by Sergeant Goff in St. James’s Park. Goff noticed James Clark 
making an effort to hide a bundle under his coat and stopped him to investigate. Clark 
was hiding a scarf worth 17s he had just stolen from a shawl dealer in Regent Street. 
Goff’s keen eye resulted in a prison stretch for Clark.36  
Sergeant Whicher had similar luck during a winter detective patrol.37 It was after dark 
one evening in January 1844 when he and one of his protégés, Sergeant Parker from 
Islington, spent three hours watching Henry Payne and William Hughes casing out carts 
in and around Oxford Street. Whicher and Parker were specifically assigned to the 
neighbourhood because theft from carts was a local nuisance. To avoid being noticed, 
Whicher explained to the court, he and Parker “did not keep together, we were obliged to 
dodge them [Payne and Hughes] the best way we could.” Whicher watched Hughes try to 
steal a box from a cart parked in a side street but it was strapped down too tightly for him 
to wrench it free. Payne and Hughes then returned to Oxford Street to find a new mark. 
This time they loitered around Joseph Baglee’s cart. When Baglee left his cart 
momentarily, he put a cloth over his horse to prevent it getting cold while standing. At 
that moment, Hughes swiped the cloth from the horse’s back. Whicher, who witnessed 
the theft, arrested Hughes while Parker arrested Payne. Both thieves were sentenced to 
seven years’ transportation. Baglee’s prosecution of Payne and Hughes demonstrates the 
importance of plainclothes patrols during the winter months. It also shows that familiarity 
with London’s criminal population was an important weapon in the fight against theft; 
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Whicher knew Hughes and Payne to be local ne’er-do-wells and focused on them 
accordingly. His hunch was well founded.38  
Jewellery theft was particularly rife in the Victorian capital.39 A typical scenario involved 
a respectably dressed individual or couple entering a store to shop and, while the 
salesperson was busy, the thieves would either switch fake jewellery for the real thing or 
pocket various items. Only after the salesperson began to put away the goods would they 
realize the swindle.40 Detectives solved these cases by circulating information about 
stolen goods to pawnbrokers, who, if they were on the right side of the law, kept the 
police informed about suspicious individuals or goods matching police information 
bulletins. In these cases pawnbrokers were often invaluable witnesses at trial, connecting 
defendants to stolen goods.41  
On the evening of November 17, 1861 Schmidt Shotte entered Thomas Emberson’s 
jewellery store claiming, “he wanted to buy some fancy rings as presents.” After ordering 
“a lot of jewellery and fancy goods to the amount of  £11 or £12,” Shotte asked to have 
them delivered to his home. Shotte never appeared at the address he gave the jeweler and 
when Emberson returned to his shop be found that “a gilt wedding-ring [had been] 
substituted for a gold one” sometime during the time Shotte was browsing in his store. 
Shotte was an experienced criminal. During his trial, Sergeant Tanner deposed that this 
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was not Shotte’s first jewel theft – he had been convicted in May 1859 for stealing a ring 
and had also been arrested twice on other charges.42 
Theft on the country’s new railways was also a common crime.43 Railways began to 
dominate the English landscape in the 1830s. The first major passenger line, the 
Liverpool & Manchester Railway, opened on September 15, 1830. Within the decade 
additional lines serviced large parts of Lanchashire, the Midlands, Yorkshire, and 
Durham. These lines also transferred manufactured goods to Liverpool for international 
markets. The London & Birmingham Railway connecting the two cities, and thus London 
to the North, was completed in 1838 and in 1844 several competing companies 
amalgamated to form the Midland Railway. Railways emerged more slowly in London 
and the south of England. The London & Brighton Railway opened in 1841 and the Great 
Western connected London to Exeter in 1844. East Anglia remained poorly serviced by 
railways and only Yarmouth and Norwich were connected by 1844.44 As rail travel 
replaced stagecoaches so railway theft replaced highway robbery.45  
The introduction of the ‘penny a mile’ rate in 1844 made travel much more affordable, 
also encouraging enterprising thieves to buy tickets and pickpocket unsuspecting 
passengers. Rail travel was still expensive enough to ensure that many passengers were of 
a wealthier sort.46 There is no distinct category in the OBP for ‘theft from railways’ so it 
is difficult to determine the amount of pilfering that took place on trains. Theft was a 
                                                 
42
 OBP: t18610107-117, “Schmidt Shotte.” Shotte’s sentence was two years’ confinement. A City 
policeman arrested him but Tanner’s testimony about Shotte’s previous convictions was significant because 
theft statutes punished recidivists more severely. 
43
 When someone not employed by the railway perpetrated the theft, they were charged with simple 
larceny. Theft by railway employees was considered stealing from a master.  
44
 Jack Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales 1830-1914 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 
1978), 17-38. 
45
 Initially locomotives’ top speed fell short of a stagecoach’s rate of travel. In 1825 the Liverpool & 
Manchester Company’s locomotives could travel 3.75 mph, while coaches could travel 9-10 mph. By the 
1840s, however, locomotives could achieve more than 12 mph. Simmons, Railway in England and Wales, 
17-18 and 37. 
46
 Simmons, Railway in England and Wales, 37. 
164 
 
distinct problem, however, and railways quickly established their own police forces to 
help protect passengers. Many railway police officers were drawn from the Metropolitan 
Police. Inspector G.D. Hazil of the South-Eastern Railway Company was a Metropolitan 
Police officer for eight years before the railway hired him.47 In 1862 two, unnamed, 
detectives were sent to work for the Eastern Counties Railway and two regular inspectors 
were seconded to the London & Brighton and South-Eastern Railway companies.48 In 
1876 Detective Inspector Meiklejohn was hired by the Midland Railway Company to 
help detect thefts on their lines.49 
England’s rail system transported goods as well as people and many terminuses also 
doubled as depots for goods in transit. Depots were a target for theft because of the 
volume of goods and the difficulty keeping track of the multitude of boxes and parcels. 
The most frequently targeted London terminal was Nine Elms Station, the parcel depot 
for the London & Southwestern Railway. When Hart Isaacs, boot and shoe dealer, sent an 
order of sixty-four boots to a customer via the London & Southwestern on 13 December 
1844, he did not anticipate that it would arrive nine shoes (an odd number, to be sure) 
short. The man accused of taking the boots was Thomas Long, one of the delivery agents 
hired to transfer the package to Nine Elms. Long’s wife Elizabeth sold some of the boots 
to a hawker in exchange for six cups and saucers and some pictures, while she pawned 
another pair for cash.50  
While the boots stolen by Thomas Long were worth only nine shillings, another railway 
theft was far more lucrative. In February 1851 Charles Whicher (no relation to the 
detective) and John Sayward stole two-thousand yards of mousseline de laine (a fine 
French woolen dress fabric) and fifty yards of merino wool in transit from France to 
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London. The cloth, worth £147, was packaged in Paris on February 17 at Messrs. Paturle, 
Lupil, and Co., from where it was sent to the Customs office in le Havre. The box was 
weighed, corded and leaded in le Havre and placed aboard the Wonder, bound for 
Southampton. The package eventually arrived at Nine Elms station where a railway 
employee named William Winter, whose job it was to match the waybills with the 
packages upon arrival, re-directed it to the house of one of his associates, William 
Plampin. It took the police until July to track the thieves, owing to the difficulty of 
locating William Winter, whose disappearance provided an important lead but also 
hampered further investigation. In late July Inspector Field and divisional Sergeant 
Brannan located John Sayward, a draper and silk mercer, whom they suspected of 
involvement. They brought witnesses from Candy and Co., the company that had 
purchased the material, who certified that the cloth found in Sayward’s shop was indeed 
the material they ordered. Unfortunately, most of the material had already been cut into 
patterns or sold at cut-rate prices and the buyers were unable to recover the majority of 
their order.51  
Scotland Yard also, perhaps unsurprisingly, investigated larceny of government property. 
This included the theft of watches from the customs house at the West India Dock in 
1845, rolls of parchment from the Court of Chancery in 1849, paper from the House of 
Commons in 1852, private dispatches from the Colonial Department in 1858 and stores 
from Woolwich Arsenal in 1869. Two of the men accused of stealing from the West India 
Docks were employees (a searcher’s cooper and a shipping officer), giving them direct 
access to the watches.52 Once the theft was noticed, the Customs House immediately 
notified Scotland Yard. Inspector Haynes spent months tracking the prisoners until he 
located them on 8 August 1845. The case against the accused was unsuccessful, likely 
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because the packing clerk for the manufacturers admitted under cross-examination that he 
could not positively say that he noted down the exact serial numbers of the watches in 
question.53 
In the Chancery theft, Thomas Smith, clerk in the Chancery offices, made off with six 
rolls of parchment relating to patent inventions. A parchment dealer testified that Smith 
sold him two rolls of ‘misprinted’ parchment. Smith claimed that he mistakenly took the 
parchment from the spoiled parchment box - his perquisite – while drunk. Sergeant Shaw 
tracked Smith and four rolls of the stolen parchment down. With a clear connection 
between Smith and the parchment and the dealer’s testimony that Smith sold him the 
stolen items, the clerk was convicted and sent to gaol for six months.54 
This was not the only paper theft from the government. Spoiled paper, ends of rolls and 
other used parchment were often sold as scrap.55 Smith claimed he was doing just that 
when he took the rolls from Chancery. When another government employee, Thomas 
Mitchell, took £6 of paper from the House of Commons his case was less straightforward. 
Mitchell took waste paper from the House and sold it to a bookbinder. Some of that paper 
was actually new ruled paper – used by short hand writers and copying clerks – not waste 
paper. When Mitchell realized his mistake, he admitted what had happened to Robert 
Chalmers, the principal clerk of the House. Thornton arrested Mitchell and he was 
prosecuted for the theft, but Chalmers, then retired, vouched for the accused’s character 
and expressed his opinion that the entire transaction was a mistake. The jury took pity on 
Mitchell and he was acquitted.56 
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More serious was theft from the Colonial Department, which involved dispatches 
regarding the state of the Ionian Islands, a British protectorate. The accused, Wellington 
Guernsey, was a friend of the Colonial Office librarian, who often left Guernsey alone in 
the office with confidential dispatches. Guernsey had been a provost marshal in the 
Turkish Contingent during the Crimean War, but was discharged in 1856 and harboured 
ill will towards the government.57 The stolen dispatches, dating from June 1857 and July 
1858, were published in the Daily News on 12 November 1858. They reported the recent 
elections to Ionian Assembly and observations about the standing of the British 
protectorate in the region. The author of the dispatch was John Young, Lord High 
Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, who mused that the new Assembly would be of little 
“practical advantage,” given that “private interests” still ruled local politics. The overall 
“impression upon my mind is,” he wrote home, 
that no permanent benefit to England, or real satisfaction to the Ionians, can 
accrue. England is in a false position here, and the islands are too widely 
separated geographically, and their interests too distinct, ever to form a 
homogeneous whole, under foreign auspices… the sooner, therefore, she 
[England] extricates herself from the position the better for her own reputation, 
and for the cause of representative institutions generally. 
He recommended that the English should bring up the turnover of the islands (excluding 
Corfu) to the Greeks with the other signatories to the Treaty of Paris as soon as possible, 
predicting that enough time had passed since the cessation of the Crimean War that 
England could “retire from the protection with good grace” without seeming like a 
“surrender, concession, or a withdrawal.”58  
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The release of this correspondence was particularly embarrassing for the Derby 
government, which had recently dispatched W.E. Gladstone to act as Commissioner 
Extraordinary of the islands. Although Derby sent Gladstone to work with Young, the 
dispatches’ publication tarnished the latter’s reputation. Derby, already convinced of 
Young’s unsuitability, had him recalled. The Times asked what everyone must have been 
thinking: how could Derby’s government avoid withdrawing from the islands after its 
own figurehead advocated as much?59 It was a delicate political balance. The Ionian 
Islands had been a British Protectorate since 1815 but there was a strong domestic 
movement for union with Greece. The British were against such a plan, seeing the islands 
as strategically significant to limiting Russian domination of the eastern Mediterranean. 
Union with Greece was problematic because there was always the possibility that Greece 
might fall prey to Russia’s imperial appetites.60 
Embarrassed and exposed, the government sent Inspector Thornton to arrest whoever 
stole the documents. Thornton apprehended Guernsey in Great Russell Street two weeks 
later and found sixteen officially sealed envelopes in his house. The state prosecuted 
Guernsey for theft at the December 1858 sessions of the Central Criminal Court. The 
attorney general demonstrated that Guernsey had been the culprit (he was identified by 
the under-Librarian at the Colonial Office as the man who stole the dispatches and by the 
editor of the Daily News as the man who supplied them for publication). Guernsey’s 
attorney, Mr. Parry, argued that his client had no intent to “deprive the office altogether 
of the property” (a felony), but merely to publish the information (not a crime). The 
attorney general scoffed at this technicality.  Aside from the disastrous political 
consequences of Guernsey’s actions, he asked, was Mr. Parry really suggesting that 
individuals who stole confidential government documents and published them had not 
committed a grave act? In the face of these technicalities, the judge reminded the jury that 
larceny was “the taking away of the property of another without his consent, and with the 
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intention at the time to convert that property to the use of the taker.” Although it seems 
clear that this was exactly what Guernsey had intended, the jury felt otherwise and he was 
acquitted.61  
The final simple larceny of government property investigated by Scotland Yard involved 
stolen cartridge paper from Woolwich Arsenal. Extra paper ends from making cartridges 
of gunpowder were sold in bulk to a contractor. The contractor, Mr. Phipps, usually sent 
his employee John Arthur Jones to retrieve cuttings from the Arsenal. Jones was charged 
alongside the Aresenal’s storeholder and his assistant for overvaluing the amount of 
cartridge paper ends and pocketing the difference. Inspector Palmer worked with the 
Chief Inspector of the Royal Arsenal to determine how the men had been swindling Her 
Majesty’s Government. Together they intercepted one of the shipments of paper cuttings 
that Jones was about to take away. They re-weighed them and found that they were, 
indeed, heavier than the manifest indicated. Some of the bags were heavier than others, 
which Palmer soon discovered was because there was new cartridge paper hidden in the 
bottom. It seems obvious that the defendants were stealing from the Arsenal but the court 
was unsatisfied with the state’s evidence. Justice Brett instructed the jury to choose 
between conspiracy to defraud or negligence, and they selected the latter.62 
4.4.2 Theft from a Specified Place 
Thefts from certain locations carried heavier penalties than others. Housebreaking was 
the first larceny to fall within the definition of a specified place. It was made universally 
capital (by removing benefit of clergy) during Henry VIII’s reign, with further statutory 
developments under Edward VI and Elizabeth I. After an early Stuart lull, the scope of 
larceny from dwelling houses broadened under William and Mary to include 
housebreaking when no one was home and also theft from homes without any breaking 
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and entering having occurred.63 In 1699 the Shop-lifting Act expanded specified places to 
include “shops, warehouses, coach-houses or stables” thus bringing within the protection 
of the law outbuildings not used as dwellings (though in many cases shop proprietors 
lived on the same premises). It also covered any theft from specified places at any time, 
day or night. The final act on the subject was passed under Anne in 1713, and included 
outbuildings near dwelling houses, even if no one was in them at the time of the theft.64  
During the eighteenth century the number of additional locations receiving statutory 
protection from theft expanded significantly, making larceny law one of the most 
complicated doctrines for legal scholars and historians to untangle. It was so complex that 
even contemporaries lamented the “multiplicity of statutes, so complicated in their 
limitations, and so intricate in their distinctions” that it was “painful on many accounts to 
attempt the detail of them.”65 The list of ‘specified places’ grew to include not only 
dwellings, shops, warehouses, coach-houses and stables, but also ships, mail, booths or 
tents at fairs, bleaching grounds, “manufactories, churches, and lodging houses” and 
livestock theft and theft of military or naval stores.66  
Judging by the punishments assigned under reformed nineteenth-century statutes, theft 
from certain places was still more serious than others. Under the 1861 Larceny Act, for 
example, thefts from shops and ships were “still punished more severely than common 
larcenies,” reflecting mercantile interests.67  Manufactured goods, imports and other 
merchandise needed protection in transit and for retail. In 1827 housebreaking and thefts 
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from churches or chapels were still capital offences.68 Housebreaking was decapitalized 
in 1833 and replaced by between seven years and lifetime transportation. Theft from a 
dwelling house over £5 also remained capital until it was replaced by transportation for 
life in 1832 and in 1861 housebreakers were instead given the opportunity to spend 
between three and fourteen years in penal servitude for their crimes. Stealing from 
churches was similarly downgraded in 1861 to between three years and a lifetime of 
penal servitude, but felonies committed in and against places of worship remained 
serious. Indeed, the only thefts punished as severely in 1861 were burglary, violent 
robbery, demanding money with menaces and stealing or destroying a will.69  
Unlike the simple larceny cases detectives were involved in, the value of goods in thefts 
from specified places were generally higher. Although the lowest value was £5, the 
majority of cases involved goods worth over £20 and just under a third of cases 
concerned sums between £100 and £1600. As with simple larceny, the targets were 
varied, including jewelers, pubs, lodging houses, coffee shops, private homes and clubs. 
The very first Scotland Yard detective case at the Old Bailey was the prosecution of a 
theft from a specified place. On 24 October 1842, in what the press termed a “delicate 
investigation,” Irish peer George Raymond, Viscount Frankfort de Montmorency, 
prosecuted his former mistress, nineteen-year-old Alice Lowe, for stealing more than 
£150 worth of clothing, jewellery and other goods from his Paddington townhouse.70 
Lord Frankfort had recently separated from Lady Frankfort and Lowe began cohabiting 
with him shortly after. Frankfort and Lowe met under dubious circumstances, having 
been introduced by an actress named Mrs. Mitchell. Two days after their initial meeting, 
Lowe appeared in Frankfort’s townhouse late at night and announced that she intended to 
stay with him. He let her stay and, as he rather uncomfortably admitted to a packed 
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courthouse, they began sleeping together. He was also forced to confess that, during the 
six weeks they cohabited, he kept her strictly confined to the house: “It was according to 
our agreement; if she chose to stop with me those were the terms.”71 When Lowe 
ultimately left Frankfort near the end of July, she took with her numerous valuables, 
which became the subject of his suit against her.72  
Frankfort tried to minimize the scandal in the weeks after his mistress’s departure, 
choosing to work though his solicitor instead of the police. He even had handbills printed 
advertising the return of the stolen jewellery. The police became involved two months 
later after the viscount’s solicitor finally contacted Scotland Yard. At that point, Inspector 
Haynes and Sergeant Thornton began their investigation. Thornton arrested Lowe the 
same day in Chancery Lane while Haynes unearthed pawnbrokers’ tickets for the goods 
in question after searching her Soho lodgings. There was no evidentiary doubt that Lowe 
took the valuables or that she pawned them. The question was whether Frankfort gave her 
the items – including diamond earrings and an expensive brooch – as gifts, or whether 
she stole them. The jilted lord admitted to buying Lowe dresses and other items of 
jewellery. This admission, combined with his less than flattering testimony, must have 
made Lowe look like a pathetic figure used by a lascivious nobleman. The jury took 
fifteen minutes to acquit her.73  
Not all cases involved playboy noblemen and young women of leisure. Inspector Pearce 
was called on in March 1843 to investigate a theft from government offices at Somerset 
House. The victim was Joseph Timm, the government’s Solicitor for Stamps and Taxes. 
He accused the woman who cleaned his office, Susannah Layton, of lifting five 
sovereigns and a £10 note from his desk. She allegedly stole the note and asked a friend, 
James Gilbert, to change it for her. Pearce arrested Gilbert for receiving and Layton for 
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theft. Gilbert was the prosecution’s main witness against Layton. Although his testimony 
was compelling, defense counsel called his reliability into question by repeatedly 
suggesting that he lived in a whorehouse. The jury either disbelieved Gilbert or took pity 
on Layton because she escaped conviction.74 
The statutes specifying thefts from specific locations were also meant to protect shop-
owners like Frederick and Thomas Green, whose Sloan Street umbrella shop was looted 
of four hundred umbrellas and dog collars with silver mounts worth over £300 during the 
night of 2 March 1870. The thieves took their time. Frederick told the court that when he 
arrived at the shop the following morning there was evidence the thieves had taken a 
break during the heist to have dinner, “for there were fish bones and potatoe [sic] parings 
all over the place.” They had indeed been bold enough to light a lantern in the parlour to 
illuminate their nocturnal activities. Such a large quantity of goods could be easily traced, 
especially if the thieves resold it in bulk. Luckily for Inspector Palmer and Sergeants 
Reimers and Foley, Alphonse Morieau and John Edwards did just that by selling their 
entire umbrella windfall to merchant John Theodoredi for £42. Inspector Palmer located 
and arrested Edwards in Soho eleven days after the robbery. Morieau took longer to 
apprehend because he had returned to France after offloading the umbrellas. Foley and 
Reimers arrested him on April 6 in a French wine shop in Soho. Foley made the arrest in 
French because “he [Morieau] can’t speak English perfectly.” Both defendants were 
convicted.75  
In February 1861 the London Dock Company prosecuted Christopher Summers for 
stealing over 5000lbs of opium from the Red Lion Wharf, where he was formerly 
employed. Opium, the sale of which was unrestricted until 1868, was freely imported and 
widely used by all levels of society. It was typically taken medicinally as we would now 
take Aspirin or Tylenol and came in many forms:  
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There were opium pills (or soap and opium, and lead and opium pills), opiate 
lozenges, compound powder of opium, opiate confection, opiate plaster, opium 
enema, opium liniment, vinegar of opium and wine of opium. There was the 
famous tincture of opium (opium dissolved in alcohol), known as laudanum, 
which had widespread popular sale, and the camphorated tincture, or paregoric.76 
Opiates were a common cure-all for a variety of ailments, usually aches and pains, but 
were also frequently used to quiet babies, aid sleep, and to cure hangovers and coughs.77 
Users who turned to opium to help cure physical ailments soon became dependent and 
many quickly moved from self-medication to addiction. The most famous opium users 
were Thomas de Quincey and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who wrote about their own 
experiences of the drug and, especially in Coleridge’s case, their addiction. Many others, 
including Byron, Keats, Scott, Elizabeth Barret Browning, Wilberforce and Gladstone, 
were known users. Agreement among the medical community about the nature of 
addiction only began to crystalize late in the century, but some, like Coleridge, tried to 
free themselves from their dependence. Detoxification was difficult, especially because 
there was nothing to substitute opium during withdrawal, and Coleridge, among many 
others, was unable to give it up.78  
Most opium was imported from Turkey and came in large shipments to the London 
Docks where it was bought by wholesalers like the Apothecaries’ Company.79 
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Wholesalers usually made their own opium-based preparations for retail but also sold 
opium to publicans, chemists or costermongers for small-scale retail. Summers allegedly 
sold some of the £500 worth of opium to Solomon Solomons, who in turn hawked it 
around local pubs. Since the sale of opium was unregulated in 1861, Summers was 
charged with stealing, not dealing, the drug. Inspector Whicher and Sergeant Robinson 
located the opium at Solomons’s house but could not prove that Summers stole it.80 
Theft by servants was a longstanding concern in England and the subject of “a good deal 
of misunderstanding and malice.” Servants and other employees might take items to 
make up for (perceived) shortcomings in their wages, to take revenge on cruel or unjust 
employers or out of simple greed. Prosecutions of servants for theft was higher in urban 
areas, especially London, where there were more households with servants, a network of 
pawnshops to anonymously pledge items for cash and countless ways to spend it.81 
Several cases of theft by domestics and employees garnered detective attention, including 
two butlers who stole valuable plate from their employers.82  
Butlers were the domestics in charge of the family’s fine silver and china.83 They held 
positions of great trust in the household and when that trust was breached the 
consequences were serious. In August 1854 £377 worth of silver plate was taken from Sir 
Hyde Parker, his niece Louisa Ann Eden and her husband General George Morton Eden. 
The Edens stayed at Louisa’s uncle’s house in Onslow Square while he was in Scotland 
but they, too, left London for the summer. The Edens’ butler, Henry Baker, stayed behind 
at the Onslow Square house and kept watch over the other servants and both families’ 
collections of fine silver. Once Parker and the Edens were safely out of town, Baker told 
the Parker’s former groom Ricketts that he intended to steal all of the family’s silver and 
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make a run for America. Sir Hyde Parker had just fired Ricketts and Baker assumed that 
the maligned groom would want to retaliate. Ricketts participated in the planning for a 
time before getting cold feet, leaving London for Cheltenham. Shortly after Baker 
committed the robbery, a friend of Ricketts’s wrote to tell him about it. Knowing who the 
perpetrator was, the former groom immediately returned to London and made contact 
with Sergeant Whicher.84 The police initially suspected Ricketts because he had been 
fired and his decampment to Cheltenham seemed suspicious. Based on his testimony 
about Baker, however, the police arrested Baker and his new co-conspirator Robert 
Crossley. Ricketts was the prosecution’s main witness in the case against Baker and 
Crossley, who were both found guilty.85 
In a similar case, £250 of plate was stolen from the butler’s pantry at John Boustead’s 
house in the Strand in February 1869. Boustead’s butler, Walter Smith, took several small 
yet valuable items to help his brother George (also charged) who was “in bad 
circumstances.”86 The robbery took place in February but the Smiths were not arrested 
until October by Sergeant Foley. It is unclear why the investigation took so long but the 
police suspected an inside job from the start. Foley travelled to the Boustead’s country 
house in Cumberland and tricked Walter into implicating himself and his brother. In a 
ruse that The Times praised as “ingenious,” Foley confronted Walter and told him that the 
police already had George in custody and he had admitted everything. Poor Walter 
immediately broke down and confessed. Foley returned to London with Walter in 
custody, arrested George and charged both men with theft. Walter plead guilty at their 
trial and got off lightly with five years’ penal servitude, while George, convicted of 
receiving, was sentenced to fourteen years.87 
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Butlers were hardly the only domestics tempted by their masters’ valuables. Edward 
Youngman Cotton and Henrietta Sharpe stole a variety of goods and cash from their 
former employers, the Drivers, in May 1844. Mr. Driver was a surveyor to the 
Commissioners of Woods and Forests and the family employed several servants 
including a charwoman, housemaid, footman and coachman. Sharpe, the family’s former 
housemaid, had left their employment nine months before the robbery to take up with 
their footman, Cotton, who remained with the family. According to the lovers’ landlady, 
the two had been “liv[ing] together as man and wife, and occupied the same room” at her 
lodging house for several months.88 Using his continued access to the Driver’s house, 
Cotton stole over £48 worth of serving ware from the pantry and cash from Mrs. Driver’s 
desk on May 6, 1844. To cover his tracks, Cotton set fire to the pantry before absconding 
to Maidstone with Sharpe. Burning the pantry was a poor way to deflect blame, 
especially since Mrs. Driver immediately suspected the culprit was her footman. Only he, 
she told the court, knew that she kept money in her writing desk, including a sovereign 
wrapped in a piece of paper marked “baby”, which was later found in the defendants’ 
possession. The fact that Cotton suddenly disappeared after the theft and arson was also 
suspicious. Inspector Pearce and Sergeant Thornton had little difficulty tracking Cotton 
and Sharpe. The detectives located the thieves’ lodgings in Westminster, found the 
cabman who took them from there, traced them to the Bull public house in Penenden 
Heath, near Maidstone and arrested them three days after the robbery. Both were tried the 
following month and, while Sharpe was acquitted, Cotton was transported for ten years, 
effectively ending their affair.89 
Domestic staff were not the only threats to the sanctity of the English household. In 
August 1870 Mary Ann Selfe was convicted of two counts of theft against invalids she 
cared for on an outpatient basis. Selfe was a nurse from the General Nursing Institute, an 
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outfit providing home care “to ladies.”90 She spent two months nursing Mrs. Mary Alpin 
until she passed away and Selfe subsequently went to take care of another woman, Mrs. 
Simmons. Selfe took it upon herself to appropriate £20 worth of jewellery and other 
goods from the Simmons’s and £70 of jewellery and clothes from Mary Alpin.91 Among 
the items stolen from the Simmons’s was the nightdress that Mrs. Simmons was supposed 
to be laid out in at her funeral. Selfe gave the stolen items to her mother to pawn. 
Sergeant Peck swiftly located Selfe, her mother and the goods. The two families she stole 
from were certain that the nurse was to blame and the Nursing Institute probably 
provided the police with her home address. At Selfe’s trials (the two cases were tried 
separately) local pawnbrokers testified that Selfe’s mother pawned the missing articles, 
which were later identified by Mr. Simmons and Mary Alpin’s sister Ann Leicester (at 
the time of the trial Mary was too invalided to testify). Self’s mother was acquitted of 
receiving the stolen property but Selfe, for her callousness, received a sentence of two 
years’ hard labour.92 
4.4.3 Stealing from a Master 
In English criminal law theft from a master only included servants until the addition of 
theft by clerks and apprentices in 1822. Theft by domestic servants and employees was 
considered worse than simple larceny because of the breach of trust stealing from an 
employer involved. In the Victorian period, thefts by domestic servants were usually 
prosecuted as thefts from households (specified places). Theft from non-domestic 
employers (such as companies) was considered theft from a master and punished more 
severely than simple larceny; while the 1827 Larceny Act punished simple larceny with 
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seven years’ transportation or up to two years in prison, employees who bit the hand that 
fed could be punished with up to fourteen years’ transportation or three years 
imprisonment.93 In 1861, reflecting the recent abolition of transportation to Australia, 
light-fingered servants and clerks could instead look forward to between three and 
fourteen years’ penal servitude or three years in gaol with or without hard labour or 
solitary confinement.94  
Investigating thefts by employees was a priority for the detectives in the 1840s, when 
they investigated a dozen such crimes. In January 1843 a lieutenant in the 6th Regiment of 
Foot prosecuted a lower-ranking officer in his service, Robert Edwards, for stealing his 
watch, watch guard, coats and shirts. Sergeant Goff and a divisional inspector searched 
Edwards’s lodgings and found pawnbrokers duplicates for the watch and the shirts while 
Sergeant Lund found additional duplicates for goods redeemed at two pawnbrokers’. 
Edwards, who was also convicted of simple larceny for stealing coats, trousers and 
handkerchiefs from another member of his regiment, was transported for seven years.95 
In October 1842 William Mouls, proprietor of the George pub in Netwington Butts, 
prosecuted his barman and two others for stealing three shillings and four halfpence from 
the till. John Otzin, the barman, had a ruse with two women wherein they ordered drinks 
and he overpaid them in change. Mouls’s son noticed the sleight of hand and called the 
police. Sergeant Braddick and Sergeant Goff knew the two women and had seen them 
hanging around the George in the weeks before the crime, establishing a pattern of 
criminal behaviour. All three defendants were convicted.96 
Employees sometimes stole to ease pecuniary distress, as in the case of Catherine Powers 
who stole six printed books from her master Daniel Exley in February 1843. Exley was a 
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bookbinder and Powers worked for him as a book folder and sewer. She stole the books, 
and gave them to her friend Kearney to have bound and pawned. When Sergeant 
Braddick arrested Kearney and Constable Goff arrested Powers, she admitted, “I did take 
the books; it was through distress.” Powers was convicted of theft from a master and 
Kearne of receiving, though they both received light sentences.97 
A more egregious theft occurred in November 1853, when 900 pairs of gloves were 
stolen in transit between a manufacturer in Somerset and a buyer in London. They were 
taken from the platform at Nine Elms station, where the shipment was offloaded from the 
London & South-Western Railway and awaited delivery by van. A significant amount of 
pilfering, from employees and others, occurred at Nine Elms and the accused, James 
Wade, worked there. He knew the railway schedule, procedures and the locations of 
goods awaiting delivery. Inspector Shaw arrested Wade with the gloves and he 
implicated two other men in the theft, including one of the railway’s porters, William 
Dummett. Shaw then arrested Dummett and one other accomplice. Wade was convicted 
and testified at Dummett’s Old Bailey trial. Unfortunately the prosecution could not 
establish when exactly the theft was committed and the judge deemed prosecution 
witness testimony insufficient to connect the defendant with the theft.98  
A much larger and more complicated railway theft, the Great Bullion Robbery, occurred 
in May 1855. It was a daring theft in which £15,000 in gold bullion was taken from 
sealed boxes travelling on the London & South-Eastern Railway bound for Boulogne. 
The bullion was weighed before shipment and re-weighed on arrival in Boulogne. The 
weights were different when the shipment arrived in France, alerting French authorities 
that something was amiss. As prosecution counsel explained, the police had no leads on 
the case until Fanny Kay walked into the offices of the South-Eastern Railway Company 
and gave up the perpetrators. Kay’s lover, Edward Agar, was one of the four men who 
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pulled off the heist. Agar was already in prison on another conviction and had trusted his 
confederate William Pierce (a ticket-printer for the railway) to use his share of the bullion 
to support Kaye and their child. Pierce kept the money and Kay went to the police for 
revenge.  
Pierce’s greed compromised a brilliantly executed robbery. Agar’s testimony revealed 
that the four men travelled to Folkstone to learn the system by which the bullion was 
unloaded from London & South-Eastern trains and loaded onto boats bound for France. 
He and Pierce saw where the railway employees stored the keys to the iron chests 
carrying the bullion. Agar made wax impressions of the keys Pierce obtained and 
William Tester, one of the railway’s clerks, made duplicates. On the day of the robbery, 
Pierce and Tester boarded the bullion-loaded train with two carpet bags full of lead shot. 
They checked the bags, which were stored in the baggage van, where the fourth man, 
James Burgess, was a railway guard. During the journey the thieves entered the baggage 
compartment, used the keys to open the bullion chests and replaced the stolen bullion 
with the lead shot (used to mimic the weight of the gold bars). Tester got off the train at 
Red Hill with the first load of the heavy gold, leaving the other three to continue 
unloading. Pierce and Agar disembarked in Dover and Burgess gave them back the 
carpetbags, now full of gold, at the baggage van as if they were passengers like any 
other.99  
On the basis of Kay’s information, Williamson and Smith began investigating. They 
arrested Pierce and Burgess in November 1856. Edward Agar, who testified for the 
prosecution, was in gaol on a forgery conviction and William Goerge Tester, a clerk in 
the office of the railway, was in Stockholm working for the Swedish Railway 
Company.100 The Swedish authorities extradited Tester and he was examined at Mansion 
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House with Pierce and Burgess on December 10.101 Pierce, Burgess and Tester were all 
found guilty.102 
Theft from warehouses was another concern, especially given the volume of goods a 
warehouse might store and the difficulty of keeping track of it. Three men were 
prosecuted in February 1843 for stealing cloth from two Cheapside warehouses. James 
Rawlings and James Newcombe stole eighty yards of lawn worth thirty-eight shillings 
from Messrs. Allen and Smith. They were caught because Sergeant Smith became 
suspicious that some of the warehouse porters “were in the habit of congregating at the 
Admiral Carter [a pub]…[so] I took a lodging there, for the purpose of watching those 
persons.” He saw Rawlings and Newcombe together “several times” after which he went 
to Allen and Smith’s. There he spoke to warehouseman Moses Martyn about setting up a 
trap. Martyn hid in the offices and asked Rawlings to stay in the warehouse while the 
other employees went on a dinner break. Martyn saw Rawlings take three pieces of lawn 
(the warehouseman had taken an inventory before leaving Rawlings alone with the 
goods) and then quickly leave the building. Rawlings was arrested an hour later, but not 
before he had give the cloth to his friend Newcombe to sell. Inspector Pearce recovered 
the cloth and the two thieves were convicted at the Old Bailey.103 These prosecutions 
indicate the importance of surveillance as a detective stratagem. Smith noticed something 
unusual and took the initiative to watch individuals he found suspicious. His hunch 
resulted in two successful prosecutions and three convictions. Smith was not yet a 
detective in 1843, but a young sergeant in Holborn. His activity in this case no doubt 
caught the commissioners’ attention for as soon as a place opened up in the Detective 
Department, he was promoted.   
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Sometimes employers worked in tandem with detectives to identify perpetrators. In 
February 1844 Thomas Sargeant was twice indicted for stealing money from his 
employers at a firm of wax buyers. Sargeant entered fictitious purchases in the company 
cashbook and pocketed the money. One of the porters discovered his scheme and 
reported it to the owners. Sargeant was acquitted of the first charge but convicted on the 
second because one of the firm owners, Thomas Smith planned a sting operation in 
conjunction with Sergeant Shaw. Smith had the entire store’s stock weighed and the coins 
in the cash drawer marked. He then sent all the other employees home and Shaw took up 
a post nearby to watch the shop. Shaw “saw the prisoner to go the till while no person 
was in the shop – I crossed the road, and looked through the window – he took something 
from the bag in the till, and appeared to be counting it.” Fifteen minutes later Smith found 
a new entry in the cashbook that did not correspond to any wax purchased by the firm. 
Shaw searched Sargeant and found eight of the marked shillings. Based on this 
unquestionable evidence, Sargeant was convicted and transported for seven years.104  
In early 1850 William Butterton, a secretary of the West Cornwall Railway Company, 
suspected a clerk of pilfering company cash at the railway’s London offices. The clerk, 
George Hart, was allowed to take petty cash for his daily expenses but his superior 
suspected that he took extra. To catch the thief, the secretary “marked two half-
sovereigns, and…put them into the bag and the bag in the safe, which I left open.” 
Shortly after, he reexamined the bag and found a sovereign missing. He immediately 
contacted the police and assembled the staff. Inspector Field searched everyone and 
found the marked coin on Hart. Butterton was conflicted about prosecuting Hart for theft 
because the youth was only fifteen years old. “I have a very high opinion of him,” 
Butterton told the court, and “I would try as far as I could to get him into the Company’s 
service again.” The jury, moved by the secretary’s character of the boy, acquitted him.105 
These cases indicate that employers were hardly passive victims of theft and were happy 
to work alone or with the police to find proof of misconduct.  
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4.4.4 Burglary  
Burglary - breaking and entering a dwelling house at night – was a very serious offence. 
It was one of the earliest crimes removed from benefit of clergy.106 After 1827 burglaries 
– still capital – were legislatively restricted to offences committed in the dwelling and 
connected buildings, although it was no longer a capital crime to burgle outbuildings such 
as warehouses and barns.107 Although burglary was decapitalized in 1837, it still carried 
a maximum penalty of transportation for life (after 1861, penal servitude for life).108  
Burglaries were not the most frequent thefts perpetrated in London but they had an effect 
on the public psyche out of proportion to their occurrence. Burglary frightened people for 
good reason – the crime was brazen and the perpetrators bold. There was every 
possibility that householders or their servants might encounter the burglar and that 
violence, or even death, might result. The threat of violence was one of the reasons why, 
even after burglary was decapitalized, any burglary involving “assault with Intent to 
murder any Person being therein” any attempts to “stab, cut, wound, beat, or strike” was 
still a hanging offence.109 Under English criminal law a burglary had to occur between 9 
pm and 6 am, otherwise it was a housebreaking.110 There is some historical debate about 
the type of men (and they were almost always men) who committed burglaries.111 V.A.C. 
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Gattrell suggests that burglars and housebreakers in Victorian England were not the 
hardened, organized and professional criminals that contemporaries believed they were. 
Rather, this type of “criminal was still, so to speak, in a state of primal innocence.”112 
Most thieves, he asserts, were casual labourers who only crossed over into criminality 
during times of acute penury.113 William M. Meier disagrees, seeing the Victorian 
burglar as a professional whose skills improved with technology. Developments in 
locking mechanisms and safes only encouraged burglars to become more technically 
sophisticated while the new Metropolitan Police forced them into professionalization to 
avoid detection. Meier argues that burglars’ “tactical advantages” over the police, 
including “improved skill, gathering inside information, and collaboration with fellow 
thieves to increase prospects of a successful raid” made them more sophisticated than the 
police were able to cope with. Whether hardened criminals or not, burglars were certainly 
bolder than most other thieves; there was, and is, a great distinction between 
pickpocketing and breaking into a house at night.114 The reality is probably a 
combination of both views, with some well-organized and skilled groups operating 
alongside amateurs. Burglars were greatly feared and there was every possibility that 
their crimes might be committed with violence. 
Concern about burglars in the mid-1840s prompted Rowan and Mayne to create an anti-
burglary task force within the Metropolitan Police. Former detective Superintendent 
Pearce took command of detectives and constables from across the Police District with 
orders to “make themselves acquainted with the persons of all such criminals in whatever 
part of the District they may reside or frequent” in order that they may “keep them under 
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observation in the future.”115 The immediate goal of the group was to provide additional 
surveillance in areas usually targeted by burglars. It was hoped that the officers involved 
would also be able to identify habitual criminals and their techniques, taking these skills 
back to their divisions with them. Using constables from around London allowed this 
small patrol to share information between divisions and facilitated cooperation between 
detectives and the uniform branch on an issue of universal concern. The patrols began in 
November, when nights became longer, giving burglars the perfect climate in which to 
plan and perpetrate their crimes. This was one of the first routine duties for plainclothes 
men in the divisions before the establishment of a dedicated divisional detective force in 
1869. When a string of thefts was identified in one area, groups of plainclothes policemen 
would patrol until the threat abated. In August 1862 the commissioners responded to 
concern about burglary by assigning nearly two hundred officers to plainclothes patrols 
between 10 pm and 2 am across London for “the prevention of robberies and other crimes 
committed with violence in the streets, and burglaries, and for the detection of those 
committing or attempting to commit such crimes.”116  
Rapid circulation of information about a burglary was essential. Police instruction 
manuals exhorted superintendents and inspectors to send routes immediately after a 
burglary was reported. This way, local stations could disseminate descriptions of the 
perpetrators and stolen goods to keep policemen and pawnbrokers on the lookout.117 The 
press, too, encouraged police vigilance. Whereas undercover police work could 
sometimes be equated with spying, when it came to burglary, concerns about Londoners’ 
safety in their homes dwarfed other considerations. After a housebreaking in Wimbledon 
in early 1869 The Times urged the police to combat housebreaking with undercover 
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police detectives, since “the ordinary police are unable to cope with these expert 
thieves.”118 
Manpower was another problem. The police budget already paid wages that were, 
according to Commissioner Henderson, “confessedly inadequate.” Even if more money 
were available, the exponential growth of the city, he noted, swiftly outpaced the 
government’s ability to augment the police force. Henderson estimated that while the 
population of London had increased by 30 per cent between 1842 and 1869, the 
Metropolitan Police had added fewer than 1,500 men.119 
Given the frequency of burglaries in London, detectives were only called in when the 
commissioners had a particular interest in a burglary case. In most cases, divisional 
policemen and, after 1869, divisional detectives were expected to make the prevention 
and detection of burglaries their focus. This is reflected in the number of times detectives 
from both branches appear at the Old Bailey to prosecute burglars. While the central 
detectives appear 13 times in 36 years, divisional detectives appear 68 times between 
1869 and 1878 alone. Burglaries are the single largest category in which divisional men 
appear in felony trials, indicating that by the 1870s divisional detectives put an emphasis 
on detecting burglary.120 And they were very good at it; Commissioner Henderson’s 
annual report to the Home Office indicated that in the first six months of the divisional 
detectives’ existence they had a 63 per cent conviction rate.121 Henderson credited the 
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undercover night patrols with deterring opportunistic property crime. They were, in his 
estimation, a “[g]reat success.”122 
Without the survival of individual burglary case files in police records it is difficult to 
determine exactly why detectives were assigned to specific cases. The monetary value of 
the goods stolen is often – but not always  - a good indicator. When burglars relieved 
Thomas Clapham and William Williams, London silversmiths, of £2000 worth of 
jewellery in October 1850, Inspector Lund was immediately called. The police suspected 
that the proprietor’s errand boy, Charles Clinton, was involved since he was usually the 
last to leave at night. Once Clinton left, the porter Charles Kelly locked the door from the 
inside and went upstairs to his apartments above the shop. When Lund arrived at the 
crime scene the morning after the burglary, he determined that it was an inside job. 
Before leaving the previous night, Clinton let an accomplice into the building to hide in 
the lobby until everyone was asleep. The stowaway then opened the front door for his 
partners. Clinton quickly gave up his co-conspirators; Lund arrested two the day after the 
burglary and a sergeant from Covent Garden arrested two others several days afterward. 
Seventeen year-old Clinton pleaded guilty and was transported for twenty years.123  
The burglary at Clapham and Williams’s premises came shortly after a series of silver 
robberies on a national scale. Scotland Yard men were often chosen to lead investigations 
outside the Metropolitan Police District and worked frequently with law enforcement 
agencies from other major cities and county constabularies. The two principal offenders 
in the silver theft ring were a Liverpool watchmaker named William Macaulay and 
Thomas Charles Sirrell, a London refiner. Macaulay would receive stolen silver in 
Liverpool and ship it to Sirrell’s warehouse in London for refining. The thieves’ most 
recent haul was the Sunday collection from St. Anthony’s Chapel in Liverpool as well as 
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all of the silver sacramental vessels and other personal property of the Rev. James 
Fisher.124 Having looted both the house of God and that of the good Reverend, Macaulay 
sent the proceeds by rail to Sirrel in London. Suspecting the London-Liverpool 
connection, Liverpool detective Lawrence Kehoe and Scotland Yard’s Inspector Lund 
followed the suspicious package. They trailed a railway porter to Sirrell’s shop and Lund 
apprehended Sirrel after discovering items belonging to Fisher among the array of silver 
sent by Macaulay.125 Lund then telegraphed the Liverpool police to have Macaulay and 
Maguire arrested.126 A great deal of property stolen in London and Liverpool was found 
at Sirrell’s and was displayed at Scotland Yard and subsequently bought to Liverpool by 
Kehoe and Lund to allow victims to identify their property.127 Macaulay and Sirrell were 
tried at the South Lancashire Winter Assizes for burglary and receiving. Although there 
was a clear paper trail between Macaulay and Sirrell and no doubt that the items in 
question were all stolen, the prosecution failed to convince the jury that Macaulay had 
been involved in the burglary. Macaulay was only convicted of receiving, while Sirrell 
was acquitted, much to the delight of the courtroom.128 
Burglaries were difficult to detect if thieves were not caught in the act, though they might 
be caught afterwards if police officers noticed suspicious behaviour. In early June 1852 
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Inspector Shaw had the Royal Oak beer shop – whose proprietor Thomas Lawrence was 
suspected of receiving stolen property – under surveillance. Shaw hid in a house across 
the road and watched Lawrence meet Nathan Woolf Jacobson at the beer shop and then 
leave. Shaw followed them to Lawrence’s stables, where the two kept stolen property. 
After Jacobson emerged with a parcel under his arm, Shaw stopped him to ask the 
provenance of the vase he was carrying. Jacobson, unable to furnish the officer with 
plausible reasons for where he obtained his property, was arrested. Both men were found 
guilty of receiving and transported for ten years each.129  
Likewise, Sergeant Coathupe hauled Joseph West before police magistrates in October 
1863 because the detective saw him wearing a new suit. Coathupe had been watching the 
corner of Southampton street in Holborn when he saw West walking by around 8 pm. 
The following morning, he saw West again at 10 am and he “appeared to have a new suit 
of clothes on.” Feeling this sudden sartorial bonanza was suspicious, Coathupe and 
Sergeant Shore followed West home where they discovered several pieces of stolen 
clothing. West was convicted of receiving stolen goods, there being too little evidence to 
tie him to the burglary itself.130  
Thefts perpetrated or abetted by servants, occasional helpers or tradesmen were common 
because these employees had intimate knowledge of the premises and the valuables 
therein. A shop boy facilitated the burglary of silversmiths and jewelers Clapham and 
Williams. He knew the location of the most valuable pieces and hid his accomplice in a 
dark corner of the shop before leaving for the night. In a similar case, Benjamin Hassler 
burgled his former employer, Edward Burmister, a merchant from Clapham. Hassler 
knew the layout of the house, the system for locking up at night, and the location of the 
most valuable watches and jewellery. He broke in through the larder window on March 
26, 1852 and relieved his former employer of £46 in jewellery and £26 in cash. A week 
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later, Inspector Shaw and Sergeant Whicher arrested him, along with the stolen property, 
in Notting Hill. Hassler was transported for ten years.131  
People who took in lodgers to make ends meet were also at risk. James Law and wife 
Mary took in lodgers at their pub in Ludgate Hill. One of their lodgers, Francis Bull, stole 
clothing and silver worth £8 in January 1843. Bull was “a tall and powerful German” 
who made a habit of returning to burgle taverns and public houses where he had stayed in 
the past.132 Inspector Thornton tracked him to Lewes, Sussex, where he was in gaol for 
another theft committed on February 9. Henry Harper, the superintendent of the Sussex 
Constabulary, suspected that Bull had committed similar crimes in London and passed 
this information along to the Met. According to Thornton, Harper’s “description [of Bull] 
seemed to tally exactly,” with the man the Laws described so Thornton travelled to 
Lewes Gaol to see for himself. Bull was wearing one of Mr. Law’s coats, had one of Mrs. 
Law’s rings and was carrying a drill that matched the marks on the desk that had been 
broken into. Francis Bull was transported for life.133  
Benjamin Lee, a hair-worker and jeweler, had most of his Baker street store looted in 
October 1869 by men he had hired several months earlier to paint the store. The painters 
used the job as an opportunity to case out the shop’s contents as well as possible entry 
points. When Lee arrived at to work on the morning of October 26 he “found it had been 
broken into, and all the valuable stock was gone – the place was in confusion, and all the 
fixtures and drawers in a heap on the floor.” The thieves entered through the ceiling by 
taking out a fan light and dropping down through the opening, stealing £500 of Lee’s 
stock. Inspector Clarke worked with Inspector Hinde from Marylebone division to track 
the burglars. So many small pieces were easily pawned and they began their investigation 
with pawnbrokers in central London. The two officers turned up rings, lockets, necklaces 
and brooches at pawnshops in Westminster, Leicester Square, Fitzroy Square, St. 
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Martin’s Lane and Chelsea. Based on descriptions from the pawnbrokers and from a local 
police constable who saw several men loitering round Lee’s premises on the morning 
after the burglary, Clarke and Hindes located Hippolyte Longuay, one of the burglars, at 
his house in Gerrard Street. There they found a large amount of jewellery and other 
miscellaneous goods. Another officer on plainclothes duty had seen Longuay and his 
accomplice George Christiens leave Longuay’s house on Gerrard Street and pawn some 
jewellery. The officer recognized Christiens carrying a bag into Longuay’s house two 
days later and arrested him and another confederate, Emile Antoine. Longuay claimed 
that he was merely the fence for the stolen goods. He was acquitted at trial, but the other 
three men were convicted and sentenced to penal servitude.134  
When widow Elizabeth Begg of Canon’s Park was burgled in late April 1871, the main 
suspect was her former gardener Robert Massie. Among the items stolen from the widow 
were a writing desk and knife “of considerable value.” Massie left her service the month 
before and was familiar enough with the layout of the house to know that he could gain 
access to the upper windows by climbing onto a stone balustrade. While walking back to 
London around 4 am the following morning he was stopped by Hampstead police 
constable Painter at Mill Hill. Painter thought it was strange that Massie should be 
passing through Mill Hill if, as he claimed, he was travelling from Edgeware to London. 
It was shorter, Painter testified, to take the Edgeware Road. When the constable later 
heard about the burglary, he was certain that Massie was the man he saw. Mrs. Begg and 
her new gardener also pointed the finger at Massie.135 Based on their description 
Inspector Pay and Sergeant Manton located the former gardener’s lodgings in 
Wandsworth and interviewed his landlady. She confirmed that Massie had come home 
the morning after the murder and claimed to have walked a great distance: “his boots and 
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socks were wet, and I dried them for him.” Pay and Manton arrested Massie in 
Wandsworth shortly afterwards and Constable Painter came to the station and identified 
the prisoner as the man he saw at Mill Hill early on the morning of April 23. Although 
Massie’s behaviour was suspicious, there was no physical evidence to tie him to the 
burglary and the jury acquitted him.136 
Burglars might be violent when apprehended. They, more than many other criminals, 
were likely to use force if interrupted by homeowners or servants. The heavy penalties 
for a burglary conviction may also have contributed to the violence displayed by burglars 
caught in the act. John Holloway and Thomas Lewis savagely attacked Constable Baker 
in the early hours of April 12, 1869 when the officer caught them breaking into Bathurst 
Edward Wilkinson’s house in Clapham Common. Baker “heard a noise in the direction of 
the prosecutor’s house” and ran to see what was happening. He saw the two accused, 
John Holloway and Thomas Lewis, standing beside the unlocked side door.137 He 
apprehended Lewis but was thrown down and kicked by Holloway, who attempted to 
slash the officer’s face with a knife. The burglars then ran off, but not before they had 
gashed Baker’s thumb and bashed in his helmet (which he produced as evidence in 
court). Baker managed to get in one shot, kicking Holloway in the eye. It was a lucky hit 
since Holloway’s black eye helped solve the case; another constable identified Holloway 
in a nearby pub from the colossal bruise around his left eye. Once arrested, Holloway 
gave up Lewis, whom Sergeant Meiklejohn arrested at his home in Westminster on April 
20. Both men were sentenced to a decade of penal servitude and Constable Baker 
received a £2 reward for his bravery.138 
Detectives were also called in when divisional burglary investigations stalled. In July 
1858 Mayne ordered a detective to look into a burglary case in Wandsworth where “[t]wo 
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such cases seem to show want of vigilance or skill in the Police near, in not detecting the 
parties in going or returning.”139 Scotland Yard interventions in local cases fed 
intradepartmental jealousies. Robert Bell, an ex-detective sergeant from Southwark 
division described a vociferous antipathy between the two groups: “It has almost come to 
fights.” He was far from the only officer to notice the problem.140 
Scotland Yard detectives were also sent outside London to assist provincial forces. In 
1848 Home Secretary George Grey instructed the commissioners of police to send two 
detectives down to Stowe “to assist in the discovery of the perpetrators of some daring 
Burglaries.” It was late November and prime season for crimes committed under cover of 
darkness.141 Some years later, Lansdowne and Croome investigated a series of burglaries 
outside the Metropolitan Police District. They were called in after the burglars stole from 
a local notable whose status ensured Scotland Yard’s attention. The thieves entered their 
victims’ houses by forcing the latch on a rear window and in each case stole only a clock 
and a tablecloth to wrap the clock in. Lansdowne surmised that only someone in the 
trades could conceal weighty table clocks without looking suspicious, in a basket 
perhaps. He and Croome watched local train stations for someone matching Landsowne’s 
theory. One evening they noticed a woman carrying a carpenter’s basket meet a carpenter 
disembarking from an arriving train. His hands, noted Lansdowne, did not look like those 
of a labourer. It transpired that the man left London during the night to steal clocks and 
then pawn them at local shops near Pentonville Road where he was known as a 
clockmaker.142  
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By the 1870s burglary was a key issue for the Home Office and Metropolitan Police. In 
mid-October 1877, the beginning of the ‘burglary season’, the District and Divisional 
superintendents met to discuss the problem.143 The result was a police order reminding 
officers of the rules for properly investigating burglary and insisting they “be rigidly 
complied with and extended to all cases of Housebreaking, or Stealing in a Dwelling 
House to the value of £5, or other serious offence against property or person.” In the 
event of a burglary, an inspector or, ideally, the divisional superintendent should be at the 
scene of a burglary as soon as possible to oversee the investigation. The senior officer 
was reminded that they were to “obtain all the particulars as to the entry, description, and 
value of the property stolen, and also of any suspicious persons seen loitering near.” They 
were then to telegraph all relevant information to the Commissioner’s Office for 
distribution throughout the Police District. A divisional detective was also required to 
attend to follow up “any clue which may be obtained…with a view to discover the 
thieves and recover the property.”144 This was part of a new mandate within the force for 
“following up and controlling crime” under the aegis of James Edward Davis. As the 
Met’s new Legal Advisor, Davis, a former magistrate in Stoke-upon-Trent and Sheffield, 
also managed the new Department of Crime where he oversaw the investigation of 
serious indictable offences.145 Davis, appointed by Home Secretary Cross in October 
1877, was also responsible for ensuring that cases sent to the treasury solicitor for public 
prosecution were properly framed with compelling evidence.146  
In November 1877, Commissioner Henderson summarized the burglary problem for the 
home secretary. In a memorandum on “Burglaries within the Metropolitan Police 
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District,” Henderson explained that the Met was stretched thin by London’s rapid 
expansion. “During the past five years,” he told Secretary Cross, “50,000 new houses, 
comprising 831 Streets and Squares and measuring 136 miles have been added to the 
police watch without anything like a corresponding increase in the force.” Police 
numbers were further dwindled because of an outbreak of cattle plague where nearly 200 
officers were pulled from regular duty to attend that problem. Additionally problematic, 
and something Mayne and Rowan had complained about in 1842, was householder 
negligence. Most burglars accessed houses from rear, often unlocked, windows, which 
constables on the beat could not see. Henderson stressed the preventive measures taken 
by the police during the winter months but “regretted that their preventive exertions are 
not supplemented to a greater extent by the care of householders themselves, who 
frequently leave their homes unattended and neglect to provide secure fastenings on their 
doors and windows.”147  
Burglary, argues Meier, preoccupied the late Victorians and “contributed to the decline of 
the English miracle” of decreasing theft prosecutions.148 By the end of the 1870s the 
Metropolitan Police struggled to successfully investigate burglaries, hampered as they 
were by deficient manpower and the sheer volume of the city itself. Central detectives 
were infrequently involved in burglary cases. Their presence usually indicated a cross-
jurisdictional case, valuable goods or some other extenuating circumstance. The majority 
of burglary cases were handed by the divisions.  
4.5 Deception 
4.5.1 Forgery 
Forgery became a legislative concern in the late seventeenth century, as public finance 
grew to be a central concern of state stability. During the eighteenth century public and 
private finance were inextricably linked, encouraging legislation to protect against 
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forgery of public and private instruments. Between 1729 and the early nineteenth century 
most forgeries were capitalized, indicating the premium that the English government 
placed upon private and public credit. As Randall McGowen has shown, forgery 
legislation “portrayed society as dependent upon the security of certain types of 
paper.”149 These included, but were not limited to: stamps, bills of exchange, promissory 
notes, cheques, wills, and powers of attorney.  
Detecting forgeries was tricky business. As paper instruments quickly gained popularity, 
it became more difficult to detect counterfeits. Forgeries were most commonly of bills, 
particularly Bank of England notes, and of signatures on a variety of financial 
instruments, though cheques were the most commonly forged paper. Birmingham, with 
its strong artisanal history, was a hotbed of counterfeiting. Engravers, in particular, were 
needed to engrave the copper plates necessary for printing banknotes. The problem was 
so prevalent that by the late eighteenth century the Bank of England’s solicitors always 
had a representative at the Warwick assizes to manage forgery prosecutions in that 
jurisdiction, a practice that continued into the nineteenth century.150  
Counterfeit bank notes were usually only detected when the notes made it back to their 
originating insitution. Many people – shopkeepers especially – were too busy and 
unqualified to identify fraudulent bills when they passed over the counter. Cheques, too, 
were often cashed because the cashier (and this might be a private person or a bank clerk) 
trusted the person proffering the paper or because the cheque was drawn in the name of 
an existing client.151 In the nineteenth century, bank clerks became essential witnesses in 
forgery prosecutions because they not only understood banking protocols (including 
tracking numbered bills) but could also identify and verify client signatures.152 
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Forgery was not initially a focus of detective policing. There were simply too few 
detectives to investigate and other groups, such as the Bank of England’s solicitors, had a 
long history of successfully investigating and prosecuting forgers.153 The City of 
London’s detectives also made forgery a specialty. The financial heart of the capital was 
their jurisdiction and they helped prosecute many cases at the Old Bailey.154 The Bank of 
England was hardly the only victim of forgeries, however, and as the paper economy 
boomed in the nineteenth century, so too did opportunities to counterfeit. The Detective 
Department investigated roughly one case each year in the 1840s and 1850s, but these 
numbers doubled by the 1870s.155 Forgeries comprise nearly 20 per cent of the detective 
workload but the total value of goods appropriated by these means amounts to tens of 
thousands of pounds. When Scotland Yard detectives were brought in to investigate 
counterfeit financial documents, it was often because the stakes were high. The cases that 
follow typically involve individuals or small groups of forgers who faked signatures on 
cheques, wills, promissory notes or orders for payments. Several involve possession of 
instruments used for forging, including copper plates and engraving tools used to print 
counterfeit banknotes. 
In their first forgery case in 1843, detectives investigated a major fraud by the Rev. Dr. 
William Bailey, who attempted to extract £2,875 from the estate of Mr. R. Smith. 
Rumour had it that the recently deceased Smith left a substantial fortune and Bailey 
concocted an elaborate sham to claim part of the estate. Bailey alleged that Smith died 
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owing his sister nearly £3,000 on investments Smith made on her behalf. Bailey took his 
claim on the estate to the Court of Common Pleas but lost. Some of Bailey’s evidence 
from that trial was suspicious, such as his claim that Smith signed an I.O.U. to him in 
August 1842, a date upon which another witness positively swore that Smith was in 
another part of London. After losing his suit at the Court of Common Pleas, Bailey then 
offered a local fruit-seller £30 to swear that he had also witnessed the signing of the 
I.O.U. The poor fruit-seller had an attack of conscience and gave up Bailey to the Smith 
family, who had him charged with forgery.156  
The Smith’s solicitor, Mr. Flower, who had also represented Courvoisier, requested that 
Inspector Pearce arrest Bailey and seize all of the accused’s papers, some of which were 
considerably damning. These included his written instructions to the fruit-seller and 
another women to make false affidavits in support of his sister’s claim on the Smith 
estate. Bailey had hoped this ‘new evidence’ would force a new civil trial.157 Smith’s 
stockbroker testified that the writing on the documents was not his client’s; the style of 
the writing was all wrong, he told the court: “there is a stiffness, a schoolboyness [sic] 
about the promissory-note” that he did not attribute to his client’s hand. Smith’s brother 
similarly felt that “it [the promissory-note] is not written with that freedom which 
characterized my brother’s writing… [though] I think it is a very good imitation.” Pearce 
testified at the trial about his apprehension of Bailey and also that he found various 
papers and a notebook in his possession. Pearce read aloud to the court Bailey’s 
instructions to his two paid witnesses about how to frame their affidavits. This damning 
evidence convinced the jury, who found the reverend guilty of forgery. He was 
transported for life.158 
The detectives also investigated two forged cheques, for £190 and £390, in 1844. In 
January, Mary Ann Brown cashed a cheque at Smith, Payne and Smith, bankers, of 
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Lombard Street. Lady Margaret Nelthorpe, the woman upon whom the money was 
drawn, was a trusted client of the bank so cashier thought nothing of paying out the £190 
sum to Brown in £50 and £5 notes. Two years earlier, Brown had applied to be a 
companion to the widow Nelthorpe and spent just over a month at Nelthorpe’s home 
before leaving. Lady Nelthorpe remembered Brown telling her “she could imitate any 
person’s handwriting,” and testified that Brown’s forgery was “very much like my 
signature.” Nelthorpe had not seen Brown since December of 1842 and, with little 
information about her whereabouts (by 1844 Brown was living as Mrs. Francis with her 
co-accused John Francis), it took Inspector Pearce and Sergeant Kendall several months 
find her. Luckily, the clerk at Smith, Payne and Smith noted down the numbers of the 
Bank of England notes before he paid Brown and, as soon as the bills surfaced, the police 
were able to trace the forgers. The detectives arrested Brown and Francis in Surrey in 
early April. Knowing the importance of written documentation to proving forgery cases, 
Pearce ensured that “when I apprehended the prisoners I seized all their papers and 
documents both their writing desks, their letters, bills and every thing they contained.”159 
Brown, the author of the forgery, was transported for fifteen years, while Francis, an 
unwitting party who believed his wife’s windfall was an annuity, was acquitted.160  
At the next sessions of the Central Criminal Court, Whicher helped put away another 
forger. Again, the forged cheque was cashed at a bank in the name of an existing client. 
The clerk at the bank happily paid out £390 in Bank of England notes and the forgery 
was not detected until the Bank returned the cheque. Scotland Yard was notified and 
Whicher began his investigation at Whistler’s in the Strand, where one of the £50 notes 
was used to purchase a gold watch. Whicher traced the man who purchased the watch, 
Daniel Wright, to Birmingham and back and ultimately arrested him at the Victoria Hotel 
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in Euston Square.161 A search of Wright produced large quantities of cash, the gold 
watch and a “pocket-book [with] a cheque similar to the one produced – it is signed 
‘Pulsford,’ the same as the other.” On the basis of this indisputable evidence, Wright was 
transported for twelve years.162  
Forgery was often committed by respectable, literate and sophisticated people. Literacy 
and an understanding of the world of financial instruments were necessary to pull off a 
successful forgery.163 Bailey was a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, and officiant at 
St. Peter’s in Westminster. When Daniel Wright and his accomplice appeared before 
magistrates at Marylebone police court, the paper reported that he was “a young man of 
very respectable appearance” and his consort “a showily dressed woman.” The two had 
run up a bill of £36 at the Victoria Hotel, one that must have been settled by Wright’s 
parents, who “were highly respectable people, living in Conduit-street, Hanover-square.” 
Wright’s father, it transpired, was a successful tradesman who had left his son an ample 
inheritance, which the latter quickly dissipated.164 
In several cases, civic-minded artisans helped police and foreign governments entrap 
forgers. This was especially important when foreign instruments were counterfeited 
because foreigners tended to rely on their own countrymen for help. The detectives 
investigated numerous cases where Dutch, Swedish, Prussian and Russian instruments 
were forged. Where would-be forgers lacked the artisanal skills to forge for themselves, 
they took a great risk soliciting help from engravers and printers. In these cases, tip-offs 
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from the artisanal community were often key to identifying potential forgers within 
London’s large ex-patriot population.  
In July 1844 Sergeants Thornton and Kendall and the Dutch Embassy began a short but 
successful sting operation based on a tip from an artist named Louis Rosenthal. Several 
forgers approached Rosenthal to help duplicate 500 coupons for certificates of Dutch 
stock (worth £2 each). Rosenthal knew that the scheme was illegal, but agreed to 
participate in order to entrap the three perpetrators, Pietro Valler, Francisco Enrico and 
Henry Harrison. Immediately after Harrison propositioned him, Rosenthal reported the 
fraud to the Dutch Embassy, which in turn informed Scotland Yard. The Embassy, 
Rosenthal and the Detective Department agreed that Rosenthal should go along with the 
plan and that the detectives would monitor the transaction.  
Rosenthal had an engraver create the copper plate for the print and made 500 
impressions. While Rosenthal was working on the forgeries, Thornton and Kendall tailed 
Valler, Enrico and Harrison. They wanted to ensure that, at trial, police evidence linked 
the three conspirators to each other and Rosenthal. They also probably wanted to ensure 
that the three men were the limit of the forgery ring. If it went deeper, a premature arrest 
would only skim the surface of a larger group. The detectives also needed to keep an eye 
on the copper plate and impressions. If they lost track of the criminals or the forged 
instruments, the scandal would be immense. No one at Scotland Yard wanted to be 
responsible for permitting £1000 of forged documents to enter circulation. Once he 
ascertained that the two Italians and Harrison were working alone, Thornton arrested all 
three two days after Harrison’s initial visit to Rosenthal. By waiting until the forgers 
retrieved the printing blocks and impressions from Rosenthal, the detective ensured that 
the prosecution had ample evidence of the fraud to support witness testimony. At the 
trial, Thornton and Kendall recounted all the movements of the accused during the two-
day sting. The detectives also told the jury how, during the arrest, they took possession of 
the copper plate, various proofs and an original coupon for the Dutch Stock upon which 
the forgeries were modeled. On the basis of such complete evidence, the court found all 
three men guilty and the judge transported each for ten years. Throughout the operation, 
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the detectives worked in tandem with the Consul-General of the Netherlands and 
solicitors to ensure that the case against the three forgers was unquestionable.165 
Christian Charles Moller and his accomplice William Foster were similarly unlucky 
when they asked engraver Charles Morrish to be their co-conspirator. Foster approached 
Morrish in late April 1856 and asked whether the artisan could copy a Swedish bank note 
(from the Malare Provinces Private Bank) on to steel or copper. Morrish agreed to help 
and requested “Ten or twelve days” to do the work. Having created some breathing room, 
he then contacted solicitors and the Swedish Embassy. To keep Moller and Foster under 
the impression he was still helping them, Morrish made the plate, though he ensured that 
the forgery was poorly done. When asked by defense counsel how he could identify an 
impression made from his engraving, Morrish responded, “I think you will find my 
initials at the back of it – you may consider this a very clumsy imitation, I did it in a 
hurry, I knew that it was not to go through the hands of a banker.” His customers were 
less discerning, however, thinking, “it was very good.” Inspector Thornton and Sergeant 
Williamson, along with a plainclothes constable from Lambeth, kept the two criminals 
under surveillance until an arrest was made on May 21. Thornton found the forged 
impressions on Foster. Richard Mullins, the prosecution solicitor, was present at the 
police station when Moller and Foster were charged, indicating that he had been working 
closely with Scotland Yard during the three-week operation. The vice-consul for Sweden 
and Norway was present at the trial to explain that the Malare Provinces Private Bank 
was a Swedish bank with Royal endorsement and to testify as an expert on the Bank’s 
legitimate notes. Moller was transported for fourteen years while Foster was given four 
years penal servitude.166 
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Another engraver took in brothers Edmund and Louis Schehl. On November 22, 1856 
they approached fellow Prussian Carl Morztz Kuhlmorgen about referring them to a 
lithographer. Kuhlmorgen recommended his friend Rudolph Appel, a “patentee of the 
process called the Anastatic process, for taking impressions on metal from paper.” 
Having worked for the Prussian Embassy before, Appel was an ideal person to help the 
Shehls forge Prussian 10 thaler notes.167 Much like Rosenthal and Morrish before him, 
Appel agreed to help the two Prussians but asked them to come back later to discuss the 
transaction further. Having bought some time, Appel immediately contacted the Prussian 
Embassy. The Embassy secretary instructed Appel to go along with the Schehls and then 
brought in the Metropolitan Police. Richard Mayne assigned Inspector Thornton to direct 
the investigation and the detective began his surveillance on November 23. Between 
November 23 and December 10, when he arrested the Schehls, Thornton watched both 
men. When he finally arrested them he found “nuts, and screws, and some of the 
engravings from the plates, a copy of the notes, and a card of Mr. Appel’s.” He also 
“found a quantity of water marked paper, corresponding with the plate which was with 
the paper, and some copies of an original Prussian note.” The physical evidence 
supported Appel’s testimony at trial and established a clear link between the Schehls, 
Appel and the forged documents. Not taking any chances, the Prussian government sent 
its own expert from the Chief Administration for the State Debts at Berlin to testify. The 
brothers were found guilty and sentenced to six years’ penal servitude.168  
A much larger web of forgeries came to light in the mid 1860s, this time of Russian 
rubles. The detectives brought nine people to trial at the Old Bailey between September 
1865 and July 1867 for forging Imperial Bank of Russia notes.169 Ruble forgeries became 
a problem in the capital during the 1850s but increased significantly in the following 
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decade.170 The problem was so extensive that the Imperial Bank of Russia sent an 
authority to London to help with the prosecutions; Eugene Klein, who oversaw the 
manufacture of Russia’s bank notes, was an important expert witness. The forgeries he 
had seen lately in London, he conceded, “are very skilful [sic] forgeries, therefore the 
more dangerous.”171 They required a knowing eye to detect.  
Seven defendants were charged with possession of materials for forging documents, one 
for engraving and one for uttering forged notes. The Russian government employed 
solicitors Venning, Dale and Robins to act on their behalf in these cases. The first 
prosecution took place in September 1865. The accused, Augustus Ancenay, was a 
French lithographer with a long history of forging foreign currency. Inspector Thomson 
searched his lodgings in Windsor and found acids, engravings and a proof sheet for a 50-
ruble note. Although Ancenay had abandoned his former workshop, Thomson had little 
trouble tracking him down at work in Gray’s Inn road.172 Thomson’s inquiries revealed 
that Ancenay was just the tip of the iceberg and the solicitors for the Russian Embassy 
asked the court to remand Ancenay “for as long a period as possible” so that Thomson 
could continue the investigation. The prosecution was also waiting for Klein to arrive 
from Russia.173 Ancenay was tried alone and convicted for possessing forging 
materials.174  
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The next case was tried in December 1865 and six more men were charged with 
possessing forged currency. The police broke this ring of forgers with the help of an 
inside man, a Pole named Joseph Liban, who had recently been charged, but released, in 
Dresden for forgery. He struck a deal with the Russian Embassy in Paris that he would 
help trace the source of the forgeries in return for his release. The Russians orchestrated 
his discharge and sent him to London. Liban arrived in London on June 1, 1865 and 
within two weeks had met inspector Thomson to discuss the investigation.175 Shortly 
afterwards Thomson and Sergeants Clarke and Mulvany began watching Liban’s 
lodgings. Thomson rented a room across the street and spent twelve hours a day 
observing who came and went. After several weeks watching – and at a time prearranged 
with Liban to ensure all the perpetrators were present – Thomson, Mulvany and several 
other officers stormed the house and arrested six conspirators. The detectives confiscated 
engraving tools and Russian notes (some of which had been partially burned in the 
fireplace). Five of the six accused were convicted. The last, Philip Braun, was acquitted 
because there was some uncertainty about whether he had been acting as an informant for 
a City of London detective.176 
The final two defendants were Vincent Jankowski and Joseph Finklestein, tried at the 
Central Criminal Court in 1866 and 1867. Jankowski was involved with the same group 
prosecuted in December 1864. He had been found in possession of 1,000 pieces of paper 
with 25-ruble notes printed on them but the prosecution could not corroborate their chief 
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witness’s story so the judge directed a Not Guilty verdict.177 The detectives had greater 
luck against Finklestein the following summer for uttering a forged 25-ruble note. 
Finklestein approached Inspector Thomson with forged notes and offered to help the 
police detect the forgers. The detective told Finklestein to keep the notes but Finklestein 
instead sold them. To avoid a repeat of Philip Braun’s acquittal, Thomson insisted that, 
although Finklestein was one of his informants, he never give him permission to part with 
the notes: 
I told him [Finklestein] to be careful what he did with them, and that if he did not 
return them to the man or bring them back to me, if he was ever found dealing 
with them, or if he fell into the hands of the police with these notes, it would be 
the same as if he was uttering them. 
Finklestein was found guilty and sentenced to five years’ penal servitude.178 During these 
investigations, Scotland Yard detectives worked closely with solicitors, especially on 
cases of counterfeit foreign currency, to build strong prosecution cases. The strength of 
officers’ testimony hinged on their ability to link defendants to the crime and often 
involved significant periods of shadowing suspects. Presenting evidence in court was 
paramount and detectives diligently collected evidence from suspects and their residences 
to present to juries.179  
Although forgeries of foreign currency attracted public and ministerial attention, the 
majority of the forgeries investigated by the Detective Department were orders for 
payment, promissory notes and bills of exchange drawn on domestic institutions. In one 
typical case, a young man named William Carroll Kelly was convicted for forging a £20 
cheque. Kelley pretended to be Cyril White, a cornet in the 12th Lancers, and had a local 
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army saddler named John Gibson change a cheque for him. Trusting his customer, the 
saddler gave Kelly £20 for a cheque which Kelley wrote in Gibson’s presence on a blank 
sheet of paper. The good-natured Gibson soon realized that he had given £20 to a 
swindler and reported the crime to the police. Jonathan Whicher arrested Kelly two 
weeks later. Kelly plead that he “was not aware of the seriousness of the offence,” but 
this did not fool the jury. Gibson had a softer heart, and recommended the boy to mercy 
because he was only eighteen years old.180    
Whereas Kelly was a desperate youngster in need of £20 to pay his debts, David Charles 
Lloyd was a cunning clerk who used his position at a share-broker’s to steal £600 worth 
of shares. Lloyd impersonated one of the North Eastern Berwick Railway’s shareholders, 
George Oliver, and managed to have a duplicate form of declaration for the shares sent to 
himself. Lloyd knew that Oliver was a client, how large his portfolio was and had access 
to papers with Oliver’s signature on them. Oliver admitted in court that Lloyd had done 
an excellent job forging his signature and it was only when some of the duplicate stock 
coupons were sent to Oliver and not to Lloyd that Oliver realized something was amiss. 
Lloyd tried to sell the stock in York, where the North Eastern Railway police became 
involved. The Railway’s police superintendent connected with Sergeant Clarke at 
Scotland Yard and together they travelled to Brighton to arrest Lloyd, who was convicted 
of forgery and sentenced to five years penal servitude.181 
Clerks and other employees in the financial sector were in an excellent position to 
commit forgeries. No only did they have access to client information (including 
signatures) but they understood banking protocol and procedures. Solicitor Herbert 
Templeman convinced one of his clients, Frank John Hawkins, to help him forge and 
utter a cheque for £1,242. Hawkins was a former clerk to bankers Robarts, Lubbock & 
Co. He had worked for their country office and so understood how to cash cheques for 
clients without verifying the funds with the client’s home institution first. Hawkins gave 
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Templeman information about bank client Major-General Henry Joseph Morris who had 
unlimited credit and to whom the bank was authorized to pay out cheques immediately. 
The cheque was drawn and cashed at a Parisian bank by commission agent Charles 
Asselin. The crime occurred in the summer of 1872. The cheque was cashed in Paris on 
July 4, shortly after which the French police notified the English Bankers’ Association 
about the forgery. The solicitor to the Bankers’ Association, Richard Mullins, managed 
the case. Asselin was arrested in June 1873, which led Mullins to Hawkins, who the 
solicitor convinced to testify for the prosecution. On the basis of these statements Mullins 
had arrest warrants drawn against Templeman and Giraud, which were executed by 
Sergeant Moss (a City of London detective) and Inspector Clarke. During the 
investigation Sergeant Reimers went undercover to question the commission agent 
Asselin. Reimers pretended ask about buying wine and, in the course of their 
conversation, had Asselin write his name and address down, which gave the detective 
handwriting to compare to that on the Parisian transaction. Although Reimers never 
testified during the trial, this evidence must have led to Asselin’s arrest and, thus, to the 
establishment of a case against the two defendants. Both men were convicted and 
sentenced to fifteen years’ penal servitude.182   
Wills were another commonly forged instrument. Attacks on inheritances were 
particularly feared in a society with such immense landed wealth.183 Forgeries of bills of 
exchange, bank notes or promissory notes – even for large amounts – were usually one-
time events. The forgery of a will, however, called into question entire estates, whether 
large or small. In the words of Justice Field, “Forgery, in any aspect, was serious, but it 
was the more serious when, in the case of a will, they [forgers] managed to amass 
property to which others were justly and lawfully entitled.”184 
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The £12,000 estate of Emma Adolphus was the subject of civil and criminal suits in June 
and September 1875. Emma was the daughter of Sir Jacob Adolphus, a physician and 
former Inspector-General of Army Hospitals and Physician-General to the Militia Forces 
in Jamaica.185 She was the last surviving sibling in her family, the sole inheritor of her 
family’s estate and, unmarried, lived with her friends Mr. and Mrs. Cooper. Mrs. Cooper 
and another friend, Amelia Jenkins, looked out for the physically frail Adolphus until she 
died on July 4, 1872. Shortly thereafter, Cooper and Jenkins produced a new will, written 
two days before Adolphus’s death, giving Jenkins a £100 annuity and the remainder of 
the estate to Cooper. Both women were named joint-executors in the new document. The 
Adolphus family was furious. They successfully sued Cooper and Jenkins in the Court of 
Probate and Divorce and had the will declared fraudulent. Two handwriting experts 
testified that Mrs. Cooper had penned the new will and the two women were ordered to 
repay the inheritance with costs.186  The government then laid criminal charges against 
both women and two male accomplices, who claimed to have witnessed the signing of 
the new will.187 Cooper was presented at Bow Street in late July 1875, but Jenkins had 
gone to Paris and the English government was in the process of extraditing her. Inspector 
James Pay arrested Cooper at home while Sergeant Adolphe Marchand travelled to Paris 
to retrieve Jenkins. She and Cooper joined their accomplices in the dock at Bow Street in 
mid-August. All four were tried at the Central Criminal Court in September 1875. 
Marchand testified but Pay, who had died several days before the trial, had his deposition 
read. Cooper and Jenkins were convicted – Cooper for the forgery and Jenkins for 
uttering the will.188      
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Another forgery involving the extradition of a suspect occurred in January 1874. 
Inspector Druscovich travelled to Belgium to retrieve provision merchant Paul Bayard, 
charged in England with forging and uttering the trademark of Messrs. Moët and 
Chandon.189 Moët and Chandon had only one agent in England, the firm Simon and 
Lightley, but the numerous publicans and spirit merchants that Bayard swindled into 
buying fake Moët and Chandon at bargain prices seem not to have understood this. 
Bayard worked in conjunction with a fellow Frenchman, Benoni LeBlanc, who plead 
guilty to forgery in December 1873.190 Immediately after that trial, Druscovich went to 
Antwerp to locate Bayard. Druscovich identified Bayard to the Belgian authorities who 
issued their own warrant for his arrest. Unusually, Bayard waived his right to a hearing 
under Belgian law and agreed to be sent back to England. The defense argued that 
LeBlanc was the real criminal behind the operation and that Bayard was unaware that the 
wine he sold was counterfeited. Notwithstanding his escape to Belgium, he was 
acquitted.191 
While the Bank of England and the City of London detectives made forgery 
investigations their priority, Scotland Yard’s detectives also made these crimes a 
specialty. Particularly when the pound value was high or where cases involved foreign 
governments, it was Scotland Yard men who liaised with solicitors, foreign embassies 
and travelled abroad to locate extradited offenders.  
4.5.2 Fraud 
In the 1840s larceny was the Detective Department’s main priority. Fraud was a 
relatively new policing concern and their fraud caseload was limited to a handful of 
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cases. By the 1870s, however, fraud investigations monopolized Scotland Yard’s 
casebook. Many of Scotland Yard’s early fraud cases involved horses: buying, selling 
and racing. Horses were valuable and often the most valuable asset an individual 
possessed. Horse theft was a significant concern in the eighteenth century and victims 
had no compunction about prosecuting horse thieves even though the penalty was death. 
Horses were valuable, mobile goods that were, conveniently, excellent getaway 
vehicles.192 Although trains became a popular means of transport in the nineteenth 
century, horses remained a primary means of transport within the city and, of course, 
were necessary working animals for many labourers. Detectives were not involved in any 
cases of horse theft but they did investigate equine frauds, habitually perpetrated via ads 
in local papers advertising the sale of a horse. Typically either the animal turned out to be 
sick, lame or ornery, or the cheque or bill used to pay the vendor was fraudulent. In each 
case the victims were gentlemen, which helps explain detective involvement. Scotland 
Yard detectives were deft at dealing with the quality and, unlike uniformed officers who 
had set duties, could devote significant time and energy to each case. In many cases of 
fraud, swindlers prevailed upon the trusting or, at times, gullible nature of their marks.  
In what would become a typical scenario, a man advertising the sale of his horse and gig 
in April 1842 received a bad bill for fifty guineas in payment. The victim, James Sykes, 
was a verger at St. Paul’s Cathedral. He was drawn in by defendant Thomas Cook’s 
“gentlemanly appearance” and his claim to be a leaseholder, client of good standing at 
Masterman, Peters & Co., the bank upon which the bill was drawn. He also purported to 
be the estate agent to Sir Samuel Fludyer (descendent of the highly successful eighteenth-
century merchant). Cook, of course, was none of these things. He gave Sykes the bad bill 
in April 1842, after which the Metropolitan Police had difficulty locating him. Cook 
remained at large for nearly eight months until Sergeant Vickers apprehended him in 
December. Cook was transported for seven years.193 
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Sykes was far from the only victim of fraudulent horse dealing. The following autumn 
George Henry Ward and his son George Jr. advertised three horses for sale in The Times. 
The unfortunate man who responded to the ad was William Angerstein, Esq., who hoped 
to purchase two geldings and a mare. Two of the equines were advertised as phaeton 
horses, meaning they were trained to drive in tandem, and the third was billed as a perfect 
accompaniment to a single horse Clarence or brougham. Angerstein should have smelled 
a ruse when the Wards claimed to be selling the horses for a third party, the Lloyds of 
Stratford-upon-Avon. But he suspected nothing amiss and paid them with a cheque for 
£115.10.0 and had the horses delivered to the Veterinary College to be checked out. He 
should have had the horses examined before paying because all three were lemons - one 
was a “roarer”, the second had chronic disease and the third was lame.194 He promptly 
sent them back to the stables where he purchased them, realizing too late that the Wards, 
the horses and his cheque (which had been cashed) were all gone.  
The Wards tried the same swindle the following month on John Prior. This time they 
claimed that they were selling the horses for a widow. By that point Inspector Shaw and 
Sergeant Whicher were already watching local stables. When Prior went to see the horses 
at Fitzroy-mews he “observed two persons standing in plain clothes; they afterwards 
proved to be policemen who had been in quest of the prisoners.” Shaw and Whicher 
arrested the Wards two days later and each was tried and convicted of defrauding 
Angerstein. Ward senior was locked up for a year while his son remained behind bars for 
four months.195 
In another equine case, racehorse owner Cynric Lloyd was taken in by Thomas Harris, 
who claimed “that he knew of a conspiracy among several persons connected with the 
turf to poison racehorses in order to win large sums by betting against these horses.” He 
requested £10 from Lloyd to blow the whistle, promising to use the money to bring the 
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necessary witnesses to London. Lloyd confided in his good friend Lord Henry Lennox, 
also an avid sportsman, about the scandal, which supposedly implicated several 
“noblemen and gentlemen.” Harris even went so far as to swear a deposition against the 
fictitious swindlers at Marlborough Police Court. Inspector Shackell was assigned to 
investigate what could have been a serious and very costly fraud. He spent twelve hours 
with Harris in an attempt to locate the men Harris had accused. No trace of the men could 
be found and Shackell began to suspect that the entire story was a ruse. Shortly thereafter 
Lloyd, Lennox and Shackell charged Harris at Malborough street police court with 
perjury and obtaining money by false pretenses. Harris was convicted at the Old Bailey 
and transported for seven years.196  
Interpersonal frauds were also common, which the young Frederica Johnston discovered 
in the summer of 1858 when she began a costly affair with Vincent Collucci, a thirty-one 
year old Italian artist.  Johnston was from a wealthy family and relished the attention 
from the handsome Italian. Her cousins introduced them and their relationship began 
after he agreed paint her portrait. They became close, bonding over their mutual love of 
art, and eventually became engaged. During their relationship, Ms. Johnston lent Collucci 
significant sums of money, including £250 to visit his sick mother in Italy. During his 
absence on the Continent, Ms. Johnston thought the better of the marriage and decided to 
withdraw from their engagement. She requested that he return the letters she had sent 
him, at which point he became violent and demanded that she support him financially. He 
extorted £1900 in cash from her after she asked that her confidential letters to him be 
returned. He took the money and returned only one letter, padding the rest of the 
envelope with newspaper. When the young woman finally confided in her brother (also 
her legal guardian) what had transpired, he tried to reason with her erstwhile lover. 
Collucci believed that Frederica and her brother would be too embarrassed to risk 
publicity by approaching the police. The affair had all the hallmarks of a good scandal 
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and, indeed, when the press caught wind of the story reports reached as far as Glasgow 
and Belfast.197  
The Italian misjudged both his position and the Johnston family by antagonizing 
Frederica’s brother. Collucci, Johnston thundered from the witness box, was “thorough 
blackguard,” having written Johnston a letter ending with “three extortionary [sic] dashes 
… [which] is the most insulting way in which a French person addresses another; it is not 
at all the habit of a gentleman.”198 After the Johnstons contacted the police, the 
commissioners assigned a detective to investigate the delicate case. Sergeant Tanner 
executed a warrant against Collucci in late August and the accused was tried at the Old 
Bailey in early November for tricking Ms. Johnston into thinking that she had bought 
back her letters. Frederica and her brother must have been thrilled when the judge handed 
Collucci three years’ penal servitude.199 
Government employees also perpetrated frauds. Mining engineer and timber merchant 
Nicholas Maron Maxwell prosecuted James Thomas Gambier and William Rumble in 
April 1869 for procuring £30 from him to grease the wheels of an Admiralty contract. 
Maxwell had “sent in a tender to the Admiralty for the supply of the timber for” 
Plymouth, Woolwich, Chatham, Sheerness and Devonport dockyards. Gambier, a clerk in 
the Storekeeper-General’s Department, had access to the tenders submitted for Admiralty 
contracts and it was from these submissions that he singled out Maxwell. He already 
knew that Maxwell had received the contract for Portsmouth, but Maxwell had not yet 
been informed, so the swindle was set. Gambier communicated this information to 
Rumble and the accomplice contacted Maxwell to say that, for £30, the contract would be 
his. Maxwell was an honest man and reported the irregularity to the Admiralty. The 
Admiralty contacted Scotland Yard and they liaised with Inspector Clarke. To catch 
Gambier in action, Clarke provided Maxwell with three marked £10 notes with which to 
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pay Gambier and instructed Maxwell to set up another meeting with Rumble on January 
18. Clarke arrived early and hid in a side room so he might overhear their conversation. 
He subsequently followed Rumble to where he met Gambier and then followed Gambier 
to the Navy Board offices at Somerset House. Clarke continued to follow Gambier and 
Rumble for the next month and finally arrested them on February 17. He found the 
marked £10 bills on Gambier as well as a notebook indicating that he received payment 
from Maxwell. Both men were found guilty of conspiring to obtain money under false 
pretenses and each received a year and a half behind bars in return.200  
Most of the cases discussed so far were limited cases involving a fraud on one or two 
individuals at a time. More concerning was the development of long and short firm 
frauds. From the 1870s, Scotland Yard became heavily involved in combatting these 
difficult to detect crimes.  
4.5.2.1 Long and Short Firm Frauds 
Long firm frauds were swindles set up by companies to “obta[in] goods by false 
pretences [sic] from merchants, agriculturalists, &c., by a gang of persons who, by giving 
each other fictitious references, obtain consignments of goods, which they sell, and fail 
themselves to pay for.”201 Usually the fake businesses dealt legitimately for a short 
period, ordered from suppliers, disappeared before payment was due and sold the 
fraudulently obtained goods for a profit. This type of deception was rampant and difficult 
to uncover, since business addresses were fluid and solicitation for goods was done via 
newspaper advertisements. Short firm frauds followed the same principles, although the 
criminals did not spend time establishing a credible front to the company.  
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It is unclear why short and long firm frauds became a detective priority. These schemes 
were hardly new. The most likely cause is the expansion of detective policing within the 
Met in 1869. The creation of over two hundred divisional detectives took pressure off the 
central force at Scotland Yard, which was itself enlarged by an addition of seven 
sergeants and two inspectors.202 The Scotland Yard detectives investigating short and 
long firm frauds were all recent hires who cut their teeth in the divisions. The new hires 
served in Lambeth, Stepney, Hammersmith, Whitehall, Paddington, Camberwell, 
Hampstead and St. James before their promotion to detectives, giving them familiarity 
with all of London, north and south of the river.  
Sergeants Morgan and Roots and Inspector Pay appeared most frequently in fraud 
prosecutions followed by Sergeants Gibbs, Peck, Sayer, Littlechild, Foley and Robson. In 
the early 1870s Peck was involved in three investigations. His first appearance at the Old 
Bailey was Daniel Feiler’s fraud trial in September 1871. Feiler ordered 153,000 bricks 
worth £210 from Herbert Barlee, manager of the Cowley Brick Company near Uxbridge, 
for which he never paid. Feiler sold the bricks to local contractors. The swindle was a 
standard long-firm fraud. Feiler wrote to Barlee under pseudonym William Hedges and 
provided a reference from an iron and stone merchant as collateral. When Barlee went to 
the address Hedges gave on his correspondence to demand payment, he “found it shut up 
– there was no business carried on there at all.” There were four conspirators: William 
Southwell, Henry Baker, John Bell Palmer and Daniel Feiler. Southwall and Feiler had 
written the letters to Barlee under two false names, while Feiler had rented the sham 
offices. Southwell, Baker and Bell pleaded guilty at the Old Bailey August 1871, while 
Feiler requested that his trial was postponed until the September sessions. On September 
18 he appeared in the dock to answer his charges.  
The frauds were perpetrated between January and February 1871. After a long 
investigation, Peck and Pay arrested Southwell and Baker on June 29, Feiler on July 7 
and Palmer on August 1. All four used fake names and addresses, making them difficult 
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to locate. As Barlee discovered when he attempted to trace the fraudsters, his letters were 
returned to the dead letter office because the men never remained at their sham offices for 
long. When Feiler was arrested, the two detectives located a stash of correspondence to 
brick makers as well as faux reference letters and rental agreements for additional 
properties. When Peck arrived he discovered that Feiler’s current front was a boot and 
shoe shop, although it was a lackluster attempt: “the stock consisted of one hamper, 
containing eighteen pairs of boots.” All four men were sentenced at Feiler’s trial: Feiler 
“as the prime mover in the conspiracy” received eighteen years’ hard labour, Southwell, 
who testified at length against Feiler, fifteen years, Baker nine and Palmer got off lightly 
with only six months.203  
Peck investigated two further long-firm frauds over the next couple of years, both 
involving fraud against Frederick Edward Vivian, a coal merchant from Swansea. Like 
the 1871 brick swindle, there were four suspects. The swindlers rented several premises 
to house their fake company and gave their marks counterfeit references. The ‘offices’ 
had only the patina of legitimacy and no one was ever there. As one witness described, 
they furnished one office with “a table and two chairs…one of them came every day for 
letters, and was there ten minutes or a quarter of an hour, then went away again…the 
name put up was Thompson and Co.” 
Vivian was approached by letter and requested to send £247 (330 tons) of coal by ship to 
Dieppe. Vivian met with one of the accused, John Garner (who called himself Johnson), 
who gave Vivian four bills of exchange as collateral for the shipment. Vivian wanted 
cash but settled for the bills. The merchant then transferred the bills of landing to Garner, 
allowing Garner to collect the contents of the ship in Dieppe. Once Vivian tried to cash 
the bills at his bank, however, the fraud was uncovered. One bill was endorsed by Poole, 
supposedly an iron and steel factor, but when Vivian visited the offices he found “no 
appearance of steel or any business being carried on; it is merely a common cottage in the 
                                                 
203
 OBP: t18710814-571, “Frederick Southwell, Henry Baker, John Bell Palmer, Daniel Feiler”; OBP 
t18710918-630, “Daniel Feiler”; The Times, 19 September 1871.  
219 
 
Hackney Road.” Vivian contacted the police at once and he and Peck began to unravel 
the fraud.  
Peck and Vivian set up a sting whereby Vivian agreed to meet Garner’s brother William, 
alias Buckey, at Kennan’s Hotel the following week. Peck hid during their meeting, but 
was able to identify Garner. Peck accompanied Vivian to Dieppe, found the ship (short 
ten tons of coal, which the perpetrators had already sold) and John Garner at a local hotel. 
It is unclear why Garner was not arrested at that time but Peck and Sergeant Dowdell 
apprehended him in the Hackney Road shortly after his return from France.204 Peck was 
familiar with the Garner brothers and their associate Henry Poore, having “often seen 
them together.” Knowing their haunts, he found William Garner and Poore at the Globe 
pub and arrested them. After searching the criminals’ lodgings, Peck found ample 
evidence connecting the three accused to the crime, including “a quantity of letters, 
telegrams, and papers” as well as letters to Vivian. All three men were found guilty and 
sentenced to five years’ penal servitude. One further conspirator, John Hart, remained at 
large until February 1873, when Peck apprehended him. He was convicted at the Old 
Bailey in March 1873.205 Less than two weeks after the trial Peck requested to return to 
uniform duty. It was a loss to the Detective Department, since he was a skilled 
investigator. No reason is listed, but he likely he fell prey to the rigour of detective duty: 
long hours, much time away from home and constant travel. 
Several officers stepped in to investigate firm frauds after Peck’s departure, indicating 
that Scotland Yard was in the process of amplifying its counter-fraud arm. Fraud was a 
new priority for the government, which had slowly, if haphazardly, moved towards the 
criminalization of company frauds since the early 1840s. New legislation was primarily 
directed at joint-stock fraud because of the increasingly disproportionate impact that the 
failure of joint-stock ventures, such as banks, had on the economy and investor 
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confidence. Enforcing criminal commercial legislation began in earnest in the 1870s, 
reflecting a transition from the Gladstonian view that company failure was an 
“evangelical purging” of the greedy to the Tory democracy of Disraeli, marked by the 
desire to enforce “Presbyterian commercial morality.”206 It is no surprise, then, that a 
new anti-fraud task force was established at Scotland Yard immediately following 
Disraeli’s 1874 electoral victory.  
At the forefront of the fraud task force were Inspector Pay and Sergeants Morgan and 
Gibbs as well as Sergeants Littlechild, Sayer and Roots. The detectives prosecuted one 
large fraud ring in three different trials in the spring of 1875. Eight conspirators, seven 
men and one woman, ran an extensive series of long-firm frauds against local tradesmen. 
The first prosecution at the Old Bailey was of Richard Browning, Charles Harrison 
Barker and Samuel Jacobs for obtaining £250 worth of ironmongery, £63 of glue and £52 
worth of tea and fruit by false pretenses. The case had the usual hallmarks: fake 
references, offices rented for non-existent businesses and fraudulent bills of payment 
given to unsuspecting suppliers. On this case Scotland Yard worked in tandem with the 
City of London detective force. Although City detectives held the arrest warrant it was 
Scotland Yard that apprehended the suspects and handed them over to the City police for 
crimes committed within that jurisdiction. The Yard had greater resources and could 
cover more ground than City men. Pay, Gibbs and Morgan arrested Barker and Browning 
on April 18 at a house near Belsize Park. Gibbs took Jacobs in Trafalgar road after 
shadowing him on April 2. They were all found guilty.207   
Shortly after Browning, Barker and Jacobs vacated the dock, one of their accomplices, 
George Foreman, appeared for his trial. Foreman claimed to be a refreshment contractor 
for the Zoological and Botanical Gardens in London and contacted individuals who 
advertised goods for sale in local papers. He managed to obtain nine guineas worth of hay 
and £8 of potatoes from unsuspecting suppliers. He was charged for these two frauds, 
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although the two victims were far from the only people swindled. Foreman’s neighbour 
reported extensive activity at Foreman’s house: “goods came in in the night and went out 
quickly again – I saw some railway vans come up, and letters and cards came; potatoes, 
meat[,] pigs, ham, butter, cheese, and eggs…the goods went out again quickly, they never 
stopped long in the place.” The only goods that remained on the premises were 
“dummies; pretended casks of butter, empty casks and things of that sort.” Foreman 
worked similar swindles for at least a decade, according to inspector Pay. His real name 
was George Bristowe (although he was on trial that day as George Foreman) and Pay had 
“known him twelve or fourteen years at a great many places, continually shifting from 
house to house.” After Foreman’s arrest Morgan found “thousands of forms” going back 
years, indicating the depth and longevity of the accused’s schemes. The fraudster was 
sentenced to ten years’ penal servitude, five each for the hay and the potatoes.208  
Foreman, Browning, Barker and Jacobs were again charged with fraud, along with 
George White, Walter and Alfred Carruthers and Florence North, against various persons 
for obtaining various goods, including: a bicycle, a mare, hay, a pony, fowl, mutton, 
potatoes, sausages and turkeys. This entrepreneurial bunch was caught when they slipped 
up while trying to defraud the Honorable Walter John Bethell of the mare. Bethell 
advertised his mare in Pullman’s Weekly News and received a reply on printed letterhead 
from “Baxter, George Street, Chelsea Market.” The second letter he received read “J. 
Baxter, potatoes, corn, and coal merchant.” The change in letterhead made Bethell 
suspicious and he went to the address in George Street and, finding no such business, 
immediately reported his suspicions to Scotland Yard. Pay, Gibbs and Sergeant Morgan 
began their investigations at once.  
George White was already a person of suspicion to the police. The detectives observed 
Walter Carruthers and Florence North at one of the fake addresses, No. 27 George Street, 
taking deliveries. Everyone but George White, the errand boy of the operation, was found 
guilty. The Carruthers brothers were incarcerated for two years, North for a year and a 
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half, Browning and Barker two years for these frauds and five years’ penal servitude for 
their first conviction and Jacobs one year in gaol for the current indictment and two 
additional years for the first conviction. Four additional conspirators were tried the 
following spring and found guilty. It took several years and significant detective attention 
to bring all the conspirators to justice. Morgan told the court that he “devoted the greater 
part of [his] time for three years” to putting the fraud to bed, spending “two years and a 
half making inquiries about other frauds in different parts of the country.” Of the eight 
conspirators, the detective confidently claimed, “I know a great deal about them.” The 
convictions were a coup for the government, which financed the prosecution of these 
brazen and prolific frauds.209 They also reflected well on the Detective Department, 
which demonstrated that it could bring the perpetrators of complicated pan-English 
frauds to justice.  
Other detectives supplemented the fraud task force based on need and specialty. 
Detectives fluent in foreign languages were in high demand for transnational cases. In 
1874 and 1875 two frauds were perpetrated in England against a French business. Eugene 
Brunneau and Henry Godin ran the same scheme in two consecutive years. Brunneau 
wrote to August Henry Blanchard, a manufacturer of clock movements in Paris, 
pretending to be from Blumberg & Co., a reputable London clock manufacturer. Godin 
then visited Blanchard’s firm in Paris to finalize the deal. The two swindlers received 
15,644 francs worth of movements from the French company. Only after a later trip to 
London did Blanchard realize he had been duped. Charles von Tornow, only a few years 
into his detective career, was given the case. He arrested Brunneau and, based on the 
evidence he discovered on Brunneau’s person linking him to the fraud, Brunneau was 
tried and convicted at the Old Bailey in April 1874.210 Godin went into hiding, assuming 
that arrest warrants expired after six months. Marchand arrested him soon after the six 
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months had elapsed and, happily, informed the criminal (in French) that he was mistaken. 
Godin was convicted for his part in the fraud.211 
4.6 Detectives and Prosecuting counsel 
Detectives frequently appeared as witnesses for the prosecution, where they described 
crime scenes, explained evidence and detailed their investigations. Justices often 
applauded their investigative skills and utility as witnesses.212 One of the hazards 
detectives faced in the courtroom, however, was cross-examination. Defense counsel 
consistently attempted to discredit detectives. The antagonism that developed between 
detectives and defense counsel was hardly new. Bow Street personnel had complained 
about similar courtroom encounters. The testimony of these early detectives “add[ed] 
weight to the prosecution in felony trials” and they were thus natural targets for defense 
counsel who tried strenuously to undermine their evidence.213  
The emergence of a criminal bar in London from the 1780s encouraged defense counsel 
to actively question the merits of prosecution cases.214 This made witnesses special 
targets and the object of pointed and at times vigorous questioning. Barristers at the Old 
Bailey were particularly tenacious, leading to an often fraught relationship between 
detectives and defense counsel at the Central Criminal Court. John Littlechild 
remembered the “unpleasant experience” of cross-examination in his memoirs: “Their 
maxim was…‘No case, bully the detective,’ and I have never lost an opportunity of 
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having a cut at them in return.”215 Richard Mayne knew that cross-examination could be 
stressful and frustrating, especially when counsel questioned an officer’s integrity. 
Nonetheless, he reminded his men that becoming agitated during cross reflected badly on 
individual officers, the police as a whole, and damaged the credibility of their evidence:  
The Police when giving evidence in a Court of Justice are to bear in mind that 
they are to answer in cross examination by the Counsel for the Prisoner or Party 
charged with the same readiness & civility as they do when giving their evidence 
in proof of the charge, they are always to remember that the manner or 
insinuations of Counsel are not to affect them & they will be best enabled to 
preserve their own character and forward the ends of justice by shewing [sic] that 
they desire simply to tell the whole truth without regarding whether it be in any 
points favourable to the party charged or not.216 
A favourite accusation trotted out by defendants and their lawyers was that police officers 
maliciously prosecuted for cash. This was an old trope, used frequently by eighteenth-
century defense counsel to accuse Bow Street Runners of maliciously prosecuting the 
innocent to claim the reward money available for felony convictions.217 In August 1845 
Inspector Haynes testified at the trial of three defendants for theft. Defense counsel for 
one of the defendants asked him about a reward offered for the return of the stolen 
property. Haynes replied that the government offered the £50 reward for information only 
after the police knew who the perpetrators were.218 At Robert Massie’s trial for burglary 
at his former employer’s residence, his counsel made similar accusations against 
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Inspector Pay and Sergeant Manton. When asked pointed questions by Massie’s counsel, 
Pay responded flatly, “there is no reward in this, and I don’t expect any.”219  
Payouts were not the only accusations of misconduct leveled against detectives. Defense 
counsel accused detectives of helping witnesses identify suspects in police line-ups. 
When Sergeant Shaw was examined by James Saunders and Robert Cholm’s counsel at 
their larceny trial, their barrister asked Shaw whether he had guided the prosecutor to 
identify them. “I had not said anything,” replied Shaw.  
Counsel: “When they were identified you took care that they should have a fair 
chance?” 
Shaw: “They were ordered by the gaoler to go across the yard – there were several 
persons about who appeared to have business with the court – I told Scott [the 
prosecutor] we had two men in custody, and he was to come and see if he 
could identify them.”220 
Vincent’s Police Code described cross-examination of police officers as “invariably 
hostile,” and “directed to create an impression among the jury unfavourable to the 
officer.” Like Mayne, Vincent cautioned police witnesses against taking the bait from 
counsel who taunted them: “However disagreeable, irritating, and even insulting, the 
questions, they should be answered coolly, briefly…good-temperedly, truthfully, and 
respectfully.”221  
Police officers were not the only individuals made uncomfortable during cross-
examination. The police commissioners asked their superintendents to report any 
prosecutors “who have been known to say that they would not prosecute again in 
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consequence of the Cross Examination amongst other things.”222 Many possible 
prosecutors were deterred from prosecuting because they knew how abrasive defense 
counsel could be. Mayne testified before the 1844 Select Committee on Gaming that 
many householders refused to report illegal gambling houses because of “the trouble of 
going before a magistrate, and possibly afterwards having to go into a court of justice to 
stand a cross-examination as to the grounds of their belief.”223 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined detective appearances at the Old Bailey between 1842 and 1878 to 
discover the policing priorities of Scotland Yard’s detectives. As might be expected, 
these priorities changed over time. Protecting property was the overarching mandate of 
the Met and the basis upon which Peel advocated his new police force to parliament. 
Scotland Yard’s caseload reflected this emphasis; nearly half of their cases involved 
thefts. Property crime remained a detective priority throughout the period covered by this 
thesis but other priorities reflected new developments in criminal behaviour and changes 
within the Met itself.  
As Table 1 indicates, detectives investigated many categories of crime, some more 
frequently than others. The diversity of their caseload demonstrates their versatility but 
also that the force lacked a clear mandate in its early years. As a response to an early-
Victorian murder scare the Detective Department was a knee-jerk reaction by the 
government to appease public opinion and the Department spent its first two decades 
searching for a focus. In the 1840s the emphasis was on theft but, as detectives were 
needed elsewhere in the 1850s, their presence at the Old Bailey diminished. They 
returned in the 1860s to combat theft and forgery but their expertise concentrated more 
heavily on fraud in the 1870s.  
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The development of undercover policing in the divisions also affected the work done by 
the Detective Department. In the 1840s and 1850s, detectives began training plainclothes 
policemen to detect burglary and other crimes more easily investigated by officers out of 
uniform. By the 1860s divisional plainclothes policemen began to investigate a greater 
proportion of crimes, especially theft, allowing detectives to focus their energies on new 
problems like forgery. The creation of divisional detectives after 1869 and the addition of 
new men to the Detective Department that same year allowed for the creation of a task 
force at Scotland Yard to tackle rampant fraud in the capital. As the commissioners of 
police grew more comfortable with an increased undercover presence in the divisions this 
change allowed Scotland Yard’s men to divert their attention elsewhere. The 
development of undercover men at the divisional level was instrumental to the 
development of the central detective force and is the subject of the following chapter.  
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5 A Not so ‘New’ Police: Plainclothes Policing 
The men of the Detective Department were not the first undercover policemen within the 
London Metropolitan Police. Another, more informal, detective group called plainclothes 
policemen had performed detective tasks in the divisions since 1829. Plainclothes 
policemen were ubiquitous after 1829 and their existence indicates a strong detective 
orientation from the very earliest years of the force. After the creation of the Detective 
Department in 1842, central detectives oversaw many aspects of undercover work in the 
divisions. Their efforts training divisional men in plainclothes tactics created a capable 
force at the divisional level that allowed Departmental men – too limited in number to 
properly police the divisions – the freedom to specialize in forgery and fraud and to work 
as an investigatory arm for the Home Office.1 In 1869 these divisional protégés were 
officially recognized as divisional detectives, reflecting the importance of undercover 
men to London’s policing needs.  
Although the official mandate of the Metropolitan Police was preventive, there was a 
growing contingent of plainclothes officers working throughout the city. The public was 
aware that the Metropolitan Police officers sometimes went undercover. In January 1846 
The Examiner (via Punch) published an ad for a fictitious company specializing in 
disguises. The ad satirized the Met’s use of undercover tactics to detect political 
subversives and other criminals and commented upon the “prevailing practice of dressing 
up policemen in plain clothes.” The notice advertised numerous disguises for the 
undercover bobby: for “political spying” there were “fustian jackets of all sizes, with 
working men’s aprons and brown paper caps.” Also available were “Sporting suits … for 
race-grounds…[and the shop could have] Twenty policemen … ready as Quakers at five 
minutes’ notice.” Workman’s tools were available upon request.2 This advertisement 
demonstrates that the public was quite aware that the police used plainclothes men as 
detectives in what was otherwise billed as a preventive police force.  
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We can reconstruct the duties of undercover constables by looking at what activities were 
encouraged or prohibited by the police commissioners, by evidence found in London’s 
newspapers and through the presence of these officers in the records of the Old Bailey. 
Collectively, these sources enable a reasonably representative picture of the work of 
plainclothes policemen within the Metropolitan Police between 1829 and 1869. Although 
the 1829 Metropolitan Police instruction book emphasized that prevention of crime was 
the overarching priority of the new police, relegating detection to a lesser role, there was 
much more detective practice in the new police than has hitherto been acknowledged. I 
argue that the Metropolitan Police, both before and after the creation of the detective 
branch in 1842, utilized the detective and surveillance practices pioneered by officers at 
Bow Street in the mid-eighteenth century. 
5.1 From Prevention to Detection: Policy vs. Practice 
From its creation in 1829, Police Commissioners Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne 
stressed the importance of prevention over detection though constant, conspicuous police 
presence on the streets of the metropolis.3 Englishmen associated centralized and, 
especially, undercover police with Continental regimes. To make the new police more 
palatable, Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel “gave positive instructions that they should 
never be employed as spies.”4 The commissioners were always cautious about using 
officers out of uniform to detect crimes, worrying about maintaining control over their 
officers and about accusations of espionage. Writing to the Home Office in 1842, the 
commissioners reinforced the high premium they placed on the “personal liberty” of 
English citizens.5  
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By the mid-Victorian period, the Met was responsible for the licensing of public carriages 
and public houses as well as well as enforcing clauses of the: Theatre Regulation Act, 
Youthful Offenders Act, Care and Reformation Act, Common Lodging Houses Acts, 
Betting and Gambling Houses Acts, Smoke Nuisance, Penal Servitude Act, Refreshment 
Houses, Dockyards, War department stations, Contagious Diseases Act, Street Traffic 
Regulation Act, and the Workshops Regulation Act.6 It would have been nearly 
impossible for uniformed officers to detect breaches of many of these Acts, especially 
those regarding theatres and drinking houses. Superintendents, focused more on 
outcomes than policy, used undercover men as they saw fit to combat crime in their 
neighbourhoods. The officers selected for detective tasks were not permanently assigned 
to plainclothes duty. They were used to investigate specific or immediate threats, 
returning to regular uniformed beat duty afterwards.7 
Although Mayne and Rowan attempted to enforce strict rules about the number of 
plainclothes men used in the divisions, these restrictions were disregarded. Regulations 
stipulated that superintendents could only use officers out of uniform if superintendents 
could demonstrate to the commissioners “some very strong case of necessity.”8 Home 
Office correspondence and Metropolitan Police records indicate that the commissioners 
often had trouble limiting the number of plainclothes men on duty. Superintendents 
ignored the rules and placed men in plainclothes at their own discretion. An exasperated 
police commissioner Rowan reminded his superintendents in 1845, “there shall be no 
particular men in the Division called Plain Clothes men.”9 In spite of these exhortations, 
however, undercover constables were constantly on duty throughout the metropolis, with 
or without official approval. Sergeant Goff testified in an 1845 trial that he was “often in 
plain clothes…I go in plain clothes by order of the inspector sometimes, and sometimes 
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by order of the superintendent … sometimes two men, sometimes four men are employed 
to go about in plain clothes.”10  
Demands for compliance from the Commissioners’ Office in the 1840s and 1850s reveal 
widespread disregard for limiting undercover work in the divisions. Metropolitan Police 
superintendents, who seem to have exercised a considerable amount of autonomy in this 
regard, saw plainclothes policemen as a tactical advantage and employed them regularly. 
Mayne entered a lengthy police order in January 1854 lamenting his discovery of more 
than 150 officers acting in plain clothes, either temporarily or permanently. He reminded 
his superintendents that plainclothes men, other than the official detectives at Scotland 
Yard, were not authorized. Too many men in plainclothes jeopardized the preventive 
effect of the police uniform and undermined public confidence in the police.  Although 
Mayne allowed that “in some cases” plainclothes men might be more effective than 
uniformed officers, “this d[id] not counterbalance the general objection to the practice.”11  
There were, however, several duties for which the commissioners did sanction 
plainclothes police officers, including seventeen men who checked metropolitan stage 
carriages for Inland Revenue, two constables working for the Post Office, one officer at 
Buckingham Palace and one detailed to the Sack Protection Society (no description is 
given for this unusual duty).12 Undercover officers were also used extensively on state 
occasions and to keep order at public events.  
                                                 
10 
OBP: t18460105-469, “George Sanders, Elizabeth Sanders.” 
11 
MEPO 7/16, 23 January 1854. The following January, Mayne reiterated that only superintendents could 
authorize plainclothes assignments. MEPO 7/16, 12 January 1855. 
12
 MEPO 7/19, 19 December 1857. These twenty-one men received no extra pay for undercover duties but 
were given an extra £5 per annum in lieu of a uniform. 
232 
 
5.2 Public Order 
5.2.1 State Occasions 
Plainclothes men were employed on all state occasions. Their duties were to keep order 
in crowds, prevent theft and to monitor suspicious characters. Officers in plainclothes 
were regularly assigned to duty at the Queen’s drawing rooms and levees at St. James’s 
Palace.13 William IV and Queen Victoria each held levees when they ascended the 
throne; aristocrats, politicians and other persons of note, both British and foreign, were 
presented to the monarch on these occasions. It was necessary to protect dignitaries from 
the hoi polloi, but also necessary to direct traffic, clear roadways, and to watch for the 
ever-present pickpocket. On one typical occasion in 1839, fifty-nine plainclothes officers 
and four hundred uniformed officers provided security at one of Victoria’s levees.14 At 
the Prince of Wales’s first drawing room in February 1862, two thousand people attended 
and over one thousand were presented to the Prince.15  
Plainclothes men, chosen from “the best qualified men for the plain clothes duty”, were 
also present at the opening, closing and prorogation of parliament.16 When parliament 
was prorogued in August 1854, 170 men in plainclothes were stationed with their 
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divisions, while twelve additional men were sent to “such parts of the line where the 
greatest number of persons are assembled and on the avenues leading to the Park viz. 
Treasury Passage, Spring Garden Passage etc. to prevent thefts.”17 These men were 
directed by a superior officer, presumably an inspector, who was instructed to appear 
before the commissioners the day of the procession to “wait for Orders.”18 Plainclothes 
men were similarly used during formal processions, such as that of the Lord Mayor to 
Westminster, and state funerals.  
The largest public funeral in the Victorian period, excluding Queen Victoria’s, was held 
for the Duke of Wellington in November 1852.19 Although the Duke died on September 
14, his funeral was not held until November 18, allowing the authorities ample time to 
make arrangements. The funeral brought immense numbers of mourners to London to 
pay their respects to the hero of Waterloo. England’s vast rail network allowed funeral-
goers to travel to London from as far as Wales, Leeds, Sheffield, Newcastle, Edinburgh 
and Manchester to watch the funeral procession. Nearly 235,000 people came to view the 
Duke’s body as it lay in state at the Chelsea Hospital.20 London newspapers speculated 
wildly at the number of people arriving for the funeral. Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper 
estimated that Britons purchased almost two million rail tickets in the days before the 
funeral and that steamers leaving Dún Laoghaire in Ireland (formerly Kingstown) for 
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Holyhead were packed.21 The Era predicted that funeral attendance would equal that of 
George IV’s coronation.22 
There is irony in the immense public fanfare surrounding Wellington’s funeral because 
the Duke himself disapproved of mass public gatherings. Wellington’s fears were not 
entirely misplaced; a mob attacked Apsley house in 1831 for his refusal to support Earl 
Grey’s parliamentary reform bill – the Duke never forgot the memory of bricks shattering 
his front windows.23 In the year before his death the great crowds surging past Apsley 
House on their way to the Great Exhibition in Hyde Park made him nervous. He not only 
feared mob violence but also mistrusted the thousands of European refugees taking 
shelter in London. His close friend, the King of Hanover, felt similarly, commenting that 
the mass combination of people at the Great Exhibition was “foolish, absurd & 
unconstitutional.”24  
The police maintained public order on Wellington’s funeral route and prevented traffic 
from interfering with the procession.25 Eleven hundred policemen were on duty at the 
Chelsea Hospital during the viewing; among them were twenty-three plainclothes men 
under control of four central detectives to catch pickpockets and others who would 
disturb the peace.26 The crush of people waiting to process into the hospital caused 
several deaths. While this did not deter an estimated 100,000 eager mourners from 
queuing outside the Hospital for a glimpse of the body, the deaths reflected poorly on the 
Metropolitan Police, which newspapers criticized as inefficient.27 The Daily News 
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surmised that the victor of Waterloo could have done a much better job managing the 
crowds. “The Duke was never so much wanted,” opined the paper, “as at his own 
funeral.”28 Onlookers filled the streets to watch the funeral procession from the Hospital 
to St. Paul’s. Reynolds’s Newspaper exclaimed that “the traffic was immense.”29 The 
procession left from the Horse Guards at 8 am and terminated at St. Paul’s by way of 
Green Park, Constitution Hill, Piccadilly, Pall Mall, Cockspur Street, Charting cross, the 
Strand and Temple Bar. Undercover police were on duty along the entire route.  
5.2.2  Public Entertainment 
Working-class recreation was under attack in the early nineteenth century from many 
sides. Enclosure and urban building removed access to green space while lengthened 
factory hours, diminished recreation time, and local authorities (citing public disorder) 
curtailed urban fairs. Growing evangelicalism in the 1830s also placed the twin-evils of 
Sabbath-breaking and drinking under attack. The “public and gregarious” entertainments 
of Britain’s labourers worried the forces of law and order. Some festivities, however, 
remained protected and this included horse racing. Railways allowed more urban 
dwellers to reach races, fairs and regattas and the race calendar expanded considerably 
from the 1840s.30  
The commissioners of police routinely assigned plainclothes police for duty at boat races, 
regattas, and horse races, especially Ascot and Epsom.31 Police responsibilities were 
similar to those at state occasions, but with an increased emphasis on detecting 
pickpockets. Although historical statistics show that petty thefts and thefts from the 
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person declined over the course of the nineteenth century, pickpocketing still posed a 
significant enough threat to merit the attention of undercover officers.32 In the 1850s, 
there were usually plainclothes officers on duty in Hyde Park.33 Petty theft could be a 
lucrative business in a public park – one former plainclothes constable, Charles King, 
was found guilty in 1855 of running a ring of pickpockets in Kensington Gardens. This 
incident embarrassed the police, who were accused of misusing their “privilege.”34 For 
some Londoners, however, the irritation of pickpockets overrode episodes of police 
corruption. One month after King’s malfeasance was uncovered, a letter to the editor in 
The Times suggested that plainclothes policemen should patrol Hyde Park to catch “a 
gang of ruffians, who are in the habit of accosting ladies and female servants, 
and…endeavouring to pick their pockets.”35  
Large numbers of plainclothes men monitored the opening of the Great Exhibition in 
1851 and the Crystal Palace in 1854.36 At both events, a detective inspector oversaw 
undercover policing. In the case of the Crystal Palace, Mayne specifically instructed the 
men to “prevent and detect thefts” within and without the building. At such events, not 
only were there event-goers to pilfer from, but the numerous stalls and exhibits displayed 
a wealth of desirable (and easily pocketed) objects. While on plainclothes patrol at the 
Crystal Palace in 1860, one undercover officer caught a thief stealing from Sir Robert 
Peel’s daughter-in-law, Lady Emily Peel. This was a strangely ironic encounter since 
Peel himself had decapitalized theft from booths because “people who kept such open 
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booths ought to guard their property sufficiently themselves and not looks for laws of 
unreasonable severity to protect it.”37 
Being in plainclothes undoubtedly did help officers catch thieves in crowds. One 
unfortunate duo, Mary Kinsdale and Albert Prior, stole a pocket watch from constable 
Robert Harvey while he was in plain clothes. Kinsdale put her arm around the officer’s 
waist and used scissors to snip the chain. Harvey immediately arrested her and the two 
were convicted at the Old Bailey in April 1849.38 The press, ever watchful for police 
misconduct, rarely expressed disapproval with officers being out of uniform to detect 
theft from the person.39 In September 1830, barely a year after the formation of the new 
police, a Times article praised the use of undercover police to detect pickpockets as novel 
and effective, suggesting the benefits of detecting pickpockets outweighed public 
concerns about secret police.40  
Plainclothes police also monitored London’s theatres. Most playhouses were divided into 
gallery, boxes and pit, to separate well-to-do theatregoers from the raffish crowds. The 
congregation of so many people, many of the middling and upper sorts, however, was a 
bonanza for London’s pickpockets. Following the 1843 Theatre Regulation Act, wherein 
Covent Garden and Drury Lane lost their monopolies, many more theatres began regular 
performances of hitherto restricted farces, tragedies and comedies.41 Keeping order at 
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plays, revues and other public shows was a police duty and local superintendents 
assigned plainclothes men to attend at theatres to prevent pickpockets.42 Officers 
regularly mingled with the crowds in the Haymarket neighbourhood of St. James, home 
to the Queen’s Theatre and Covent Garden. Theatres usually had their own security to 
enforce house rules, including dress codes. Robert Jones wrote angrily to the police 
commissioners that one of their undercover men had thrown him out of the Opera House 
in June 1840. Richard Mayne replied that it was not a Metropolitan Police officer but 
“persons of the Establishment” who “subjected [him] to violence of an aggravated nature 
at the Pit Entrance of the Opera from his being improperly dressed.”  Five plainclothes 
Met officers were at the Opera that evening, but none was involved in the ejection.43 
As superintendent of Covent Garden division, former detective inspector Nicholas Pearce 
was involved in efforts to keep order in the theatre district. In April 1843 he appeared at 
Bow Street to testify in a case against George Griffith and Henry Stuart for “acting in a 
disorderly manner at the promenade concert in Covent-garden Theatre, and with 
assaulting the police in the execution of their duty.” Pearce usually checked in at the 
theatres several times on weekend evenings to see that things ran smoothly. In this 
instance, Pearce believed he saw a pickpocket steal something and, when confronted, the 
youth called him a “d----d scoundrel.” An accomplice then struck one of Pearce’s 
constables on the hat (called ‘bonneting’), an insult designed to aggravate, and the 
situation quickly escalated. Mr. Hall at Bow Street decreed that “It was high time to put a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
productions of legitimate drama. David Thomas, David Carlton and Anne Etienne, Theatre Censorship: 
From Walpole to Wilson (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 61-63. The Act also 
distinguished between theatres and music halls; licenses to sell food and drink were restricted to the latter. 
See Jane Moody, “The theatrical revolution, 1776-1843” in The Cambridge History of the British Theatre 
Vol. 2, ed. D. Donohue (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 206; David 
Russell, “Popular Entertainment, 1776-1895” in The Cambridge History of the British Theatre Vol. 2, ed. 
D. Donohue (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 378. 
42
 MEPO 7/6, 25 Mach 1839. For a discussion of the other responsibilities of the police as of 1868, see 
Commissioner Mayne’s testimony before the 1868 committee, 38.  
43
 Mayne sent all the officers on duty the night of the assault over to Jones’s house and Jones agreed that 
none of them had assaulted him. MEPO 1/36, 20 June, 24 June and 27 June 1840.  
239 
 
stop to such misconduct, for which no excuse could be offered,” sending the first boy to 
gaol for eight days and fining the second £5 for the bonneting.44 Central detectives were 
also on duty at theatres. Sergeant Coathupe – Scotland Yard’s pickpocket expert in the 
1860s – caught John Sinclair trying to pick a woman’s pocket at the Adelphi Theatre in 
February 1864. Sinclair was a recidivist, having been convicted twice before for theft, 
and the justice sentenced him to two years hard labour.45 
Dance performances in licenced theatres were also under the watchful eye of the police. 
The arrival of the cancan in London shocked respectable opinion. Some members of the 
public were concerned that the dance was too suggestive for public performance and put 
pressure on the Lord Chamberlain and London’s magistrates to take action. In October 
1870 two plainclothes officers attended a performance at the Alhambra in Leicester 
Square to report on what exactly happened during the show. “The dance, on the whole,” 
they reported, “is indecent, especially on the part of one dressed as a female, who raises 
her foot higher than her head several times towards the public, and which was much 
applauded.” The Alhambra lost its dancing licence at the October 1870 Middlesex 
Sessions (but kept its music licence) because of the cancan, which at least one examining 
magistrate found profoundly distasteful: “amusement must not degenerate into licence, 
and if persons undertook employment to pander to the depraved tastes of a certain small 
section of the public, they must themselves take the consequences.”46 
Other entertainments also caught the attention of undercover officers. In May 1852 
Sergeant Kelly of Whitechapel division went undercover to detect illegal dog fighting. 
Having been told that the fights occurred in Dunk Street, Mile End, he gained admission 
to the house with another officer, though, sensing danger, Kelly sent his colleague back 
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for reinforcements. Unfortunately, the ringleader Thomas Field suspected something was 
wrong and menaced Kelly with a poker, saying “You --- ---, what business have you in 
my house? If you don’t instantly get out of it I’ll smash your --- head for you.” Kelly 
managed to run out and, when back up arrived, they stormed the residence. One of 
Field’s bulldogs bit Kelly’s leg, puncturing the skin and taking some flesh with it. A mob 
assembled outside and attacked the police with stones and brickbats. Nonetheless, Kelly 
and his fellow constables managed to bring several attendees and the two proprietors, 
Field and his wife Elizabeth, before magistrates at Worship Street, where they were all 
summarily convicted.47  
5.3 Political Policing: Chartism 
The greatest threat to public order in the early years of the Metropolitan Police was 
Chartism, an ideological and political movement demanding democratic reforms to 
England’s electoral and parliamentary system. Although the 1832 Reform Act increased 
the franchise and offered political representation to major urban centres, these changes 
benefited the propertied middle classes, not workingmen. The failure of the 1832 Reform 
Bill to enfranchise the working class gave way to escalated calls for democratic reform 
between 1832 and 1848. The 1832 Act was not the only catalyst. The European 
revolutions in 1830 and 1848 also inspired English radicals, especially those already 
upset by agricultural depression and the harsh terms of the 1834 New Poor Law.48 
Although the Chartist movement was diverse and, in some cases, intensely localized, 
there were several points of agreement. The London Working Men’s Association, an 
offshoot of the National Union of the Working Classes and Others (NUWC), drew up a 
People’s Charter in 1837/38 encompassing many of the main aims of the radical 
democratic movement in England: universal manhood suffrage, annual parliaments, 
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secret ballot, equal parliamentary districts, payment of Members of Parliament, and the 
abolition of property qualifications for Members of Parliament.49 
Although, in retrospect, the radical movement in Britain was tame in comparison to its 
European counterparts, this was far from clear to the English government in the 1830s 
and 1840s. Strikes, public meetings, demonstrations, and inflammatory publications were 
typical methods of Chartist protest in England.50 The Metropolitan Police were required 
to prevent Chartist mobs or processions from disturbing the peace.51 The police, a visible 
symbol of government power, were a popular target for the unenfranchised, and the often 
heavy-handed attempts of the Metropolitan Police to disperse mobs and demonstrations 
drew reciprocal violence from those whom they tried to control.52 During an attempt to 
put down a demonstration at Coldbath Fields in 1833, the police were attacked with 
“brickbats, stones, and lumps of pig-iron ballast.”53 In more serious cases policemen 
were seriously wounded or even killed. Most notable is the case of Constable Culley, 
who died during the clash between police and rioters at Coldbath Fields. In a strong 
statement of public misgivings about police brutality, the coroner’s jury found a verdict 
of justifiable homicide against Culley’s killer (or killers).54  
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Much of Chartist life revolved around assemblies, small or large, and this associational 
culture made the government nervous.55 Any policeman who wished to know what went 
on in meetings had to gain access in disguise. To avoid clashes between police and 
Chartist demonstrators, plainclothes officers subtly assessed the temperature of radicals 
in crowds and at meetings. Public suspicion that the police could be used to spy on Her 
Majesty’s subjects was affirmed when, in 1833, police sergeant Popay was accused of 
acting as an agent provocateur. Popay’s membership in the National Political Union 
(NPU), a moderate reforming body formed by Francis Place in 1831, and the accusation 
that he incited violence sparked a select committee investigation that publicly censured 
his behavior and embarrassed the police.56 The irony, of course, was that the NPU was 
far less radical than the NUWC, which, unlike the NPU, rejected the membership of 
middle-class radicals whom Place felt were necessary for the success of democratic 
reforms.57 Although the commission decried Popay’s behaviour, their ire was directed at 
the man not the method. After the Popay scandal, both the public and the commissioners 
of police were cautious about the involvement of plainclothes men in political meetings. 
The government still expected the police to monitor such meetings, but forbade any 
active participation.58 As one constable put it, there was a difference between being “[a]t 
the meeting, and attending the meeting.”59  
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In the summer of 1839, London’s newspapers reported significant unrest in the Midlands, 
including a ten-day riot in Birmingham in early July.60 Home Secretary Lord John 
Russell sent Metropolitan Police officers to Birmingham at the request of the city’s 
magistrates. Once the riot was put down, Chartist ringleaders were charged with sedition, 
arson, riot, and attacking the Metropolitan Police.61 Birmingham was hardly the only city 
disturbed by radical activity. In August there were disturbances in Lancashire where 
workers took part in the Chartist ‘national holyday’ by stopping work in Bury, 
Middleton, and Salford. In Heywood, only enough workers appeared for work to open 
three of the town’s twenty-seven mills. Chartist meetings were held in all disturbed 
areas.62 
Although The Charter, the mouthpiece of the London Working Men’s Association, 
beseeched its readership to avoid violence, the Commissioners of Police made 
preparations in case of riot or mob activity in London.63 In early August several Chartists 
were convicted of riot and related offences at the Warwick Assizes and three were 
sentenced to death. In protest, London’s Chartists held a meeting on Kennington 
Common on Monday August 12, where roughly 2,000 Chartists gathered to hear speeches 
by Feargus O’Connor, Bronterre O’Brien, and Dr. Taylor.64 The commissioners 
responded to this meeting by ordering 1,651 policemen of the regular ranks and one 
plainclothes man from each division for duty on the Common. The undercover men were 
instructed to muster at Scotland Yard the morning of the meeting, no doubt to be 
personally reminded that, barring any breach of the law, their duty was to observe, not 
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interfere, with the Chartist meeting.65 The commissioners were careful to follow the 
recommendations of the select committee on Popay.  
Three years later, the police responded to another significant threat to public order when 
over 100,000 Chartists mobilized to deliver a petition to the House of Commons.66 More 
than twelve hundred policemen and fifty plainclothes men from across London were 
instructed to keep order along the procession route.67 No violence resulted from the 
petition.68 Later that summer another large meeting was held at Kennington Common. 
The Times reported that although “it was the largest meeting ostensibly convened for 
Chartist agitation…it was the least formidable.” Mayne had placards posted around 
London ordering that public thoroughfares be kept clear to prevent omnibuses and cabs 
from congregating. “An immense number” of people arrived on the Common by six 
o’clock in the evening, but no Chartist leader appeared and the police had little problem 
dispersing the crowd. The Times praised the “masterly style” in which the police 
performed their duties. The Met had less luck preventing a meeting on Clerkenwell 
Green, where the crowed pelted officers with stones as they arrested a man for inciting.69 
Chartist leaders often kept the location of public meetings secret until the last minute to 
prevent authorities from mobilizing in response.70 The commissioners were convinced 
that large numbers of Chartists were assembling with “ulterior objects.”71 In May 1848 
they instructed the police “not to interfere with a Meeting unless [the Chartists] 
attempt[ed] to move off in a body or to march in procession in which case they are to 
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have immediate notice that such a movement is contrary to the law and will be 
prosecuted.”72 If no procession developed, the presence of uniformed officers might be 
inflammatory. In such instances, plainclothes men were used to mingle in suspicious 
crowds and relay information to their superiors about whether a demonstration might 
result.73 During what was likely to be a summer of significant political agitation, the 
commissioners wished to ensure that policemen observed proper legal procedures. 
The largest Chartist meeting in the history of the movement was held at Kennington 
Common on April 10, 1848. 150,000 Chartists attended and were met by 4,000 
policemen and 8,000 troops.74 Alarmed by the size of Chartist gatherings, Commissioner 
Rowan drew up a plan to mobilize undercover policemen on short notice: 
When political meetings are held in open air on any of the undermentioned [sic] 
Divisions [D, G, H, K, N, P, R, S], two Constables in plainclothes from each of 
the nearest Divisions will attend such meetings and be in communication with the 
Superintendent or other officer of the District present or in the vicinity of such 
Meetings.75 
Rowan’s orders covered areas of London that were home to the politically active working 
class, as well as locations with large open spaces suitable for demonstrations.76 Within 
these eight divisions were Regent’s Park, Hampstead Heath, Gray’s Inn Road (the site of 
the Cold Bath Fields Riot of 1833), Clerkenwell Green, Bethnal Green, Victoria Park, 
Kennington Common, and the docklands east of the City. Anticipating an increase in 
political agitation, this order gave local superintendents power to assign men in 
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plainclothes to closely observe meetings. Devolving power in this way allowed 
superintendents to react quickly to the news of a political meeting and draw on constables 
from neighbouring divisions who were likely to be familiar with local criminals and 
suspicious persons.77 
Further Chartist disturbances in the summer of 1848 resulted in several treason trials at 
the Old Bailey. In September and October, William Dowling, William Lacey, Thomas 
Fay, William Cuffey, and George Mullins were convicted of treason and sentenced to 
transportation for life. Trial testimony revealed that the police had used a combination of 
undercover investigation and informants to prevent several major disturbances in London 
that summer. During the scare, undercover officers watched suspicious individuals and 
their meeting places. Constable Thomas Pronger testified that he was sent by his 
inspector to tail William Lacey. Another constable, John Jenkinson, shadowed 
Cartwright’s coffee shop, a known Chartist meeting place.78 Both constables reported to 
their superiors who they saw and what they were involved in. In this way, the police were 
able to piece together networks of subversive Chartists. When the police collected 
enough information to arrest, undercover officers made the apprehensions. In many cases 
undercover men had to wait near the accused’s lodgings for them to return home. Doing 
so in uniform would have alerted the suspect and their accomplices that an arrest was 
imminent. In some cases, however, even plain clothes were not enough to disguise 
policemen. The first time the police attempted to arrest William Dowling, his friends 
noticed two plainclothes men waiting outside his house and helped him to escape.79  
Although undercover policemen could work from outside political organizations to gain 
evidence for arrests, informants were far more useful because they provided a view from 
within. Informants helped illuminate the membership and plans of Chartist organizations, 
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and those inside Chartist organizations gave the most significant testimony during the 
treason trials of 1848. These witnesses were private citizens who described themselves as 
‘moral-force Chartists.’ Defense counsel tried to portray informants as government spies, 
but it is clear that informants joined Chartist organizations of their own free will and 
subsequently turned against them out of national loyalty.80 In the words of one informant, 
“I did not join it [the Chartist movement] for the purpose of betraying the people I had 
joined – it first came across my mind to betray them when I found the villainous part they 
were acting.”81 Informants were not government plants but civic minded citizens who 
approached the police after sensing that they were involved in something wrong. Their 
evidence described Chartist leadership, meeting places, methods of organization, access 
to weapons, recruiting techniques, and plans. There was no select committee to inquire 
into police behaviour after the 1848 demonstrations as there had been in 1833. The police 
had learned how to monitor subversive political activity while remaining within the 
bounds of publicly and professionally acceptable conduct. It is also likely that the public 
were more tolerant of political policing than they had been in 1833 and were happy to 
have a police protecting them from the upheavals occurring on the Continent.  
5.4 Undercover Patrols 
Aside from policing official functions, public events, and investigating political 
dissidents, the commissioners of police and divisional superintendents assigned 
plainclothes men to foot patrols. The purpose of patrol was to ensure that plainclothes 
policemen were familiar with London and its criminal underworld.82 In the years before 
photography, police could only identify criminals by description or by sight. The use of 
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patrols was hardly new; Bow Street had used patrols since the late eighteenth century to 
prevent and detect both property crime and violent crime, as had parishes like St. 
Marylebone and St. James.83 The Met only took over undercover patrolling after Bow 
Street’s Policing function ceased in 1839.  
From the early 1840s Metropolitan policemen assigned to undercover duty were expected 
to familiarize themselves with local criminals. Plainclothes men needed to walk their 
divisions, observe where criminals congregated and take note of the movements of repeat 
offenders. Once the police gained this information, they were to relay it to other members 
of their divisions. In this way, whenever a known criminal was spotted they could be 
“ke[pt] under observation.” The police commissioners felt that surveillance of this kind 
would prevent crimes, lead to the identification of “burglars and felons” and aid in their 
detection.84 The divisional superintendent was also responsible for watching “loose and 
disorderly persons” and ensuring “that certain detection [would] follow any attempt to 
commit a crime.”85  
Surveillance of known offenders was expanded in the 1840s. By this time plainclothes 
officers were taken to see prisoners remanded at police courts and those in prison but 
undercover patrols were introduced to combat specific crimes, especially burglary.86 The 
police commissioners began by experimenting with temporary patrols on winter nights to 
observe “all Burglars and other persons known to be felons” so that officers could 
identify possible suspects if a crime was committed.87 In the winter months the hours of 
darkness were longer and extra vigilance was necessary to prevent burglaries. These were  
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the hours when those crimes of jewel robberies are most likely to be committed… 
between 7 o'clock and 9, while people are at dinner … the upper part of a house 
of that kind [in the wealthy West End] is generally left entirely unprotected from 
about 7 until 9, because after the ladies go down to dinner the servants go down to 
their supper at 9 o'clock, and the consequence is that for an hour and a half the 
upper part of the house is left.88  
In November 1845 two men from each division were selected for a special night patrol. 
Nicholas Pearce, now superintendent of Covent Garden division, and Detective Inspector 
Shackell oversaw this patrol.89 The detachment patrolled for seven months from 
November 1845 until May 1846. If the special patrolmen were unfamiliar with certain 
parts of London, they would receive information about local criminals from the divisional 
constables. Central detective sergeants were also expected to accompany special patrol’s 
visits to the divisions and to share their expertise. When patrols returned to uniform duty, 
the commissioners hoped that they would use their experience in “detecting Criminals, 
visiting Public Houses and in such other ways that their Superintendents shall consider it 
most useful.”90  
This first experimental patrol was not, as it may have seemed at the time, only to prevent 
theft during long winter nights. It was also an information-gathering exercise to ensure 
that divisional constables possessed detective expertise useful throughout the Police 
District. During the winter, the men chosen for undercover patrol became familiar with 
the faces, meeting places, and tactics of London’s criminals in a way they could not have 
done while in uniform. When the patrols ceased in the spring, Mayne expected that his 
                                                 
88 
Report of the Departmental Commission appointed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
to inquire into the State, Discipline, and Organization of the Detective Force of the Metropolitan Police 
(1878), 259. 
89
 Pearce was a former detective inspector and both men had Detective Department experience. Pearce was 
one of two detective inspectors when the Department was formed in August 1842; Inspector Shackell 
replaced him when Pearce was promoted to superintendent of F division (Covent Garden) in November 
1844. MEPO 7/9, 12 November 1844 and 23 November 1844. 
90 
MEPO 7/11, 11 May 1846. 
250 
 
superintendents would remain in contact with the Detective Department to share 
information.91 Cooperation between the Detective Department and the divisions 
facilitated the sharing of knowledge and techniques. Although the Detective Department 
rarely dealt with routine divisional work, the commissioners wanted their expertise on 
early divisional patrols. It is unclear whether more winter patrols occurred during the late 
1840s and 1850s. While it is entirely likely that they did, evidence of this does not 
survive in the police records.  
Undercover patrols were revived in August 1862 in response to a famous garrotting 
panic, which began with the robbery and choking of Hugh Pilkington, M.P., in Pall Mall 
on July 17, 1862.92 That same night another man, Edwin Hawkins, was also killed by 
strangulation. London’s newspapers blamed former convicts, especially ticket-of-leave 
men, for the increase in violent crime.93 In response to public panic, Mayne assigned a 
plainclothes night patrol. In the largest deployment of plainclothes men on patrol in the 
history of the Metropolitan Police, 17 sergeants and 176 constables were placed on duty, 
in addition to constables on the beat. Each divisional superintendent was instructed to 
suggest constables for duty most familiar with the criminal element in their 
neighbourhoods.94 This was the first instance where divisional sergeants were chosen to 
spearhead patrols, a sign that the commissioner was devolving central detective duties to 
divisional men. To facilitate the compilation of information, sergeants at the head of the 
night patrol were instructed to report on their constables’ activities and any crime of note. 
The commissioners also used undercover patrols to combat specific crimes. In 1854 
Home Secretary Palmerston authorized a plainclothes patrol to detect fraudulent retailers, 
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especially those who falsified weights and measures or adulterated foods for sale to “the 
poorer classes.” Five men were assigned to buy various items from suspected sellers and 
a professor of chemistry at the Royal Polytechnic Institute tested the items. The police 
were aware that anyone caught by them might accuse the police of entrapment but hoped 
that “the public will sympathize with the defrauded Poor, and with the measures taken to 
protect them.” Plainclothes men were essential for the task because “the uniform might 
deter a party who practises [sic] such fraud systematically.”95  
An 1859 plainclothes patrol scoured Marylebone for three months to uncover the 
perpetrator of several larcenies.96 In such instances, Commissioner Mayne assigned 
surveillance patrols for a fortnight, to be reviewed and renewed, if necessary, on a bi-
weekly basis. This allowed time for the patrols to investigate and submit reports but 
prevented overuse and abuse of undercover privileges. A similar patrol was established in 
January 1860 to detect larcenies at Covent Garden theatres. Plainclothes police constables 
from eight divisions were called to duty at Bow Street station every evening for several 
weeks. Again, central detectives did not participate; instead, two superintendents 
supervised the patrol.  
Between July and September 1865 Mayne also used undercover patrols to combat a 
string of highway robberies in Whitechapel. He ordered twenty-eight men in four reliefs 
to patrol between 9 am and 1 am. Mayne chose specific constables from the divisions for 
duty under the direction of two detective sergeants.97 After one week, the hours of patrol 
changed with one patrol of fourteen men to patrol from 9 am until 9 pm while the 
remaining fourteen constables bolstered numbers between 7 pm and 1 am.98 After three 
weeks, half of the men were removed, as was one of the detective sergeants. His 
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replacement at the head of the second patrol was Sergeant Dunnaway of Whitechapel 
division. Dunnaway was one of a new breed of highly skilled divisional detectives, 
receiving numerous citations for good conduct. Mayne regularly chose him for 
undercover work and, in midsummer 1865, placed Dunnaway was in change of a 
Whitechapel patrol targeting highway robbers.99  
As they became more adept at detective duties, Mayne began devolving responsibilities 
from Scotland Yard detectives to divisional men. Sergeant Dunnaway’s seniority in the 
Whitechapel patrol is an example of Mayne’s tendency to remove Yard men from more 
routing detective work in London and entrust it to the growing detective talent of 
divisional plainclothes officers. This not only encouraged expertise in the divisions, but 
also allowed Mayne to conserve manpower at the small Scotland Yard office. Assigning 
any of his detective sergeants to lead divisional patrols reduced the number of detectives 
available for other duties. Divisional ‘detective officers,’ as he had begun to refer to 
them, worked specifically on crimes occurring in the divisions. The Whitechapel anti-
highway robbery detail was an experiment with divisional detective officers, although 
Mayne assured the Home Secretary that “when not so employed they [still] perform the 
ordinary duties of Constables.”100  
Undercover policing was also used extensively in Her Majesty’s Dockyards. Woolwich 
dockyard was within the Metropolitan Police District from 1829, while Portsmouth, 
Devonport, Chatham and Pembroke were transferred to police control in 1860.101 
Plainclothes men were specially chosen to work undercover to counteract theft of 
government property and from warehouses and Mayne, pleased with their success, 
praised their diligence.102 His successor as police commissioner, Edmund Henderson, 
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also lavished praise on the undercover men policing the dockyards.103 I have encountered 
no instances where their methods elicited criticism from the government or in the press, 
which is likely because they were protecting Britain’s navy and related state property 
and, thus, could hardly be accused of infringing on the rights of individual Britons.  
5.5 Growing Comfort 
By the 1860s the Metropolitan Police was an established institution, the Detective 
Department was popular and successful, and the public was no longer concerned about 
the legitimacy of centralized policing. Indeed, all counties and boroughs in England were 
now required to have forces of their own, making centralized policing the norm in mid-
Victorian England. Mayne, after more than thirty years at the helm of London’s police, 
had grown increasingly comfortable with plainclothes police work.104 He issued fewer 
censures for undercover work and more queries about its effectiveness. Following the 
trial winter night patrol in 1862-63 and the 1865 Whitechapel patrol, the commissioner 
became increasingly interested in exactly what plainclothes men were doing and how 
effective they were. He asked local superintendents in March 1866 about how many 
offenders had been apprehended by plainclothes men in the first three months of that year 
and asked for similar statistics the following year.105 He wanted to determine how useful 
these patrols had been at catching thieves and, based on what must have been favourable 
returns, plainclothes patrols became routinized. 
Mayne was also interested in the outcome of cases brought to the magistrates’ courts by 
plainclothes men and whether magistrates had made any comments relative to officers 
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out of uniform and how the public might identify them as police.106 It was important for 
plainclothes policemen to identify themselves to the public, both for their own safety and 
to justify the legality of their actions: being unable to do so could lead to 
misunderstandings. In 1830, the unfortunate Superintendent Thompson intervened in 
what he believed was an altercation between a prostitute and man named Fitzgerald. 
Enraged at the interference, Fitzgerald dragged Thompson by the collar to the nearest 
police station and accused him of being “a b—s—d imposter.” Once it was confirmed 
that Thompson was, indeed, a police superintendent, Fitzgerald was charged with assault 
at Bow Street police court. The sitting magistrate sympathized with the superintendent, 
declaring: “I know that disguise is sometimes very necessary in an inquiry after 
criminals,” and bound Fitzgerald and his accomplice over for trial at the next 
sessions.107A similar case occurred in late 1841, when an omnibus driver assaulted 
Inspector Baker of St. James Division. The driver refused to comply with Baker’s 
instructions to move his omnibus on (one of the duties of the police was to keep 
thoroughfares clear). After the driver refused to comply, Baker took hold of the horses 
and the defendant lashed him across the hands with his whip. In the course of the event, 
Baker’s hat was knocked off and driven over. The driver was fined forty shillings by the 
magistrate at Marlborough Street police court.108 Finally, poor Sergeant Carpenter was 
assaulted while detecting pickpockets at Charlton Fair in October 1850. As he knelt down 
to watch a suspected pickpocket search through a woman’s skirts, his attacker mistook 
him for one himself and smacked him in the face.109 
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To ensure accountability, and to prevent assaults on officers, plainclothes patrolmen were 
issued with a ‘special duty card,’ a truncheon and a rattle “where practicable.”110 Shortly 
after, Mayne authorized official truncheons – a total of one hundred and seventy seven – 
for plainclothes men, to be distributed as the men paraded for duty each day. These 
truncheons were to be their identification and were only to be given to authorized 
plainclothes men, as stipulated in the orders for the 1862 night watch and the rules of 
May 1863.111 Inspectors on patrol out of uniform were likewise expected to carry their 
brass truncheon and warrant card to indicate their credentials.112 Truncheons and pay 
raises for undercover officers demonstrate Mayne’s acknowledgement that, over the 
preceding thirty years, plainclothes men had become an integral part of metropolitan 
policing. 
Complaints that undercover officers suffered financially were recurrent throughout this 
period. Officers who spent large amounts of time out of their uniforms received a shilling 
per week raise in 1862.113 This extra pay was important because plainclothes officers had 
to supply their own out-of-uniform clothes. One of the petitioners to the Home Office 
about the Popay Scandal told the Select Committee that he routinely saw policemen in 
disguise during meetings of the Walworth and Camberwell Political Union. When asked 
how he could be sure they were policemen, he replied, “Why they generally wore police 
boots and trousers; it was from that that we generally knew them to be policemen in 
                                                 
110 
MEPO 7/23, 12 November 1862. Assaults on police were common throughout the nineteenth century, 
and not just when officers were in plain clothes. Commenting in 1872, Commissioner Henderson thought 
that assaults on police had lately increased, “So that every Policeman is assaulted about once in every two 
years.” Report of the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis (1872), 4. 
111 
MEPO 7/29, 7 March 1867.  
112
 MEPO 7/30, 14 April 1868.  
113
 MEPO 7/23, 12 November 1862. 
256 
 
disguise.”114 Pay was still a problem in 1878 when the Departmental Committee 
concluded that divisional detective’s £5 clothing allowance was “utterly inadequate.”115  
Commissioners Rowan and Mayne initially restricted the use of undercover policemen, 
yet Mayne warmed to the utility of undercover officers. Their frequent use by local 
superintendents, and their evident successes, led to a proliferation of plainclothes work 
within the Metropolitan Police. Mayne worried that leaving men in plainclothes too often 
might lead to corruption so he ordered that plainclothes officers be frequently rotated 
back to uniform duty.116 Police officers found it easier to detect crime while out of 
uniform. Divisional Detective Sergeant George Forster told an 1878 Departmental 
Committee: “In my opinion one plain clothes man is worth a dozen uniform men. A 
uniform man is very good for acting as watchman in the night, and looking after 
premises, but he is of no use whatever in detecting crime; he is confined to a certain spot, 
and there he is.”117 
5.6 Enlarging the Detective Force 
On the afternoon of December 13, 1867, London’s Clerkenwell Prison was bombed. The 
explosion killed twelve people and injured nearly ten times as many. The Home Office 
and the Metropolitan Police expected the bombing, having been forewarned by Dublin 
Castle that an attempt to free Fenian prisoner Richard O’Sullivan Burke, incarcerated at 
Clerkenwell for dealing arms, would take place on December 12.118 That attempt failed. 
The second – successful – attempt was made the following day, shattering an outer wall 
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of the prison. By that time, however, prison officials had moved Burke to a different part 
of the facility to prevent his rescue.119  
Although the Metropolitan Police were unable to avert the Clerkenwell bombing, the 
ensuing scandal advanced the cause of detective policing in the Met. The press supported 
an enlarged detective force. The Morning Post called on Mayne to improve his Detective 
Department and free it from the “police bungling or want of intelligence…that the 
incompetency of the detective department has … made so painfully clear.”120 The 
Standard published a lengthy opinion, exhorting that “the Executive must…be incessant; 
that the authorities must not shrink from their responsibilities; that the law must make the 
weight of its hand unmistakeably [sic] felt.”121 A more tempered response came from 
The Pall Mall Gazette, which called upon its readers to remember the difficult, dangerous 
and thankless task performed by police officers: “As the representatives of the law they 
fight at inevitable disadvantage in contending with crime…How well and at what risks 
they perform their duty let the events of Friday show, and justice no less than gratitude 
will then suggest the conclusion.”122 Local justices were less sympathetic. At a meeting 
of the Middlesex magistrates, Lord Ranelagh accused Mayne of improperly guarding the 
exterior walls of the prison: “if it did not rest with the Commissioner of Police, he would 
like to know with whom the blame did rest?”123 
A Committee to Inquire into the System of Police was assembled in the aftermath of 
Clerkenwell, interviewing senior and junior police officers, as well as Scotland Yard 
detectives about the state of the police generally and its detective capabilities in specific. 
The committee concluded that there were not enough detectives to properly “cope with 
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conspiracies and secret combinations” in London.124 The Metropolitan police required a 
dedicated group of official divisional detectives to adequately police political 
dissidents.125 Mayne had himself undergone a change of heart about the use of 
plainclothes policemen over his thirty-year tenure as commissioner of police. The 
Clerkenwell bombing startled him into supporting policing tactics that he had heartily 
shunned in his younger years. After Clerkenwell, Mayne acknowledged that the cultural 
and political landscape in England had changed since 1829. Policing needed to adapt to 
take on the challenges posed by Irish unrest: “I think now,” he admitted,  “looking at the 
organization [of criminals] that we have to contend with … we must meet it with a 
different organization, both of a detective and of a preventive nature, from what we have 
hitherto had.”126 His superior at the Home Office, Gathorne Hardy, felt similarly: “more 
detection force & skill needed…I must decide whether to ask for more powers,” he wrote 
in his diary shortly after the bombing.127  
The detective force was enlarged in the spring of 1869, one year after the committee 
report was published.128 In July, a divisional detective force of twenty detective sergeants 
and one hundred and sixty detective constables was created.129 Divisional detective 
policemen were of lower rank than their Scotland Yard counterparts and were given the 
rank of constable and sergeant, while those at Scotland Yard began at sergeant and 
moved up to inspector. In this capacity, the men at Scotland Yard could coordinate and 
oversee divisional patrols without discrepancy of rank. Many of the men chosen for 
divisional detective duty had been long-time plainclothes men who now had professional 
status and formal place in the hierarchy of the Metropolitan Police. Within a month of 
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their promotion, it was clear that the divisional detectives were effectively combatting 
crime. On August 12, eight detectives from five divisions were offered rewards for good 
conduct.130 One month later two more divisional men, Detective Sergeant Ham and 
Detective Constable Ranger, were rewarded a substantial £10 each for resisting bribes 
from suspects.131 Justice Hayes awarded each man an additional £5 after the trial for their 
“vigilance and tact” in the detection and arrest of a housebreaker.132 During their first six 
months, over 63 per cent of persons arrested by divisional detectives were convicted and 
the new commissioner pronounced their work a “success.”133 
Between the publication of the 1868 report and the creation of the divisional detectives in 
July 1869, Richard Mayne passed away.134 His successor as Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis was Sir Edmund Yeamans Walcott Henderson, a military man who spent 
most of his life working in convict administration in the empire and at home in the United 
Kingdom.135 Like Mayne, Henderson preferred uniformed officers – they were visible to 
the public and, thus, accountable. Plainclothes patrols, however, were undeniably useful 
for catching criminals in the act of committing crimes.136 In the 1870s Henderson 
continued using the system of winter night patrols that Mayne pioneered in the 1840s and 
1860s. In his 1873 annual report, Henderson revealed that he had had great success using 
detective patrols to prevent larcenies and portico thefts. Theft statistics were down, 
loiterers arrested and he felt the patrols “have naturally tended to discourage similarly 
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evil disposed persons.”137 His confidence in the divisional detectives remained high 
throughout the decade. During the 1878 Home Office inquiry into Detective Department 
misconduct, Henderson praised his divisional men for their “very considerabl[e]” impact 
on London crime.138 He assured the Home Office that “[t]he conduct of the Police during 
the year was, with the exception already alluded to, very good.”139 
The relationship between the Detective Department and the plainclothes men in the 
divisions weakened in the 1860s. In earlier decades, divisional undercover officers cut 
their teeth under the guidance of Scotland Yard’s detectives. By the 1860s, divisional 
sergeants began to assume control of local detective activities and, by the 1870s, the 
divisional detectives and the central force at Scotland Yard had little to do with one 
another. Divisional detectives patrolled, visited prisons, and aided local investigations. 
Their familiarity with local criminals and their haunts gave them an edge over the 
Scotland Yard men in the divisions. The Met’s legal advisor James Edward Davis told 
the 1878 committee that Inspector Shore was the only central detective familiar “with the 
criminal element in London,” because he oversaw divisional detective prison visits.140  
Central detectives, as we will see, spent more time on theft and inquiries for the Home 
Office within England and internationally. They generally had better education and 
special skills, such as knowledge of foreign languages, which made them better suited to 
the senior detective ranks. The divisional men viewed any central man sent down to help 
a stalled local investigation as an imposter, while Scotland Yard men felt that divisional 
detectives were uneducated and unintelligent.141 Testimony before the 1878 departmental 
commission uncovered significant jealousy between divisional and central detectives. 
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Inspector George Greenham was candid with the commissioners when asked about his 
working relationship with divisional detectives: “I can only say that they do not unite 
with us in any way at all, and that there is a tremendous amount of jealousy between them 
and us; they are jealous of us, and they do not assist us in any possible way,” although, he 
conceded, “I do not say that it applies to every one.”142 Detective Superintendent 
Williamson, in particular, spoke of divisional men with disdain.143 For their part, 
divisional detectives felt similarly; Detective Sergeant William Chamberlain of Lambeth 
division told the committee that Yard men send to help with divisional investigations 
were “of no use.”144 Although Mayne encouraged cooperation between divisional and 
central detectives, he recognized that it was not always appropriate. Involving the senior 
detectives in divisional cases might lessen the “action and energy” of divisional men who 
– with warranted concern – might lose the credit for their work.145 By the time Mayne 
died in 1868 divisional detectives had come of age in the Metropolitan Police.  
5.7 Conclusion 
Both Colonel Rowan and Richard Mayne were wary of undercover policemen in the 
early years of the Metropolitan Police. They worried about the repercussions of the Popay 
incident and wanted to distance the police from accusations of spying. The 
commissioners wanted an accountable police force that commanded public respect. By 
the close of the 1860s, however, Mayne acquiesced to undercover policing within limits.   
The work of the divisional detectives has not attracted much historical attention. Indeed, 
plainclothes police were active from the first years of the Metropolitan Police, thus 
preceding Scotland Yard’s force. As we have seen, they began as auxiliaries to the 
uniformed branch, policing state occasions, fairs, and regattas. During the 1830s and 40s 
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they became involved in public order, especially Chartists disturbances. The 
commissioners also experimented with undercover night patrols in winter to prevent and 
detect theft. By the 1860s plainclothes men had become an established part of London’s 
policing apparatus. Mayne ultimately conceded what his superintendents had long 
realized - the utility of detection at all levels of London’s police in the nineteenth century. 
When Mayne died in December 1868, Metropolitan Police officers routinely performed 
plainclothes duties. Testifying before the 1868 Committee, Mayne reported “[e]very 
constable is occasionally employed in plainclothes.”146 The creation of the divisional 
detectives in the Metropolitan Police 1869, like so many changes in English legal history, 
merely codified an existing practice.  
The growth of undercover policing in London’s police divisions between 1829 and 1869 
allowed central detective officers to focus their attention elsewhere. Detectives undertook 
a great proportion of this new work for the Home Office, for which Scotland Yard’s elite 
detective force was a useful auxiliary to gather information and conduct surveillance. The 
following chapter analyses detectives’ role in the expansion of the Victorian information 
state.  
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6 Agents of the State 
London, excluding the City of London, had no municipal government until 1888, leaving 
the daily management of the Metropolitan Police to the police commissioners and police 
oversight to the Home Office. Metropolitan London contained parts of northeastern 
Surrey, northwestern Kent, southeastern Essex and most of Middlesex counties, although 
the City of London remained administratively separate with its own corporate privileges.1 
Commissioners Mayne and Rowan worked closely with home secretaries and their staff 
on all policing issues. The direct relationship between the government and the 
Metropolitan Police was unique. In the rest of the nation, local government ran local 
police services, though urban and rural police forces were still subject to some Home 
Office oversight.2 In urban centres police forces answered to town councils, while quarter 
sessions controlled county constabularies. The City of London remained independent 
within the capital, with its own police force under the watchful eye of the Common 
Council. The Metropolitan Police’s relationship with the Home Office was much more 
direct – no municipal bodies stood between the commissioners and the home secretary.  
This relationship with the central government made Metropolitan police officers – and 
detectives at Scotland Yard in particular – agents of the state in the truest sense of the 
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word. Not only were they close at hand to police the capital, but they also became key 
gatherers of information for the increasingly expanding Victorian state.3 Parliament 
passed numerous bills relating to domestic government during the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century. The regulation and enforcement of these laws fell to the Home 
Office. Among the responsibilities were operating a variety of inspectorates (overseen, 
but not staffed, by the Home Office), including: “anatomy (1832); factory (1833); prison 
(1835); mines (1842); burial grounds (1854); constabulary (1856); reformatory and 
industrial schools (1857); salmon fisheries (1861); gunpowder (1871) which became 
explosives (1875); and cruelty to animals (1876).”4 All of these duties were borne by an 
office with a staff of twenty-five, including the home secretary, parliamentary under-
secretary, permanent-undersecretary, counsel, chief clerk and an army of junior clerks.5 
Detectives, with elite status within the police and the freedom to undertake inquiries 
whenever and wherever, became an important tool for surveillance and information 
gathering. The following chapter describes the work done by detectives for the Home 
Office, a role too often overshadowed by felony investigations.  
6.1 General Tasks 
The Home Office assigned Scotland Yard’s detectives to a wide variety of general tasks 
outside the metropolis. In June 1847, for example, detectives provided protection to 
notable attendees of a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science 
in Oxford. Among the attendees were “Lucien Bonaparte, Prince of Canino; the 
Chevalier Bunsen, the Prussian Ambassador; the Hon. Mr. Bancroft, the American 
                                                 
3
 Oliver MacDonagh, Early Victorian Government 1830-1870 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977).  
4
 Jill Pellew, The Home Office 1848-1914: From Clerks to Bureaucrats (London: Heinemann Educational 
Books, 1982), 122. Policemen also shouldered this burden. As Clive Emsley points out, policemen often 
helped enforce the Poor Laws, Old Metal Dealers Act (1861), Salmon Fishery Acts, Education Act (1870), 
Explosives Act (1875), Adulterated Foods Act (1875) and performed many other more incidental tasks 
(such as inspecting cattle or tramcars) that were not part of their regular patrol duties. Emsley, The English 
Police, 78-79 and 88. 
5
 There were, excluding the home secretary and the parliamentary under-secretary, twenty-three permanent 
officials working in the Home Office in 1848. This number rose slightly, to 33, by 1870 and to 36 in 1876. 
Pellew, The Home Office 1848-1914, 6, 23 and 30. 
265 
 
minister; [and] Count Rosen, from Sweden.” Detective Inspectors Haynes and Langley 
travelled from London to Oxford to ensure that no one interfered with any of the famous 
names.6 Similarly, while the ex French royal family was living in England, Sergeant 
Sanders kept an eye on their movements. He reported in March 1852 on the Duc de 
Joinville’s departure to Ireland.7  
Scotland Yard’s assistance was also sought in felony cases outside London, as three cases 
in the early 1850s demonstrate. When several Cornish justices asked for a detective to 
help detect arsonists, Secretary Grey agreed. Local constables often experienced 
difficulty investigating people they knew while officers from London had no local 
connections and, thus, a freer investigatory hand.8 The arson was in retaliation for the 
conviction and transportation for life of Joseph Hendy for sending threatening letters to 
William Thomas. Thomas was a local landowner and Hendy a prosperous farmer. When 
one of Thomas’s properties needed a new tenant, Hendy wanted his son to get the lease. 
Thomas instead decided to rent to his own nephew and that is when Hendy sent a letter 
“threatening to burn his house and outbuildings.” Hendy was convicted in April 1850.9 
“Since the Conviction of Hendy,” the justices wrote to Hardy, “various attempts have 
been made to burn the Houses and Property of Persons resident in Mullion – and on the 
20th of August last, the Stock adjoining the Farm House of Mr. John Thomas was set on 
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fire.”10 The government offered a £200 reward for information leading to a conviction. 
John Thomas was son-in-law to Joseph Thomas, the previous victim’s brother. The 
following summer, John’s father-in-law prosecuted another man, William Bartle, for 
sending threatening letters. Sergeant Thornton, sent to Cornwall by the home secretary, 
arrested Bartle. The detective testified during Bartle’s trial at the Cornwall Summer 
Assizes that sealing wax and letters found at Bartle’s lodgings matched the wax and 
handwriting on letters sent to Thomas. The jury took less than five minutes to find Bartle 
guilty and the judge sentenced him to fifteen years’ transportation.11 
Around the same time as the Cornish magistrates asked the Home Office for help, 
magistrates from Frome, Somerset, requested government help to find a murderer.12 The 
victim, fourteen-year-old Sarah Watts, was raped, robbed and murdered near a turnpike 
in broad daylight. The magistrates felt “the local constabulary – however intelligent and 
zealous are but indifferently qualified to pursue and investigation in which those with 
whom they are in the habit of associating are mixed up.” In addition to concerns that 
local officers were compromised by their close relationships within the community, the 
Somerset magistrates also worried that their officers were incapable of coordinating a 
complicated investigation. A Scotland Yard detective would provide a necessary 
“directing head.” Sergeant Smith took up the case, according to the magistrates, 
“patiently and systematically…until step by step he laid before us a chain of evidence 
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instigators of the fires.” Archer, By a Flash and a Scare, 107, 110 and 157. In 1844, largely as a result of 
this intense period of arson, West Sussex established a constabulary force and arrests increased as a result 
of the greater police presence. Ibid., 154 and 166-67. 
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which has justified us in committing three men to take their trial at the next Assizes for 
the murder.”13 All three men were acquitted, though not before the presiding justice 
defended the police for “discharge[ing] their duty properly.”14 
Detective Whicher spent three days in Shropshire at the request of local magistrates to 
find the person who cut a rope at a colliery in Ketley, leading to the deaths of three 
people. The rope was cut so that the two men and a boy being lowered fell the last eleven 
yards into the fifty-three yard deep pit.15 Together the government and the Ketley 
Company offered £100 for evidence leading to a conviction.16 
Detectives would also help home secretaries out of tricky political situations. During the 
July 24, 1868 sitting of the House, Alderman Lusk pressured Home Secretary Hardy 
about what the Home Office was doing to help a man wrongfully convicted of theft.17 
The man in question was James Bell, convicted of sheep stealing in March 1868 at the 
Middlesex Sessions. Inspector Thomson re-investigated the case and determined that the 
officers on the original case made a mistake. The real perpetrators were Thomas Daley 
and Edwin Winder (already incarcerated for sheep theft) and Frederick Winder (Edwin’s 
butcher brother). Frederick was tried and convicted in August 1868 and Bell’s conviction 
overturned. The presiding justice “ordered Inspector Thomson to receive a pecuniary 
reward as a recognition of the care and labour which he had bestowed upon the matter.”18 
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6.2 Naturalization 
While many of Scotland Yard’s duties included detection of felonies, they served a 
variety of other functions. One of the unique duties of central detectives was to 
investigate applicants for naturalization or denization within Britain. Naturalization, 
granted by act of parliament, and denization, granted by letters patent from the sovereign, 
gave foreigners the right to hold and inherit land, vote if they met the burden of suffrage 
and (after 1844) hold office, although not in the Privy Council or House of Parliament.19  
There were limits on citizenship grants, however, since naturalized subjects could neither 
hold political office nor claim protection or rights from the Crown if they left Britain.20 
Neither could their descendants, and all rights of British citizenship lapsed after a six-
month absence from the British Isles. Even with such restrictions, naturalized status 
offered male foreigners who chose to make Britain a permanent home nearly all the rights 
and privileges enjoyed by natural born (male) Britons.21 Applications for naturalization 
or denization were expensive, limiting the number of foreigners able to afford the 
privilege. Before 1844 there were, on average, only seven naturalizations and twenty-five 
denizations per year. Each naturalization application cost about £100, while endenized 
foreigners could expect to pay at least £120, although multiple applicants sometimes 
shared the cost. The home secretary, on behalf of the monarch, approved all applications 
for denization. Without a dedicated staff to evaluate each application and, given that there 
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 This provision, a hangover from the 1700 Act of Settlement, was intended to prevent Hanoverians from 
infiltrating the government. Clive Parry, Nationality and Citizenship Laws of The Commonwealth and of 
The Republic of Ireland (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1957), 57-58.  
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this and above summary, see Fahrmeir, Citizens and Aliens, 43-52. 
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were so few each year, it was customary for a signed testimonial from a respectable 
reference to be the only necessary application requirement.22 
The 1844 Aliens Act introduced a more streamlined administrative procedure, allowing 
naturalization under statute by executive rather than legislative means.23 It removed the 
necessity of legislation for individual foreigners by allowing applicants to submit 
standardized requests to the Home Office. Although this new process relieved the burden 
on the applicant it placed significant administrative pressure on an already overburdened 
Home Office.  
Under the 1844 guidelines, potential subjects submitted a memorial to the home secretary 
indicating their age, profession, trade and any other relevant information that might help 
the government in its decision. The home secretary then evaluated applications “and 
receive[d] all such Evidence as shall be offered, by Affidavit or otherwise, as he may 
deem necessary or proper for proving the Truth of the Allegations contained in such 
Memorial.”24 Unlike much of the other social legislation passed by parliament, the Aliens 
Act of 1844 (and, indeed, all legislation regulating foreigners) contained no provisions 
for an inspectorate or any other body tasked with enforcement. Instead, the home 
secretary had to delegate this responsibility to individuals already employed by or 
working under the aegis of the Home Office. Home Secretary Sir James Graham needed 
discreet, professional and trustworthy individuals to evaluate applications for 
naturalization on his behalf.25 Luckily, he had just such a group at his disposal. From the 
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passage of the Act, investigating the fitness of prospective candidates became one of the 
responsibilities of Scotland Yard’s new detectives.  
The naturalization applications of three Moroccans - Judah, Samuel and Joseph Yuly 
Levy – in 1849 and 1850 reveal how detectives gathered information about applicants. 
All three men were merchants who split their time between Morocco and London but 
decided to make England their permanent home. Judah, the youngest at forty-seven, had 
an English wife and several children who lived with him in the City of London. As he 
approached fifty, he wanted to ensure that his children could inherit the family business. 
According to his testimonial, Judah was “most desirous of possessing some Freehold 
property and is therefore anxious to possess all the rights, privileges and capacities of a 
British born subject.”26 Samuel, 50, spent thirty-four years working as a merchant in 
Portsea, Hampshire. Like Judah, he wanted to make England his permanent home with 
his English wife and their three children. Although Samuel’s memorial stressed how he 
became “much attached to the English nation,” the right to hold and bequeath real 
property must have influenced his decision to seek naturalization as much as any loyalty 
to Albion.27 The eldest applicant in the family, Joseph, was a fifty-five-year-old bachelor. 
Like Judah and Samuel, he had spent over two decades as a merchant in England and 
wanted to be able to pass on his business to his family upon his death.28       
Each man submitted a testimonial to the Home Office and swore oaths before a 
magistrate, which, as City merchants, they did before an alderman at Mansion House. 
Accompanying these applications were affidavits from respectable parties in support of 
the applicants. There was no statutory limit to the number of references, but four seems to 
have been the norm. Judah received support from two fellow merchants, a hairdresser and 
perfumer and a tailor. Samuel and Joseph both used the same four references, three local 
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 HO 1/31/1011, “Judah Levy Yuly,” 14 August 1849. 
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 HO 1/34/1164, “Samuel Levy Yuly,” 9 July 1850. 
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 HO 1/34/1165, “Joseph Levy Yuly,” 9 July 1850. 
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merchants and a warehouseman. Each reference vouched for the identity and loyalty of 
the applicant.29 
Once the memorials and sworn statements were submitted to the Home Office, detectives 
were assigned to authenticate the information therein. Grey was especially interested in 
any “information as to [their] respectability and that of the parties by whom the Memorial 
is certified.”30 In the case of the Samuel and Joseph, Inspector Charles Frederick Field (a 
household name thanks to Charles Dickens) did the legwork himself.31 He visited the 
workplaces of the four references, asked about them locally and reported to the 
commissioner “that they [the Levys] are Merchants residing in the City of London, of 
great respectability, and have been many years in this Country.” He wrote a similar letter 
regarding Joseph’s application and verified that Joseph was “a highly respectable 
merchant” in Bishopsgate whose references, being the same as Samuel’s, were also 
approved.32 
Similar procedures were followed for three further applicants. Jacob de Judah Pariente, 
another Moroccan subject, applied for naturalization in 1850. Pariente was a fifty-nine-
year old Moroccan merchant with ten children. He had only been living in England for 
two years but had excellent references from a master tailor, clerk, shoemaker, and 
interpreter, all of whom Detective Sergeant Jonathan Whicher – sent by Field to 
investigate – described as “respectable” or “decent, and well conducted.”33 Pariente 
swore his oath before the alderman at the Guildhall in July 1850. In March 1852 Whicher 
gathered information about Adam Bermes, a German national from Hamborn in western 
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Germany. Bermes worked as a baker in Drury lane and argued in his memorial that 
naturalization would “enable him the better to carry on his business and to secure him the 
privilege of a permanent residence here of which without such rights and capacities he 
might be deprived.” Three other bakers and a grocer supported his application in sworn 
statements at Bow Street police court. Whicher supported the application, indicating that 
Bermes and his references all “bear the character of respectable men.”34 
The Home Secretary and police commissioners not only trusted their detectives’ 
discretion but also relied on them to evaluate the appropriateness of applicants and their 
references. Detectives routinely dealt with swindlers and con artists, so should have been 
more likely than most to sense if something about the applicants or their references was 
amiss. But detectives sometimes made mistakes. In January 1873 the undersecretary to 
the Home Office, A.F.O Liddell, asked the police to look into a Belgian named Augustin 
Dufer who worked as a tobacconist in Leicester Square. Chief Inspector Druscovich and 
Superintendent Williamson made “quiet enquiries” and affirmed that Dufer’s referees 
were “respectable householders,” although no one noticed the subtle change Dufer made 
to his name on his memorial, from Dufer to Defer. Dufer had broken the law in Belgium, 
fled to England and changed his name. All, Williamson surmised, “with the view, I 
presume, of not being traced.” The record does not indicate whether Dufer’s certificate 
was revoked, but he was hardly the only man to submit a false application for 
citizenship.35  
In March 1873 the government scrambled to determine how Abraham Albert Leutner, a 
Prussian national and wanted criminal, had managed to naturalize as a British subject. 
Leutner fled Germany in 1868 under the name Abraham Leutner after being charged with 
fraud in a lottery scam. His new circle of friends in England had similar interests, because 
Sergeant Reimers arrested him in 1871 for involvement in an international lottery scam. 
He told Reimers that his name was Abraham Leutner. When applying for naturalization 
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in November 1872, Leutner neglected to disclose his criminal past to the Lord Mayor of 
London who administered his oath at Mansion House. Like Dufer before him, Albert 
altered his name on the naturalization application. His real name was Abraham Albert 
Leutner, but he alternated between his two given names: if he was arrested for a crime, he 
gave his first name as Abraham; when he needed a clean identity, he became Albert. 
Thus, when Leutner’s application for naturalization came up for review, the police did 
not realize that “Albert Leutner” was the same “German Jew Swindler” that Reimers 
knew to be Abraham Leutner, the criminal.36  
Unfortunately, the statute of limitations for fraud in Germany had elapsed by the time the 
police realized Leutner’s true identity and extradition was no longer an option. Leutner 
also escaped prosecution for his fraud in England because the relevant evidence never 
arrived from Germany. The only remaining option for the government was to prosecute 
him for falsifying documents. The Home Office consulted with Sir Thomas Henry about 
the problem. A lawyer by training and an Irishman by birth, Henry was chief magistrate 
at Bow Street from July 1864 until his death in June 1876. He was an expert in 
extradition law and had written the 1870 Extradition Act and associated bilateral 
agreements with other European powers.37 Henry suggested the government’s only 
recourse might be to use the 1870 Naturalization Act to prosecute Leutner for omitting 
his given name on his application. Even though Henry acknowledged that Leutner 
“willfully and corruptly made a declaration which he knew to be untrue in a material 
particular,” he felt that the “omission would not be sufficient to insure [sic] a conviction” 
and advised the Home Office against prosecuting the case.38  
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Leutner’s case brought oversights in the Act’s wording to light. There were no provisions 
restricting felons from gaining citizenship and the neither the wording of the Act nor that 
of the oath taken by applicants indicated that prior arrests or convictions would proscribe 
such a process. While the Act allowed the home secretary to give or withhold certificates 
at his discretion, there were no specific provisions for revoking them.39  
More research is needed about the national apparatus for evaluating naturalization 
applications after 1844, including what powers the government had to annul status, who 
evaluated character evaluations for applicants outside the metropolis, what made a 
desirable applicant and on what grounds applications were denied. The only applicant 
considered here who came from outside London, Judah Yuly Levy, lived in Hampshire 
but came to the City to take his oath. Within the capital, however, Scotland Yard’s 
detectives eased the administrative burden placed on the Home Office by the 
Naturalization Acts of 1844 and 1870. The home secretary relied heavily on their 
judgment. Investigating applicants and their references gave detectives a voice in the 
decision-making process and a discretionary role in determining who could become a 
British subject.   
6.3 Extradition 
London’s detectives also helped the government with the complicated process of 
extradition. Scotland Yard was integral to locating and transporting fugitives in England 
and abroad. Britain’s first extradition treaties – bilateral agreements for the return of with 
fugitive offenders – were with America (1842) and France (1843). These, along with a 
treaty with Denmark (1862), were the only British treaties in effect between 1842 and a 
new Extradition Act in 1870.40 The 1870 Act precluded the need for legislation to ratify 
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individual treaties, considerably streamlining the process. Extradition agreements after 
1870 simply opted into the Act through an Order in Council and treaties were soon 
concluded with Germany (1872), Hungary (1873), Italy (1873) and Switzerland (1880), 
in addition to those already in place with the United States, France and Denmark.41  
Extradition treaties required both nations to agree on which crimes would be subject to 
extradition. The 1843 French treaty included a short list: murder (the associated French 
legal terms were assassination, parricide, infanticide and poisoning), attempted murder, 
forgery, and fraudulent bankruptcy. The 1842 American treaty contained several more 
options, including: murder, assault with intent to commit murder, piracy, arson, robbery, 
forgery, and uttering forged paper.42 Without agreement on applicable crimes, there 
could be no extradition agreement.  
Even when parties agreed on which crimes were subject to extradition, rendition 
remained a tricky process with opportunities for technical legal problems at all levels. 
Applications were limited. Between 1843 and 1864 France obtained only one extradition 
from England while the English asked France for nine fugitives between 1852 and 1856 
with two successes.43 The greatest impediment to French extradition requests was 
English distrust of the French legal system. In particular, there were incongruities in how 
the two countries took depositions from witnesses. In England, depositions were recorded 
in open court before a magistrate, while across the Channel witnesses were compelled to 
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attend a private meeting with a Juge d’Instruction, who recorded the interview and had 
the witness sign. The French minister of justice would then countersign, seal the 
deposition and send it to England. Problematically, the English legal system did not 
consider the French minister’s seal adequate authentication of legal documents.44 The 
1866 Extradition Act fixed this problem by making the official seal of a foreign minister 
of justice adequate verification and authentication of foreign legal documents. This seems 
to have improved relations, although there were other impediments to successful 
extradition. Of six requests made of the English government between 1866 and 1868 
(five from France, one from America), only two offenders, a bankrupt and a forger, were 
successfully extradited. Of the four failed cases, the police twice failed to locate the 
fugitives, one request was withdrawn because the suspect fled England for Brussels and, 
in the last case, Henry denied the warrant because he thought the case against the accused 
too circumstantial.45  
Requests from foreign governments for the rendition of fugitives came through 
diplomatic channels, but the extradition itself was a Home Office responsibility. 
Permanent Under-Secretary Edmund Hammond admitted that the Foreign Office was a 
“mere conduit pipe for the warrant,” forwarding extradition requests to the Home Office 
and corresponding with foreign governments. Hammond conceded that his staff at the 
Foreign Office was “little acquainted…with the working of these treatises.”46 The 
American, French and Danish treaties placed the burden of evaluating applications on the 
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home secretary who, upon receiving an application from the Foreign Office, decided 
whether the crime accorded with the terms of the treaty. This was a straightforward task, 
unless the crime might be political. English law did not acknowledge political crimes and 
refused to extradite foreigners on that basis. If the extradition request met English 
criterion, the home secretary then forwarded the information to the Bow Street chief 
magistrate to evaluate the contents and issue a warrant.  
At this point, detectives became involved. They had been working on extradition cases 
since the late 1850s, but the workload increased after 1870 from a handful of cases per 
year to nearly thirty.47 Once a Bow Street magistrate issued an arrest warrant for a 
foreign fugitive in England, Scotland Yard’s detectives began searching for the 
offender.48 Once apprehended, detectives brought fugitives to Bow Street police court for 
a pre-trial hearing and, if evidence was sufficient to merit a trial in English courts of law, 
the suspect was imprisoned awaiting the home secretary’s final extradition order. 
Prisoners had fifteen days to appeal the court’s decision with a plea of habeas corpus to 
Queen’s Bench. If the appeal failed (as they usually did) a detective would take the 
offender from England to their home state and deposit them in the hands of their nation’s 
police.49 
Extradition requests came from across Europe and the United States. France and Belgium 
appealed most often because the frequency of shipping traffic between England, France 
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and Belgium made it easy for fugitives to escape from one country to the other. Happily 
for offenders on the run, Britain’s liberal immigration policy offered few impediments to 
entry.50 Fast steamers to America, however, also gave renegades the option of trans-
Atlantic flight. Britain did not have extradition agreements with individual American 
states, so arrests had to be made by a federal official. English detectives worked 
alongside local law enforcement and the federal US Marshals’ office because of the “the 
mutual jealousy of the State and Federal officers.” During the capture of murderer Franz 
Muller, for example, and in a clear attempt to smooth federal and state relations, the US 
Marshal in charge of the investigation deputized a New York Police Department officer 
so that the local officer could make the arrest.51  
The Muller case is an excellent example of the collegial relationship between American 
officials and English detectives. Muller murdered seventy-year-old bank clerk Thomas 
Briggs on the North London Railway in July 1864. After escaping London he boarded the 
Victoria, a sailing ship bound for New York. Inspector Tanner and Sergeant Clarke took 
a much faster steamship, arriving in New York a full three weeks ahead of Muller. 
Although there were diplomatic tensions between Britain and America over the former’s 
support of the South in the ongoing civil war, the Americans agreed to extradite Muller 
and Tanner and Clarke escorted him back to England.52 John Littlechild also worked a 
British-American extradition. Like Tanner and Clarke, Littlechild also outpaced a 
fugitive across the Atlantic. Littlechild was experienced dealing with violent criminals 
but found American manners more difficult to manage. Having arrived in New York to 
trace a suspect, the English detective found that his American counterpart treated him 
rather more informally than he was used to back home: 
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I was handed over to a young gentleman who came into the Marshal’s office in 
his shirt-sleeves, with hair dishevelled [sic], and a cigar between his teeth. He sat 
himself familiarly down, crossed his legs, exposing the frayed ends of his trousers 
and his well-‘ventilated’ boots, and my heart sank within me as I looked at him.53 
Although Littlechild’s account claims he arrested the suspect when the fugitive’s ship 
arrived in New York, having “sent the Marshal’s man home to his mother – or dinner,” it 
is more likely that the Marshal accompanied him. It is doubtful that the Americans would 
have let the British detective arrest a suspect on their own soil; however much 
camaraderie may have existed between English and American law enforcement, such 
goodwill stopped short of allowing extra-territorial jurisdiction to either group. 
The police often waited long periods before a warrant could be executed. Henry James 
David, wanted for forging a $1000 bill against James Styles Kean of Philadelphia, 
managed to dodge his extradition warrant for nearly a year. When he made the mistake of 
returning to London in January 1859, Whicher, who had been waiting for him, pounced 
immediately. Unfortunately the prosecutor had already left England because “It would be 
unreasonable to suppose that a prosecutor could remain in the country for months and 
years to await the contingency of a person being apprehended who was known to be 
hiding abroad.” The prosecution had to wait until he returned.54 
Magistrates evaluated cases against fugitive criminals before any extraditions could 
proceed. Witnesses who could identify the accused and prosecute the case in court were 
essential. Tanner and Clarke took two witnesses with them to New York to ensure that 
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Muller’s examination before American magistrates went smoothly.55 When an American 
fugitive wanted for murder was located at Falmouth in October 1872, Home Secretary 
Henry Bruce instructed Mayne to send “a detective officer of intelligence” to Falmouth to 
collect the prisoner and to make sure “to bring with him to London the Witnesses in the 
case, whose Depositions are enclosed, and whose evidence must be taken before Sir 
Thomas Henry.”56 Similarly, when Chief Inspector Druscovich and Sergeant Dowdell 
arrested Isaac Sitbon as an accessory to a Marseilles murder, his hearing before Henry at 
Bow Street was delayed until the French witness arrived in England.57 The English 
authorities were similarly happy to await the arrival of a Hungarian witness in the case of 
Albert Buckler, a Hungarian national accused of defrauding Rothchilds’ of Paris of 
£100,000 francs.58 Detectives were sometimes advanced large sums to bring witnesses to 
England for trial. In April 1858 the government advanced Inspector Sanders hundreds of 
pounds to bring witnesses for Dr. Simon Bernard’s trial to London from France. Bernard 
was charged for his part in the Orsini plot, an attempt to assassinate Napoleon III at the 
Praris Opera. From his base in Birmingham, Orisini made the grenades used by the 
conspirators. The extradition and prosecution, including expenses for accommodations in 
London, cost the government over £5000.59 
Extradition cases were often complicated. Inspector Druscovich showed great skill and 
determination investigating Vital Douat, wanted for an elaborate life insurance fraud in 
Bordeaux. Douat was 24,000 francs in debt and fled to England to avoid his creditors. 
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With no way to pay them back, he faked his own death so that his wife could cash in his 
life insurance policy. He came to England under a false name and had a waiter at Ford’s 
Hotel in London pose as a doctor to write out a fake English death certificate (he had, it 
seems, died from an aneurism). Douat took the medical certificate to the Registrar of 
Deaths at Plaistow to obtain a formal death certificate, which he then submitted to the 
sexton of St. Patrick’s cemetery in Low Leyton to buy a burial plot. Douat purchased a 
coffin and attended his own funeral mass, “Douat himself being the chief and only 
mourner.” With Vitual Douat officially laid to rest, his widow applied for his life 
insurance policy. The French insurance company was suspicious and asked English 
authorities verify the death. After tracing Douat under two false names, Druscovich asked 
Home Secretary Spencer Horatio Walpole to have the coffin exhumed. It was empty. 
Douat managed to evade the English warrant by fleeing to America, although sometime 
later he appeared in Antwerp and the Belgian authorities sent him back to France.60 
Typically, Scotland Yard detectives escorted extradited offenders from England. 
Cooperation between English and foreign police officers was usual, though English and 
American authorities were considerably collegial. When, for example, American 
fraudster Charles Lawrence was extradited back to the United States in May 1875, 
American officers travelled to England and accompanied Sergeant Shaw and Lawrence 
from London to Liverpool. Shaw left Lawrence with American officials in Liverpool as 
they boarded their ship for New York.61 Transporting prisoners could be very costly. In 
June 1875 Chief Inspector Druscovich conveyed A.A. Roelin to the Netherlands at a cost 
of £14.62 When the extradition was of an English fugitive, detectives usually met the 
prisoner at the nearest port. Stephen Francis Simpson, wanted for fraud, was handed over 
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to Inspector Whicher by the French authorities at Boulogne in July 1862. He was later 
found guilty at the Central Criminal Court and given twenty years’ penal servitude.63 
Foreign governments sometimes paid premiums for successful extraditions. Belgium 
usually offered £10 and the French £12.64 While portions of these funds were 
undoubtedly used to pay transportation costs, they could also help with another costly 
area: the payment of informants. According to George Greenham, informants were a 
necessary yet costly part of the extradition business. Greenham, who was fluent in French 
and Italian, was made the detective inspector in charge of foreign cases – including 
extradition – in 1877. Since, Greenham mused, “it is impossible for an officer to know 
every runaway from another country who comes here,” he developed an extensive 
network of informants, who “were in the constant habit of communicating with such 
delinquents.” Information had a price, however, and Greenham indicated that sums of £3 
or £5 were not unusual because “informants always expect something.”65 
Detectives did more than just track down fugitives and present them at court. They were 
also helpful in the courtroom, using their language skills to interpret foreign warrants and 
other related documents. In 1872, during England’s first extradition of a German 
national, Sergeant Reimers interpreted for the accused, a German seaman who stabbed 
the second mate on board during a drunken brawl.66 Sergeant von Tornow, also fluent in 
German, interpreted depositions in the case against German citizen Anton Theilkuhl for 
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fraudulent bankruptcy in November of the same year.67 Extraditions for crimes 
committed on the high seas were not uncommon. Sergeant Jarvis travelled to 
Queenstown to retrieve William Augustus Myers, an American seaman who murdered 
the ship’s cook over a loaf of bread during a crossing from Liverpool to Havana. Jarvis 
brought Myers before Henry at Bow Street and, since the John Sherwood was an 
American vessel, Myers was extradited to the United States.68  
Cases involving foreigners and extraditions became a specialty for some of Scotland 
Yard’s detectives. Men like Druscovich, who The Times referred to in 1866 as “the 
officer usually engaged in foreign inquiries,” regularly located foreign and English 
fugitives at home and abroad.69 Although Druscovich was the most prolific detective who 
worked extraditions, he was hardly the only man at the Yard involved in these cases. 
Whicher, von Tornow, Williamson, Jarvis, Shaw, Shore, Greenham, and Marchand all 
regularly appeared before Bow Street magistrates to execute warrants for the arrest of 
fugitive criminals. Because the terms of extradition treaties were so specific, the 
detectives involved in these cases developed a strong sense of the legal requirements. 
Some, such as Inspector Williamson, were involved in active dialogue with the bench 
over relevant case law. During the presentment of suspected thieves Paul Baudin and 
Alexandre Perdrix in March 1865, Williamson advised the sitting magistrate Mr. Yardley 
at Marylebone about their possible detention for extradition. Williamson had received a 
telegram from the Procureur-Impérial at le Havre requesting that the two prisoners, 
suspected of being in possession of over 5,000 franks worth of stolen property, be 
detained. Williamson was doubtful that the case would pass muster as an extradition. He 
advised Yardley (who was not the usual magistrate for extradition cases): “I don’t think 
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the Extradition Treaty touches a case of this kind. It only bears upon fraudulent 
bankruptcy, forgery, and murder.”70 
Cases of naturalization and extradition excited little concern among the public. While a 
few extradition cases received significant public attention, overall these investigations 
were routine administrative inquiries for the government. Investigations into naturalizing 
subjects usually determined that applicants were honest foreigners who wanted little 
more than to make lives for themselves in England and to allow their families to do the 
same. Tracking down criminals for extradition served British interests by ferreting out 
foreign fugitives and send them home or by bringing English criminals to justice. Neither 
of these areas of detective specialization was the cause of any discernable public 
criticism. One of their other duties, however, was more contentious: espionage.  
6.4 The Spy Question 
6.4.1 Political Policing in Revolutionary Europe 
The spy question had a long pedigree in England, beginning during the Napoleonic Wars 
and continuing long into the nineteenth century. Detectives, not surprisingly, spied for the 
government. English public opinion steadfastly rejected the idea that a British 
government would adopt policies of espionage to prevent domestic political unrest or 
foreign invasion. Spying was closely associated with political policing and that was out 
of the question. Espionage was contentious, given that most of what Britons knew, or 
believed they knew, about spying came from Continental Europe. 
During and after the Napoleonic wars, surveillance and political policing became central 
pillars of European police culture. In particular, Napoleon’s minister of police, Joseph 
Fouché, the Duke of Otranto, represented to the English all that was diabolical about the 
French spy system. Fouché was a perfect foil against which English values of 
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representative government, individual liberty, and the sanctity of judicial process were 
compared.  The English press endowed Fouché with an almost mythic omnipresence, 
making him the mastermind of police despotism. Newspapers referred to him as the 
“vigilant,” “inexorable,” “artful” and “bloodstained” overlord of French tyranny.71 He 
was credited with single-handedly establishing a system of espionage far more pervasive 
than any under the ancien régime.72 His system of informants, according to The Times, 
made him more aware of “the state of the different factions and the intrigues of the 
Capital, than any Person in France.”73 One anecdote about him emphasized that he had 
an insatiable appetite for violence, while another portrayed him drunk with power.74 
According to Cobett’s Annual Register, Fouché ran a system of “voracious prisons and 
places of execution.”75 After the Restoration, The Times came out strongly against him as 
“odious and infamous in the eyes of all France.”76 Following the announcement of the 
new French ministry in October 1815, The Observer characterized him as a man with 
slippery morals, “polluted by every crime, and who had betrayed every faction which had 
the weakness to confide in [him].”77 A year later, the Morning Chronicle offered a milder 
retrospective on the former spymaster of France, suggesting that he was perhaps “not the 
milk of human kindness.”78 During the Hundred Days, rhetoric again swung towards the 
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excessive. In April 1815, The Times derogated Fouché as one of a “perjured and bloody 
set,” whose “own countrymen will bring them to the gibbot [sic].”79  
Fouché was hardly the only European statesman using political policing as a means of 
national defense. Major European revolutions occurred in 1830 and 1848, following long 
periods of political tension between reactionary restoration governments and left-leaning 
reformers. To combat often concealed and dispersed political movements, political 
policing became a cornerstone of a restoration policy that prioritized tripartite policies of 
surveillance, repression and censorship. Restoration governments used fear and the 
prospect of denunciation to deter political dissidents.  
Russian rulers relied on informers and denunciations to identify subversive activities, an 
arrangement in place since the seventeenth century. A good deal of coercion was 
involved, since failure to report a “word and deed” crime against the tsar was itself a 
criminal offense.80 The secret police, or Okhrana, worked out of No. 16 on the Fontanka 
embankment in St. Petersburg; ‘Fontanka 16’ was the Russian equivalent of ‘Scotland 
Yard’. Common practices of Okhrana agents included spying, infiltration of dissident 
groups, and institutionalized mail tampering.81 Training was more demanding for 
Russia’s elite agents than anything found in England. While English detectives began by 
working as beat policemen followed by a brief apprenticeship at Scotland Yard, the 
Okhrana had an advanced orientation system. Each recruit  
rehearsed the fine art of detecting in simulated situations on the street, and then 
proved he could file a report that met the rules. He had to remember, for instance, 
always to refer to suspects by code names only. If his solo performance satisfied 
his trainer, he joined the corps and acquired a cover or code name of his own.82  
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The rigorous training of agents reflected the tumultuous political landscape of Russia, 
where the tsars fought a continual – and ultimately losing – battle against revolutionaries 
and anarchists. The Okhrana also established Foreign Agencies in Paris and Berlin to 
monitor expatriate Russians and anarchists who had fled political repression at home. 
Foreign Agency agents routinely paid French and Prussian journalists and their editors to 
print articles friendly to the tsarist regime.83 The greatest difference between the Russian 
and English systems was that the Russian government used administrative channels to 
deal with political malefactors to avoid the judicial system.84 In England all criminal 
offenses went through the justice system in the same manner, especially since there were 
no distinct categories for political crimes in English criminal law. 
In France, gendarmes and the Paris Police prefecture shared political policing. There was 
also a close relationship between policing and censorship, aptly represented by Fouché 
who, as Minister of Police, also oversaw state censorship. The government also sought to 
protect its own agents from prosecution; in 1849, the government declared that French 
secret agents acting to protect the state could not be indicted, even if their activities were 
unlawful.85 Such latitude was, at least officially, inconceivable in England.86  
Austria under the Hapsburgs was no different. The Austrian military, the war office, and 
regional governors all monitored politics, revealing widespread concern for political 
stability in the restored Hapsburg monarchy.87 Clemens von Metternich, head of the 
Foreign Office, was heavily involved in policing Hapsburg Europe and instrumental in 
ensuring Prussian, Russian and French collaboration with Austria in security measures. 
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He was, and he was hardly alone, frustrated by England’s constitutional and 
administrative impediments to European-style surveillance.88 In the Hapsburg territories, 
all subjects had to register their residences so the government could, theoretically, locate 
anyone at any time. Strict rules were placed on travel to and from other countries as well 
as within the Hapsburg territories. All movement required government approval.89 
England, by contrast, had no immigration control. As an island nation, there was no 
effective way to enforce border control along nearly 9,000 kms of coastline, so records of 
foreigners entering and residing in England were fragmentary. 
Although English governments rejected highly centralized and invasive policing 
techniques on principle, they were nonetheless sympathetic to the intentions behind them. 
All European governments, England included, feared armed insurrection and the English 
were not above supporting conservative European regimes in their fight against leftist 
agitation. England supported Russia in the early 1860s when Polish insurrectionary 
movements threatened Russian hegemony in the region. Between May and June 1862 the 
Russians introduced reforms in Poland, including the appointment of Tsar Alexander II’s 
uncle the Grand Duke Constantine as viceroy. Dissenters tried to assassinate several 
Russian figureheads in Poland. The first near-victim was General Lunders, acting 
Viceroy before Constantine arrived. Three further attacks followed: one on Grand Duke 
Constantine and two on Marquis Alexander Wielopolski, Polish statesmen and Russian 
ally.90 Wielopolski’s attempts to crush opponents of the new reform program resulted in 
the revolutionary movement of 1863. The revolutionaries, outnumbered and overpowered 
by the Russian army, were quickly defeated and the Kingdom of Poland was incorporated 
into Russia.91  
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England’s own experiences with Chartist agitation in the 1830s and 1840s gave the 
country a sympathetic ear for Russia’s Polish troubles. The Russians were in close 
contact with Foreign Secretary Russell and the English ambassador in St. Petersburg, 
Lord Francis Napier, about the 1862 reforms.92 Russell supported Russian attempts to 
suppress insurrection, arguing that the best way for Poland to achieve constitutional 
freedoms was as part of Russia. He told Napier that “patient and quiet submission” by 
Poland “until an improvement shall take place in the political institutions of Russia” was 
the best possible option. Russell disliked democratic movements in Europe because they 
did not distinguish “between Constitutional Freedom and Democratic License.”93 
Warsaw was the seat of significant political agitation and the Russians needed help. 
Following the assassination attempt against General Lunders on June 21, 1862, the 
Russians reached out to Russell to help police the Polish capital. Richard Mayne sent the 
head of the detectives, Inspector Whicher, and his most senior superintendent, Robert 
Walker of Whitehall division to Warsaw to liaise with Russian officials. For their own 
safety, the detectives’ presence in Warsaw was kept a secret from all but a few officials.  
Whicher and Walker reported that the Russians worried about further assassination 
attempts and “the Government appears to be in constant apprehension.”94 It is not clear 
what aspects of London’s police apparatus the Russians were interested in, but the 
Metropolitan Police sent along copies of instruction books for the Met, English police 
forces in India, as well as reports on fires (presumably arson) and police finance. 
Strikingly, no information seems to have changed hands about English police practice in 
Ireland, which would seem to have been the most applicable to the Russian situation. 
English subjects in London, although raucous at times, did not consider themselves 
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occupied by a foreign police force; the Irish did.95 Nevertheless, Grand Duke Constantine 
was impressed by Whicher and Walker’s expertise and said as much to Mayne.  
The two officers chosen have entirely satisfied His Highness’ expectations by the 
justice and sagacity of their remarks as well as by the practical utility of the 
information and instruction which they have offered. These officers are fresh 
proof of the degree of perfection to which all branches of the Public Service in 
England have attained, and particularly that branch sir which is under your 
excellent administration.96 
In spite of their efforts to export English police practices to Russian Poland, the success 
of this trip is unclear. Following the 1863 insurrection, however, Whicher and Walker’s 
advice would have been completely unsuitable. Constantine returned to Russia and was 
replaced by General Feodor Feodorovich Berg who used “official terror” to pacify 
Poland.97 Reflecting on the matter in 1878, James Thomson believed that his colleagues 
had “found the customs so very different that I believe it [exporting London’s police 
model to Warsaw] could not be done.”98 
The customs were not always so very different, though. England, for all her posturing 
about the sanctity of individual liberties, also had a history – though “a very uneven one” 
– of espionage.99 The reverberations of the French Revolution, Napoleonic Wars and the 
political instability in the wake of the Restoration were felt in England. For the better part 
of three decades after 1789, the British government sacrificed traditional conceptions of 
liberty to buttress the state against possible revolution. Most controversial was the 
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suspension of habeas corpus between 1794 and 1795, and again between 1798 and 1801, 
enabling the government to arrest and hold suspicious individuals without trial.100 In 
1817, following a resurgent radical threat, the government debated suspending habeas 
corpus yet again, triggering heated debates in parliament and widespread public 
disapproval.101 
During the 1780s and 1790s, the Home Office used various methods to gather 
information about public threats. Official sources of information were local justices of the 
peace, magistrates, and post office employees.102 Other, less official, intelligence came 
from informers and spies who reported suspicious persons and organizations. In the 
1780s a small cadre of men worked for the Home Office under a man named William 
Clarke but were replaced by the creation of stipendiary magistrates in London in 1792.103 
Informer and spy turnover was high because, after appearing before the Privy Council or 
in court, an informer or spy lost their anonymity and, thus, their utility.104 Pitt’s 
government recruited men to infiltrate radical societies, including the London 
Corresponding Society and the United Englishmen, although members of these clubs 
probably exaggerated the extent to which their organizations were penetrated.105 Even 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Wordsworth were under suspicion after Coleridge’s 
servants reported that, John Thelwall, who had been tried and acquitted for treason in 
1794, was a dinner guest in July 1797. The Home Office sent agent James Walsh to 
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investigate, though Walsh determined that the writers were “but a mischiefous [sic] gang 
of disaffected Englishmen.”106 Given the limited bureaucratic staff of late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth-century English governments, the network of spies and informers put 
together by the Home Office was paltry compared to those operated by other European 
powers.  
Spying and political policing offended the palate of an English public strongly imbricated 
with ideals of civil and political liberty. Yet, nice divisions between English and 
European practice were impossible. Governments, then as now, knew that information 
was power and an ill-informed government was a vulnerable one. Although in 1855 
Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper confidently claimed that spying was “native” to France, this 
was hardly true. The English government had used spies for years to gather information 
about domestic political dissidents. As Clive Emsley demonstrates, hiring spies and 
cultivating informers ad hoc was the only way for the government to gather information 
about suspicious individuals and groups when the state lacked a dedicated force 
specializing in such work.107 After 1848, with the Chartist threat dissolved, the 
government directed similar attention towards foreigners.   
6.4.2 Policing Foreign Nationals in Britain  
For the most of the nineteenth century, Britain possessed few legal tools to control its 
borders or the activities of foreign nationals. Migrants flowed freely into and out of the 
country between the withdrawal of the Aliens Act in 1826 and its reinstatement in 1905. 
The government used what historian Bernard Porter describes as negative liberty, 
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wherein “people’s freedoms…were secured by the absence rather than the presence of 
laws.”108  
Between 1830 and 1860 Polish, Hungarian, German, Italian and French exiles poured 
into London, severely testing Britain’s relationships with her European neighbours. The 
influx was more pronounced after 1851 when Switzerland and Belgium reversed their 
policies of asylum, leaving no option for refugees but to cross the Channel or the 
Atlantic.109 Although refugees always considered their stay in England temporary, they 
significantly impacted English political life. Many refugees were politically active and 
maintained this level of political involvement throughout their stay. London became what 
Christine Latteck describes as a “hothouse or experimental laboratory for political 
opinions and theories.”110 Exiles organized political groups, honed political theories and 
printed subversive political material to smuggle back into Continental Europe. Refugees 
did not live in isolation while in England but were active agents of what sociologists 
Stephan May and Panikos Panayi refer to as “cultural transfer.” They formed part of a 
mutual exchange of information that fostered the development of politics outside 
mainland Europe.111  
Many Britons were fiercely proud of their liberal border policies, especially in 
comparison to France, Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia, which maintained strict 
immigration controls and patrolled their borders extensively. France, for example, 
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prevented the congregation of large numbers of refugees in one place through a 
settlement policy that deliberately dispersed them throughout the country.112 Compared 
to these oppressive police states, the British considered their islands bastions of political 
and social freedom. Historian Caroline Emily Shaw traces the source of this policy to the 
Congress of Vienna, when “British diplomats handed over the reins of power in Europe 
to the forces of the conservative establishment.” She argues that harbouring refugees was 
Britain’s “penance” to Continental liberals as well as “a means of preserving British 
liberal ideology.”113 Gregory Claeys goes further, claiming that Britons found refugee 
causes “noble” and that they reinforced “national pride in the superiority of the British 
mixed monarchy to Continental despotism and in the magnanimity and justice of political 
asylum.”114 These causes were also, significantly, distant ones and so long as they 
remained so Britain could bask in the progressiveness of her institutions.  
England’s policy of asylum was a continual headache to Continental governments that 
wanted their troublemakers sent home for trial and feared that the dispossessed plotted 
against them from England. European governments expected British ministers to be as 
concerned as they were about the spectre of dissident radicals. As European governments 
cooperated with each other after the Restoration to track down and neutralize political 
threats, so too they called on England to make common cause and report on anarchists 
and political exiles taking refuge in England. Britain took no major action against these 
groups, resulting in friction between her and her neighbours across the Channel.115  
Part of the problem was that the English government lacked the will and the means to 
effectively mount surveillance of all foreigners in the country. At the Foreign Office, 
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staff was too limited to gather statistics on resident aliens.116 This was made painfully 
clear in the late 1840s when the Belgian government asked for a list of Belgians in 
Britain and was informed that the British government simply did not know.117 There were 
no reliable statistics on foreigners entering or exiting the country. Within the Home 
Office, the Aliens Office tried to compile accurate records but were unsuccessful because 
“aliens do not report their place of birth, [while] others refuse to give their information to 
customs agents.” Information compiled by ships’ masters at ports of entry was woefully 
inaccurate. Not surprisingly, many had neither the skill nor the will for record keeping. A 
Home Office report lamented that information gathered from them was recorded “in such 
a careless and slovenly manner” that it was considered “useless.” Furthermore, not every 
port had a customs agent, making it easy for arriving aliens to fall through gaping 
bureaucratic cracks.118  
Yet, the government’s response to the influx of political refugees during this period was 
not as benign as the absence of laws to prevent their entry might make it seem. Even 
though Home Secretary Palmerston affirmed “the duty which is incumbent on the British 
Government to afford protection to foreign exiles,” the government was suspicious of 
foreigners.119 There were ideological and political barriers to implementing Continental-
style paramilitary or political policing, but that did not mean that the English government 
was naïve about the possible threats posed by foreign dissidents. Many foreigners were 
investigated and put under surveillance during their time in exile, while others were 
encouraged – with some financial incentive - to leave England for America.120   
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Beginning in 1793, the British government passed a series of Aliens Acts aimed at 
watching foreigners in the British Isles. Registration was the cornerstone of the policy, 
mandating that immigrants declare themselves upon arrival, nominate a place to live, and 
notify the government when they wished to leave. Given that Britain was an island 
nation, it made sense to begin registration at ports. All masters of ships were required to 
report foreign passengers to customs officers. Foreigners had to present themselves to 
customs, show passports and other identification, and then receive a certificate allowing 
them to remain. The Home Office kept a duplicate copy of their certificate. In order for 
the foreigner to again leave the country, that certificate was required. After 1798 aliens 
had to register their place of residence and were restricted by license to that area – being 
found at large could lead to jail time. Magistrates could compel aliens to produce licenses 
on the spot and, if the document was not forthcoming, could imprison them.121 The home 
secretary was likewise empowered to expel foreigners who seemed suspicious.122 
Although English monarchs had the power to deny entry to the country between 1793 and 
1826, this prerogative was never used and whether the government was capable of 
enforcing it is debatable.  
After 1826 the home secretary’s power to deport foreigners lapsed and was not reinstated 
until the twentieth century. One individual who did have powers of expulsion was the 
Governor of Jersey who, under Norman codes of law for the Islands, could expel 
foreigners for oral slander. This power proved helpful in the autumn of 1855 when 
L’homme, a revolutionary French periodical published on the island, slandered the Queen 
in print. The publication included one particularly scandalous line about Victoria being 
“kissed on the knee by thirty Arab chiefs, below the garter.”123 An executive Cabinet 
order expelled the perpetrators and their supporters. The incident was an unusual 
“concession to the continent, in the sense that, by taking punitive actions against men 
who were not tried or even charged, it contravened what were supposed to be some very 
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fundamental principles of English freedom.”124 But the refugees had only been expelled 
from Jersey, not Britain, and they were free to remain elsewhere in the British Isles.  
Aside from this exceptional case of expulsion, extradition was the strongest legislative 
power available to the government for expelling foreigners. This could become 
problematic, however, because of the way crimes were defined in different countries. 
Although the French stated in their extradition treaties that political crimes could not be 
the basis for an extradition request, assassinations proved problematic.125 As French 
barrister Nestor Treitt tried to explain to the 1867-68 Select Committee on Extradition, 
French law used ‘murder’ to describe unpremeditated homicide and ‘assassination’ to 
cover premeditated homicide. Thus, even if someone shot and killed the sovereign, it was 
considered an assassination, a premeditated homicide de droit commun, not treason. 
French law also distinguished between whether the accused “knew the person he 
attempted to kill.” So even a politically motivated murder against a political official could 
be considered a crime at common law because the murderer attempted to kill a specific 
person known to them.126 The Home Office disagreed with this definition and only one 
political criminal, anarchist Theodule Meunier, was successfully extradited. Meunier 
bombed a barracks and a Paris café killing two civilians. It was for the second crime that 
he was extradited in 1894 because the judge felt “anarchy, is the enemy of all 
Governments” and he was sent back to France.127 Meunier was the sole exception to this 
rule. If, however, a foreigner committed a crime on British soil, they were tried by British 
law and, if convicted, did British time.  
One final, and entirely legal, option to remove foreigners from British soil was to send 
them to America. The British government spent significant sums shipping refugees to the 
                                                 
124
 Porter, The Refugee Question, 167.  
125
 The only exception was with Belgium, which excluded attempts on the sovereign’s life. Report from 
the Select Committee on Extradition (1868), 22. 
126
 Report from the Select Committee on Extradition (1868), 68-69.  
127
 Quoted in Christopher H. Pyle, Extradition, Politics, and Human Rights (Philadelphia: Temple 
University, 2001), 107.  
298 
 
United States. The government could not and did not compel these people to go – many 
wanted to go to America where life was less expensive and opportunities greater. 
Although refugees were ideologically welcome in Britain, life was not easy for them 
there. Many political refugees felt ignored by England’s political class while others were 
accused of espionage and suffered from a loss of identity.128 Most who received financial 
help from the government to cross the Atlantic were poor refugees. In 1852 Sergeant 
Sanders counted nearly two thousand refugees in London, “Two thirds … in straightened 
circumstances.”129 In order to prevent them becoming burdensome, the government 
provided them with supplies and passage across to America, including: provisions, 
cooking utensils, bedding, lodging, dock dues, some spending money on arrival in New 
York and even clothes.130 Generous as this may seem, the government did not trust the 
refugees to leave and had detectives escort them to the port of departure. Only once 
refugees were about to embark did the detectives distribute their clothes, since in the past 
they “have pawned them to drink with their friends previous to departure.”131 Not all 
refugees wished to leave, however, and they could not be compelled to. Short of statutory 
power to expel foreigners, or paying them to leave, the government relied heavily on 
surveillance.  
In the absence of effective controls over immigration, detectives and informants kept 
foreigners under observation. Scotland Yard detectives’ use for this work reflected both 
the refugees’ own choice of London as a destination (the Channel Islands were also 
popular) as well as the lack of any other law enforcement body capable of doing the job. 
Self-registration at ports was a demonstrable failure and the government could hardly 
expect Home Office clerks to wander through Leicester Square knocking on the doors of 
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foreign lodging houses.132 Detectives had manpower and familiarity with London’s 
innumerable neighbourhoods and the language skills needed to interact with foreigners 
whose mother tongues were often French or German.  
In 1844 Home Secretary Sir James Graham met with the Metropolitan Police 
commissioners to discuss how best to track the number of foreigners in the country. He 
suggested that the Aliens Office should liaise with the police to share what information 
they did possess. Judging by their correspondence, however, the Aliens Office seems to 
have been more concerned with keeping track of its documents than with inter-
departmental information sharing.133 Shortly after this meeting the police commissioner 
submitted to Graham his own list of foreigners recently arrived in England, indicating 
that he found it more useful to compile his own information on the subject.134 
Sometimes the police were asked to investigate rumours about new arrivals to the city. 
Police Commissioner Richard Mayne often notified his superintendents about foreigners 
in their divisions, even if it was only to confirm or deny hearsay. In one communication 
he asked for a report from Whitechapel about recently arrived Frenchmen. They were, he 
said, reported to have arrived “in fishing boats are of a low class and want blouses.” The 
Whitechapel superintendent replied that no shirtless Frenchmen had been lately found on 
boats. The only foreigners in his district were the large population of Germans who 
worked at the sugar factories, and they, he assured his superior, “are a respectable class of 
men.”135   
When customs officers failed to gather accurate information, police monitored the 
Thames waterway and major coastal ports. Thames Division, which covered the 
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waterway within the Metropolitan Police District, identified foreign arrivals by steam 
packet, reporting the origins of the ship and the number of foreigners. As an example, for 
the week ending June 26, 1848 steam packets arrived from Havre, Antwerp, Boulogne, 
Calais, Hamburg and Rotterdam with a total of fifty-six foreigners, many of whom made 
the trans-Atlantic crossing soon after.136 Scotland Yard detectives watched ports outside 
the police district most often during times of European crises, such as the spring and 
summer of 1848. Inspector John Haynes monitored immigrant arrivals at Folkstone, 
reassuring his superiors in early June 1848 that the expected wave of refugee arrivals had 
not materialized. On the contrary, “the number [of aliens] that have arrived at all ports 
during the last month is … less than for the same period last year.”137  
The police also watched political clubs. One detective in particular became an expert on 
domestic surveillance of foreign nationals: Sergeant Jonathan Sanders. Although he was 
an Englishman, Sanders “could pass himself off easily as a radical refugee.”138 His 
fluency in French and clear talent for undercover policing meant that he spent a great deal 
of time throughout the 1850s monitoring foreigners in London as well as French refugees 
in the Channel Islands. He was Mayne’s principal man on the street to deal with 
foreigners and “the only source of information about refugees that his superiors 
trusted.”139  
Following Napoleon’s December 1851 coup many French refugees fled to Jersey, where 
they remained particularly active.140 Sanders visited pubs and clubs throughout London 
and the Channel Islands listening to what was said during such meetings. There was a 
polite “tug of war” between General Love, the governor of Jersey, and the Home Office 
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for Sanders.141 Overall, Sanders considered the refugees’ bark worse than their bite, 
reporting that they “merely meet to talk over the affairs of their country but beyond that 
no fears need be entertained.” Although he reported hearing drunken cries of “Death to 
the Aristocrats, down with the President, Vive la République Democratique et Sociale,” 
he saw little real threat to France and even less to order and stability in England.142 Some, 
such as historian Bernard Porter, hint that Sanders’ reticence to implicate most refugees 
in the plots of a few aggressive politicos “made him complicit” in their activities.143 I 
would argue that the relative lack of aggressive behaviour among refugees and the 
minimal amount of trouble they caused is more than sufficient to bear out the detective’s 
conclusions.  
European governments were also sources of information for the British government. 
British ambassadors on the continent and foreign ambassadors in London often relayed 
information about dangerous revolutionaries on their way to or already arrived in 
England. Although the British government refused to extradite aliens for political crimes 
(though such requests routinely arrived from European governments), politicians took 
these warnings seriously. In January 1844 the Italian ambassador to London pressured 
Foreign Secretary Aberdeen to locate Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini, believed to 
have fled to London. Aberdeen forwarded the request to the Home Office and Inspector 
Pearce was sent to locate him. After checking “all the foreign hotels, lodging houses, 
passport office, and steam company offices,” Pearce could find no trace of him.144 
Mazzini was a habitual subject of inquiry for the Home Office. In 1850 the English 
ambassador at Paris relayed a report that the Italian was planning a revolution from 
London, the French police having found documents describing revolutionary activity. 
The heady aim of this conspiracy was to unite all the revolutionaries in Europe “for the 
                                                 
141
 Porter, The Refugee Question, 156. 
142
 HO 45/3518, 1 November 1851. 
143
 Porter, The Refugee Question, 156. 
144
 HO 45/751, 4 and 12 January 1844.  
302 
 
overthrow at one and the same time of all Monarchical Governments in Europe.” An 
undated note in the Home Office file feared that “London [would] be the headquarters for 
this Conspiracy.” The London press picked up on the story and reported that the 
proposals for a 10,000-franc loan “for the purchase of arms and ammunition to 
recommence revolution in Italy, were printed in London.”  The police sent Inspector 
Frederick Field to investigate the claim. He reported that there was no such revolutionary 
conspiracy in London and that Mazzini, recently in the capital, had since departed.145 
Two years later, reports suggested that Hungarian revolutionary Lajos Kossuth (member 
of the Society of Friends of Italy) was manufacturing artillery rockets in London. The tip 
came from a German refugee named Konack. Two constables from Thames Division 
watched a factory in Rotherhithe where the rockets were manufactured. The rocket 
makers, Mr. Hale and his son, had previously built rockets in Woolwich but, as the police 
reported laconically, “the factory…blew up which put an end to the affair.”146 The 
explosive shells were made in Birmingham and shipped down to London for assembly. 
The police received information from an informant named Useuer, who helped 
manufacture the rockets and who estimated that in six weeks over two thousand had been 
assembled.147 The police managed to search Kossuth’s house while he was in the process 
of moving. A carpet fitter tipped them off that Kossuth’s belongings had been moved to 
his new residence but that the family had yet to move in. Two plainclothes constables 
managed to get hired by the mover and spent the day rummaging through the family’s 
new house.148 Four months after the investigation was initiated the Rotherhithe factory 
was raided and the rockets and gunpowder were seized by Sergeant Sanders and the 
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superintendent of the Thames Police.149 As Home Secretary Palmerston informed the 
House shortly after the raid,  
there were found in it [the factory] upwards of seventy cases, closely packed, and 
apparently intended for transmission to some distance, containing several 
thousand war rockets…There were also discovered a considerable number of 
rockets, in various stages of preparation, in those iron cases which usually contain 
inflammatory matter, 2,000 shells not as yet loaded, a very considerable quantity 
of that composition with which rockets are filled, and 500lbs. weight of 
gunpowder.150  
Kossuth was a popular figure in England. His short-lived leadership of Hungary during 
the 1848-49 revolution and his attempts to promote nationalism and Hungarian 
independence from the Austrian empire made him a republican hero. His actions were 
lauded by many in England and he toured England after his release from Turkey, 
speaking publicly to many delegations of trade unionists. Liberal MPs lauded him in the 
House of Commons as a modern “Washington” and a “remarkable man.”151 Foreign 
Secretary Palmerston was attacked in the House for allusions in The Times that the 
rockets had been made for Kossuth. Henry Bright, MP for Bristol, pressured the 
government to prove that Kossuth was involved but Palmerston avoided the question. 
Lord Dudley Stuart, a stalwart defender of European refugees and a friend of Kossuth’s, 
denied the allegation on the Hungarian’s behalf.152 Palmerston lamented that the press 
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had linked Kossuth with the Hales’ arrest but assured the House that Kossuth was never 
named in any charges associated with the case.153 
Palmerston was also questioned in the House about police surveillance of Kossuth’s 
residence. Liberals Henry Bright and Richard Cobden accused the government of using 
police spies to watch Kossuth. In addition, petitions from Marylebone, West Hackney 
and Sheffield protested “the use of the police as spies.”154 Although Palmerston admired 
Kossuth’s liberalism and helped ensure the Hungarian’s release from Turkish custody 
(Kossuth fled to Turkey in 1849 and was detained there by the Sultan), he nonetheless 
defended the government’s right to watch any suspected person,  
whether Englishmen or foreigners, who may be supposed, rightly or wrongly, to 
be contemplating any breach of the laws of England; and neither the house of M. 
Kossuth, nor of any political refugee in this country, can be exempted from those 
ordinary precautions which may be taken with regard to any individual, whether 
he be a British subject or a foreigner.155 
MPs and members of the public expressed their concern about the use of police espionage 
but Palmerston repeatedly defended the principle of surveillance. It was, he told the 
House, “one of the duties of the police to ascertain whether the laws are infringed…[and] 
to take such measures as may be fitting and proper for the purpose of preventing a 
violation of the law.” The home secretary stalwartly refused to be moved on this subject 
and the public petitions came to nothing.  
In the spring of 1851, the Prussian foreign minister wrote a strongly worded letter to 
Viscount Palmerston requesting the arrest of two Prussian officers, currently in England, 
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who circulated a paper advocating the Prussian army revolt against the King. The 
Prussian tried to convince Palmerston that this was “an affront on the laws and hospitality 
of England and acts contrary to nations with which Britain is on terms of amity.” “Great 
Britain knows very well,” he thundered, “that these ringleaders are condemned by the 
English common law.” The upcoming Great Exhibition, he warned, would be a target for 
those who “menecaient la paix et la civilization de l’Europe.”156 It was a savvy attempt to 
appeal to British notions of hospitality and good will, but it failed. Lord Westmorland, 
the British ambassador in Berlin, gave what we can only imagine was an irate Prussian 
foreign minister the usual British platitude, “We had no powers of expelling from the 
Country any Persons foreign or otherwise who did not render themselves subject to legal 
proceedings for the infringement of the laws of this country.”157 
The policy of refuge was sometimes more comfortable than reality for the British 
government. The massing of people, foreign and domestic, for the Great Exhibition was a 
security problem, and one that the Home Office and Metropolitan Police could not 
ignore. The British ambassador to Paris indicated to his superiors in Whitehall that 
London could become a focal point for foreign revolutionaries during the Exhibition. The 
head of the Saxon police reported that the festivities would be the centre of a “Collection 
of reckless [German] Democrats.”158 The Exhibition also coincided with Switzerland’s 
expulsion of foreign exiles. The French government offered to transport the refugees in 
Switzerland to England and America, though when this news reached England, Foreign 
Secretary Palmerston conveyed his concerns about such a plan to Lord Normanby, his 
ambassador in Paris. He asked Normanby to “represent strongly to the French 
Government the inconvenience which would arise to this Country from the Execution of 
that proposal.” However much Britain defended the principle of safe haven, the 
government refused to encourage it. Palmerston also wanted Normanby to relay to the 
French “how inconsistent such a course of proceeding” was, considering earlier French 
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complaints that when French refugees were in England they “threaten[ed] the internal 
tranquility of some of the states in Europe.”159 The English ambassador, however, replied 
that Britain could hardly ask the French government to for help in this matter when “we 
do not ourselves take those internal powers of control, of which every other Country, in 
extraordinary circumstances, avails itself.” Although the Metropolitan Police liaised with 
many European governments to ensure adequate surveillance of foreigners during the 
Great Exhibition, no revolutionary cells used the opportunity to ignite revolution. This 
lead to much ridicule in the press of, as Charles Dickens put it, the “nervous old ladies, 
dyspeptic half-pay officers, suspicious quidnuncs, [and] plot-dreading diplomatists.”160  
6.5 Conclusion 
Scotland Yard’s special relationship with the Home Office began because London had no 
municipal government to oversee the city’s police. The close working relationship 
between the police commissioners and Home Office staff meant that detective priorities 
reflected government priorities. Detectives protected dignitaries and foreign royalty 
during events and state visits. The Home Office also used detectives, especially in the 
years before county and borough police forces were mandatory, to help with provincial 
cases where local law enforcement lacked the skill or ability to properly investigate.  
Scotland Yard also helped ease the administrative burden placed on the Home Office by 
the 1844 Naturalization Act and the 1870 Extradition Act. The government outsourced 
the evaluation of naturalization applications to detectives who evaluated the suitability of 
applicants and their references, trusting detectives to use their experience and discretion 
to help determine who might be a good candidate for British citizenship. Similarly, the 
Home Office used Yard detectives, in conjunction with Bow Street magistrates, to 
execute extradition warrants against foreigners in England and to retrieve English 
fugitives from abroad. These cases involved a great deal of time, travel and effort, 
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including the coordination of witnesses, foreign and domestic, to ensure the successful 
extradition of suspects.  
Britain’s immigration policy may have been liberal, but foreigners, once arrived, were 
still objects of suspicion. Although no legislation was passed during this period 
prohibiting foreigners from entering the country or allowing for their expulsion, this did 
not (as many other European governments believed it did) reflect British naiveté.  The 
Home Office employed detectives to monitor recent arrivals, persons of suspicion and to 
identify radicals in need of observation. They evaluated possible threats as they 
developed, used surveillance, espionage tactics, and disguises to gather information about 
possible threats but policed foreigners within existing political and cultural boundaries. 
The public was tolerant of detective involvement in naturalization and extradition cases, 
there being little in the nature of this work to elicit concern about detective behaviour. 
Surveillance of foreign nationals was, at times, more contentious, but then the revolutions 
in Europe and their possible effects at home in Britain were a volatile subject. The 
government defended its right to watch suspect foreigners and Britons alike and, aside 
from exceptional cases, surveillance was an accepted police practice.161  
This chapter demonstrates that Scotland Yard’s detectives had a varied workload, 
comprising much more than the felony investigations they are so famous for.162 The 
expanding responsibilities of the Home Office created by nineteenth-century domestic 
legislation led successive home secretaries to value the Detective Department as a 
flexible force that could be deployed in various ways. Whether detectives vetted 
candidates for naturalization, tracked down foreign fugitives, or kept a watchful eye on 
European refugees, London’s detectives always acted as agents of the English state.  
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7 Conclusion  
My thesis has demonstrated that the detective element within the London Metropolitan 
Police was far more widespread than historians have acknowledged. It was pervasive, 
professional and present from the very early years of the force. The Detective 
Department, a small cadre of men who formed the core detective force of the Met, played 
a pivotal role in the development of undercover policing in England.  
There was initial skepticism about what, if any, role undercover policing would play in 
the Met. Resistance to even a preventive police had been so strong that the Gordon Riots 
(1780) and Ratcliffe murders (1811) resulted in no significant changes to local policing. 
When Bow Street officers’ corruption, especially their compounding of felonies, was 
exposed by the 1828 committee backlash was powerful enough to ensure that the public 
face of the new Metropolitan Police was the prevention of crime. The recent memory of 
the French Revolution and Napoleonic period exacerbated fears that the executive might 
use the police to spy on English subjects. As a result, the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act 
was, cautiously, only applied to London. The geographical extension of this model was 
haphazard and slow and only in 1856 did the government mandate that English counties 
and boroughs follow suit. 
Although the Met was founded to prevent crime, a small Detective Department was 
established in 1842 following a scandal, highlighted by London’s newspaper press, about 
failed murder investigations and alleged corruption. The English press was lively and 
alert to police news because crime, especially violent crime, sold newspapers. With the 
advent of a centralized Metropolitan Police force, details of police investigations 
appeared in newsprint for a readership hungry for crime stories. Additionally entertaining 
were the jurisdictional squabbles between the police and coroners over who should 
investigate murder, an issue not anticipated by legislators and one that took years to 
settle. Increased press attention also amplified scrutiny of police investigations and 
London newspapers were unimpressed by the pattern of unsuccessful murder 
investigations between 1837 and 1842. Newspapers’ demands for a more professional 
detective force within the Met in 1842 are striking in view of the virulent opposition to 
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detection in the late 1820s. What had changed by 1842 was that the Met was an 
established institution that had not, as feared, been used to trample the liberties of the 
people. If London’s police could be trusted not to abuse their power, and if they clearly 
needed some expertise when it came to detecting murder, perhaps a detective force was 
needed. The new detective force remained small so the commissioners of police could 
ensure professionalism and accountability and so there could be no accusations that the 
police had established a spy network.  
Officer turnover in the Met was high due to stringent operational guidelines that bound 
officers on and off duty. Many policemen were fired for violating behavioural rules, 
especially when it came to drunkenness. By contrast, the small Detective Department was 
more successful at retaining men. Detectives typically served in the force for extended 
periods, bringing knowledge and experience of criminals, criminality and, importantly, 
about gathering and giving evidence. Some of the earliest detectives became celebrities 
after Charles Dickens, a great fan of the new detectives, profiled them for his periodical 
Household Words. He famously based the detective in Bleak House on Charles Frederick 
Field while Jonathan Whicher was the inspiration for Sergeant Cuff in Wilkie Collins’s 
The Moonstone. Although Bow Street was in disgrace, the Detective Department relied 
on many of its information gathering, surveillance and detection techniques, providing a 
strong link between the Fieldings’ eighteenth-century policing innovations and 
nineteenth-century detection. Bow Street may have been out of fashion but many of its 
methods were sound. The career longevity and varied possibilities for promotion gave 
Scotland Yard detectives a professional identity and many became dedicated, long-term 
public servants. Superior pay also allowed many, if they were promoted to the rank of 
inspector or above, to live a comfortably lower-middle or middle-class lifestyle.  
The force slowly developed a mandate, reflecting the fact that, although the Detective 
Department was founded in response to a murder scare, murder was (fortunately) too 
infrequent a crime to occupy detectives on a daily basis. Property crime, the most 
pressing concern of the Metropolitan Police as a whole, was also the focus of detective 
policing, especially in the 1840s and Yard men distinguished themselves as vigilant and 
talented investigators, routinely earning praise from London’s magistrates. During the 
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1850s the force began working for the Home Office in the provinces, helping to 
investigate complicated crimes and to supplement the as yet incomplete development of 
provincial police forces. Provincial magistrates often requested Yard detectives to help 
stalled or complicated investigations. Central detectives offered investigatory and 
organizational expertise and directed local investigations when necessary. Their skill and 
professionalism probably did much to allay county magistrates’ fears about how a 
centralized police force could look and act. By the 1860s and 1870s (a period of 
economic depression), detectives focused more intently on forgery and fraud, reflecting 
greater government concern about white-collar crimes and the fragility of a paper 
economy. Yard men also trained divisional detective officers, facilitating widespread use 
of undercover policing throughout the Metropolitan Police District. In this way detectives 
helped professionalize the substantial number of divisional plainclothes officers active 
throughout London. By the 1860s, this allowed central detectives to focus more on major 
white-collar crimes and on their growing responsibilities at the Home Office. 
Since the Metropolitan Police was the only police force in England directly answerable to 
the home secretary, Scotland Yard’s detectives focused more exclusively on government 
priorities than any other force in the country. Successive home secretaries employed them 
to gather information about foreign nationals, whether refugees or applicants for 
naturalization status, to help execute the extradition of foreigners and Britons, and to 
assist local investigations across the country. In only a few decades Scotland Yard’s 
Detective Department became the Home Office’s investigatory arm. Detectives were 
trusted senior police officers whose professionalism and discretion were valued at the 
highest levels of government. The public seems to have felt similarly, if the lack of 
sustained criticism of Scotland Yard detectives in the press can be taken as representative 
of a broad consensus. There certainly were incidents that elicited press censure, such as 
the surveillance of Kossuth in 1853 and the 1867 Clerkenwell bombing, yet the relatively 
rapid acceptance of the new detectives and the legitimacy of their work is striking.  
This acceptance is most evident in the public response to the Turf Fraud scandal. The 
Detective Department, founded amidst a scandal about police inefficiency and possible 
corruption, ended its days mired in another scandal. This time a turf fraud (fraud 
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associated with betting on horse races) led to two trials in 1877, harkening the end of this 
early era of detective policing. At the first trial in April 1877 four men were convicted of 
forgery, while at the second trial, three senior detective officers (three chief inspectors 
and one inspector) were found guilty of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.1 The 
trial of the detectives had serious consequences for the shape of detective policing in the 
Metropolitan Police.  
The Turf Fraud scandal, as it quickly became known, began in much the same way as 
many frauds in Victorian England, with a newspaper advertisement. Newspaper readers 
were frequently lured into fraudulent schemes by the promise of profit, so much so that, 
Inspector Andrew Lansdowne lamented, “The ease with which the public can be imposed 
upon is astonishing.”2 The fraudsters created a fictitious betting periodical called The 
Sport, which they had translated and distributed within France. The Sport reported that 
betting agent Mr. Montgomery had become so adept at selecting winning horses that 
bookies would no longer give him fair odds. As a result, Montgomery solicited 
individuals to bet for him at no risk to themselves. Interested parties could send him 
money, he would lodge the bets with bookmakers under their names and send them a 
cheque covering the initial investments and part of the winnings as a commission.  
The swindlers made between £14,000 and £15,000 before they were caught, the biggest 
loser being Parisian aristocrat Mme. Marie Cecile de Goncourt. She had invested £10,000 
with Mr. Montgomery, but, when Montgomery requested a further £30,000, de Goncourt 
and her bankers became suspicious. They contacted a London solicitor, Mr. Abrahams, 
who quickly determined the illegality of the scheme and notified Scotland Yard.3  
                                                 
1 OBP: t18770409-391, “Harry Benson, William Kurr, Charles Bale, Frederick Kurr, Edwin Murray”; 
OBP: 18771022-805, “John Meiklejohn, Nathaniel Druscovich, William Palmer, George Clarke, Edward 
Froggatt.” Clarke was the only officer acquitted.  
2 Andrew Lansdowne, A Life’s Reminiscences of Scotland Yard (New York and London: Garland 
Publishing Inc., 1984; Originally published: London: Leadenhall Press, 1890), 46.  
3 The Times, 20 July 1877; OBP: t18770409-391, “Harry Benson, William Kurr, Charles Bale, Frederick 
Kurr, Edwin Murray.”  
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The men behind the fraud eluded capture for months because they paid hush money to 
senior-ranking members of the Detective Department. When Mme. de Goncourt’s 
solicitor contacted Scotland Yard, the case fell into the hands of men who already knew 
the criminals involved and protected them. Chief Inspector Druscovich was put in charge 
of the case, aided by Chief Inspector Palmer and Inspector Meiklejohn. Meiklejohn had 
been taking money from the ringleader, Harry Benson, since 1873 and was only too 
happy to continue protecting Benson and his co-conspirators when Scotland Yard’s 
investigation began. Although Meiklejohn voluntarily colluded with Benson, Druscovich 
was drawn in when he accepted a loan, orchestrated by Meiklejohn, from another 
conspirator, William Kurr. Benson’s testimony indicates that Druscovich believed Kurr 
was a legitimate businessman although, once the transaction was made, Druscovich “was 
a ruined man.”4  
Although Scotland Yard’s investigation was hampered from inside, Abrahams 
successfully tracked de Goncourt’s £10,000 because Benson had transferred the money 
into Scottish Clydesdale Bank notes. This was a poor, and ultimately costly decision, 
since the Clydesdale Bank was small and their notes infrequently used. Having received 
warning from Meiklejohn that the police were tracing the notes, the conspirators fled to 
Rotterdam where, again, the unusual notes were recognized. Superintendent Williamson 
sent Druscovich to Rotterdam to have Benson and his associates extradited, but the 
corrupt detective dallied in a final and desperate attempt to conceal his involvement. By 
this point, it finally dawned on the trusting Williamson that some of his detectives were 
on the take. He travelled to Rotterdam to ensure that the arrests took place. Benson, the 
Kurrs and their associates were convicted at the Old Bailey in April 1877 and shortly 
after, in July 1877, the government charged Meiklejohn, Druscovich, Palmer and Clarke 
with corruption.5  
                                                 
4
 The Times, 20 July 1877.  
5
 OBP: t18770409-391, “Harry Benson, William Kurr, Charles Bale, Frederick Kurr, Edwin Murray”; 
OBP: 18771022-805, “John Meiklejohn, Nathaniel Druscovich, William Palmer, George Clarke, Edward 
Froggatt”; Joan Lock, Scotland Yard Casebook: The Making of the CID 1865-1935 (London: Robert Hale, 
1993), 72-78. 
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The resulting scandal was immense. Press reports from the two trials, however, called for 
improvement of the detective system rather than its abolition. The Derby Mercury hoped 
“that disclosures may be made which will lead to a thorough overhauling of police 
arrangements, provincial as well as metropolitan,” while the Penny Illustrated Paper and 
Illustrated Times supported commissioner Edward Henderson saying that Londoners had, 
overall, “little to complain of in the Police administration of the metropolis.”6 The 
Illustrated Police News reprinted articles from the Pall Mall Gazette praising the 
government for prosecuting the detectives publicly instead of trying to hush the scandal 
up and from the Manchester Examiner hoping that “one of the first duties of the 
Government will be to reorganize this branch of the public service on sounder 
principles.”7 While asserting “the Detective Service has broken down and is no longer to 
be relied upon,” The Morning Post held out hope for “the Government to inquire into the 
means by which a similar scandal may be prevented in the future, and the Detective 
Service be so organized that it shall not be possible for those who are engaged in it to 
betray their trust.”8 The Times, likewise, lamented that men of Scotland Yard “should 
have fallen to such unworthy courses,” yet reaffirmed that “A detective department is a 
necessary adjunct to every modern police system.”9 The newspaper press accepted that 
detective policing was a necessary part of the English criminal justice system and 
criticized practice but not policy.  
Immediately following the detectives’ autumn 1877 trial, the Home Office convened a 
departmental commission to investigate the entire detective system within the 
Metropolitan Police. The commission interviewed senior police and detective officers 
from the Met, City of London and provincial police forces. Reporting in early 1878, the 
committee – in agreement with the press – determined that the most significant issues 
                                                 
6
 The Derby Mercury, 25 July 1877; The Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times, 3 November 1877.  
7
 The Illustrated Police News, 1 December 1877.  
8
 The Morning Post, 15 December 1877.  
9
 The Times, 22 November 1877.  
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were operational, including insufficient pay, centralization and secrecy. It recommended 
that detectives, especially divisional detectives, be given raises to encourage good 
performance and to prevent the temptation to corruption. The committee also advised that 
divisional detectives should be controlled from headquarters and that the entirety of the 
detective force’s paperwork should be isolated to avoid leaks. Little in the Report’s 
recommendations focused on the Turf Fraud except for proposals to isolate sensitive 
information, prohibit gratuities from the public and disapproval of detectives accepting 
jobs outside the force while still employed by Scotland Yard.10 Detective officers were 
often seconded to public and private companies, especially railways, to help prevent 
thefts. Meiklejohn was employed as superintendent of the Midland Railway Police, a post 
which placed him in Darby, not London, allowing him to collude with Benson and the 
Kurrs without any Scotland Yard interference.11 Scotland Yard’s senior clerk, Chief 
Inspector Harris, was against the practice because it was impossible for senior officers to 
exercise proper oversight over outsourced officers. “[T]here is not the slightest control; 
we do not know where they are or what they are doing,” he told the committee, “it is a 
very bad system indeed.”12  
The subsequent reorganization of the Met’s detective force incorporated many of the 
Report’s proposals. The new Criminal Investigation Department (CID) began work in 
April 1878 and was composed of the remaining men of the former Detective Department 
and the divisional detectives. A new position, Director of Criminal Investigations, was 
established, reporting directly to the home secretary. The first Director was Howard 
                                                 
10 Report of the Departmental Commission appointed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
to inquire into the State, Discipline, and Organization of the Detective Force of the Metropolitan 
Police (1878), xv-xvii.  
 
11
 OBP: 18771022-805, “John Meiklejohn, Nathaniel Druscovich, William Palmer, George Clarke, 
Edward Froggatt.” 
12
 Report of the Departmental Commission (1878), 174-75. 
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Vincent, a young barrister with a keen interest in detective policing.13 The new chief 
superintendent, who reported directly to Vincent, was Adolphus Williamson, for whom 
the Turf Fraud was sobering but not career ending. Directly below Williamson was John 
Shore, the new chief inspector.14 The entire divisional contingent was promoted to the 
rank of sergeant (first, second and third class) or inspector and given better pay and a 
plainclothes allowance. At the central office, all sergeants were promoted to inspectors 
(first and second class). The new CID had twenty-four men at headquarters, six clerical 
staff and 254 divisional men.15 
Former Yard men continued with the specializations they developed under the old 
Detective Department. Williamson continued as the most senior detective, coordinating 
and overseeing the force in conjunction with his new director, Vincent. Inspector Von 
Tornow, with his background in German, monitored German socialists with a new 
colleague, Detective Inspector Hagan. Chief Inspector Littlechild also worked on political 
crimes as a member of the Special Irish Branch of the CID before being made head of the 
Special Branch (focusing on counter-terrorism) in 1887.16 Foreign nationals were 
targeted by Special Branch before the First World War, especially those with socialist or 
Fenian sympathies. When the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service 
(MI6) were established in 1909 to protect Britain from the threat of German spies, the 
                                                 
13
 Vincent had studied the French detective system in Paris and written a report on it that impressed the 
1878 Departmental Commission. Douglas G. Browne, The Rise of Scotland Yard: A History of the 
Metropolitan Police (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1956), 190; Shpayer-Makov, Ascent of the Detective, 
39-40.  
14
 Lansdowne recalled that “[t]he exposure of certain inspectors appeared to shake Mr. Williamson’s faith 
in his men greatly. He was much less confiding after their trial than before.” Andrew Lansdowne, A Life’s 
Reminiscences of Scotland Yard (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1984; Originally 
published: London: Leadenhall Press, 1890), 15. 
15
 Browne, The Rise of Scotland Yard, 190-91; MEPO 7/40, 6 April 1878. 
16
 Bernard Porter, The Origins of the Vigilant State: The London Metropolitan Police Special Branch 
before the First World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 42-43 and 84-86. Special Branch, 
he argues, was a “response to new perceived threats, and to a growing vulnerability in Britain” caused by 
the 1870s economic depression, the revival of homegrown socialism, trade unionism and Fenian terrorism. 
Ibid., xiii and 19-20. 
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first superintendent, William Melville, was recruited directly from his senior position at 
Special Branch.17  
The 1878 Commission’s and newspapers’ responses to the Turf Fraud and detectives’ 
corruption are remarkably measured, indicating that, in a little over one generation, 
public opinion traversed the distance between fear of any and all undercover policing and 
an acceptance that detective policing could and did protect Britons from certain types of 
crime. The recognition that undercover policing is an important adjunct to preventive 
policing is reflected in current debates in England about the behaviour of operatives in 
the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) during the 1980s and 1990s.18 Home Secretary 
Theresa May’s recent statement on the inquiry into undercover policing indicates 
concerns similar to those of the Victorian period, including: 
 …the role and the contribution made by undercover policing towards the 
prevention and detection and crime; 
 …the motivation for, and the scope of, undercover police operations in 
practice and their effect upon individuals in particular and the public in 
general; and 
 …the state of awareness of undercover police operations in Her Majesty’s 
Government. 
Other topics of concern are the “justification, authorisation [sic], operational governance 
and oversight” and “selection, training, management and care of undercover police 
officers.”19 These areas of investigation bear striking resemblance to the 1878 
                                                 
17
 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 
2009), 3-6.  
18
 Recently uncovered documents indicated that Scotland Yard quietly disbanded the SDS in 2008 because 
of its unrestrained and often unethical activities. Rob Evans, “Scotland Yard shut down undercover police 
unit because it broke the rules,” The Guardian, 26 July 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/undercover-with-paul-lewis-and-rob-evans/2015/jul/26/scotland-yard-shut-down-undercover-police-
unit-because-it-broke-rules. 
19
 Theresa May, “House of Commons: Written Statement (HCWS115), Undercover Policing,” Home 
Office, 16 July 2015.  
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Commission’s concerns. My investigation of early and mid-Victorian detectives explains 
how the conversation in England developed from profound distrust of all detective 
policing to defense of the institution and a desire to ameliorate it in the face of corrupt 
individuals. 
By the 1870s detection was entrenched within English policing culture. The relatively 
benign press reaction to the Turf Fraud scandal coupled with the primarily organizational 
recommendations of the 1878 Commission and the increased centralization, 
professionalization and expansion of detection within the new CID indicate that the press, 
senior police, and government officials agreed that detectives were integral to public 
order and state security in England. Criticisms of detective police after 1842 tended to 
focus on individuals, not the institution itself, and this, I argue, is why my investigation 
into this early Metropolitan Police detective force is a necessary corrective to their 
relative absence in current historiography. Through hard work, vigilance, professionalism 
and skill central detectives proved to a skeptical public that undercover policing was not 
only the tool of despots. It could work in a parliamentary democracy and it could work to 
the benefit of the public.  
Mid-Victorian detective policing is understudied, yet was crucial to the development of 
modern undercover policing. Its absence from the historical record is unjustified and 
distorts the historical record. The creation of the CID in 1878 was done because of, not in 
spite of, the Detective Department. The history of detective policing in the Met begins in 
1842, not 1878. If the members of this first detective force had not been so successful at 
giving detective policing a good name then I very much doubt that the CID or Special 
Branch could have been established in the favourable climate they encountered in the late 
1870s and 1880s. As Commissioner Mayne and successive Victorian home secretaries 
realized, detective policing is a question of limits and legitimacy, of when and where to 
use covert tactics to gather information, not whether it is necessary to do so. This is the 
legacy of the Detective Department of Scotland Yard, one that my thesis has, for the first 
time, recognized as formative to the development of English detective policing.  
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